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ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
Author: 
Degree for which the thesis is submitted: 
Title of the thesis: 
D. H. F. Gourlay 
Doctor of Philosophy 
History of Industrial Relations in 
the North Sea Oil and Gas Industry 
1965 to 1995. 
This thesis analyses the reasons why the system of industrial relations on the 
United Kingdom continental shelf is very different from that which prevails both 
onshore and on the Norwegian continental shelf, where the same technology is 
used to produce an identical product. The scope of the research encompasses the 
relationships of the trade unions and the offshore companies, both Norwegian 
and British, where they concern employment and related matters such as 
accident prevention and those interventions which govermnents have made in 
response to particular events. In addition research papers and other reports which 
have a close bearing on the human resource management of offshore employees 
have received attention. 
British trade unions have failed to win full recognition offshore after "first oil" 
because the oil companies have been determined to exclude them and have 
exhibited a cohesiveness of purpose in this respect through their formidable 
employers' association, UKOOA. By comparison trade union efforts have lacked 
cohesion on account of internal disputes and the indeterminate position of the 
IUOOC within the trade union structure. Even the assistance of a friendly 
disposed government which persuaded the employers to permit recruitment 
visits offshore has had no effect on membership which remains derisory. 
Although the Norwegian LO recognised as early as 1975 that a new union for all 
offshore workers was necessary, the TUC has never shown the same realism. 
OILC seeks to cater for all UK offshore workers, but survives only as a small 
independent union outside the STUC. It arose spontaneously in 1989 as a cross- 
union group of workers who wanted a national offshore agreement but after 
initial support from the official trade unions was later abandoned by them. 
There have been some dramatic accidents offshore, none worse than Piper Alpha 
in 1988 with its 167 fatalities. This has concentrated attention on the 
maintenance of safe working environments and trade unions have sought, 
unsuccessfidly, to win recognition from the employers by demanding 
representation on installation safety committees. As the oil industry. now 
implements a programme of cost savings there have been accompanying 
assertions in some publications that the oil industry's commitment to accident 
viii 
prevention remains secondary to profitability, assertions this thesis finds 
groundless. 
ix 
FOREWORD 
In May 1993 the drilling rig Borgny Dolphin, owned by the Norwegian Fred 
Olsen organization but manned by British workers, put in at Sandeflord in 
Norway for repair. The company forbade the men to go ashore for the reason 
(as reported by the Norwegian newspaper "Dagbladet") that they may drink 
alcohol and make the local women pregnant. I Two important points arise out 
of this otherwise amusing incident. The first is that in 1993 an employer could 
expect such an order to be accepted and, when challenged; should offer as a 
reason something which was as offensive as it was stupid. The second is that 
the company changed its mind following the intervention of OFS2 which had 
responded to a request from the Offshore Industry Liaison Committee, a small 
pressure group which did not gain full legal status as a trade union until April 
1994. These two points encapsulate the history of industrial relations in the 
North Sea over the past twenty years :a company (although it is conceded that 
this is an extreme case) treats its employees with contumely and it is a 
Norwegian and not a British trade union organization which is powerful 
enough to obtain a reversal of a decision. 
The main purpose of this thesis is to examine why the British trade union 
movement, powerful, mature and constitutionally linked to the Labour Party, 
failed to win any negotiating rights from oil companieS3 operating in the North 
Sea, except in the special conditions of hook-up, and whether the emergence of 
OILC was a symptom of this failure or had different origins. The thesis will 
also seek to demonstrate how the culture of the oil employers clashed with the 
indigenous received opinion on how industrial relations should be conducted 
and how these companies have developed their own norms of employee 
involvement to the extent that these norms may now be becoming more 
common onshore. Yet the pattern of British industrial relations did not change 
significantly during these years although by the 1990s there were differences in 
leadership style, membership and legal constraints compared with earlier 
years. 
Since the oil and gas bearing section of the North Sea continental shelf is 
shared with Norway it will be necessary to look at the Norwegian experience 
in bringing its offshore employment within its national framework, thus 
providing a contrast to the British experience where this has not happened. In 
particular the failure of British trade unions to win representation on safety 
committees and therefore have a lever to extract wider recognition from the oil 
companies will be examined 
The physical and environmental dangers inherent in the oil and gas industry 
pose special hazards for its employees and the presentation of the UK offshore 
I Blowout, 33, July/August 1993. 
2 The Norwegian Federation of Oil Workers' Trade Unions 
3 MSF (then ASTMS) was an exception. Phillips Petroleum recognised it on the Hewett gas 
field off E. Anglia and, much later, after Piper Alpha, on its North Sea oil installations. 
safety culture both by the media and in specialist publications has been, with 
rare exceptions, universally negative. The thesis will examine the justice of 
this assault on the integrity of the industry. 
Two theses on industrial relations with particular reference to employment 
offshore have been supervised by this author. James Buchan's research for his 
"Approaches and Attitudes to Collective Bargaining in North East Scotland". 
was carried out during the early 1980s and has provided useful material for 
that period. His principal conclusion was that traditional collective bargaining 
remained the norm among on-shore based companies, whether traditional (e. g. 
textiles, fish processing) or oil related (e. g. fabrication) but that in the offshore 
companies the managers' strategy was to set their own conditions of 
employment and prevent any challenge to them. Alix Thom, in 1989, found 
this position unaltered and her thesis " Managing Labour under Extreme Risk" 
looked at how different companies in the oil industry (e. g. drillers, operators, 
caterers) established relationships with each other and conducted their 
employment policies either in concert or independently. In addition she 
identified the increasing use of contractors on rigs and platforms and how this 
was a specific ingredient of the offshore industry's employee relations 
imbroglio. Dr Thom did not approach her thesis within the wider context of 
Brtish industrial relations nor had she an opportunity to examine the Offshore 
Industry Liaison Committee, which appeared on the scene after her research 
had been concluded. These theses have been used and acknowledged where 
appropriate but served only as a small part of a much wider area of 
investigation. 
2 
CHAPTER ONE 
METHODOLOGY 
History writing needs good facts, good judgment and good writing wrote 
Margaret Cole to Robin Page-Amott, the distinguished historian of the British 
miners! Anyone seeking to write history as recent as the last three decades will 
do well to heed this admonition and neither rush into hasty judgments nor accept 
anything as fact without establishing its certainty. To do otherwise can mislead 
later researchers, particularly as the power of the printed word increases with the 
passage of time. Scrupulous attention to fact and careful exercise of that most 
prized of human qualities -judgment - serve to enhance rather than to impede the 
good writing which Cole sees as the third criterion of the historian's task. Even 
when they have an interesting tale to tell, authors will fail to retain the interest of 
readers if they use turgid or ungrammatical prose. Although referring to the 
immediate post war period when she stated that historians had not learned to 
write English, Cole's trenchant comment that the result is not a book, but a bed 
of crackling thorns, often full of mistakes 2 is not without its validity today. In 
the same vein the historian C. V. Wedgwood said that the capacity to weigh and 
to use words correctly, the shaping of sentences, and the structure and 
presentation of a scene, a fact or an exposition are the natural concomitants of 
the clear, inquiring and imaginative mind which is needed for historical 
research. 3 There are several parts of this thesis where narrative takes over and 
having thus offered a hostage to forttme, this author hopes that he will at least 
approach if not attain such demanding levels of excellence. 
This thesis is presented by a historian whose career has brought him into contact 
with industrial relations, both practically and academically, over a period of forty 
years and who believes that a knowledge of history contributes towards a better 
understanding of industrial relations. This opinion is shared by Henry Phelps- 
Brown who wrote that bygone affairs were not transacted on anotherplanet: the 
motives, reactions and propensities displayed in them are the same as those in 
play around us now. By studying them we enlarge and sharpen our knowledge of 
them. 4 The truth of this is shown in the problems which the mainly American 
multi-national oil companies experienced with Norwegian labour in the early 
1970s and which were less likely to have occurred if the employers had bothered 
to examine the history of Norway. In the late 1960s and early 1970s it seemed to 
Norwegians that a process of acculturalisation was being forced upon them, 
whereby they were being pushed into a homogeneity which the oil companies 
favoured for their "modus operandi". Resenting this assault upon their 
5 individuality they adopted the necessary counter-measures. This was similar 
1 Vernon, B. D. (1986) Margaret Cole 1893 - 1980: A Political Biography. Croorn 
Helm. (Quoted by A Wright in his review of Vernon's book in Society for the Study of 
2 
Labour History, Vol 51, No 3 p. 40. ) 
ibid p. 42. 
3 Wedgwood, C. V. Truth and Opinion, p. 74. Times Literary Supplement. 6 January 1956. 
4 Phelps-Brown, E. H., (1986) The Origins of Trade Union Power, p. 18. Oxford University 
Press. 
5 v. Chapter 5. 
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(although obviously less brutal and shorter in time) to the Soviet Union's attempt 
to deprive the inhabitants of its Central Asian republics of their traditional 
Islamic culture and, in a highly acclaimed novel based on this theme this 
percipient statement appears in the introduction: A man without a sense of 
history, without memory of the past lacks any perspective and lives onlyfor the 
present, for the day. 6 It is interesting to speculate on what would have been the 
comment of Samuel Johnson 7 had he read the previous sentence because the 
great lexicographer believed that history was nothing more than a compilation of 
facts, a shallow stream of thought where all the greatest powers of the human 
mind are quiescent. 8 The good doctor found no support for this aphorism and 
was attacked by David Hume, 9 who saw history as a continuous process 
governed by institutions, economic factors, geography, religion and other forces 
but not contiolled by the intervention of individuals. This interpretation too 
could be criticised but at least it offered a deeper intellectual basis for the study 
and some elements of Hume's approach can be discerned in the philosophy of 
Christopher Dawson, which finds a mention in Chapter 5 of the thesis. 
Phelps-Brown added that interpretations of industrial disputes can often be ill- 
judged by persons who fail to bring the insight which a knowledge of history can 
provide. He believed, for example, that some economists, unenlightened by 
history havefallen into the trap of -supposing that trade unionists conduct their 
bargaining as a way of maximising their gains. 10 By contrast, the historian 
understands that workers often have beliefs about the past which, although 
sometimes closer to myth than to reality, exert a strong influence on the present, 
especially when a serious dispute erupts. 
Little is gained by attempting to demythologise such perceptions but it is helpful 
to be aware of them. Myths are in constant creation. One relates to the 1971 
"work-in" by the employees of Upper Clyde Shipbuilders, the most successful 
experiment in myth-building of recent years. " It is commonly believed that 
employees threatened with redundancies took over the yards and, through their 
shop stewards, organized work, purchased materials -and paid wages from the 
E485,000 12 contributed by pensioners, trade unions and other well-wishers. The 
reality is that the liquidator and not the workers took over and ran the yards. 
Miners, in particular, have certain perceptions of struggles against employers and 
even to challenge these perceptions can cause problems as the historian, Dr 
Richard Neville, found. He had been commissioned to write the history of the 
6 Aitmatov, C., (1983) The Day Lasts More Than A Hundred Years. Macdonald. London. 
7 Samuel Johnson (1709-84). English lexicographer and savant 
8 Trevor- Roper, H. T., (1967) 71e Idea of the Decline and Fall ofthe Roman Empire in The 
Age of the Enlightenment. - Studies presented to Theodore Besterman. pp. 413-430. Edinburgh 
University. 
9 David Hume (1711-76). Scottish philosopher: author of Treatise ofHuman Nature and History 
of England. 
0 Phelps-Brown, (1986) op cit p. 19. 
1 Sykes, A. I M., (1973) Myths ofIndustrial Relations, p. 7. Working Together Campaign, 
London. 
12 This is the figure quoted in The Times obituary of Jimmy Airlie (1936-1997), one of the UCS 
shop steward leaders and, later, AEU official. II th March, 1997. 
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Yorkshire miners but was dismissed by Arthur Scargill when he refused to write 
in a manner which reflected only the union's view of past events. 13 A more 
recent case is the strike of about 300 Liverpool dockers which began in 
September, 1995 and remained unresolved until January 1998. The attitude of 
these strikers is fully understandable only in the light of the history of 
employment in their industry. As far as the oil and gas industry is concerned 
there may already be a myth in the making; namely, that all operating companies 
are heartless employers for whom accident prevention is a low priority and 
whose installation managers make wholesale use of NRB (not required back), 
the argot of the industry for declaring a person no longer acceptable offshore. 
This thesis will, it is hoped, demonstrate that such a generalisation is unfair and 
can be contradicted by several examples of published research. 14 However, the 
total demolition of the generalisation is a hopeless task and will not be addressed 
in the thesis. 
Industrial relations, however, is not a discipline in its own right and can be 
approached from economic, sociological and even psychological points of view 
as well as from the historical. The historian who discounts the assistance that he 
can receive from other disciplines lays himself open to the criticism levelled by 
an anonymous "Times Literary Supplement" reviewer. Yhe historian who puts 
his system first can hardly escape the heresy of preferring the facts which suit 
his system best. 15 Such dependency, argued Sir Isaiah Berlin in his Auguste 
Comte Memorial Trust Lecture, deprives an author of his right to assume 
individual responsibility for his interpretation of events. Yet it is this, (individual 
responsibility) it seems to me, that is virtually denied by those historians and 
sociologists, steeped in metaphysical or scientific determinism, who think it right 
to say that (in what they arefond of calling) the "last analysis ", everything - or 
so much of it as makes no difference - boils down to th. - qtTect of class, or race, 
or civilization, or social structure; believing that although we may not be able to 
plot the exact curve of each individual life with the data at our disposal and the 
laws we. claim to have discovered, yet, in principle, if we are omniscient, we 
could do so. " Consequently, the historian must not become trapped within the 
boundaries of his own subject and fail to recognise the contribution made to 
industrial relations from disciplines other than his own. For example, although 
the author has a high regard for the work of the historian Richard Cobb, he 
cannot agree with him to the extent of def 
, 
ýng the Armies of the Night, the dark, 
mechanicalforces ofthe Social Sciences, since he regards the social sciences as 
neither dark nor mechanical. 
13 The story of Dr Neville's dismissal is given in some detail in Bulletin no. 35 (Autumn 1977) 
and Bulletin no. 36 (Spring 1978) of the Society for the Study of Labour History. 
14 A good example is Fleming et al, (1995) A Comparative Study ofRisk Perception on the UK 
and Norwegian Continental Shelves. Work and Well-being in Europe Conference, Nottingham 
University. Also Mearns et aL (1997) Human and Organizational Factors in Offshore 
Sa/ety. OTH 543 RepoM Suffolk: HSE Books. 
:5 Quoted in Tuchman, B. W., (1983) Practising History, p. 23. Macmillan. London. 
6 Berlin, L, (1953) Historical Inevitability, pp. 29-30. Oxford University Press, London. 
17 Johnson, D., (1996) A, Man full of Surprises. The Spectator, II th May, 1996. 
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Industrial relations can be directly affected by economics and a prime example 
was the General Strike of 1926. When coal was imported from countries which 
could produce it more cheaply than the indigenous suppliers, the mine owners' 
response was to offer reductions in wages, which the miners refused to 
countenance. Forty five years later the turmoil in industrial relations either side 
of the 1970s arose out of a foreign currency crisis compounded by the decision 
in 1973 of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to 
quadruple the price of oil. 
William Brown 18 suggests that bargaining structures, an important facet of 
industrial relations, are central to the way in which an economy is managed and 
that anyone who contemplates the analysis of an industrial relations theme from 
an economic viewpoint should first investigate three separate but linked 
phenomena: the power of organized labour, which can affect the distribution of 
income between wages and profits, the micro-economic discretion of 
management and employers to determine pay and working practices within their 
own establishments and the macro-economic organization of the labour market, 
which studies the link between economic performance of nations and substantial 
levels of trade union membership. 19 This presumes a wide knowledge of applied 
economics and consequently it is not appropriate for someone who has only a 
moderate understanding of the subject to attempt this type of analysis of 
industrial relations over a period of thirty years. Nevertheless, economics canot 
be ignored and its inter-relationship with the industrial relations of the North Sea 
will be examined in the next chapter. 
Industrial psychology has made a considerable contribution to an understanding 
of industrial relations from as early as 1908 when H. L. Ganteo advised that for a 
firm to be successful it must give as much consideration to the human aspects of 
employment as to the technical. Psychologists carry out studies in depth of 
particular aspects of industries and forms of employment and thus add a different 
dimension to industrial - relations. There have, been studies on the, wider 
application of psychology to industrial relations2l but on the whole the 
contribution of psychologists has been directed towards specific aspects of tasks 
pcrfbrmcd under closely observed conditions. A pioneer of this approach was 
Elton Mayo, whose study on teamwork at Western Electric, usually known as the 
Hawthorne Report, is a classic in employment literature. As Graham Hutton 
wrote over forty years ago in reference to the work of American industrial 
psychologists, the Americans have been pushing along the right lines for two 
decades since the Great Depression. The significant thing is that the lines are 
19 Montague-Burton Professor of Industrial Relations, University of Cambridge. 
19 Brown, W., (1992) Bargaining Structure and the Impact ofthe Law. Chapter 9 of Legal 
Interventions in Industrial Relations edited by W. McCarthy. Blackwell. 
20 Gantt, H. L., (1908) Training Workmen in the Habits ofIndustry, American Society of 
Mechanical Engineers. 
21 Hewstone, M., Stroebe, W., Codol, J. P. & Stephenson, G. M. (1988) Introduction to Social 
Psychology: a European Perspective. Blackwell, Oxford. This is a good example of the genre. 
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logically those along which progress in the human relationships of industry-if it 
is to be achieved at all-must be made anywhere. 22 
Due acknowledgment will be paid to the work of industrial psychologists in the 
North Sea oil and gas industry, especially to the research carried out at The 
Robert Gordon University under the direction of Professor Rhona Flin during 
1990 -1996, a period which co-incided with the research on which the author 
was himself engaged. 
It is not a far step from psychology to sociology and here greater attention must 
be paid to a discipline which cannot be ignored in any analysis of the nature of 
industrial relations. Moreover, it has also made inroads to history, which is 
scarcely surprising given that it is the study of the development, organization, 
functioning and classification of human societies'. Since this thesis is centred 
around the investigation of an industrial relations theme from a historical 
perspective, the relationship of sociology to both industrial relations and history 
requires consideration. 
Although most sociologists have identified their subject as one which can assist 
towards an understanding of industrial relations, some go so far as to claim that 
industrial relations is a mere sub-set of their own discipline. Hill and Thurley 
argued that all explanations of human behaviour are built on some sociological 
premises and that Sociology, in particular, can locate the shape and pattern of 
industrial relations systems within models of wider society and can thus provide 
a basisfOr comparative industrial relations. "' This may be an extreme view but 
sociology has contributed greatly to our understanding of industrial relations, 
particularly during the 1960s when several sociologists published work which 
h. had a permanent effect on how the industrial relations culture of an 
organization can be appraised. 
An iicellent 'example is Allan Fox who introduced into the language of 
industrial relations the two terms "unitarist" and "pluralisf ' which have become 
part of its common vocabulary. They first appeared in 1966 in "Industrial 
Sociology and Industrial Relations". 25 one of eleven research papers prepared for 
the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations. Fox 
argued that sociology could help to construct a frame of reference by means of 
which the problems of industrial relations could be approached in a realistic 
fashion. He drew a sharp distinction between managements which adopted a 
"unitary" frame of referen ce and managements which preferred a "pluralistic" 
reference. The former assumed a basic harmony of purpose between themselves 
and their employees and expected, even occasionally demanded, total acceptance 
of their authority. Such managements saw their organizations in terms of 
22 Hutton, G., (1953) We Too Can Prosper, p. 136. George Allen and Unwin. 
23 Collins Dictionary 1995. The Concise Oxford Dictionary gives a similar definition but prefers 
the term "science" to "study". 
24 Hill, S. and Thurley, K., (1974) Introductory Note. British Journal ofIndustrial Relations, 
X11. 
25 Fox, A., (1966) Industrial Sociology and Industrial Relations. HMSO, London. 
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families or teams to which loyalty should be unquestionably given and 
consequently they were confused when employees took their own line of thought 
and action. By contrast, managements which adopted the "pluralist" frame of 
reference accepted that their organization was a coalition of interests, some of 
which would be divergent from their own. Fox suggested that the latter frame of 
reference was the more realistic since it accepted the adversarial nature of 
industrial relations wherein trade unions had a r6le and allowed the type of joint 
decision making , which was a socially preferable method of 
industrial 
government, that no management need feel guilty about accepting. Soon this was 
generally accepted as the only prudent relationship which an employer could 
have with his employees as is demonstrated by the following definition of 
collective bargaining by one of the most prominent contemporary authorities on 
industrial relations: collective bargaining is essentially an adversarial process 
based upon a pluralist concept o 
unions have independent r6les. 2 
[the enterprise, in which management and trade 
Fox also commented that technology, the organizational structure of work and 
the system of managerial authority all had an effect upon the behaviour of 
workers. Other writers such as Sayles, Kuhn, Lupton, Woodward and Bums and 
Stalker had all published work based on psychological/sociological research in 
the years immediately preceding Fox's paper and to which he gave full 
acknowledgment. Thus, he was, to some extent, pushing open a door that was 
already half-open. One, whom he did not mention, was Boris Gussman, whose 
paper for the Acton Trust 27 on industrial relations within the London Transport 
Authority pre-dated Fox's statement that overt and palpable expressions of 
conflict are no more a reliable indicator of low morale than their absence is of a 
clean bill ofhealth. 28 
The attention paid here to unitary and pluralistic terms of reference has particular 
relevance to the sub ect of this thesis: industrial relations in the North Sea oil and 
gas industry. This is an industry for which the work of Fox and all other writers 
in similar vein has had no effect whatsoever because, from its earliest beginnings 
in USA to its current exploration, development and production activities in the 
North Sea, it has retained a perspective, which, if not completely unitarist, has 
permitted so small an injection of pluralism as to render its effect nugatory. 
By the mid-1970s sociology was beginning to lose the high profile within 
industrial relations which Fox and other practitioners had deservedly earned for 
it. It found itself on the defensive, since prominent authorities within the field of 
industrial relations began to doubt the value of its methodology when applied to 
their subject. The sociologist works within models of social structure to seek 
therein an explanation of industrial relations and Bain and Clegg doubted the 
value of this approach to industrial relations. To take only one example, the many 
26 Roberts, B. C., 1977 Lloyd's Bank Review. No 125, p. 15. 
27 1 he author regrets that he cannot give the precise title or date of this paper but he was present 
at a committee meeting in the House of Commons in 1954 when Gussman talked about his 
research. 
2" Fox, A. op cit, p 9, para 36. 
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attempts to explain the growth and character of trade unionism in terms of class 
and status are a monument to thefolly of explaining trade unionism withoutfirst 
looking closely at trade unions. 29 Eric Batstone was even more forthright when 
he wrote that Sociologists do not have much to be proud of when it comes to the 
study of industry and industrial relations. Partial insights have in the past been 
built up into great theories, leading to remarkable biases in later work 30 
Batstone's execration of the partial insights of sociology was shared by Richard 
Cobb, 31 who believed that sociology imposed a false sense of unity and 
simplicity on a subject which has neither. 32 It is interesting to note that here both 
Batstone, the industrial relations theorist, and Cobb, the historian, are exercising 
common cause. Yet Cobb had some of the traits of a sociologist since he said 
that I have never understood history other than in terms of human 
relationships 33 . 
Sociology has provided valuable insights into industrial relations and will 
continue to do so. Nevertheless, since industrial relations academics of the 
calibre of Bain, Clegg and Batstone suggest, to put it no stronger, that a 
sociological approach to industrial relations research has many pitfalls, it is 
perhaps advisable to use another methodology. An even stronger argument 
against its use is supplied by none other than Professor A. H. Halsey, arguably 
Britain's most eminent sociologist, who has stated Today sociolo F and its 
neighbouring subjects are in a disarray of both theories and methods. It is also 
a case of a cobbler sticking to his last. 
It is necessarv nevertheless, to consider sociology even further because, as 39' - stated aDove, sociology is also intertwined with history and its methodology in 
this regard must be compared with the author's preferred choice. Just as there 
have been sociologists who have asserted that industrial relations come wholly 
within the ambit of their discipline, there are other sociologists who believe that 
history and sociology are two sides of. the same coin. Philip Abrams has argued 
that history and sociology are and always have been the same thing"' and 
Anthony Giddens states There simply are no logical or even methodological 
distinctions between the social sciences and history. 37 If this were indeed the 
case-the author would have no option about his choice of methodology but a 
totally contrary view is taken by J. H. Goldthorpe, himself a sociologist, who has 
29 Bain, G. S., and Clegg, H. A., (1974) A Strategy for Industrial Relations Research in Great 
Britain. British Journal ofIndustrial Relations, X1 1, p. 107. 
30 Datstone, E., (1974) Strikes and Sociologists. Societyfor the Study ofLa5our History Bulletin 
28 p. 86. 
31 Richard S. Cobb, (1917-1996). Professor of Modem History, University of Oxford (1973-84), 
Senior Research Fellow, Worcester College, Oxford (1984 -1987). 32 Gilmour, D., (1996) Napoleon Bad, Critchley Good. The Spectator, 27th January, 1996. 
Gilmour gives this as a quotation but does not identify the source. 
33 ibid 
34 Halsey, A. H., (1996) Subject to Change. Times Higher Education Supplement, 14th June, 
1996. 
35 
v. p. 7 supra. 
36 Abrams, P., (1980) Historical Sociology, p. x. Open Books, Bath. 
37 Giddens, A., (1979) Central Problems in Social Theory, p. 230. Macmillan, London. 
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been prominent in the field for almost thirty years since the publication of his 
acclaimed "The Affluent Worker in the Class Structure". 38 Goldthorpe says that 
here interdisciplinary, or rather adisciplinary, enthusiasm would seem to me to 
have gone toofar, at least on the sociological side" and argues that one-highly 
consequential- difference concerns the nature of the evidence on which 
historians and sociologists rely or, more precisely, the way in which this 
evidence comes into being. 40 
Historians use evidence that has survived in physical form and what Eltonýl calls 
"deposits" and Goldthorpe "relics". They include such artefacts as weapons, 
tools and buildings but of greatest importance are communications in written 
form to which the name of "documents" is normally given. They are a limited 
selection of what could have survived and they cannot increase except in the rare 
42 cases when previously unknown documents are found . They are therefore finite 
and constrain the historians to work within what E. P. Thompson calls the 
discipline of context. 4' By contrast, while the sociologists use evidence in a way 
similar to the historian, they can, in addition generate evidence. This is of course 
what they are doing when they engage in 'fieldwork". They are producing, as a 
basisfor inferences, materials that did not exist before. 44 The only evidence that 
historians can generate legitimately is oral evidence and then the most careful 
attention must be paid to its accuracy and its representativeness. 
This is the cardinal difference between the approach of the historians and that of 
the sociologists. Historians work in the past, even if that "past" is the previous 
year, while the sociologists do not seek to tie their arguments to specific time 
and space co-ordinates so much as to test the extent of their generality 45 and 
need resort to historical method only when the social issues that concern them 
are related to a specific place and within a particular period of time. This releases 
sociologists from the restraints placed upon historians, whose data base gives 
small scope for generalisations but it also requires sociologists to apply their 
38 Giýldthorpe, P. H., (1969) The Affluent Worker in the Class Structure. Cambridge University 
Press. This book was standard reading for both industrial relations and sociology students in the 
1970s and is regarded as a classic. 
39 Goldthorpe, P. H. (1990) The uses of history in sociology: reflections on some recent 
tendencies. British Journal ofSociology, 42 No 2, p. 227. 
40 op cit p. 221. 
41 Sir Geoffrey Elton, (1921-1994). Professor of English Constitutional History (1967-1983), 
Regius Professor of Modem History (1983-1988), University of Cambridge. 
42 Ile provenance of such documents must always be subject to rigorous testing before their 
authenticity is established. A remarkable example of failure to do so in recent times was the case 
of the "Hitler Diaries", remarkable in the sense that H. T. Trevor -Roper, a Professor of History 
at Oxford University, allowed himself to be hoodwinked into pronouncing them authentic. By 
comparison, the Dead Sea Scrolls, discovered originally by a Bedouin goatherd near Qu'mran in 
what is now Israel, have been authenticated by Jewish scholars of international standing. 
43 Quoted in Stone, L., (1987) History and the Social Sciences in the Twentieth Century. 
Routledge, London. 
44 Goldthorpe, op cit p. 214. 
45 op cit p. 214. 
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own forms of academic discipline, a practice which some modem sociologists, 
through over-reliance on secondary sources, are failing to observe. 46 
The sociologist, therefore, has the privilege of being able to generate evidence 
while the historian must rely on those physical remains of the past, mainly 
documents that are available or can be found. The work of the sociologist, claims 
Barrington Moore, resemembles a large-scale (he clearly meant "small-scale") 
map of an extended terrain, such as an airplane pilot might use in crossing a 
continent, whereas the quality of an historical interpretation is dependent on the 
qualit 47 y of the details out of which it is spun. 
Thus the researcher must free himself from conditions and dependencies that he 
may so far have considered as given or fixed. 48 It was the failure of R. H. 
Tawney 49 to observe this principle that drew damning criticism from at least one 
of his peers. 50 Previous knowledge and experience complement research but the 
historian who enters upon an investigation of any facet of an industry must 
remember that its human relationships (according to Cobb5l the only source of 
understanding in history) are dynamic, not static, and that he must recount what 
is revealed by his analysis. In particular he must, like Dr Neville, avoid the 
Procrustean52 approach, whereby what does notfit I'S cut off and excluded, may 
not even be noted, and what doesfit may be stretched tofill a larger space than 
it is suitedfor. 53 
Many doctoral candidates place considerable weight on the use of models to 
support their research, or, at least, to guide it within the limits of its aim. This 
can be useful when a model has been shown by subsequent events to have been 
reliable and valid. It can also lead to disaster as in the case of a candidate who 
selected a model which she did not realise was under attack from its creator's 
academic opponents. 54 This thesis will not base itself upon, or make use of, 
models since history does not lend itself easily to such a method. Elton warns 
against'it for to the historian this seems a very dangerous procedure : for too 
often the model seems to dictate the selection of the facts used to confirm it. 55 
Cobb also disliked models because they gave an impetus to compare and to 
46 op cit p. 220 and 222. Goldthorpe accuses some sociological historians of accepting secondary 
historical sources as their evidential base and coming to conclusions that are both tenuous and 
arbitrary to a quite unacceptable degree. He excludes from his condemnation writers concerned 
with the methodology of social science in general. 
47 Moore, B., (1966) The Social Origins ofDictatorship and Democracy, p. xi. Harmondsworth- 
Penguin, London. 
49 Habermas, J., (1987) Knowledge and Human Interest Cambridge University Press. 
49 Richard Tawney (1880-1962). British historian. Author of Religion and the Rise of 
Capitalism. 
so v. p. 13 infra. 
51 Y. p. 9 supra. 
52 Procrustes (or Polypemon) was a figure from Greek mythology. He tied his "guests" to a bed 
and if they were too tall he cut off their legs; if too short he stretched them on a rack. 
53 Gurnmesson, E., (199 1) Qualitative Methods in Management Research, p. 55. Sage 
Publications, London. 
54 A candidate for the degree of M. Phil, who had this author as one of her examiners. 
55 Elton, G. R., (1968) The Practice offfistory p. 55. Collins Fontana. London. 
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generalise in cases where comparisons and generalizations are either irrelevant 
or positively misleading. "At the same time a thesis must conform to an 
appropriate shape and the methodology chosen for this thesis is a combination of 
an approach relevant to research in the humanities in general with one more 
specific for historical research. 
Evert Gummesson 57 suggests that research in the social sciences, to which he 
applies the term hermeneutics (from the Greek word "hermeneuien", to 
interpret), should be based upon the inter-relationship of preunderstanding and 
understanding. The author of this thesis has behind him a long career in 
industrial relations as a practitioner in engineering companies, as an academic, as 
a member of the Industrial Tribunal and as an arbiter with the Advisory, 
Conciliation -. nd Arbitration Service. To this personal experience can be added 
what Gummesson refers to as "intermediaries", namely, the experience of others 
communicated through text books, research reports, lectures and conversations. 
Thus the combination of one's own experience and that of others constitutes the 
preunderstanding brought to the thesis but always with the caveat of the previous 
paragraph kept in mind. 
Preunderstanding can be compared to a base camp without which an ascent 
cannot be made upon a mountain. Elton put it more dramatically when he wrote 
Yhe future is dark, the present burdensome; only the past, dead and finished, 
bears contemplation. "' The researcher now reaches towards understanding by 
devising his own methods of analysing and interpreting the experiences of 
others, many of them entering his ambit for the first time as his work progresses. 
At the same time he pursues his own quest for data and makes the choice of what 
is relevant to his objective. These two activities, his own analysis and 
interpretation of "intermediaries" and what he has discovered through his own 
efforts bring about the understanding which is his goal. 
Since history is concerned with human beings, a historian must be selective in 
his use of individuals. He can only make one man witness for many by the 
selective use 9f the individual case history as a unit of historical 
impressionism. 59 In Chapter 8 of this thesis the author uses a case history in this 
fashion since the successful industrial action led by a shop steward gives a 
flavour of the oil industry at that particular time (1975/76). Again, ten years 
later, when the IUOOC was engaged in a long contest to secure recognition 
from Phillips Petroleum Company, the tactics adopted by the company's 
Administrative Officer are given in detail (Chapter 9) as representing the 
common practice of oil companies faced with similar situations. Cobb's aversion 
to the supposed insights of sociology meant that his books were packed with 
detail and incident. This thesis will also show detail and incident although on a 
smaller scale than a book will permit and, if it does include some untidy 
structures, the author will share this criticism along with his mentor. What else is 
56 Cobb, K (1969) A Second Identity, p. 18. Oxford University Press, London. 
57 Gunuriesson, E., (1991) op cit. 
58 Elton, G. R., (1989) The Practice offfistory. Collins Fontana, London. 
59 Cobb, R., (1969) op cit p. 47. 
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history if examined from the level of the individuals who play their part over a 
closely observed period of time? Tolstoy's view of history was that it is 
determined more by the small insignificant gestures of unnamed people rather 
than the decisions of outstanding leaders. 60 
It is not surprising that some contributions to the history of industrial relations, 
as distinct from text books, are written with the purpose of giving the point of 
view of manual or other lower paid employees. Sometimes this is a healthy 
antidote to the company histories that are almost public relations exercises but in 
any case it is necessary for work to be published which explains that the 
reactions of employees can arise from a feeling of powerlessness in an 
environment where their voice is seldom heard and often ignored. There are 
histories written in this mode which have become classics such as "The History 
of Trade Unionism7' (1894) by Sidney and Beatrice Webb and the six volume 
"History of the British Miners" which Robin Page-Arnot compiled over a thirty 
year period from 1945. That the Webbs were founder members of the Fabian 
Society and that Page-Arnot was an open supporter of the Soviet Union was well 
known and their books could be read with that in mind. With R. H. Tawney, 
author of "Religion and the Rise of Capitalism", the position is very different. 
He was at the peak of his reputation, which amounted to uncritical adulation 
among historians of the more leftward political persuasion, when he was 
excoriated by Elton in his inaugural lecture at Cambridge in 1968: there is not a 
single word which that very good man Richard Tawney wrote which can be 
trusted. In all his work he was so dominated by his preconceptions that 
everything he wrote was unconsciously written to a propaganda purpose . 
61 Elton 
returned to the attack in 1977 when he wrote that Religion and the Rise of 
Capitalism was one of the most harmful books written between the wars and that 
Tawney's example persuaded a powerfully inj7uential. --hool of historians that 
they may employ a method which involves selective study designed to document 
a previous conviction and neglecffiul of the changed setting in time, and that they 
are justified in doing so if their purpose is to serve a progressive cause. 62 Nor 
was Elton the only historian to take up arms against what was seen as an assault 
by the left upon truth and no less than an attempt to distort facts in order to make 
them fit the conclusion which the authors had already reached. Marxist writers 
can be guilty of this "trahison des clercs" and their scholarship has been attacked 
by the historian Perez Zagorin on the grounds that it has too often had to impose 
a mutilating pressure on the facts and in the case of recalcitrant evidence to 
resort to excessively ingenious methods of interpretation. 63 Not that Marxists are 
alone in this misuse of historical data. The geat nineteenth century historian 
Macaulay wrote in his diary in 1849 that I am glad to find that whatever I 
60 v. Tolstoy's Forces operating on History, the first epilogue to his War and Peace, wherein he 
discusses the effect of leaders such as Napoleon on world history. Also Berlin, I., (1953) The 
Hedgehog and the Fox: An Essay on Tolstoy's view ofhistory. Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
London. 
"' Kenyon, J., (1993) The History Men, p. 260. Weidenfeld and Nicolson. London. 
62 Correspondence in The Times Litera? y Supplement, II th February, 1977. 
63 Zagorin, P., (1982) Rebels and Rulers. Cambridge University Press. Quoted by Lockyer, R., 
(1982) in Long Live the Kings! Times Higher Education Supplement. 24th December, 1982. 
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discover relating to the reign of James 11 confirms my general views but he 
preferred to ignore discoveries which were unsupportive of his conclusions. 64 
The author notes with interest that in the editorial to the first edition of 
"Historical Studies in Industrial Relations"65 there is a statement that articles 
with an explicit political dimension ---- will be encouraged. No-one should cavil 
at work written from a political perspective provided that it is seen to be written 
with a specific political outlook and that no conclusions are offered from 
insufficient or distorted data. It is to be hoped for the future reputation of this 
new publication that such articles as are published will meet the criterion of 
historical logic, which is defined by E. P Thompson (a self-proclaimed writer of 
the "left") as a logical method of inquiry designed to test hypothesis and to 
eliminate seýr-confzrming procedures ("instances ", "illustrations P). 66 
The methodology which the author has chosen to use for his thesis is thus a 
combination of Gummesson's approach to the study of social sciences and the 
historical approach of Elton and Cobb. Elton attributes prime importance to 
documents and consequently argues that history is the only true empirical 
discipline. He further advises that it is the only discipline in which the writer 
should not begin with a predetermined thesis that he intends to test. 67 Cobb 
believes that human relationships are the key to the interpretation of history. 
Here one is reminded of the famous line from the Roman poet Terence, 
68 homo 
sum : humani nil a me alienum puto while at the same time recalling Royden 
Harrison's warning that this can make for excellence in moral rather than 
historical practice. Harrison points out that the famous quotation of Terence - 
which he does not acknowledge 69 - might be appropriate for a historian of 
classical antiquity who mayjust about manage total history butfor the rest of us 
hajr the trick is to discover what to leave out. 70 Thus, since every recorded 
incident in the history of industrial relations of this period cannot be included, 
judgment will be exercised in selecting those which are of consequence and in 
ignoring those which appear to be trivial. As the American historian Barbara 
TuchmWl wrote Selection is what determines the ultimate produCt. 72 
Sound historical research depends upon a distinction between original and 
derivative authorities. Original authorities are statements by eye-witnesses and 
documents which are contemporary with, and relate directly to, the events to 
which they attest. Often referred to as primary sources, original authorities are 
64 Berlin, I., (1953) Historical Inevitability, p. 29. Oxford University Press, London. 
65 March 1996. Keele University Centre for Industrial Relations. 
66 Thompson, E. P., (1978) The Poverty of Theory and other Essays, p. 23 1. Merlin. London. 
67 Elton, G. FL, (1977) Presidential Address. Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 5 
210. 
Publius Terentius Afer (c. 184 - 159 BQ. Heauton Tfmorumenos. 1 1,25.1 am a man and thus 
nothing about mankind is indifferent to me. 
69 Perhaps Harrison assumed that since his target readership would be historians they would have 
no difficulty in recognising the quotation and its source. 
70 Harrison, PL, (1983) Totality or Triviality?. Times Higher Education Supplement, 4th 
November, 1983. 
71 Barbara W. Tuchman (1912-89). 
72 Tuchman, B. W., (1983) op cit. p. 18. 
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not "ipso facto" iffeftitable evidence which admit of no other interpretation. Bias 
in a primary source is to be expected but one allows for bias and corrects it by 
reading other accounts. 73 Derivative authorities are accounts of events which 
have not been witnessed but which can be inferred directly or indirectly from 
original authorities. It is "second-hand" evidence, very similar to Gurnmesson's 
"intermediaries", 74 and it is only through the use of sound judgment in the 
interpretation and evaluation of the original sources that derivative authority can 
enjoy confidence. Relevant examples of the correct use of research material are 
the famous biographies of Trotsky7s by Isaac Deutscher 76 and Elton's "Tudor 
Revolution" 77 where we can see the use by master historians of both original 
and derivative authorities. Trotsky may have been dead but when he had been 
exiled from the Soviet Union in 1929 he had managed to take with him a 
considerable number of government documents which he entrusted to Harvard 
University. These and Trotsky's own papers written in exile were Deutscher's 
prime original material while his derivative authority arose from his reading of 
many contemporary histories to which he applied all of his wide intellect in the 
selection and interpretation of what he judged to be fact and not speculation or 
assumption. Elton's intensive re-examination of all the documentary material of 
the Tudor period had the result of updating every other textbook on the period. 
Xf underlying As Elton himself claimed with typical bluntness A whole coT? 1e. o 
ideas, a whole frame of references is being discarded , which can 
be 
paraphrased as an assertion that the derivative authorities relied on by other 
historians of the period lacked any foundation. 
Original authorities appropriate to this thesis are personnel employed at different 
levels within the industry and contemporary company and trade union 
documents relating to industrial relations. Immediately this poses a problem for 
th. historian who is looking at any aspect of the oil industry. The industry is 
controlled by a small coterie of companies, which exercises a far greater 
influence, in political as well as economic terms, than any other commercial 
organization in the world and seeks to protect this status by revealing as little as 
possible about its 'ýmodus operandi. " J. D. House, who has carried out research 
on employment issues in the Canadian offshore oil industry, reported in 1985 
that any previous systematic investigations were notable by their paucity and that 
this has not been due to lack of interest by researchers, not even, primarily, by a 
lack of available funding. Rather, the main cause has been the successful 
resistance of the offshore petroleum industry to having itseýf investigated, and 
73 This is recognised in our legal procedure where different accounts of the same incident can be 
offered by two or more witnesses. 
74 v. p. 12 supra. 
75 Leon Trotsky (1879-1940). Bolshevik leader exiled 1929 to Mexico and there assassinated by 
a Soviet agent. 
76 Isaac Deutscher (1907-1967). Marxist historian and biographer of Stalin and Trotsky. (1959) 
The Prophet Unarmed. - Trotsky 1921-29. Oxford University Press. London. (1963) The Prophet 
Outcast: Trotsky 1929-40. Oxford University Press. London. 
77 Elton, G. R-, (1953) The Tudor Revolution in Government. Cambridge University Press. 
Cambridge. 
78 Elton, G. PL, (195 6) Fifty Years of Tudor Studies at London University. Times Literary 
Supplement 6th January, 1956. 
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the reluctance of most governments to insist that it be studied against its will. 79 
The position in the UK offshore industry was discovered to be similar by K. 
Sutherland and R. H. Flin in 1989.80 
Two factors assisted the author to overcome this problem. The first was that for 
over twenty years he had been involved in the placement of students with oil 
companies as part of their undergraduate or postgraduate courses and some of 
these former students were now middle or even senior managers within the oil 
and gas industry. The second factor was that he knew socially several people 
who held, or had very recently held, senior posts in the industry, including two 
directors of prominent companies. This enabled him to approach oil company 
executives on an informal basis and, having explained the research upon which 
he was engaged, to secure their co-operation. 
The level of manager interviewed was head of department or above. Each 
interview was initially structured round a standard questionnaire but in almost 
every case the managers preferred to widen the discussion and bring in aspects 
which were of particular relevance to their organization; for example, one 
manager spent a long time explaining how different cultures had emerged on his 
company's platforms, although the tasks of the employees and the conditions of 
service on each did not differ. Thus once the main issues such as the method of 
employee representation were disposed of, the managers expanded on their 
company's industrial relations philosophy and how it was implemented. 
Assurance was always given that anonymity would be guaranteed and, in view of 
some comments made by managers, considerable trust was placed in the author's 
discretion, a confidence which he has taken pains to honour. Two interviews, 
however, were very different from the others. One was with Mr Jim Cheetharn, 
who had left the service of Phillips Petroleum Company LJK and gave a detailed 
account of his company's negotiations with ASTMS over the years 1984 to 
1989.81 The other was with the personnel manager of a major oil operator who, 
after a discussion on the industrial action offshore in 1989 and 1990, quietly 
passed to the author a file of the company correspondence for these years. These 
unique documents have, consequently, allowed him to present, for the first time, 
a major oil company's perspective of the turbulence offshore at that time and 
thus provide a contrast to the trade union view. 
Trade union documentation was known to exist and while its location would not 
be difficult to find there was no certainty that access could be obtained. By a 
great stroke of luck the necessary trade union records were found at the same 
time as permission to consult them was granted. Professor Rhona Flin 82 met Mr 
Ronnie McDonald, the general secretary of the Offshore Industry Liaison 
79 Working Offshore : the Other Price ofNewfoundland's Oil, Institute of Social and Economic 
Research, Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1985, p. 6. 
"0 Sutherland, K. M. & Flin, R. H. (1989) Stress at Sea: a Review of Working Conditions in the 
Offshore Oil and Fishing Industries. Work and Stress, 3,269-285. 
81 These negotiations are detailed in Appendix S. 
82 At that time Head of the Business Research Unit, The Robert Gordon University. 
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Committee, at a conference and mentioned someone in her department was 
engaged upon research into industrial relations offshore. He expressed interest, 
an interview was arranged and the author found that Mr McDonald had in his 
custody the minutes and correspondence of the Inter Union Offshore Oil 
Committee from its inception to 1988. Moreover, he was pleased to grant access 
and for several weeks the author worked on these papers at the union's office at 
6 Trinity Street, Aberdeen. 
Since these documents consist of fourteen years of correspondence with local 
union officers, national officers of unions; the Trades Union Congress and the 
goverm, nent, they represent a prime original source for any research over this 
period. They are not catalogued and searches were often necessary to find a 
document to which a particular piece of correspondence referred. The author has 
given these documents the classification OILCarc(OILC archives); although 
lUOOC documents they are held in the OILC archives. Unless otherwise 
indicated all unpublished correspondence or other documentation is drawn from 
the OILC archives which arc included among the the List of Sources (Volume 2, 
Section E). 
The author has not been the first scholar to use these documents, since there is 
reference to them in Payingfor the Piper, 83a book published in 1996 after his 
work on these archives had been completed. He may, nevertheless, claim to have 
given them a more thorough examination and to have been the first to have 
produced in the appendices many documents which illustrate the industrial 
relations climate of the period, particularly those concerning the negotiations at 
government level culminating in the Memorandum of Understanding on Trade 
Union Access to Oil Installations. 84 
IUOOC minutes'and correspondence from 1989 have been in the care of Mr 
Campbell Reid, who played a prominent r6le in offshore industrial relations. Mr 
Reid allowed access to these documents, and since there is no mention of them 
in the source notes of Payingfor the Piper, the author of this thesis can claim 
that they are virgin territory which he has traversed. Of special interest is the 
light they throw on the circumstances leading up to the severance of official 
trade unionism and the OILC. 
The Offshore Industry Liaison Committee has its own archives of minute books 
and correspondence dating from mid-1989 and provided an interesting 
comparison with those of the IUOOC, especially after relationships between the 
bodies were sundered. 
Valuable oral information was also garnered from these trade union connections. 
Mr Reid had over twenty years of experience of negotiations or, as he would 
prefer to put it, attempted negotiations with the oil companies and their 
contractors. Mr McDonald gave most helpful comments and allowed himself to 
83 Woolfson, C., Foster, J. and Beck, M., (1996) Paying for the Piper. 
94 Appendices G, H. I and J. 
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be recorded on tape, now in the possession of the author. Working in the OILC 
offices brought the author into direct contact with Mr and Mrs Robertson from 
whom he has received a great deal of information on working offshore from the 
earliest days to the foundation of OILC, where they played (and still play) a 
prominent part. The chapter on the strike aboard the drilling rig Venture One was 
made possible only by their oral information. 
To the data acquired through this direct contact can be added newspaper articles 
dealing with contemporary industrial relations matters and books written by 
people who have been participators in the events which they describe such as the 
Piper Alpha disaster. 
The contrast between the approach to industrial relations on the UK and the 
Norwegian continental shelves is significant and constitutes part of the thesis. 
There was much more openness from the Norwegians who were interviewed. As 
well as consulting translations of research work on the oil industry in Norway 
data have been obtained through direct interviews with Mr Ketil Karlsen, Deputy 
Leader and Mr Tor Fjelldal, Research Officer of NOPEF (the Norwegian Oil and 
Petrochemical Workers' Union), Mr Odan Bergflodt, Deputy Leader of OSF 
(the Norwegian Oil Workers' Federation), Mr Borge Bekkheien, Assistant 
Director of OLF (the Norwegian Oil Industry Association) and Mr Gunnar Lied, 
Head of Technical Training, Elf Petroleum Norge. Professor Karlsen of the 
Rogaland Research Institute in Stavanger is Norway's most prominent authority 
o1i industrial relations and he made himself available for a complete morning to 
discuss the main aspects of his country's industrial relations. Although it was not 
possible to interview Mr KAre Willoch, Prime Minister of Norway from 1981 to 
1986, he wrote a most courteous and informative reply when the author sought 
an interpretation of the term "Willoch Doctrine" which appeared in a Norwegian 
account of industrial relations during his period of office. 
The derivative authorities are the many text books, articles and commentaries on 
various aspects of industrial relations and accident prevention relevant to the 
period under research. An obvious example here is the use that the author had to 
make of texts about employment on the Norwegian continental shelf, which 
derive from work originally offered in the language of that country. 
The author does not and cannot claim to be a pioneer in the application of 
historical methodology to an industrial relations thesis. David Dunkerley, who 
has published widely on organizational theory, used this approach in a historical 
study of Devonport Dockyard and contributed an article on his methods to a 
15 textbook on organizational research . He begins by saying that within 
organizational analysis emphasis has been on the description and analysis of 
contemporary phenomena with little consideration of how the current 
characteristics of organizations have emerged. Description and analysis alone 
can provide neither explanation nor prediction and although it is obvious to the 
85 Dunkerley, D., (1988) Historical methods and Organizational analysis: The Case of a Naval 
Dockyard. In A. Bryman (editor), Doing Research in Organizations. Routledge. London. 
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historian that An event arisesfrom the past, structures the present and affects the 
future" Dunkerley believes that this virtual truism often eludes social scientists. 
We can note here the similarity of Dunkerley's comment and that of Phelps- 
Brown given in the second paragraph of this chapter. 
Dunkerley chose three inter-linked methods of inquiry in his work on the 
Devonport Dockyard. The first was an analysis of the population censuses in 
order to show the different types of employment within the dockyard, the second 
was the record of dockyard employment and industrial relations to be found in 
local histories, admiralty papers and local newspapers and the third was oral 
history. He soon had to discard the first method because, quite apart from the 
inconvenience caused by the storage of the census records at Kew in London, the 
nature of the data that were collected differed significantly over the years. This 
made the original objective of an occupational community study unrealistic and 
it was replaced by the technological and historical development of the dockyard 
over the last century. As Dunkerley states 7he decision was made with the 
historical knowledge that although a naval base had existed since the 
seventeenth century, it was not until the nineteenth century that any significant 
increases in size or technological application tookplace. 87 Thus a knowledge of 
history made it possible for the research to continue. The change in the objective 
ensured that the research would be based on sound documentary evidence and 
would still link in well with local archive search and oral history. 
Dunkerley describes documents as the "bread and butter" research tool of the 
historian 88 and he decided to abandon use of census returns because they were 
unreliable for his original purpose. In this context he is a pure disciple of Elton 
and he echoes the master in his insistence that documents must not be interpreted 
in ways which suit the preconceptions of the researcher; the researcher is always 
in danger of interpreting a piece of evidence in the light of hislher contemporary 
situation and imposing suppositions and assumptions that may be totally 
unwarranted. 89 Elton was equally aware and when his contemporary, E. H. Carr, 
author of a history of the Soviet Union, which gives a favourable account of its 
internal and external policies, argued that when any historical judgment was 
made it was inevitably a function of the prevailing philosophy of the time, Elton 
would have none of this and asserted that data, once established, were 
incontrovertible. Like Dunkerley, this author has made full use of local archive 
material and oral history which have enabled him to make some original 
discoveries that are not elsewhere documented. Moreover, he takes confidence in 
the fact that a reputable authority in the field of management research supports 
the historical method of inquiry and concludes his article with this sentence: 
Indeed it is heartening to observe such an approach being incorporated into 
more and more studies oforganizations. 90 
86 ib, P. . 7 ibid p. 87. 
8 ibid p. 88. 
89 ibid p. 88. 
90 ibid p. 95. 
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This thesis is not rigidly chronological in its composition. This does not mean 
that the sequence of the history is lost but that events, to be clarified, must 
sometimes be looked at according to their nature rather than their chronology. It 
thus starts with a chapter on the rise to power of the immensely influential oil 
and gas industry which had established its "modus operandi" before the 
discovery of oil and gas in the North Sea and then Chapter Three argues that the 
hostility of the industry to trade unionism is explained by the economic milieu 
within which it operates. There follows an account of the industrial relations 
system in Great Britain because it was this very system within which the oil 
companies have continually refused to conduct their employee relations policies. 
In retrospect this may be seen as the first crack in the mould of the British 
industrial relations system that accorded an influence to trade unions which has 
now greatly diminished. This initial rejection of a trade union presence offshore 
and the subsequent events are the subject of this thesis. The Norwegian 
dimension is so important to the development of the thesis that it was necessary 
for it to be dealt with early and in its totality in order for comparisons to be made 
with the very different developments on the UK Continental shelf. Thereafter the 
thesis follows a chronological pattern through Chapters 6,7,8, and 9 at which 
point three separate themes are analysed outside the confines of a specific time 
period. Chapter 10 looks at trade union failure to recruit significant membership 
offshore, Chapter II examines the connection between industrial relations and 
accident prevention while Chapter 12 investigates the impact of offshore 
contracting upon industrial relations on the UK continental shelf. Chapter 13 
picks up the chronological narrative again with its account of the emergence of 
the Offshore Industry Liaison Committee. The final chapter draws together the 
different threads of the thesis and offers some conclusions. 
There are two prime criteria of any research. It must be developed in a way that 
allows the evidence to be presented in proper order and thus permit the story to 
speak for itselL The second is that the author abides by the established evidence 
and adds no embroidery. In doing so the dictum of the great German historian 
von Ranke9l is obeyed: events are discussed wie es eigentlich gewesen ist. 92 The 
author has striven to observe these criteria, trusts that this is reflected in his 
thesis and seeks to be judged by Elton's own definition of the standard of quality 
which should be attained at his level of work: intellectual honesty and 
intellectual penetration within the compass oftheproblem investigated. 93 
9' Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886). This German historian was one of the first to base his work 
tipon methodological research. 
92 i. e. as it really happened. 
93 Elton, G. F-, (1989) op cit p. 35. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE NATURE OF THE OIL INDUSTRY AND ITS INDUSTRIAL 
RELATIONS 
The oil industry as we know it to-day developed from the invention of the 
internal combustion engine and its ftiel requirements. Oil had been discovered 
in considerable quantities in Pennsylvania and Oklahoma just after the Civil 
War of 1861-65 and it was sold first under the name of kerosene as a means of 
illumination and domestic heating. Three millennia earlier the people of the 
Middle East had found that the black sludge-like material which oozed out of 
the ground could be used in construction and visitors to the, remains of the 
ancient city of Babylon will see the bricks of the buildings held securely in 
place by bitumen. Fires came from the ground at different times and in 
different places without people understanding their origin and it has been 
suggested that the legend of Moses and the burning bush derives from one of 
these fires. While the demands of heating and illumination remain a not 
inconsiderable aspect of the oil industry, the supply of refined crude oil for 
energy has become its principal business. 
I The Nature of the Industry 
The outstanding features of the oil industry have been its power and its 
secrecy. That the oil industry is powerful is almost too obvious to state. On 
the other hand its inter-company relationships and agreements and its methods 
of operation were kept secret for decades and reliable source material 
regarding the American companies has become available only in the last 
twenty years. Anthony Sampson in the Introduction to his book "The Seven 
Sisters", which has the secondary title of "The History, the Companies and the 
Politics of Oil", l writes as follows: 
.. it is difficult to describe or analyse the workings of the companies without a 
body of reliable documentary evidence. It was not until the crisis of 1973 that 
a great deal of such documentation came to light; particularly through the 
exhaustive investigation by the Multinationals Subcommittee of the Foreign 
Relations Committee, under Senator Church. 
It is significant that the oil industry receives not a single mention in Graham 
Hutton's "We Too Can Prosper"2 which arose out of a visit of British 
Productivity Council members to USA to discover why productivity across 
both the primary and the secondary sectors of employment was so much 
higher there. As Sampson has observed it was 1973 before documents of 
impeccable provenance were available to historians, who were interested not 
only in the workings but also the machinations of this industry. A certain 
frisson of excitement must attend the analysis of the released information when 
it is realised that Congress had to use sub-poenas to secure some of the data it 
required. This reluctance to appear transparent about its activities is the 
Sampson, A., (199i) 7he Seven Sisters, p. 8. Hodder and Stoughton, London. 
2 Hutton, G., (1953) We Too Can Prosper. George Allen and Unwin, London. 
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hallmark of the industry in the United Kingdom as well as in the United States 
of America. 
It is appropriate to point out here that other industries in the USA have not 
exhibited this reluctance which borders on a refusal to collaborate with 
economists, business historians and others who have sought access to their 
records. Professor Payne of the Department of Economic History at Aberdeen 
University, writing in 1962, compared American business organizations very 
favourably with their British counterparts in this respect. Reviewing a number 
of histories of American business he said: 
Anyone having had the experience of trying to persuade British businessmen to 
open their recent archives to historical and economic research must applaud 
the liberality and farsightedness of the American companies to whose records 
these authors have had access. 3 
The chairman of the Congressional Subcommittee referred to above was the 
redoubtable Senator Church, who summed up the nature of the industry and 
the attitude of his government in one significant sentence. It is time we began 
the process of demystifting the inner sanctum of this the most secret of 
industries. 4 Two years later the Securities and Exchange Commission was 
investigating political contributions and extracted the confession that money 
was used by all the major oil companies for bribery on a grand scale within the 
USA as well as abroad. The following quotation from the evidence given to 
the Commission by one company alone (Gulf) is illuminating: (between 1960 
and 1973) approximately $10.3 million of corporate funds were used in the 
United States and abroad for such purposes, ( i. e. bribery ) some of which 
may be considered unlawful. 5 Sampson accompanies this quotation with the 
following comment: 77ze ability of a giant corporation to conceal such huge 
sums through underground routes, spotlighted the fact that the big oil 
companies were, in both the technical and general sense, unaccountable. 6 
As Anthony Sampson writes: Tax avoidance of the companies was their most 
striking common achievement. 7 Although it may be argued that tax avoidance 
is a wholly legitimate objective it is clear that Sampson was really referring to 
tax evasion which is illegal and even as far back as the 1930s a more damning 
comment was made by Harold Ickes, who later was President Roosevelt's 
Petroleum Minister of War: an honest and scrupulous man in the oil business 
is so rare as to rank as a museum piece. 8 
Attempts have been made to justify the lengths to which the industry goes in 
order to prevent national governments extracting what has been decreed to be 
an appropriate level of taxation. Paul Frankel argued immediately after the war 
3 Payne, P., (1962) Business History, V, no. 1, p. 13. 
4 Sampson, op cit p. 329. 
5 ibid p. 265. 
6 ibid p. 266. 
7 ibid p. 263. 
8 Ickes, H. L., (1953) The Secret Diary of Harold Ickes Vol Z the First Thousand Days. 1933- 
36, p. 646. Simon and Schuster, New York. I 
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that the oil industry is subject to laws quite unlike most others. 9 He advanced 
two reasons for this opinion. The first was that the demand for oil is price- 
inelastic because people need it. It is, however, the demand for energy which 
is price inelastic as it is a basic necessity for the modem industrial 
economy. Within the energy market there is competition from other products 
offered as substitutes for oil-based energy systems. Thus the cross price 
elasticity of demand for oil is higher and we see this in the search by energy 
users for alternative energy systems such as nuclear, solar and wind power. 
Frankel's second argument was that lower prices often have very little effect 
on limiting production. Oil refineries must, for example, be kept going at any 
cost because of the enormous expense of decommissioning and later 
recommissioning to restart production. Thus price elasticity of supply is low. In 
consequence producers stockpile oil in order to protect prices and to counter 
the potential impact of the change in market conditions, which followed the 
success of OPEC in limiting Middle East production in the 1970s in order to 
drive up the price of oil. This was a classic example of market collusion in an 
oligopolistic structure. 
Frankel was writing before, the impact of Middle East oil had been fully 
understood. Maurice Adelman of MIT took a different view almost twenty 
years later. He insisted that in competitive conditions over the long term, the 
oil industry is bound to behave like any other industry. Thus, the greater the 
output of an oilfield, the higher the cost of additional output and so the crude 
oil industry contrary to common belief, is inherently seýrladjusting. 10 The 
assumption here is that marginal exploration and production costs rise as more 
oil is extracted, a position which tends to arise when an oilfield approaches 
exhaustion and output begins to decline. 11 
As the demand for oil grew, so did the size and power of the producers, which 
were in control of a commodity that affected the economies of the developed 
nation states. This control was so great that the chairmen of the two largest 
UK companies, M'Fadzean of Shell and Drake of BP, could refuse to accede 
to the demand made in 1973 by the Prime Minister, Edward Heath, that the 
country should continue to receive as much oil as it needed. War had broken 
out between Israel and her neighbours Syria and Egypt and OPEC had called 
for an embargo on sales of oil to USA. M'Fadzean and Drake said that with 
reduced supplies on an international scale their companies must not be seen to 
be favouring one customer at the expense of another. Thus nations had been 
reduced to the status of customers of the major oil companies although 
M'Fadzean and Drake probably saw themselves simply as representatives of 
organizations which could do business only if they adopted what J. E. Hartshorn 
described as an international viewpoint detached. /rom the special interest of 
any one nation. 12 
9 Frankel, P. H., (1946) Essentials of Petroleum, p. 71. A. M. Kelley, New York. 
10 Adelman, M. A., (1964) Article in Natural Resources and International Development, p. 32 
Baltimore. 
II The author is indebted to Mr B. C. Scroggie of The Robert Gordon University for his advice 
on the arguments advanced by these two authorities. 
12 Hartshorn, J. E., (1967) Oil Companies and Governments, p. 378. Faber, London. 
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Over the years Shell and BP had become major partners in "Oildom", a 
virtually independent international organization often referred to as The Seven 
Sisters : BP, Royal Dutch Shell, Exxon ( or Esso ), Mobil, Texaco, Gulf and 
Socal ( or Chevron)13, although by the mid-1980s Gulf had been bought over 
by Chevron (which had dropped the Socal title) and Texaco had been 
dismembered following a disastrous legal confrontation, which practically 
drove it into bankruptcy. To the original seven, it is now necessary to add 
firms such as Occidental, Conoco, Total, Marathon, Petrofina and Amerada 
Hess, which have emerged as major players in the North Sea. How had this 
nation of "Oildorn emerged? 
2 The United States of America 
The early days of the American oil industry were dominated by John 
D. Rockefeller and Standard Oil. A ruthless entrepreneur, he gained control of 
all the major producers by various stratagems and as early as 1885 about 70% 
of Standard's business was overseas; moreover, in order to keep himself 
apprised of all the latest developments and opportunities, Rockefeller had 
established a network of agents throughout he world which doubled as a sort 
of espionage service seeking confidential information about his rivals. Under 
the USA anti-trust legislation his Standard Oil was divided into independent 
companies such as Standard Oil of California (Socal) but this independence 
was compromised by the unofficial interrelationships which continued among 
what were in reality members of an extended family. 
There is another important aspect to remember when Rockefeller's immense 
impact on the industry is considered. He served as a r6le model for his 
subordinates and successors and the tough, aggressive attitude which underlay 
all his business transactions has permeated the industry. Labour unions, for 
example, were seen as obstacles and Joseph Cullinan, President of Texaco in 
the 1900s, found a kind of enjoyment in his conflicts with them. While it 
would be nonsense to claim that a similar attitude prevails today, the fact 
remains that in the North Sea oil industry the British trade unions have been 
trounced in their efforts to gain any worthwhile level of recognition for the 
purposes of bargaining. They still have the appearance after twenty five years 
of supplicants seeking some crumbs of recognition but whose ability to apply 
bargaining sanctions to achieve them is weak to the point of nullity. As a long 
and faithful member of the Baptist Church, Rockefeller would have known the 
13 Sampson op cit p. 32 and passim. T'he term " Ile Seven Sisters" was first used in 1913 but 
it was not until Enrico Mattei of AGIP spoke of "le sette sorelle" that the description 
became common currency. Mattei resented the power of the oil majors and the way they 
utilised it so he sought to break into their exclusive circle or to circumvent them through 
deals with the USSR. He was killed in an aircraft accident in 1962 and accusations, totally 
unsubstantiated, circulated about the possibility of sabotage through the agency of the 
"Sisters" ( v. Sampson op cit p. 198 ). 33 years later his corpse was exhumed by judicial 
order when an imprisoned Mafia leader wrote that "the Sicilian Mafia sentenced Enrico 
Mattei to die. He had damaged certain important American business interests in the Middle 
East". Minute pieces of metal taken from his corpse show that a bomb destroyed his 
aircraft. (Scotsman 29th August, 1997). v. Appendix AAA. 
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biblical text about bread cast on waters being seen after many days. Across the 
broad canvas of industrial relations issues that have involved the oil industry in 
British waters- the story in Norwegian waters is vastly different- the shade of 
John D. Rockefeller appears as a leitmotif. 
The story of the exploration for oil in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf emirates is 
one of success for the United States oil industry but it falls outside the scope of 
this thesis except in so far as it represents the determination of the American 
oil interests to persevere against initial disappointment and possible failure. 
Years of frustration followed by the eventual discovery of vast reserves honed 
to an even sharper edge the American belief that the most effective way to run 
an industry, which presents so many physical problems and hazards, is one 
which makes little or no concession to factors other than those which allow oil 
to be extracted, refined and sold. Until the formation of OPEC the interests of 
host nations did not attract attention except when they were seen as problems 
to be surmounted. Moreover, the virtual absence of anything resembling 
organized labour allowed the companies to dictate conditions of employment 
and it is this aspect of the "culture" of USA oil companies outside their own 
national boundaries which has brought them into conflict with trade unions of 
the industrialised western democracies, without, it must be added, any 
noticeable change taking place. 
The career of Calouste Gulbenkian must also receive but cursory treatment. 
This extraordinary entrepreneur, while still a young man, obtained from the 
Ottoman Empire irnmediately prior to the First World War an agreement 
whereby he would be responsible for developing the oil industry within its 
borders in return for 5% of the equity shares. Despite the fragmentation of 
the Ottoman Empire into a number of small states after 1918, Gulbenkian was 
allowed to retain his lucrative concession within the famous " Red Line" which 
he drew on a map of the Middle East in 1928 at a conference at Ostend and 
which followed roughly the frontiers of the former empire. Thus the huge 
development of oil in these regions, including Iraq, was accompanied by the 
consequent enrichment of his immense private fortune. 
3 Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
British oil companies have a very different background to those of the USA. 
Oil was being extracted from shale at Pumpherston, near Bathgate, in Scotland 
by "Paraffin" Young in the last century but, since it was small in quantity and 
limited in its commercial applications, operations ceased about forty years ago. 
Two major oil companies are British in origin. One is Shell which has always 
been different from the other Seven Sisters in that it has been essentially a 
trader in the commodity rather than a producer. It was founded by Marcus 
Samuel, later Lord Bearsted, whose father had imported sea shells in the 
middle of the nineteenth century when they were in vogue as decorative 
material on boxes. Samuel was quick to see the importance of oil as a source 
of energy in the future and founded the " Shell Transport and Trading 
Company ", the name under which the company continues to trade. He bought 
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oil, mainly from Baku in what is now the independent nation of Ajerbaijan, 
had it delivered to his tankers in the Black Sea and sold it on the open market. 
The company amalgamated with Royal Dutch Oil in 1906 to form the present 
main company, Royal Dutch Shell. This introduced the ruthless figure of 
Henri Deterding, who had managed the Dutch company extracting oil in its 
colony, the Dutch East Indies ( now Indonesia ). He outmanoeuvred Samuel in 
the negotiations and the British company was left with only a 40% share of the 
organization. One is inevitably reminded of Canning's quip about Dutch 
methods of business almost a century before: 
In matters of commerce the fault of the Dutch 
Is paying too little and asking too much. 
Samuel gradually withdrew from business into public life and Deterding, 
whose approach to the industry could be described as that of a European 
Rockefeller, stamped his own imprint on the oil industry. He became a British 
citizen, was an object of fascination to Winston Churchill and received a 
knighthood. In 1919 he bought from Weetman Pearson, later Lord Cowdray, 
the latter's Mexican oil business where the appalling conditions of employment 
eventually drove the workers to strike in 1936. Following the usual 
uncompromising attitude of the oil companies there was an unexpected and 
dramatic response by the Mexican government: in 1938 President Cardenas 
nationalised all 17 oil companies in his country, a solution to be followed, 
probably unconsciously, in later years by Middle East nations beginning with 
Iran in 1951. Shell, no longer under Deterding14, took notice of this 
resentment at the exclusion of any indigenous involvement in the management 
of an operation in a foreign country and developed a scheme to train local 
managers but no other oil company followed suit. 
Britain's other main oil company is BP. The Royal Navy realised about 1910 
that it must convert its source of energy from coal to oil . Fisher, the First Sea Lord, was friendly with Samuel and when Churchill, another friend, became 
First Lord of the Admiralty15 in 1911, he urged Churchill to collaborate with 
Shell. Churchill, however, preferred to deal with Anglo-Persian, an offshoot 
of Burmah Oil. The official reason for this decision is that Churchill saw the 
advantage of an oil supplier based on the Persian Gulf, which was easily 
accessible to the Royal Navy in the event of war with Germany. In addition, 
he feared that Shell might charge too high a price. To ensure that the 
Government had some control over the supply and the price of the fuel, 
Churchill persuaded the British Government to buy a controlling share (5 1 %) 
of equity in the Anglo-Persian enterprise. 16 The company later became known 
as British Petroleum and eventually BP. The allies floated to victory on a wave 
14 Deterding, becoming autocratic to the point of madness, was eased out of the post of 
Director General in 1936 and went to live in Germany. He had become an admirer of 
National Socialism and Hitler sent a wreath to his funeral in 1939. 
15 Sadly, this historic tide and position is no more. 
16 From 1977 the government gradually divested itself of its holding and at June 1994 it owned 
1.85%. 
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of oil said Lord Curzon but curiously most of that oil had been supplied by 
Shell. 
Churchill's decision to choose Anglo-Persian has been interpreted by some as 
being rooted in other causes including anti - sernitism, which was perfectly 
respectable in the early years of the century. Samuel was a Jew and it is 
claimed that Churchill distrusted him. He is alleged to have said that You can 
never be sure of Shell but this, like the anti-sernitism, is pure speculation and 
no documentary evidence exists. It is, however, of more than passing interest 
that for decades Shell used advertisements with the caption You can be sure of 
Shell, almost as if the company was seeking to erase a slur on its reputation. 
By the 1920s both Shell and BP were established as major oil companies and 
along with their American "sisters" were supplying oil to the world on terms 
and conditions which they laid down in concert. Exxon, Shell and BP met 
secretly at Achnacarry Castle in Scotland in August 1928 where they 
established a cartel which outlawed price cutting. Twenty four years were to 
pass before this meeting became public knowledge and was then justified by 
Bill Farish, chairman of Exxon, on the grounds that stabilisation of prices was 
necessary for conservation of the commodity. "Oildom" had been established 
and was to conduct its affairs as a powerful independent organization for 
which the policies at home or abroad of internationally recognised nations 
could be ignored if judged to be contrary to the interests of the industry. This 
is well illustrated in the following excerpt from a memorandum sent by 
Kenneth Younger, Minister of State at the Foreign Office to Herbert 
Morrison, Foreign Secretary, in October 1951: 
He ( Sir William Fraser, Chairman of BP ) on many occasions explicitly 
stated in my presence that he does not think politics rnncern him at all. He 
appears to have all the contempt of a Glasgow accountantfor anything which 
cannot be shown on a balance sheet. This is an attitude quite incompatible 
with the responsibilities of a company like A. L 0. C. operating in so complex 
and unsettled an area as the Middle East. 
4 The Nature of Employment in the Industry 
If oil companies can confront a British prime minister17, it is Unlikely that they 
will be afraid to "mix it " with their employees. The first point to realise in 
any attempt to understand employment in the North Sea, at least in British 
waters, is that the operators are, in the main, very powerful transnational 
organizations who have been accustomed to operate with little concern for 
what may have been the accepted patterns of industrial relations within the 
territories of the host nations. This is not to say that they are callous or 
indifferent towards employees but simply that they wish to manage their 
organizations with the minimum of interference from third parties whether it 
be Her Majesty's Government or a trade union. The most obvious departure 
from the traditional pattern of British industrial relations is that trade unions 
are not recognised as having any legitimate role in the establishment of 
17 v. supra p. 23 
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conditions of work offshore, despite the fact that the same trade union which is 
being denied negotiating rights for its members offshore may have enjoyed 
full recognition from the same company for decades onshore. For example, 
distribution of their product is very important for oil companies and so they 
negotiate with the T. G. W. U. on the pay and conditions of tanker drivers. The 
employers are therefore adopting a pragmatic position: they may not like to 
negotiate but the alternative will be disruption of their distribution. Offshore, 
by contrast, the opportunities for effective industrial action are limited and the 
simple expedient of refusing to recognise a trade union for bargaining 
purposes removes a vital element in the consideration of any action taken to 
deal with a dispute. In recent Years there has been an added factor. Fewer 
persons are now directly employed by the operators of platforms while an 
increasing number of workers on the platforms are employed by contracting 
firms. In the 1980s the terms and conditions of employment on installations 
varied widely according to whether employees were operators' or contractors' 
men. This could be interpreted as a "divide and rule " policy but the increasing 
employment of contractors was simply the consequence of technical and 
financial decisions and in any case current policy is to reduce to a minimum 
the differences between the two types of employee. This matter will be dealt 
with in greater detail later in the thesis. 
The second point which must be appreciated is that employment offshore in the 
quest for oil is utterly different froin land based employment because of its 
environmental hazards. These hazards alone are sometimes used by the oil 
companies to justify their style of management because an indifferent attitude 
to weather and the problems it can cause would be in urious to the safety of j 
both the platforms and those who work on them. Fishing - and to a limited 
extent marine transport- are the only other activities, where any real 
comparison can be drawn with employment in offshore oil. There is the 
obvious common factor of the sea, which can become life-threatening in 
stormy weather to all who are exposed to its fury. Fishermen have had to cope 
with this for centuries and on the whole they are recruited from families who 
have adapted to the life style which the nature of their job demands. There is 
the added danger that the modern technology of fishing involves machinery 
which must be operated with care e. g. trawl machinery. Employees in marine 
transport have no other element than the sea to fear in the conduct of their 
livelihood and apart from that their work does not differ in any essential way 
from work onshore. 
Oil installations are far out to sea and consequently those who work on them 
have to be flown to and from their employment and at some installations to 
and from their sleeping accommodation ( the "flotel" Offshore oil must be 
the only industry which has to transport its employees to and from work by air 
and there have been accidents with loss of life, when helicopters have crashed. 
On 6th November, 1986 a Chinook helicopter dropped into the sea off 
Sumburgh in Shetland when its rotorarm sheared and 45 oilmen died. There 
have been other accidents with fatalities. 
Air accidents, however, pale into significance before the- horror of the disaster 
which befell Piper-Alpha platform on 6th July, 1988 when 167 men perished 
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after fire had broken out. Unlike establishments on land which can and do 
erupt on occasion, such as ICI's plant at Flixborough in 1974, there is no 
escape on foot from an oil installation, when its personnel have to be 
evacuated and this is an ever-present and immovable factor in offshore oil 
employment. 
The whole question of accident prevention and the method of employee 
representation on the bodies set up to reduce or eliminate accidents will be 
investigated later. All that will be said at this point is that the trade unions 
have always approached the issue from two different but closely related points 
of view: the right of all employees to have as safe a working environment as 
possible and the right of trade unions to represent that concern on behalf of 
4their members. 
As is the case with almost all industries, the culture is paramount and it is 
unlikely that attitudes and practices built up over decades of experience will 
change when an industry starts to operate in a different part of the world. This 
is especially so in the case of oil which has for almost a century operated on a 
global basis and found success with its modus operandi in places as far apart 
as Saudi-Arabia and Venezuela. Oil as a business has cultivated a" get up and 
go " philosophy among its managers and they find it difficult to operate in any 
different manner. The following crude comment may be an extreme example 
but it gives a flavour of the point being made. 
To hell with the law, I'm the law around here. We break yourf ..... law every 
f ..... day; if we didn't, you wouldn't have onef ..... hole drilled in yourf ..... North Sea. 18 
Less crude but surprisingly insensitive to the atmosphere offshore in the 
immediate aftermath of Piper Alpha was the response on 22nd September, 
1988 of John Browne, drilling supervisor of the rig Ocean Odyssey, to a 
warning about a possible influx of gas from a rogue well. He dismissed as 
paranoia the concern of the senior employee who had raised the matter adding 
Let's get on with the job. You are scared of a little bit of gas. 19 He then told 
the installation manager, who was in charge of safety, to do nothing until he 
authorised any action. Three hours later a blowout occurred and the rig was 
engulfed in flames. 
Managerial attitudes are very different now. Nevertheless, the memories of 
Piper Alpha and Ocean Odyssey remain and, justifiably or not, oil companies 
are still regarded in many quarters as organizations which put productivity 
above accident prevention. 
18 Carson, W. G. 1982 77ze Other Price of Britain's Oil. Martin Robertson, Oxford (Statement 
by an American oil official to W. G. Carson). 
19 Report in the Scotsman, I Ith August, 1993 on the prosecution of the rig owner, Odeco 
Drilling, for breaches of health and safety regulations. The firm was fined E250,000. One 
employee, a radio operator, died under particularly tragic circumstances, having been ordered 
back to the burning rig. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE INTER-RELATIONSHIP OF ECONOMICS AND INDUSTRIAL 
RELATIONS IN THE NORTH SEA OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY 
William Brown, Professor of Industrial Relations at Cambridge University, 
advises that an organization's industrial relations are, in the last analysis, a 
reflection of the economic milieu within which it operates and that consequently 
an understanding of economics is an essential ingredient of any research into an 
industrial relations theme. I Brief reference has been made in the previous chapter 
to micro-economic theories within the oil industry. However, in accordance with 
Brown's dictum, the economics of the industry must be analysed in greater depth 
in order that the industrial relations policies of the oil operating companies can be 
understood, if not necessarily condoned. 
One constant threat is woven throughout the tapestry of industrial relations in the 
North Sea oil and gas industry. This is the resolute refusal of the operators on the 
UK Continental Shelf to accept that trade unions should be consulted on pay and 
conditions of employment once a platform is in production. The costs of 
production in an environment as hostile as the North Sea are enormous and, in 
addition, do not conform to as regular a pattern as is the case with land-based 
locations. Accordingly, the employers have been determined to reduce to a 
minimum all impediments to their unfettered management of offshore 
installations. Trade unions are perceived as such an impediment and, unlike 
weather and geological formations, a factor which they can control. This attitude 
of refusal has its roots in the economics of the oil industry and it is thus relevant to 
discuss trade union recognition, or rather the lack of it, in this context. 
During the 1960s the major oil operators, especially BP and Shell, had become 
alarmed at the nascent nationalism of the Gulf States. As early as 1951 Iran had 
suddenly nationalised all the assets of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (soon to be 
renamed BP) and although an acceptable compromise had been reached it seemed 
certain that foreign technological and economic control of the industry would be 
challenged sooner or later by the sovereign governments in the Middle East and 
Gulf States. Shell and BP therefore decided to seek other sources of oil in 
politically stable areas, where there would be no dispute over the prime ownership 
of the reservoirs. Accordingly they inaugurated exploration in Alaska and the 
North Sea and by 1970 they had identified vast reserves in these areas, although, 
as far as the North Sea was concerned, exploitation would entail enormous capital 
expenditure on account of the technological difficulties posed by a hostile physical 
environment. The Middle East had to remain, for the time being at least, their 
principal source of supply. 
Crude oil is priced internationally. Whatever the currency cost of extracting crude 
oil - and it is obviously much less expensive to extract from a desert in Arabia 
than from the depths of the North Sea - its revenue value to the operator is always 
1 Comment made to the author when discussing a thesis of which they were joint supervisors. 
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expressed in terms of US dollars per barrel . The $ price level and the $ exchange 
rate against national currencies both fluctuate and this volatility exerts a 
considerable measure of influence not only on the forward planning, which all oil 
operators carry out, but also on any current exploration and production. For many 
decades these fluctuations were so small that they could be virtually ignored but 
by the early 1970s there was soon to be a dramatic change in this comfortable 
economic climate. Two unrelated but contemporary events, the collapse of the 
international currency system and political upheaval in the Middle East, brought 
about this change. 
By the time that the Second World War was drawing to its close, the USA had 
become the dominant political and economic power in the world. It was, in 
addition, financially stable and under the Bretton Woods Agreement of 1944 it 
allowed other nations to use dollars as their reserve currency and offered 
unconditional conversion into gold at a fixed rate of $35 per fine ounce. Indirectly, 
the dollar had become a medium of international exchange and all currencies were 
pegged to the dollar, which, in its turn, was pegged to gold at a constant value of 
$35 per ounce. This system, however, depended upon there being limited and 
stable inflation in the USA and, after about two decades, low but creeping 
inflation in the USA began to undermine the Bretton Woods mechanism. Since the 
quantity of dollars was increasing as a result of American military expenditure in 
Vietnam, the US dollar/gold fixed exchange rate was under increasing pressure 
and there was a risk that either the US reserves of gold would run out or the world 
economy would decelerate, creating world-wide slump. Inevitably, other countries 
began to convert their dollars into gold and even other currencies. In 1970 Canada 
allowed its dollar to float and the following year President Nixon ended gold 
convertibility of the US dollar, thus abrogating the Bretton Woods Agreement. 
The world currency system went into free-fall. 
This by itself might have had only scant effect on the price of oil had it not co- 
incided with political turbulence in the Middle East, which the oil companies had 
foreseen. First, in 1969, an army colonel, Muammar Quadaffi, staged a successful 
coup d'6tat in Libya, which replaced the constitutional Senussi monarchy of King 
ldris. 3 Quadaffl demanded an immediate increase in the posted price of Zelten 
(i. e. Libyan) oil, which was valued on account of its low sulphur content and he 
successfully encouraged the other OPEC4 countries to demand similar increases. 
By September 1973 the price paid to the oil companies had risen to $2.90 per 
barrel in comparison with the previous figure of $2.26, an increase with which the 
companies were, nevertheless, able to bear without difficulty. Then in October 
1973 another Arab-Israeli war erupted. 5 The Arab nations cut oil supplies by 25% 
2 The traditional unit of measure of volume is the barrel, which has a capacity of 42 US gallons 
This equates to approximately 35 imperial gallons. 
3 He established a fundamentalist Islamic r6gime and has remained head of state for almost 30 
years. 
4 The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries had been founded in 1960, largely at the 
instigation of Venezuela, which subsequently played so small a r6le in its decisions that OPEC 
appeared to the general public to be a Middle Eastern cartel. 
5 Known as the Yom Kippur war since hostilities began on the Jewish Day of Attonement. 
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and this pushed up the price which by January 1974 had risen to $11.65 per barrel 
and to over $22 on the cash wholesale market in Rotterdam. The price eventually 
stabilized around $13 but this was a figure more than five times greater than the 
level a few months previously. 
This steep rise in the price of oil and the political instability of the Middle East 
must been seen against a third factor, a world-wide recession, which had been set 
in train by the oil price "hike". There had been a huge transfer in funds from USA, 
Japan and Western Europe during 1972- 1974 to OPEC countries and they were 
unable to recycle their purchasing power through the normal channels of 
international trade. Thus the demand for goods world-wide fell and there began a 
world recession from which Britain was not immune; for the last time Britain had 
to receive assistance from the International Monetary Fund in 1976. 
Rampant inflation at home and political turmoil in the area of the world where it 
obtained 80% of its supplies initially persuaded one British operator, Shell, to 
think of new areas of business. Serious consideration was given to investment in 
tourism and in a chain of hotels in Iran, although these ideas were slightly less 
6 bizarre than Gulf Oil's attempt to buy Barnum and Bailey's Circus. However, the 
fundamental core business of the two major UK operators, Shell and BP, still 
remained crude oil, petroleum, natural gas and chemicals and the decision was 
made to invest in the United Kingdom Continental Shelf. The cost of this would 
be immense because the exploration andproduction investment in the region was 
estimated at D, 200 - 11,500 per barrel per day; yet in the Middle East, the 
comparablefigure was a mere _rI00.7 There were two reasons why they were able 
to fund this investment; the price of oil had reached a height that made such 
investment an economically viable prospect and the funding for this investment 
quickly emerged from co-operation between the City of London and American 
banks, the USA being as eager as the UK to secure sources of oil outside OPEC 
countries. 
Since the late 1940s all public utilities in the United Kingdom had been 
nationalised and in its manifesto for the general election of early 19748 the Labour 
Party had pledged to nationalise North Sea oil, an objective which, once in 
government, it reinterpreted more realistically as 51% participation in all oil 
production rather than 51% control of the equity of all North Sea oil operating 
companies. The government purchased at prevailing prices just over half the oil 
produced by North Sea operators through the British National Oil Corporation 
(BNOC) which it established in January 1976. BNOC also operated three 
platforms9 and participated in new rounds of licences. When the price of oil 
tumbled in the mid-1980s the commitment to buy 51% of all North Sea oil 
became more and more costly and the government (now Conservative and not 
well disposed to nationalisation) withdrew from its participation agreements. It 
6 
7 
Howarth, S., (1997) A Century of Oil, p. 3 10. Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London. 
Howarth, S. op cit p. 317. 
8 1974 was the year of two general elections. Labour did not win an overall majority in the House 
of Commons in the March election but achieved this in a second election late in the same year. 
9 Beatrice, Clyde and Thistle; it also owned a gas platform in Morecambe Bay. 
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sold its operational arin, which had a short existence as Britoil, until BP bought it 
over, principally to secure the large number of licences that came with the 
purchase. 10 
In 1975 the first oil was produced from the North Sea but it was a veritable trickle 
in relation to world production and even by 1982, when Britain was producing 
more oil than it consumed, it represented less than 4% of total world production. 
The price of oil seemed to be on a permanent upward spiral which rose even more 
steeply in 1979 when the events of 1973 were repeated. OPEC raised the price of 
its oil by 5% just before a revolution in Iran replaced the rule of the Shah with a 
religious fundamentalist r6gime. With Iran in turmoil its output fell first by 6 
million barrels per day and then in September four million barrels per day 
vanished from the world's daily supply when Iraq attacked Iran, the oil production 
capacity of which was close to its border. The price of oil doubled that year to 
$26. There were further OPEC - instigated rises of $7 in 1980 and $4 in 1981 and 
thus within eight years the price of a barrel of oil had jumped from less than $3 to 
$37 at one point. Immense funds flowed into OPEC countries and again there was 
a world recession (1980-1982) since OPEC reserves were withdrawn from, and 
not returned as purchasing power to, the industrialised economies of the world. 
This combination of the high cost of oil and another world-wide recession had the 
inevitable effect of energy consumers seeking to reduce their consumption and 
this did not exclude oil producing nations such as USA or Uy" although the latter 
had become self-sufficient in oil by 1981. The USA improved its energy 
efficiency overall by 25% and its oil efficiency by 32% during the seven years of 
1978-1985 and over the same period Japan, which had no indigenous oil, followed 
suit by 31% and 51% respectively. It took just over a year for business to recover 
the costs of converting to another source of energy- cow, electricity, natural gas 
or nuclear power. For the oil companies it had become not only financially 
feasible to explore in difficult areas but now strategically essential as Sir Peter 
Baxendell, Chairman of Shell was to comment later. No longer were we just 
searching for very large reserves but also small accumulations. It became a 
question not so much offinding giantfields as finding the right sort of oil in the 
right places. II Consequently a record number of wells were drilled in the North 
Sea in 1982, the first year that non-OPEC companies produced more oil than 
OPEC. 12 Yet heavy investment and greater production at a time of reduced 
consumption could have only one eventual outcome, the replacement of a seller's 
by a buyer's market. 
At the start of 1983 oil was still (officially at any rate) selling at $34 per barrel but 
in February of that year BNOC intervened, reducing its price by $4 per barrel. The 
BNOC reduction evoked an immediate response from OPEC which cut the price 
of its oil and curtailed its production to 17.5 million barrels per day, 44% less than 
it had produced in 1979. The steep increase of 1974-1982 was followed by the 
steady and precipitous decline of 1983-1986 which saw, by Spring 1986, oil 
10 As a result of its Britoil purchase BP now held more "acreage" of the North Sea than did Shell. 11 Howarth, S. op cit p. 343. 
12 Howarth, S. op cit p. 345. 
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available at $ 10 per barrel and spot prices reaching a nadir of $6. Later in 1986 oil 
stabilized at $15-$18 but production in the North Sea had to be reviewed and 
ftuther development postponed. 
There followed a period of very slow recovery, which was hindered by yet another 
recession, this time peculiar to UK. It was induced by the government's decision 
in 1990 to enter the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), whereby sterling's 
exchange rate was set at fixed limits against the other currencies in the European 
Monetary System (EMS), principally the Deutschmark. This new exchange rate 
level for sterling meant the pound was overpriced on the world money market, 
exports suffered, interest rates were forced up to above 12% and investment was 
stifled. The United Kingdom pulled out of the ERM at considerable cost in 1992. 
The price of oil has oscillated between the $12 to $18 limits since 1986 and, in 
addition, production, and therefore revenue, declined significantly from 1986 to 
1991. The Cullen Report on the Piper Alpha disaster of 1988 was followed by 
legislation on accident prevention measures that cost the industry L5 billion, just at 
the time of the recession mentioned immediately above. The result has been that 
oil companies have had to pay far greater attention to their costs than was once 
necessary. With government encouragement and support the CRINE (Cost 
Reduction in the New Era) Initiative' 3 was launched to encourage oil companies to 
identify and investigate areas where reductions in operational costs might be 
achieved. 
Throughout the 1980s three new factors affected the control of the British 
economy. To some extent they were the result of a change in political philosophy 
associated with the premiership of Margaret Thatcher (1979-1990) but there were 
also developments affecting the economies of all the industrialised democracies, 
which the United Kingdom could not ignore. These factors - the privatisation of 
British industry, the liberalisation of the financial system and the advent of 
modem communication technology - naturally had implications for the North Sea 
oil and gas industry as well. 
The first factor was a virtual revolution within British industry that saw the 
privatisation of the nationalised utilities, which had been brought under public 
control, mainly in the 1940s. The enterprises which emerged from this 
abandonment of state ownership could not depend on government subsidies if they 
failed to sustain their profitability and this led to a decrease in the number and size 
of establishments together with consequent manpower reductions. Between 1982 
and 1991 the number of employees in nationalised industries fell from 1,850,000 
to 660,000. Steel, in particular, demonstrated this trend. In the mid 1970s it 
employed almost 250,000 but began to suffer heavy losses (which the government 
was subsidising at over f3m per week) on account of low productivity associated 
with over-capacity and by 1990 its employees had fallen to 51,200, many units 
such as Ravenscraig and Shotton having been closed down at great social cost. 
13 'Me CRINE Initiative is discussed in greater detail in chapter 12. 
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There is a direct link between the demand for steel and the demand for oil. Until 
about ten years ago the steel industry could be taken as an indicator of the general 
level of economic activity within the United Kingdom because when it was 
progressing the nation progressed with it. An increase in the production and usage 
of steel, which is a major input into industrial activity, would suggest a rising level 
of industrial production and hence economic growth. An implication of higher 
levels of economic activity is an increased consumption of energy in general and it 
consequently follows that this relationship between steel production, economic 
growth and energy consumption could be taken as a reliable barometer of all 
forms of energy production. Oil is a major component of the energy sector and 
thus benefited when economic activity levels were high but experienced reduction 
in demand when activity levels declined. Examples of this phenomenon are the 
recessions first in 1974-1975, when pressure to reduce national capacity of steel 
production was first mounted, and then in 1980-1982, when demand was so low 
that the opportunity to close many uneconomic units was too good to be missed, 
and then the relatively prosperous years of the late 1980s, when the slimmer and 
therefore more productive British steel industry could respond to, and satisfy the 
demand for, increasing quantities of its product. 
The nationalised industries had represented for the trade unions vast swathes of 
membership concentrated in vulnerable areas of the British economy but this 
powerful weapon was now dissipated. In the private sector also there had been 
reductions in the number of employees in other industries such as motor vehicle 
manufacture. Many displaced employees probably carried their trade union 
membership into new employment but there was a parallel revolution taking place 
in the industrial relations structure of the United Kingdom. Legislation was 
introduced at intervals of two years which gradually reduced the power of trade 
uninns to confront employers, significant examples being the illegality of strikes 
called without secret ballots and the abolition of enforced closed shop 
membership. Trade union membership declined from 13,289,000 in 1979 to 
10,043,000 in 1989 and to 8,03 1,000 in 1995. 
This decline in trade union influence removed some of the restraints which had 
formerly impeded management's ability to deploy their human resources in the 
most effective manner but this was as nothing compared with the liberalisation of 
the financial system. All restraints on the movement of capital in and out of the 
United Kingdom were removed from 1979 onwards and throughout North 
America, Western Europe and, to a lesser extent, Japan funds were transferred at 
will. Moreover, just as modem technology was now playing a huge part in the 
achievement of higher productivity in the manufacturing sector, 4 the advent of 
electronic transfer and similar advanced communication technology had 
revolutionised the modus operandi of international trade and finance. For the oil 
industry the effect was monumental. The price of oil could change within a few 
14 There is also a reverse side to technological advance. It removed employment opportunities 
from people of modest intellectual attainment who had always found work as labourers and 
helpers. A comparison of photographs of any manufacturing establishment taken in 1980 and 
today demonstrates this. * 
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minutes and traders in company offices could sell or purchase entire shiploads of 
crude oil without the oil tankers ever having to discharge their cargo ashore. 
This added a new dimension to the risks which the oil industry had to bear. There 
had always been the risk that capital expended on exploration could not be 
recovered on account of geological problems which were not foreseen or that 
production could be curtailed on account of environmental, technological or 
manpower problems. There was now currency risk as the relationship of a 
particular currency to the US dollar could change without warning. If, for 
example, the current dollar/sterling exchange rate of $1.64 to El moved to $1.30 
to El and the price of a barrel of oil remained steady at $15, the value of receipts 
in sterling would rise to about El 1.50 from E9.14 per barrel. Since output is 
usually measured in millions of barrels per day the difference in value to the UK 
of its oil would have risen very significantly; and that (hypothetical) example was 
based on a steady price for the commodity. 
An actual case - BP's report on its performance in the first half of 1998 
15 
_ 
demonstrates the difficulties which have been argued above. Operating profits 
from exploration and production have fallen from L6951n to E4471n as higher oil 
output volumes - up 8% - and cost reductions have failed to compensate for steep 
falling prices. The average price realised by BP in the last six months of 1997 had 
been $19.90 per barrel and this has now dropped to below $13. A recent OPEC 
production agreement means that it will take a long time for oil stocks to unwind 
and BP foresees problems with its high cost Alaskan fields if the price of oil 
continues its downward drill towards $10 per barrel. This concern may have been 
one reason for the proposed merger in August 1998 of BP and Amoco making it 
the largest oil company after Exxon and Royal Dutch Shell. If, as some 
economists suggest, this merger provokes a spate of similar amalgamations (there 
has been speculation concerning a possible link-up between the French oil 
company ELF and Dupont-owned Conoco), there will be fewer but even larger oil 
companies competing on the world energy market. 
At the time of writing even more factors must be taken into consideration, when 
British oil company directors make decisions bearing on the future of their 
business. Currently, share prices are falling on both the London and the New York 
Stock Exchanges, partly in response to problems in the economies of Russia and 
several Far East nations. In 1999 the European Monetary Union will be launched 
and, although Britain is, at present, undecided when, or even if, it will join ,16 
it 
will increasingly become a de facto member of the new monetary system as UK 
companies begin to invoice sales to, and purchases from, EU countries in Euros. 
In addition, Japanese and United States companies which trade with European 
Union nations may have to invoice in Euros. Another important factor in the 
determination of an oil company's forward planning is the interest rate but one of 
Gordon Brown's first decisions on appointment as Chancellor of the Exchequer 
was to remove formally Treasury influence over interest rate policy and give full 
15 Published 4th August, 1998 and commented upon in all major newspapers the following day. 
16 William Hague, Leader of the Conservative Party, said in 1997 that he believed that ten years 
should pass before Britain contemplated membership seriously. 
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and independent responsibility for it to the Bank of England. Finally, the 
continuance of the United Kingdom as an integrated state cannot be assumed as 
long as there is a Scottish National Party, which continues to attract over 20% 
support at parliamentary elections. 17 
With their operations increasingly dependent on funding from international capital 
markets and a host of variable factors jostling for attention, it is now more 
incumbent than ever upon the oil companies to avoid unnecessary extra 
expenditure and to take such measures which will ensure that they run their 
operations with the minimum of interference, which may provoke cost increases. 
UK governments have been content to allow the combination of international 
bankers and oil company directors, representatives of which sit on each others' 
boards, ' 8 to influence the nation's energy policy and so there has been the 
minimum of interference from that quarter. On the other hand there has always 
been a single threat which has exercised the minds of the oil companies and this 
has been the power of organized labour. It was for this reason that they were 
determined from the outset of exploration in the North Sea that no interference in 
the running of their operations would be tolerated from this quarter. This leads on 
to the question of recognition of trade unions. 
The refusal of almost every oil operating company to recognise trade unions for 
collective bargaining purposes and, in most cases, also for joint consultation was a 
total rejection of what may be called the macro-recognition culture of British 
industrial relations. There was no room even for micro-recognition, which might 
allow for exceptions in certain cases. While other inwardly investing organizations 
from North America and Japan adopted the macro-recognition culture of British 
industrial relations 19 - the attitude of the majority of American companies being 
described as "relaxed" by one authority'o_ opposition by the oil operators to trade 
unions was and remains total. This can be explained from two different aspects. 
The first is that in the early days of North Sea oil the expertise in exploration and 
production lay largely with North American companies which did not recognise 
trade unions in their own country and had no intention of altering this practice in 
British waters. They regarded trade unions as impediments to the operation of 
their business and if British trade unions were not corrupt like some of the larger 
unions in the USA they were addicted to restrictive practices that were anathema 
to any oil company, which sought to operate with the minimum of restraint from 
any quarter. The second reason is that it was simply a decision based upon the 
need to avoid any addition to operational costs. This argument was put succinctly 
by two industrial relations academics: For employers, the issue is essentially 
practical. - the saving in unit labour costs, the cost of disruption to markets or 
17 The author refuses to speculate on the possible voting patterns in the first election to the Scottish 
Parliament in May 1999. 
lg A similar situation prevails in the USA to-day with the directors of the US automobile industries 
sitting on the boards of American banks. 
19 IBM and Kodak were notable exceptions. 
20 Kessler, S and Bayliss, F., (1992) Contemporary British Industrial Relations, p. 180. Macmillan, 
London. I 
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service provision, the changes in personnel necessary to implement thepolicy, and 
the resources required to overcome union collective power. 21 For the first time 
the industry was about to operate in a physical environment very much harsher 
than it had experienced elsewhere and this demanded huge expenditure on 
specialist technology, quite apart from all the other costs of extracting oil from the 
North Sea, including the transfer of employees to and from installations and their 
accommodation offshore. Labour costs would inevitably be high and so the oil 
companies wanted to be free to decide the terms of employment in relation to 
other demands on their resources without the intervention of some third party. 
The quest for recognition became a permanent factor in the relationships between 
the trade unions and the oil industry. At one point trade union leaders believed that 
the tragedy of Piper Alpha, where a major operator was found to have been 
negligent in its approach to accident prevention, would be followed by 
government pressure upon employers to recognise unions, even if only for the 
purposes of joint consultation on accident prevention. 22 This did not happen and 
oil companies continue to manage their industry without recognising trade unions. 
Recognition of trade unions was one of the matters which concerned the Royal 
Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations. In 1962 William 
McCarthy wrote Yhe outlook facing the leaders of the British trade union 
movement today is uncertain, impossible to predict, and potentially disastrous. 23 
One of these leaders was George Woodcock, who, addressing the Trades Union 
Congress of which he was General Secretary, had posed the rhetorical question: 
"at are unionsfor? 
It was a time when, although there were over 600 independent unions, union 
growth had almost ceased because even traditional industries were beginning to 
become capital rather than labour intensive. McCarthy saw that the solution lay in 
wider recognition of trade unions in the emerging industries and in persuading 
clerical workers to see the value of trade unionism, especially those within private 
industry, only 5% of whom were unionised. By the early 1960s there was also 
growing concern about the prevalence of labour. disputes in certain sectors of 
British industry. 
The government set up a Commission, usually referred to as the Donovan 
Commission after its chairman, Lord Donovan, in 1965 -just at the time when oil 
exploration began in the North Sea - with the remit that it should (inter alia) 
consider relations between managements and employees and the r6le of trade 
unions and employers' associations. 24 To assist its members to reach their 
conclusions and recommendations, which were published three years later, it 
21 Smith, P. and Morton, G., (1993) Union Exclusion and the Decollectivization of Industrial 
Relations in Contemporary Britain. British Journal ofIndustrial Relations, 3 1, p. 10 1. 
22, MiS is dealt with at some length in Chapter 11. 
23 McCarthy, W. (1962) The Future of the Unions, p. 1. Fabian Tract No 339. Fabian Society, 
London. 
24 The Report of the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations. Crnnd 
3623,1968. 
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commissioned eleven research papers. One of these was "rrade Union Growth 
and Recognition" by G. S. Bain, which may be used as a starting point in 
considering trade union recognition and derecognition over the last thirty years. 
Bain outlined his basic themc in the opening paragraph of his introductory 
chapter. Manual workers, the power base of the trade union movement, were 
declining in numbers in contrast with white collar workers whose numbers were in 
rapid ascent but few of whom, outside the public sector, were trade union 
members. If trade unions were to continue to have an effective role within the 
British industrial relations system they would have to recruit a far higher 
proportion of these workers. This itself presented a ma or problem because the 
majority of employers rcfiiscd to recognise those trade unions which organized 
white collar workers. Consequently the continued growth and effectiveness of the 
trade union movement largely depend upon government action to encourage union 
recognition. 25 
In subsequent chapters Bain stressed the importance of density as well as size of 
union membership in any industry, a characteristic which was generally lacking in 
white collar unionism despite its numerical growth. He discussed the reasons 
given by employers for refusing to recognize white collar unions and 
demonstrated why they were spurious. He also rejected social status as a, factor 
impeding white collar employee membership of trade unions. From the evidence 
that he had brought forward he concluded that the survival of the trade union 
movement as an effective force would depend upon its expansion among the white 
collar section of the workforce and that assistance to do so must be provided 
through government action since many employers were determined to obstruct this 
process by refusing to recognize trade unions prepared to represent junior 
managerial staff. 
Bain used his research to produce a book, 26 which dealt in greater detail with the 
issues he had raised in his paper for the Donovan Commission. In its conclusion 
he claimed that the model he used to describe the growth of white-collar trade 
unionism can be adequately explained by three strategic variables- employment 
concentration, union recognition and government action27. 
A few years later other academics criticised aspects of Bain's research. R. I 
Adams argued that the three strategic variables which Bain offered as an 
explanation of white collar growth was a very parsimonious theory, which he at 
least implied to have universal validity. 28 This model was deficient because it did 
not provide an independent mechanism for the achievement of density. As Adams 
pointed out, Bain stated that a certain density of membership is a necessary 
condition for any degree of recognition to he granted because government action 
25 Bain, G. S., (1967) Trade Union Growth and Recognition, para 1. Research Paper 6 prepared for 
the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations. HMSO. London. 
26 Bain, G. S. (1970) The Growth of Mile-Collar Unionism. Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
27 idern p. 187. 
28 Adams, R. J., (1977) Bain's Theory of White Collar Growth: a Conceptual Critique. British 
Journal ofIndustrial Relations, XV, pp. 317-322. 
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alone could not be justified as a reason for recognition and therefore unions would 
have to recruit members in the first place. Yet Bain had said earlier that union 
recruitment was of negligible importance and so his argument was circular. R. 
Richardson criticised Bain's apparent assumption that additions to the workforce 
of women, white collar workers and public sector employees over the past 75 
years had been steady across all sectors of employment whereas it had occurred at 
different levels of intensity among different sectors at different times. He had 
failed to take into consideration the large compositional changes which had 
happened over that period. It may be that compositional variations are not related 
to union growth but elementa? y reasoning and an examination of the raw data 
both suggest that they should be considered at greater length than was done in 
the book29 
Bain's critics, nevertheless, praised his research as a major achievement in 
comparison with anything that had preceded it. Moreover, the members of the 
Donovan Commission accepted his findings on the problems of recognition faced 
by trade unions in general and by white collar unions in particular and these were 
incorporated in their Report, 30 although they did not go so far as to propose 
penalties on employers who refused to recognize trade unions. 31 Both Bain and 
Allan Flanders 32 had favoured an independent tribunal to which recognition 
disputes might be referred but the Commission advised that these could be 
delegated to an Industrial Relations Commission, whose establishment it 
advocated 33 and which will be able to approach its task in the spirit of the tribunal 
proposed by Mr Flanders. 34 
North Sea oil companies operating above the UK Continental Shelf have never 
accorded full recognition to trade unions except in very exceptional cases. The 
reasons which they advance for justifying their anti-trade union stance have a 
remarkable similarity to those found by Bain, although he was interested almost 
exclusively with the problems of white collar unions. Since these reasons are still 
advanced by oil operating companies to vindicate their exclusion of trade unions 
they deserve some attention. 
The first reason given by employers for refusing recognition is that trade unions 
are unnecessary in their industry. They claim, as Bain found over thirty years ago, 
that the terms and conditions of employment being observed by the firm--are 
equal to, ifnot superior to, those negotiated by the trade unions. 35 This may be so 
but, as Fox argued in his research paper, 36 unions have functions other than that of 
looking after the economic well-being of their members. Managements may make 
"Richardson, R. (1978) Trade Union Growth: a Rejoinder. British Journal ofIndustrial Relations 
XVI pp. 103-105. '0 Paras 216-224. 
31 Para 204. 
32 Flanders had sent a written submission to the Commission. 
33 The government did set up the Commission on Industrial Relations in 1969 and its functions 
were subsumed by the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service in 1974. 34 Para 256. 
35 Bain, G. S., (1967) op cit. Para 168. 
36 v. Chapter 1, pp. 7&8 supra. 
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decisions which employees feel are unjust and prejudicial to their interests and the 
absence of a trade union deprives them of a channel of communication through 
which their view can be presented. This is the distinction between the unitarist and 
pluralist frames of reference, which has already been dealt with in the chapter on 
methodology. 
A second reason is that trade unions impede decision-making. Trade union 
recognition, argue the employers, leads to conflict and divided loyalties with 
consequent lowering of morale. This brings us again to unitarist and pluralist 
frames of reference with the oil companies almost entirely within the unitarist 
frame. The industrial philosophy of oil companies appears to suggest that trade 
unions have no function other than that of agitators for increased financial rewards 
whereas trade unions may well consider other issues to have greater importance. 
This is certainly the case with the Offshore Industry Liaison Committee which 
places improved accident prevention at the summit of its priorities and does not 
see increased remuneration offshore as a pressing issue. 
Bain found that employers offered two further arguments against recognition of 
trade unions. One was that the particular trade union which sought recognition 
was inappropriate, a euphemism for undesirable. In Bain's research this 
circumstance normally arose when the employer already recognized a manual 
worker trade union but did not wish to extend that recognition to the union's white 
collar section, but the oil companies, once an offshore installation was in 
production, usually treated all trade unions as "inappropriate". Bain quoted the 
Labour Correspondent of the "rimes", who had made the reasonable point that it 
was the employees and not the employer who should decide the appropriateness of 
their representatives. 37 The final reason which Bain found for refusal of 
recognition has, however, particular relevance for the oil industry. 
Employers often claimed that the principal criterion for recognition should be the 
extent to which the membership of a particular trade union was representative of 
their employees. Had his research paper been written a decade later, Bain's 
discussion on this matter could well have applied to the North Sea oil industry, as 
is demonstrated by the following two paragraphs: 
A much more complex problem than defining or measuring representativeness is 
defining the area over which the union is expected to demonstrate its 
representativeness. Should the area of representativeness cover a single plant, a 
whole company or the whole industry? Should there be separate areas of 
representation for manual and non-manual workers, plant clericals and office 
clericals etc? Employers who claim that they will recognise a representative 
union, often choose an area over which it will be most difji'cultfor the union to 
demonstrate its effectiveness. Sometimes the firm may have an organisational 
reason for the choice of this area. But generally it is designed merely to keep the 
union out. 38 
37 "Times", 2nd December, 1963. Bain, G. S., (1967) op cit para 197. 
38 Bain, G. S., (1967) op cit para 204. ' 
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Bain gave as an example of this stratagem a company employing over 40,000 
white-collar employees in 75 establishments, which agreed to recognize a union 
but only if the union has majority membership among this grade across the 
company as a whole. 39 
The term used, by the oil operators for Bain's somewhat clumsy 
"representativeness" is "common interest group". It is very easy to avoid 
discussions on recognition by insisting that a trade union has first to show that it 
has recruited a membership among a "common interest group", especially since 
there is no definition of the term. The employers are like Humpty Dumpty in 
"Alice Through the Looking Glass" when he said that a word meant just what he 
chose it to mean. The "Guidelines Through Which Recognition May Be 
Achieved" which were agreed in June 1977 are a triumph of obfuscation, wherein 
0 0 the term occurs in three of the seven very short clauses. 0 
Whether as a result of the recommendations of the Donovan Commission or 
through a gradual acceptance by employers that white-collar unions could assist in 
the determination of terms and conditions of employment, recognition disputes did 
not feature highly in British industrial relations throughout the 1970s . 
41 Between 
1969 and 1979 trade union membership increased by almost three million and 
recognition of white collar unionism became widely accepted in the private sector. 
ACAS must have had a positive cffcct because the statutory basis upon which it 
was established stated that it had a general duty to promote the improvement of 
industrial relations and in particular to encourage the extension of collective 
bargaining, a process which could not take place without trade unions. One 
statutory ACAS function was to examine and make recommendations following a 
submission by a trade union that it had been refused recognition by an employer. 
If the employer failed to comply with the ACAS findings, the union could refer 
the matter to the Central Arbitration Committee 42 (established under the 
Employment Protection Act of 1975) which was empowered to make an award 
through unilateral arbitration. Enforcement, however, was possible only through 
43 actions by individuals for breach of contract . Representational rights might be included in an arbitration award on terms and conditions of employment, as in the 
case of Uniroyal Ltd and ASTMS. 44 Recommendations for recognition were made 
in 158 of the 247 cases submitted to the CAC but of these only 55 were known by 
ACAS to have been implemented. 45 
39 ibid. para 205. 
40 The acceptance of this agreement by the trade unions is dealt with fully at Chapter Seven. 
41 Tlie dispute which f igurcd most prominently occurred in 1976 at the photograhic processing 
company, Grunwick, in London. It had many curious elements and is remembered as a cause 
ciMbre. 42 The CAC replaced the Industrial Arbitration Board which had itself replaced the Industrial 
Court in 1971, the latter having been established in 1919 following the recommendations of the 
Whitley Report. 
43 Lewis, R. (1986 ) Labour Law in Britain, p. 7. Basil Blackwell, Oxford. 
"Central Arbitration Committee case number 1979/27. 45 
Lewis, R. op cit. p. 9 1. 
42 
e, p 
Although the Employment Act (1980) included abolition of this mechanism for 
securing recognition, this was less an anti-trade union move than an 
acknowledgment of an ACAS difficulty. Claims for recognition which it 
investigated were too often inter-union recognition disputes, which disrupted the 
neutral stance that ACAS wished to retain in these matters. 
Throughout the 1980s the government mounted a legislative assault on trade union 
power and influence although it did not inhibit trade unions from continuing to 
seek and retain recognition from employers. Indeed, very little altered in this 
respect. By the end of the decade, however, when unions were wilting under the 
combined drawbacks of a huge decline in the number of manual workers and a 
political philosophy which stressed the importance of voluntarism in all aspects of 
relationships between employer and employed, they became concerned about 
derecognition. It should be said at the outset that the degree of derecognition has 
been very small in relation to the number of recognition agreements which have 
continued to exist but it has been large enough to attract the attention of some 
researchers. 
Snape and Bamber considered the case of managerial and professional eýiployee 
trade unions. 46, These unions had always been small in membership 7 and 
concerned more with their professional standing than with collective bargaining 
and were, in the words of the authors, employerfriendly. There were a few cases 
of derecognition but these were confined to cases where interest and commitment 
to trade unionism was in severe decline. In 1987 for example, British Rail 
discovered that only 49 of its 800 senior managers in the British Transport 
Officers' Guild wanted the Transport Salaried Staff Association (to which the 
Guild was affiliated) to continue to negotiate on their behalf and so ceased to 
rec,. 6nize TSSA at this level of bargaining. This was partial exclusion rather than 
derecognition, a development investigated by Smith and Morton four years later. 
Smith and Morton argued that straightforward dcrccognition was perceived by 
employers as too blunt an instrument for the reduction of trade union influence in 
their establishments. It would immediately arouse the ire of trade unions and 
attract unwelcome attention. Instead, some employers continued to recognize trade 
unions but marginalized them through joint consultation and direct 
communication with their employees. This form of partial exclusion is different 
and more subtle than any unilateral withdrawal from a collective bargaining 
arrangement in respect of a poorly supported segment of a'union because 
employees may gradually come to regard the union as superfluous to their needs. 
However, like all who have looked at derecognition, Smith and Morton judged 
that it has remained uncommon outside weakly organized workers or those whose 
skills have been made redundant by technological development. 48 
46 Snape, E. and Barriber, G., (1989) Managerial and Professional Employees: Conceptualising 
Union Strategies and Structures. British Journal ofIndustrial Relations, 27, pp. 93-110. 
47 The British Medical and Dental Associations are obvious exceptions. 
49 Smith, G. and Morton, 'G. (1993) op cit p. 10 1. 
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Writing only a few months later, Dunn and Wrighe9 also found that recognition 
agreements remained largely intact but suggested that there could be cases where 
this had ceased to have any real effect. They quoted an oil company manager who 
told them that Although an agreement with ASTMS existed on paper, there was no 
contact with the union at all. 50 The authors do not imply that this is common 
although unscrupulous employers will have seen the opportunity it offered to 
operate in a unitarist fashion within an ostensibly pluralist frame of reference. 
The earliest research had been carried out by Claydon, writing at almost the same 
time as Snape and Bamber, but working on a wider canvas. His research5l covered 
the period 1980 to 1988 and he calculated that the average annual rate of trade 
union derecognition was about 35, mainly affecting non-manual workers. Building 
upon Claydon's research and that of Gregg and Yates, 52 who found that complete 
derecortion and company-wide derccognition were rare, Gall and Mackay's 
paper 3 covering the period 1988 to 1994 demonstrated that the incidence of 
derecognition was on the increase. Nevertheless they concluded that as yet there is 
no stampede and our conclusion is that the scale'of derecognition to date is still 
fairly small . 
54 Gall and McKay provided sharper, and therefore more useful, 
definitions of different types of recognition than Claydon had done, partial 
derecognition being defined as where recognition remains for the Purposes of 
5 Y. consultation, individual representation and grievances onl Including 
derecognition cases where single-union deals had been negotiated, they calculated 
that the average annual rate of derecognition was now about 70, of which the 
majority could be classed as partial. That Gall and McKay were writing no 
polemic on the subject is demonstrated by their comment that Despite the new and 
significant developments identified, derecognition must be seen in context, 
remaining mainly insignificant and marginal outside a few sectors. It still 
represents an extreme in industrial relations; at most, somj 150,000 workers have 
been affected since 1988.56 Nor had trade unions ceased to negotiate collective 
agreements with employers. They had continued to win recognition agreements 
and Gall and McKay point out that 390 agreements covering 70,000 employees 
counter-balance the 150,000 who were subject to derecognition during the period 
under review. Moreover, in 1992 the third WIRS 57 investigation indicated that 
there had been no decline in union membership or collective bargaining in the 
largest workplaces (200 or more employees) and the "Financial Times" published 
49 Dunn, S. and Wright, M., (1994) Maintaining the Status Quo? An Analysis of the Contents of 
British Collective Agreements. British Journal ofIndustrial Relations, 32 No 1. 
50 ibid p. 39. It would have been interesting to know if the recognition agreement referred to 
onshore or offshore employees. ASTMS (now MSF) did extract a few recognition agreements for 
offshore workers. 
51 Claydon, T., (1989) Union Derecognition in Britain in the 1980s. British Journal ofIndustrial 
Relations, 27, pp. 214-224. 
52 Gregg, P. A. and Yates, A., (1992) Changes in Trade Union and Wage Setting Arrangements in 
the 1990s. British Journal ofindustrial Relations, 29, pp. 361-376. 
53 Gall, G. and McKay, S., (1994) British Journal ofindustrial Relations, 32, pp. 433-448. 
54 ibid p. 434. 
11 ibid p. 439. 
56 ibid p. 443. 
57 Millward, N. et al (1992) Workplace Industrial Relations in Transition. Aldershot, Dartmouth. 
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a survey which showed that 70% of these workplaces still negotiated fully with 
trade unions. 58 
Rose was another who looked into derccognition and came up with similar 
conclusions. 59 He made a particular study of industry in Swindon, which had 
attracted in 1981-83 a growing number of new firms specialising in the 
manufacture of electronics and other "sunrise" technical products. Direct 
worker/employee contacts and staff status were part of the philosophy of these 
organizations and with traditional trade unionism in decline it might have seemed 
an unlikely area for unions to flourish. Yet by the end of the 1980s it was clear 
that managers did not see trade unions as necessarily obstructive towards their 
company objectives of higher productivity, greater flexibility in working practices 
and increased employee commitment. Trade union authority may have been less 
than it had been in the previous decade, but only marginally so, and this was offset 
by their closer involvement in training and in planning technical change. 
Rose also comments on one derecognition case which unsurprisingly attracted a 
great deal of attention nationally. This was the decision in 1984 by the 
government that trade union membership by employees of the GCHQ operations 
at Cheltenham was incompatible with the security r6le of the establishment. 60 
What was in effect derecognition by government decree was interpreted by some 
as a prelude to a general attack on the Whitley system of collective bargaining 
within the civil service but this did not follow, probably, as Rose argues, because 
union influence in the Civil Service was no longer a government preoccupation 
since its former irfluence had visibly diminished. 61 Shortly after the general 
election of 1997 the new Labour Government restored to GCHQ staff their right 
to membership of trade unions. 
In 1996 Claydon returned to the discussion on trade union derecognition. 62 He 
supported the findings of others who had followed his earlier research, believed 
that the WIRS 3 survey of 1992 had produced somewhat ambiguous evidence on 
the extent ofderecognition63 and suggested that Warwick University's CLIRS 2" 
was more reliable since it found examples of derecognition across a wider range of 
employment. He attempted an interpretation of both surveys. While both found 
derecognition in the private sector was associated with low union density and was, 
therefore, primarily an opportunist response to union weakness, 65 WIRS 3 
considered that it had been the smaller establishments which had been most 
affected while CLIRS 2 suggested that it had, for the most part, been limited to a 
minority of sites or plants within large organizations. Claydon supported this 
58 19th September, 1992. 
'9 Gallic, D., Penn, I- and Rose M. (1996) Trade Unionism in Recession. Oxford University Press. 
60 GCHQ (Government Communications Headquarters) monitors radio communications; between 
between foreign intelligence services. 
61 Gallic, D., Penn, R. and Rose, M. (1996) op cit p. 118. 
62 Claydon, T., (1996) Union Derecognition: a Re-examination. Chapter 7 of Contemporary 
Industrial Relations: a Critical Analysis (edited by I Beardwell). Oxford University Press. 
63 ibid. p. 153 
64 Company Level Industrial Relations Survey 1992/3. 
65 Claydon, T., (1996) op cit p. 155. 
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conclusion with reference to four large oil companies - Shell, Esso, BP and Mobil 
- which had been carrying out what he described as gradualist strategies o union 
exclusion leading ultimately to general derecognition of unions . 
6t Most 
interestingly, Cla 
6rýon 
drew attention to the research of AhIstrand on Esso's 
Fawley refinery. 6 In a widely acclaimed publication twenty-eight years earlier, 
Flanders had described how Esso had negotiated with trade unions a mutually 
satisfactory productivity agreement . 
68 AhIstrand's research demonstrated that 
although the agreement was hailed at the time as a good example of pluralist 
industrial relations in practice it was in reality the initial step of a company-wide 
strategy to dismantle collective bargaining. 
Claydon prefaced his conclusions with the proviso that the significance of 
derecognition is difficult to assess but that two general approaches to 
derecognition can be discerned. One is that it is "reactive", an opportunist 
managerial response to weakening trade union presence in the establishment. The 
other is that it is "purposive", part of a long term objective by management to 
reduce trade union influence or even remove it entirely. The "reactive" approach 
is more likely to happen at the margins of the trade union movement where 
membership is small, declining or reducing in density. The "purposive" choice is 
described by Claydon as a hollowing-out of unionized industrial relations at the 
centre as the hard core of union organisation is itsey undermined. 69 This is 
exemplified by what has been happening in the petro-chemical sector and is 
currently being attempted at CoSteel Sheerness . 
70 Within this category of 
derecognition can be placed the employer policy of introducing individual 
contracts. In some cases this has been accepted by employees with little or no 
demur but Aberdeen was the locus of a dispute which erupted when Aberdeen 
Journals sought to enforce this policy upon their journalists, many of whom 
preferred their union, the National Union of Journalists, to continue to negotiate 
collectively on their behalf. After a bitter and protracted strike, jourrialists 
employed by Aberdeen Journals were told to accept individual contracts or lose 
theirjobs 71 and the National Union of Journalists was, in effect, derecognised. 
Claydon rejects as unwise the advice of Metcalf2 that trade unions might be able 
to avert derecognition by offering local bargaining, when employers decide to end 
national bargaining or by moving to single table bargaining. The evidence of 
AhIstrand's study and his own research into the petro-chernical industry suggest 
that trade unions which co-operate too closely with companies could be paving the 
way for their derecognition. 
66 ibid p. 163. 
61 AhIstrand, B., (1990) The Questfor Productivity: a Case Study of Fawley after Flanders. 
Cambridge University Press. 
68 Flanders, A., (1964) The Fawley Productivity Agreements. Faber, London. 
69 Claydon, T. (1996) op cit p. 170. 
70 Row escalates as CoSteel digs in over recognition. People Management 4 No 16, August 1998. 71 One national official believed it was part of a concerted campaign to make the industry union 
free. v. Kessler, S. and Baylis, F., (1992), op cit p. ISO. 
72 Metcalf, D., (199 1) British Unions: Dissolution or Resurgence?. Oxford Review ofEconomic 
Policy 7, pp. 18-32. 
46 
Since the return to power of the Labour Party in May 1997, trade unions have 
regained some support at government level though rather less than they had 
hoped. The government has already put forward proposals for a new statutory 
trade union recognition procedure, which is almost bound to put into reverse the 
gradual increase in derecognition that had been taking place over the previous two 
decades. Derecognition, however, was never a matter of great consequence upon 
the industrial relations scene during these years. It should be seen as a small by- 
product of something much more significant, the huge decline in trade union 
membership, itself associated with the reduction of labour intensive employment, 
and the statutory impediments placed upon industrial action by trade unions, not 
all of which the present government has promised to restore. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
BRITISH INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS FROM 1960 AND THE 
OFFSHORE OIL OPERATING COMPANIES 
As stated in the previous chapter, the North Sea oil operating companies, for 
reasons which were principally financial / economic, refused to recognize 
trade unions and thus rejected the prevalent macro-recognition culture of 
British industrial relations. Industrial relations policies were implemented 
according to their own rules and not to those rules so widely accepted by other 
employers. These had been practised so widely that that Hugh Clegg, 
Professor of Industrial Relations at the University of Warwick, could refer to 
them as a system. In 1970 Clegg, a member of the Royal Commission on 
Trade Unions and Employer Associations, which two years previously had 
published its report, ' described British industrial relations as a system of rules 
designed and administered in three ways: collective bargaining, employer 
regulation and statutory regulation. 2 He regarded employer imposed industrial 
relations, the unitarist approach condemned by Fox, 3 as a thing of the past, 
and statutory control as a necessary safeguard for certain aspects of 
employment such as accident prevention with collective bargaining now the 
norm. Consequently the employer- employee relationship offshore was atypical 
of the British industrial relations structure because collective bargaining 
between recognized trade unions and employers just did not take place and 
even in some cases statutory regulations were modified to meet the special 
circumstances of the industry. 
The trade unions at national and local level have never accepted that the oil 
operators' stance on industrial relations is justified. They have always 
protested that the oil companies have not played according to the rules, which 
other employers accept, and they have persisted in their attempts to bring the 
oil operators "on-side". Accordingly it is necessary to look at this system 
which the offshore oil employers find unacceptable but which the trade unions 
regard as necessary for the proper conduct of industrial relations within the 
United Kingdom. 
The economist Peter Nolan believes that what he calls the standard 
characterization of British industrial relations over the entire post-war period 
is based upon a mis-reading of the evidence. He believes that this has arisen 
out of the enduring inj7uence of the system's perspective, which treats 
industrial relations as a more or less autonomous set of social relationS4 and 
that, compared with European countries and America, there has been a sharp 
demarcation line in Britain between the study of the institutions of job 
regulation and the study of their economic consequences. 5 A prime example of 
this were three research surveys carried out in the 1950s by the British 
I Report of the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employer Associations, Cmnd 3623. 
2 Clegg, H. A., (1970) 7he System of Industrial Relations in Great Britain p. 1. Basil 
Blackwell, Oxford. 
3 V. chapter 1, p. 7. 
4 Nolan, P. (1996) Industrial Relations since 1945, pp. 115-116. Chapter 5 of Contemporary 
Industrial Relations: a Critical Analysis (edited by 1. Beardwell). Oxford University Press. 
5 ibid p. 100.1 
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Employers' Confederation6 which demonstrated that there was little employee 
resistance to new technology7 and that consequently failures to improve 
productivity lay elsewhere. Yet received opinion continued to assert that 
restrictive practices impeded manufacturing industry's contribution to national 
prosperity and that trade unions were powerful bodies whose leaders in the 
eyes of government and management were too often seen as mainly managers 
of discontent. 8 
Many, if not most, people will now accept Nolan's main criticism of the post- 
1945 industrial relations system: that its structure arose from the work of 
academics who were working in isolation from contemporary research in 
labour economics which could have modified their perspective. Interesting 
although it would be to discuss further Nolan's thesis (which does have some, 
but not all, of the advantages of hindsight), attention must be paid to the 
system which he has criticised because it was the one that prevailed during and 
after the establishment of the North Sea oil and gas industry. It was a system 
which survived for about three decades from the early 1950s mainly because 
academics of the Oxford School - Hugh Clegg, Allan Flanders, Alan Fox, 
Alan Marsh and William McCarthy - had established a dominance in the field 
of industrial relations research through their published work. They and their 
research had consequently exerted a strong influence on the recommendations 
of the Donovan Commission, principal among which was that greater order 
should be brought into the collective bargaining practices of industrial 
relations, including acceptance of a defined role for shop stewards. The report 
established collective bargaining at the centre of British industrial relations and 
in its most acute form this emphasis has focused on the trade union as the 
agent of collective bargaining requiring better management by means of more 
comprehensive or tougher public policy interventions by government. 9 
Industrial relations policy was, therefore, carried out within an institutional 
framework wherein government, management and trade unions were the 
participants with management and trade unions being represented by middle 
managers and shop stewards at plant and equivalent levels in service 
industries. This ftamework was made up of four components: general 
acceptance of collective bargaining, legal immunity for trade unions in 
industrial disputes, legal support for union membership and entitlement of 
unions to membership of tripartite institutions at national level (e. g. Health 
and Safety Commission). This was the system that the oil operating companies 
refused to accept. They could do nothing about the legal position of trade' 
unions under British law and their representation on public bodies but that did 
not concern them overmuch since they were able to exclude collective 
bargaining from their industry with impunity. The British industrial relations 
6 ibid p. 114. 
7 One obvious exception was newspaper printing. 
8 Taylor, R. (1978) 77ze Fifth Estate, p. 452. Taylor is quoting Flanders here but gives no 
reference. 
9 Beardwell, 1. (1996) "How do we know how it really is? ". An Analysis of the new Industrial 
Relations" p. 3. Chapter 1 of Contemporary Industrial Relations: a Critical Analysis (edited 
by 1. Beardwell). Oxford University Press. 
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system was, and remains, voluntarist and there were no legal sanctions 
available to trade unions if employers chose to ignore them. 
Industrial relations in the offshore oil and gas industry were, therefore, 
conducted in a mode that was contrary to established theory and practice 
onshore. The enormous extent to which this mode deviated from that 
commonly practised by almost all the other major British employing 
organizations can be measured only when it is seen within the context of 
contemporary British political and industrial history. Thus, in accord with 
Nolan's admonition that industrial relations research should not be conducted 
as if it were an entirely autonomous activity, it will be appropriate to provide a 
short account of that political and industrial history with particular emphasis 
on the influence which the trade unions exerted upon national life at the time 
when the offshore industry was establishing itself. 
The influential social, economic and political issues of one decade inevitably 
affect the next and history can never be approached as if it is an aggregation of 
discrete periods. Very conveniently, however, the history of British industrial 
relations from 1960 can be divided into three periods which coincide with the 
decades and consequently each period will receive separate attention although 
every effort will be made to present a comprehensive picture of these thirty 
years. 
2 Industrial Relations in the 1960s 
There are two reasons for examining the 1960s in a thesis on industrial 
relations in the North Sea oil industry. The first is that Britain had become 
aware from the success of Dutch exploitation of natural gas off their coast that 
there was also a possibility of mineral wealth off British shores. In 1964 the 
UK government passed the Continental Shelf Act which vested in the Crown 
the hydrocarbon reserves of the British part of the continental shelf. This act 
empowered the government to license and to control any exploration and 
production. The second reason is that the industrial relations system to which 
the incoming oil operators took exception had already become established. 
Sir Winston Churchill, who had been instrumental in the government's 
purchase of BP shares almost fifty years previously, was still a member of 
parliament. Industrial relations were quiescent outside what came to be known 
as the strike-prone industries of coal mining, dock work, shipbuilding and 
vehicle manufacture. The trade unions had emerged from the Second World 
War with their reputation and their power enhanced. Ernest Bevin, the leader 
of the TGWU, and whom Churchill had brought into his government in 1940 
as Minister of Labour, had imposed a system of national arbitration to 
facilitate peaceful settlement of labour disputes. The trade unions had been 
accepted as full partners in national arbitration and, although the system 
naturally changed to meet the requirements of a peacetime as distinct from a 
wartime economy, its basic tri-partite form remained. Employers negotiated 
either independently or through their federations with the appropriate trade 
unions or their confederations and the state assisted when required through 
institutions established specifically for that purpose. As stated earlier, a 
macro-recognition culture prevailed. 
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Typical of these institutions was the Industrial Court. Set up in 1919 following 
the Whitley reports, it was a permanent independent tribunal to which parties 
could refer an issue, usually about payment, which had failed to be settled 
through the normal process of collective bargaining. It had a permanent 
chairman but its members were appointed on an ad hoc basis from panels 
supplied by employers and unions. In practice an issue would be considered by 
three members, the chairman and a member from each panel, and an award 
recommended although it was not binding on the parties. Its name was later 
changed to the more appropriate Industrial Arbitration Board. 
There were disputes, particularly in the motor vehicle construction industry, 
but the trade union leaders were aware of the great improvements in pay and 
conditions of work and acted as a restraining force on what they saw as wilder 
elements in their organizations. Management, trade unions and government 
knew that disputes would arise and that they might escalate into strikes but it 
was widely, perhaps universally accepted, that all management-union 
disagreements could and should be resolved through collective bargaining. In 
contrast with the practice in other industrialised democracies, collective 
agreements in the United Kingdom were not legally binding in any way and it 
was this anomaly which provided scope for shop stewards to act almost 
independently of their full time union officers within the place of work. While 
the vast majority of shop stewards played an honourable role as the unpaid 
union representatives within the factories and other establishments, there were 
some who abused their position. Indeed, the full-time convenors of shop 
stewards in the vehicle construction industry were better known to their 
members - and to the general public - than their union's full-time officers 
because they were so often interviewed on television to explain the reasons 
why there had been a sudden withdrawal of labour: and because collective 
agreements were not legally binding (and remain so) there was no statutory 
body from which an employer could seek redress for non-compliance with an 
agreement 
The industrial relations scene changed as the decade advanced, to some degree 
on account of the emergence of new trade union leaders. Frank Cousins had 
taken over the general secretaryship of the TGWU in 1956 and was eager to 
reverse what he saw as the overmoderate objectives of his predecessors in 
control of Britain's largest union. In 1968 Hugh Scanlon, who had a similar 
outlook, was elected President of the AEU. Moreover, the number of strikes 
had been increasing, many of them unofficial, a term used to describe a 
withdrawal of labour which did not have the sanction of the appropriate trade 
union. This was the perception rather than the reality because, although the 
number of days lost in strikes in 1962 were almost double those of 1961, this 
was exceptional and days lost through strikes during the next six years of the 
decade approached nowhere near the figures which would be recorded for the 
1970s. These disputes, nevertheless, were, in part, responsible for the 
establishment in 1965 of the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and 
Employers' Associations to which reference has already been made. The 
Commission was charged with considering relations between management and 
employees and the role of trade unions and employers' associations in 
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promoting the interests of their members and in accelerating the social and 
economic advance of the nation, with particular reference to the Law affecting 
the activities of these bodies. 10 
Although the report was recognised by its more perceptive analysts to be a 
valuable social document rather than a prescription for any improvement in 
industrial relations, it had two important consequences. The first, as stated 
above, " was that it confirmed collective bargaining at the central mechanism 
of the British industrial relation system. One of the larger chapters of the 
report was headed "The Extension of Collective Bargaining"12 and when the 
Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service was established on a statutory 
basis in 1975 the first clause of the act stated that its general duty was to 
promote the huprovement of industrial relations and in particular to encourage 
the extension of collective bargaining. Good industrial relations were therefore 
equated with the practice of collective bargaining. 
The second consequence was that the government decided to introduce 
legislation allegedly based on the report's recommendations. In doing so it was 
seeking to curb what it saw as the untrammelled power of shop stewards and 
other militants to disrupt industry and the white paper "In Place of 
Strife"proposed significant amendments to the position enjoyed in law by the 
trade unions. The objective of the government was clearly to inject some order 
into the conduct of collective bargaining but the reaction of the trade unions 
was explosive. Among the proposals was one which would lead to the 
imposition of financial penalties upon members who breached any order of the 
Secretary of State for Employment to defer strike action or to require a ballot 
before industrial action could be taken. There were other proposals to which 
no union objected but "penal clauses" became virtually the sole issue and for 
only the second time in British political history a Labour government had a 
serious difference of opinion with its -natural constituency, the trade union 
movement. 13 In a famous confrontation with. Hugh Scanlon, the Prime 
Minister, Harold Wilson, is reported to have said Hughie, get your tanks off 
nzy lawn. When Wilson called a general election in 1970 no new industrial 
relations legislation had been enacted but the scars of the dispute were still 
there and contributed to the defeat of the government. To the oil majors, 
which now knew that there was oil under the North Sea, 14 this was another 
example of the power of British trade unions to oppose successfully any effort 
to reduce their ability to disrupt legitimate economic activity. 
10 op cit P. iii. 
IIv. supra p. 49. 
12 op cit pp. 54-73. 
13 Tie first was in 1931 when the minority Labour government of Ramsay Macdonald reduced 
unemployment pay as part of its strategy to deal with the economic slump. 
14 By 1969 geological reports had confirmed beyond reasonable doubt that there were 
significant reserves of oil under the United Kingdom continental shelf. 
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3 Industrial Relations in the 1970s 
The premiership of Edward Heath (1970-1974) was a troubled period on 
account of economic difficulties. The deflationary budgets of the late 1960s 
had been designed to transfer resources in an effort to accommodate 
opportunities presented by the devaluation of sterling from $2: 80 to $2: 40 in 
November 1967 but the British economy had moved into the 1970s with a 
balance of payments surplus, faltering growth and signs of rising inflation 
coupled with increasing unemployment. This was the era of "stagflation", a 
term coined to describe a condition where rising prices are accompanied by 
little or no economic growth. The economic policy of the Heath government 
was a drive for growth associated with the reflationary policies of the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Anthony Barber, but it was adversely affected by 
a prolonged miners' strike (1972) which ended with a 20% pay award. The 
abrogation of the Bretton-Woods Agreement's in the early 1970s and the 
decision of the OPEC nations in late 1973 to quadruple the price of their oil16 
caused further problems because they set in train a trade recession marked in 
the United Kingdom by even greater inflation and, when sterling came under 
pressure, an application in 1976 for assistance from the International Monetary 
Fund. 
The Conservative government's attempt to reform industrial relations simply 
added to its problems. Labour costs across manufacturing were rising and the 
government, believing, as the previous government had done, that productivity 
would be improved by making the conduct of industrial relations more orderly, 
introduced the Industrial Relations Act (1971) which imposed legal constraints 
on the conduct of collective bargaining. This legislation caused general 
dissatisfaction to both trade unions and employers anct so succeeded only in 
creating further difficulties. Almost a quarter of a century has passed since the 
act's repeal in 1974 and consequently there is little point in examining it in 
detail. Unions were offered certain fundamental and traditional rights in the 
operation of their organizations and in the conduct of collective bargaining 
provided that they registered with the Registrar of Trade Unions but all the 
major trade unions refused to register. Employers (and trade unions) had the 
right to refer unfair industrial relations practices to the National Industrial 
Relations Court which had been set up under the act but very few employers 
and no unions used the N. I. R. C. since they preferred to rely on established 
collective bargaining channels. Even the goverrunent did not make use of its 
own legislation in 1972 when the miners were on strike, although the N. I. R. C. 
was empowered to order a "cooling off" period to assist the resolution of a 
dispute without the pressure of an on-going strike. Indeed, Campbell 
Adamson, Director of the C. B. I., remarked just before the February 1974 
general election that the act was a disaster. 17 
15 V. Chapter Three p. 31 supra. 
16 V. Chapter Three pp. 31-32 supra. 
17 Adamson thought, incorrectly, tha 
't 
his words were, "off the record". Edward Heath, 
somewhat unreasonably, has always believed that this was a major cause of his defeat. 
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Resistance to the Industrial Relations Act (1971) may have been successful but 
it diverted the attention of trade unions to what was happening in their 
movement. William McCarthy had forecast in 1962 that trade unionism 
would survive only if greater numbers of white-collar workers were recruited 
to take the place of manual workers whose numbers would inevitably decline 
as industry became less labour intensive. 18 Although correct in his assessment 
of future events, the full impact of a more capital intensive industrial structure 
upon employment was delayed until the early i980s. The membership of two 
trade unions, catering mainly for manual workers, the TGWU and the AEU, 
demonstrate this. Membership of the former, which had increased from 
1,302,000 in 1960 to 1,639,000 by 1970, was to continue its growth in the 
decade that followed, while AEU membership, 973,000 in 1960, increased to 
1,202,00 in 1970 and continued to grow throughout the 1970s. Nevertheless 
white-collar unions such as the newly formed Association of Scientific, 
Technical and Managerial Staffs (ASTMS) had begun to make an impact 
within industry and were recruiting steadily, if unspectacularly, sometimes 
among employees whom other, longer established, unions believed would be 
more appropriately represented by them. 
Recruitment by white-collar unions in the tertiary sector of employment was 
much more significant. Even McCarthy could not have foreseen the growth in 
public employment which occurred in the 1970s. NALGO members totalled 
274,000 in 1960,440,000 in 1970 and 782,000 in 1980. The National Union 
of Public Employees (NUPE), a mere 200,000 in 1960, had grown to 373,000 
by 1970 and had practically doubled that by 1980. National Health Service 
workers seemed almost to rush headlong into trade unions, with membership 
of the Confederation of Health Service Employees rising from 90,000 in 1970 
to 216,000 ten years later, when the Royal College of Nursing (admittedly a 
professional rather than a white- collar union, although the difference was to 
become almost semantic) claimed a total of 116,000. The many unions 
representing teachers also attracted greater support and most of them, certainly 
the larger ones such as the National Union of Teachers, affiliated themselves 
to the TUC. The reason for this surge of interest among white- 
collar/professional employees and the steady if less spectacular recruitment of 
manual workers, who had previously seen no value in union membership, was 
rising inflation. 
The word "rampant" is commonly used in reference to the inflation suffered 
by the British economy in the period just before, during and immediately after 
the Conservative government of 1970-1974. The table which appears overleaf 
shows the rise it retail prices, a common method of measuring inflation. 
The cause of the inflation was the "wage explosion" which occurred in 1970 
as a result of a general increase of militancy among trade unionists, who had 
experienced no increase in their real earnings and disposable incomes for about 
three years and, once it had begun, it was sustained by the expectations of 
employees that prices would continue their rapid rise. A rise in the price of 
goods affects every citizen and, since trade unions were seen to be active and 
Is v. chapter 3 p. 38. 
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successful in the defence of their members' interests, it was not unnatural that 
they became attractive to workers who had previously taken little interest in 
what they had to offer. 
INFLATION 1969-1975 
Year Rise in Retail Prices 
1969-1970 6% 
1970-1971 9.5% 
1971-1972 7% 
1972-1973 9% 
1973-1974 16% 
1,1974-1975 1 24% 
There was another reason specifically in relation to white-collar union growth. 
The social distinction between manual and white-collar employment had begun 
to break down during the 1960s when companies yielded to the not 
unreasonable demands of trade unions for equality of treatment concerning 
holiday entitlement and superannuation and sick-pay schemes. Now with the 
advent of rising inflation and the trade union response to it on behalf of their 
members, it was not at all uncommon for manual workers' earnings to have 
surpassed those of white-collar workers, who might have accepted this state of 
affairs had their other conditions of service remained more favourable. Even 
some professional associations who had never regarded themselves as trade 
upions became restless when anomalies arose such as when a report to the 
Scottish Office in 1974 revealed that the basic salary of an unqualified social 
worker was greater than that of a registered general nurse after several years 
of service. 
The number of trade union members rose by over two n-dllion in the decade 
1970-1979, the largest increase taking place over the period 1973-1978 when 
inflation was at its height. As already stated, both manual worker and white- 
collar trade unions shared in this growth and largely for the same reason but 
white-collar union growth was the more significant. Tens of thousands who 
had no background in traditional trade unionism had come into the movement 
and, liking what they found, retained membership for the duration of their 
working life. By contrast, manual worker unions were to suffer in the next 
decade a haemorrhage of membership on account of the investment by 
manufacturing industries in modern technology. This, together with the 
corresponding growth of white-collar unionism, was soon to create within the 
trade union movement a new balance of power, where manual workers had 
minority representation. 
Labour's return to power in 1974 saw the immediate and complete abolition of 
the legal structure which its predecessor had introduced in order to reform the 
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industrial relations process. The dislike, not to say the hatred, of the trade 
union movement towards the Industrial Relations Act 1971 was so great that 
one Labour member of parliament even suggested that it be repealed 
immediately by royal decree rather than by the introduction of appropriate 
legislation to achieve the same purpose. The end came soon enough with two 
successive Trade Union and Labour Relations Acts in 1974 and 1976 which 
restored the legal immunities that the trade unions had enjoyed since 1906. 
Lord Scarman put it simply thus: the law is now back to what Parliament had 
intended when it enacted the Act of 1906 - but stronger and clearer than it was 
then. 19 
MANUAL AND WHITE COLLAR MEMBERSHIP OF TRADE UNIONS 
1970-1979 
Year Manual Union 
Membership 
Union Density 
(percentage) 
White Collar 
Union 
Membership 
Union Density 
(percentage) 
Manual/white- 
collar Union 
Density 
(percentage) 
1968 6,636,900 49.8 3,056,000 32.6 65.5 
1970 7,095,000 55.2 3,533,000 36.5 66.1 
1973 6,968,900 55.9 3,966,300 38.6 69.1 
1974 7,082,300 57.3 4,130,800 39.5 68.9 
1975 7,112,100 57.7 4,488.800 41.9 72.6 
1976 7,321,600 59.4 4,632,300 42.1 70.9 
1977 7,445,300 60.7 4,837,900 43.0 70.8 
1978 7,549,700 62.0 5,029,100 43.9 70.8 
1979 7,577,500 1 63.0 1 5,124,700 1 44.0 1 69.8 
Source: Industrial Relations in Britain (ed. Bain) 1983, p. 9. 
Further legislation added power to trade unionism. The Health and Safety at 
Work Act (1974) included provision for the appointment in prescribed cases 
by recognised trade unions of safety representatives from amongst the 
employees whom the employers would be obliged to consult on safety matters. 
Then the Employment Protection Act 1975 and its successor the Employment 
Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 extended even further trade union and 
individual workers rights but the Trade Union and Labour Relations 
(Amendment) Act (1976) removed from an employee the right to claim unfair 
dismissal if dismissed by an employer for non-membership of a union closed 
shop other than in the rare case of union membership being contrary to 
religious belief. 
19 Lewis, R. and Simpson, B., ( 198 1) Stfiking a Balance? Employment Law after the 1980 
Act, p. 5. Martin Robertson, Oxford. 
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Before introducing the parliamentary bills, which led to the Trade Union and 
Labour Relations Act (1976) and the Trade Union and Labour Relations 
(Amendment) Act (1976), the government had published the terms of reference 
of the Committee of Inquiry on Industrial Democracy, more commonly known 
as the Bullock Committee after its chairman Sir Alan (later Lord) Bullock. 
The terms were advised to the House of Commons on 5th August, 1975 by the 
Trade Secretary and they were as follows : 
Accepting the need for a radical extension of industrial democracy in the 
control of companies by -means of representation on boards of directors, and 
accepting the essential role of trade union organisations in this process, to 
consider how such extension can best be achieved, taking into account the 
proposals of the TUC report on industrial democracy as well as experience in 
Britain, the EEC and other countries. Having regard to the interests of the 
national economy, employees, investors and consumers, to analyse the 
implications for the efficient management of companies andfor company law. 
The terms themselves suggested that the principle of industrial democracy was 
self-evident. The government was agreeing at the outset that boards of 
companies should include a large proportion of employee representatives, that 
trade unions should be instrumental in providing these representatives and that 
the proposals of the TUC in this respect should receive special attention. The 
TUC had already demanded 50% as an appropriate proportion of employee 
representation2O and there were three trade union leaders on the Committee as 
well as two sympathisers who held that view. The fact that the, report 
submitted by the Committee2l two years later was too radical even for a 
Labour government is immaterial but the terms of reference demonstrated that 
trade unions and trade unionism wielded such power in 1975 that the 
government felt obliged to accept the principle of industrial democracy as 
interpreted by the unions and set up what some critics saw as a" loaded 
committee to examine how it should be introduced. 
During 1976 the goverm-nent proposed the Dock Work Regulation Bill. Its 
objective was to extend the regulations of the National Dock Labour Scheme to 
every port in the United Kingdom in order that the privileged terms of 
employment provided under this scheme could be enjoyed by all dock workers 
in the United Kingdom. Although the bill failed to obtain a second reading in 
the Commons 22 it was widely interpreted as a sop to the TGWU and its 
leader, Jack Jones, in return for the union's continued support of the Social 
Contract. 23 It was, perhaps, the clearest signal yet received ty the oil operators 
that the trade unions could demand the legislation that they wanted and this 
seemed to be confirmed by no less a person than the Secretary of State for 
Energy. Tony Benn, at precisely the time when he was seeking to persuade the 
20 TUC Interim Report on Industrial Democracy 1972 
21 '[be three business managers on the Committee refused to sign it and issued their own 
report. 
22 The defeat of the bill was by the smallest margin, a tie: two Labour Party members 
abstained and every other MP outside the Labour Party voted to defeat the bill. Some claim 
that this was the beginning of Labour's slide to defeat in 1979. 
23 V. infra. 
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oil companies to allow trade union officers access to offshore installations, 24 
said that trade unions should be prepared to extend their traditional collective 
bargaining role so that their views could be injected into central areas of 
Government policy. 25 
The oil companies would certainly have approved Lord Diplock's comment 
that the Trade Union and Labour Relations Acts were intrinsically 
repugnant. 26 and would have extended his criticism to all the industrial 
relations legislation passed by the Labour government; possibly the 
Conservative government's Industrial Relations Act (1971) was equally 
abhorrent. British employment legislation, in their opinion, fully justified their 
decision to operate an industrial relations policy where trade unions had, at 
most, a minor consultative role. 
In his study of trade union power27 David Marsh expresses surprise that no- 
one has looked in depth at the history of the Trade Union - Labour Party 
Liaison Committee, which was formed in January 1972. Marsh asserts that the 
industrial relations policy of the early years of the Labour government of 
1974-79 was in accord with decisions made by that body. An agreement, 
which came to be known as the Social Contract, was reached whereby the 
trade unions, in return for legislation which met their wishes, would support 
the government in its economic strategy. The Trade Union and Labour 
Relations Acts and the Employment Protection Acts were the parts of the 
agreement which the government was able to honour but legislation to impose 
trade union representation on the boards of private companies did not reach the 
statute book. The severe financial problems which beset the nation as a result 
of the quadrupling of oil prices by OPEC28 found the government looking to 
the unions to deliver their side of the bargain and initially this support was 
given. With inflation at one point as high as 25 % per annum, some restraint on 
incomes was obviously required and unions agreed to limitations in wage 
settlements. However, by 1976 sterling had come under such great pressure 
that an International Monetary Fund loan had to be negotiated at the cost of a 
considerable reduction in public expenditure. This, together with low 
economic growth and consequent small increase in incomes led to rising 
unemployment. It also stimulated further interest in trade unionism as a shield 
against loss of jobs. 
The trade unions, especially those in the public sector, could not restrain their 
members' demands for wage increases and the Social Contract simply ceased 
to have any relevance. James Callaghan, who had succeeded Harold Wilson as 
Prime Minister in 1976, decided to allow parliament to run its full statutory 
period of five years and saw the industrial relations position worsen as the 
24 V. Chapter 9 infra. 
25 Address to the Electrical Power Engineers' Conference on 7th April, 1976. (Quoted in 
Financial Times 8th April, 1976. ) 
26 Lewis, R. and Simpson, B. (1981) op cit p. 6. 
27 Marsh, D., (1992) The New Politics of British Trade Unionism, p. 4 1. Macmillan, London. 
28 V. Chapter 3 pp. 31-32 supra. 
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months passed. The consensus between employee and employer which the 
government had sought to foster finally evaporated during the winter of 1978- 
79 when by January 1,469,000 employees were on strike (compared with 
118,000 in 1978) and 2,585,000 working days were lost (compared with 
865,000 in 1978). The term "Winter of Discontent"29 was applied to this 
period on account of the bitterness with which much of the industrial action 
was prosecuted. 
The North Sea oil industry, now established with Aberdeen as the oil capital of 
Europe, was unaffected by the industrial relations malaise. There was an 
industrial dispute in 1979 in the offshore catering industry but this had nothing 
to do with any dispute onshore. Incomes were high and the employment 
prospects were sound. The oil companies experienced no industrial relations 
problems which could not be resolved quickly after their own fashion. In 
February 1979 the government sought to bring some order out of the ruins of its 
industrial relations strategy by a Concordat with the trade unions. In general 
terms the Concordat stated that unions would seek to follow the guidance of the 
TUC in the conduct of their industrial relations, that there would be talks with 
the public service workers to negotiate pay and conditions without any resort to 
industrial action and that the government would set an inflation target of 5% per 
annum by 1982. The Concordat had little or no effect although to managers in 
the oil industry it represented yet another example of the influence wielded at 
national level by trade unions. They questioned why the government seemed 
unable to act independently and felt it necessary to seek an agreement from the 
TUC, which had no statutory authority within the nation. There appeared, and 
not just in the eyes of the oil companies, to have been an incorporation of trade 
unions into the economic policy making process of the nation. As with the 
example given immediately above, the TUC (which in reality meant its General 
Council with its over-representation of manual workerS30) was consulted so 
regularly that it appeared virtually an organ of state. Even by informal means 
trade unions had access to the corridors of power when both Labour prime 
ministers invited delegations to Downing Street to settle disputes over beer and 
sandwiches. At the other end of the scale, the power and influence of shop 
stewards was often highlighted during workplace disputes as in the case of 
Derek Robinson, full time convenor of the shop stewards at the Longbridge, 
Birmingham plant of BL. In 1979 his determination to bring out employees on 
a spurious grievance led to his dismissal and he failed to secure the support of 
his own union executive. This was a single incident but it can be interpreted as 
a turning point in union - shop steward relationships when unions, many now 
under new and less militant leadership than at the start of the decade, 31 began 
to regain direct control of their memberships. 
29 Taken from the opening lines of Shakespeare's King Richard III: Now is the winter of our 
discontent Made glorious summer by this son of York. 
30 In 1983 the TUC reformed the method of election to its General Council. Union nominees, 
almost invariably general secretaries and/or other top officials, were appointed in 
proportion to a union's total affiliated membership. 
31 A good example here was the election in 1978 ol Terry Duffy to succeed Hugh Scanlon as 
President of the AUEW. 
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Reality and current perception of phenomena are seldom identical or even just 
slightly out of step. The reality of the position in 1979 was that trade union 
membership had already entered a period of considerable change both as 
regards its total and its nature. Membership of trade unions had risen 
continually throughout the 1960s and 1970s to reach a peak of 13,289,000 by 
the end of 1979. This, coupled with the fact that trade unions were perceived 
by an increasing percentage of the nation to have the government in their 
thrall, convinced even close observers of the scene that their power would 
extend further. In the first paragraph of a book on this subject G. Dorfman 
writes -: 
Yhe disniptive power of unions in Britain has been painfully obvious in recent 
years. Strikes have had an impact throughout the society, stopping trains, 
darkening whole cities and even bringing down governments in dramatic 
political confrontations. 7he union movement has seemed at times an 
impregnable fortress of pressure group power, immune to the legal and 
political counter-force which Britain's elected leaders have attempted to bring 
against it. 32 
With all the benefit of hindsight we can see today that such a conclusion was 
incorrect because trade union membership and power were about to enter a 
period of rapid decline not least because the membership growth in the 1970s 
was essentially in the white-collar and professional areas of employment with 
their different outlook and less traditional adherence to trade unionism. 
Moreover, new technology was already beginning to have its effect upon 
employment within manufacturing although the dramatic decline in 
employment in this sector of the economy (described by James M'Farlane, 
Director-General of the Engineering Employers Federation as the "bastion of 
the trade unions")33 had yet to take place. Few people foresaw the 1980s with 
any accuracy and most agreed with the interpretation of one of the most 
eminent authorities, Keith Middlemas, who wrote in 1979: 
however negatively the General Council (of the TUC) may transmit the 
inchoate will of its membership trade union hegemony has broadened out 
firther than in any comparable Western nation, profoundly to alter the nature 
of the state. 34 
and 
It is hard to see trade unions' economic political power confined to the old, 
negative formulation. ... the movement's representative 
function has 
increased, over a wider area of state policy, as a result of the "social 
contract" and the powers granted by legislation after 1974, and it is unlikely 
that a future government will make the mistake of treating the TUC as a mere 
agent. 35 
32 Dorfman, G., (1983) British Trade Unionism against the TUC. Macmillan, London. 
33 Lecture attended by author at Templeton College, Oxford University, 1986. 
34 Middlemas, K., (1979) Politics in Industrial Society, p. 452. Andr6 Deutsch, London. 
35 ibid p. 454. 
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Other authorities wrote in a similar vein. Samuel Brittan referred to the unions 
as the robber barons of the systeM36 and Paul Johnson noted that British trade 
unionism has become a formula for national misery. 37 Robert Taylor, the 
labour correspondent of the "Observer", opined gloomily in 1978 that It will 
be a miracle if we display enough realism and determination to transform 
Britain into a high wagelhigh productivity country like all our nwjor 
competitors in the industrialised West. 38 As stated above the oil industry had, 
earlier , 
in the decade, come to much the same conclusions about industrial 
relations in Great Britain and from the outset had determined to operate 
offshore in a manner which would deny to trade unionism any effective role. 
The degree to which researchers and other industrial relations authorities were 
mistaken about the revolution in British industrial relations which was about to 
take place was monumental. The result of the 1979 general election suggests 
that a majority of the nation perceived the influence of the trade union 
movement to be malign and returned a government of a political complexion 
which would deal with that issue. Moreover, it now appears that a large 
proportion of the country's trade unionists went to the ballot boxes with the 
same impression. In the opinion of Kessler and Bayliss It was the trade 
unionists' reaction to the events of the last decade that put the Conservative 
government of 1979 in power. 39 
4 Industrial Relations in the 1980s 
The 1980s will always be the decade of Margaret Thatcher. This remarkable 
woman, who has the curious ability to attract respect and execration in equal 
proportions, bestrode British politics like a colossus for the eleven years of her 
premiership, enjoying the longest period of continuuus office since Lord 
Liverpool (1812 - 1827). She resigned in 1990 not as a result of a general 
election or of a defeat in parliament but through a rebellion within her own 
Conservative Parliamentary Party and it could be claimed that her political 
legacy contributed in part to the Conservative Party winning an unprecedented 
fourth successive general election two years after she had left office. 
Apparently still powerful and influential at her accession to political power, 
the trade unions suffered a series of setbacks from which they have never 
recovered. Indeed, it can be asserted that the British trade union movement 
today has had a modus operandi imposed upon it as a result of a series of 
statutes enacted over the years 1980 to 1993. No-one, least of all the trade 
union leaders, could have envisaged in 1979 the extent to which their power 
would be reduced within ten years. Yet this industrial relations legislation 
from 1980 onwards could not have been possible without the general assent of 
the electorate. In this respect a comparison with Henry VIII is relevant. This 
monarch changed the entire religious outlook and structure of England and this 
36 Brittan, S. (1974) Inflation: Causes, Consequences and Cures p. 14. Institute of Economic 
Affairs. 
37 *New Statesman" May 1975. 
38 Taylor, R., (1978) ne Fifth Estate, p. 457. Pan Books, London. 
39 Kessler, S. and Bayliss, R. op. cit. p. 39. 
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he could not have achieved without the general consent of his subjects. 
Likewise, Margaret Thatcher sensed the mood of the nation towards trade 
unionism as it had been practised in the United Kingdom and won support at 
the polls for the legislation enacted. Ironically, the manner in which Arthur 
Scargill called and conducted the lengthy miners' strike in 1984-85 offered the 
government an opportunity to justify its legislation. 
Memories of the disastrous Industrial Relations Act 1971 were still fresh in the 
minds of the prime minister and of James Prior, her Secretary of State for 
Employment, and consequently a more cautious strategy was adopted. One of 
the first decisions of Prior was to state that the term "employee participation" 
would be used in preference to "industrial democracy" with its overtones of 
organized labour representation on the boards of public and private companies. 
The preferred term was both unspecific and innocuous and the interpretation of 
its meaning could vary from collective bargaining with senior trade union 
leaders to joint consultation at the level of canteen committees. The term was 
also useful in the sense that it was directed at employees as individuals rather 
than members of an organization; in short, it made a distinction between the 
terms "employee" and "trade unionist". 
A brief description of the legislation is necessary for a full understanding of 
the transformation of industrial relations over the decade since by 1990 the 
battle-zone mentality of the 1960s and 1970s had become an unpleasant and 
distant memory. 40 The Employment Acts of 1980 and 1982 repealed some of 
the provisions of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act, outlawed 
secondary industrial action (and made unions liable to be sued for organizing 
any unlawful industrial action) and provided protection for non-unionists in 
closed shops. The 1982 Act also encouraged the development of employee 
participation practices by requiring companies with over 250 employees to 
give a statement in their annual reports describing the action taken during the 
year to introduce employee involvement schemes. Thus the direction of 
industrial relations was clarified in favour of a more individualist and less 
collective approach to employment relations and a greater flexibility for 
management in the use of its workforce. One positive result of this was that 
some restrictive practices, 41 ceased to be observed. These had been acceptable 
in the 1930s and subsequently during other periods of severe unemployment 
and were often still defended as sound trade union policy even although their 
rationale had vanished. There also began a movement within organizations to 
consult directly with their employees instead of using trade unions as single 
channels of workplace communication. 
Having gone to the country in 1983 and been returned with an even greater 
majority, the government then focused its attention on trade unions. The Trade 
Union Act 1984 required all trade unions to have their national officers elected 
by secret ballot (some such as the AUEW already did so) and to seek 
40 Taylor, R., (1994) 7he Future of Trade Unions. Andre Deutsch, London. 
41 Examples of these are job demarcation, insistence on manning levels agreed at an earlier 
period and refusal to work with "dilutees", people capable of doing the work but not trained 
under the rigid apprenticeship system. 
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members' approval by secret ballot to retain political funds. Perhaps the most 
radical alteration in the law introduced by this act was that the legal immunity 
of a trade union would be removed if it took industrial action without first 
obtaining the approval of its members through a secret ballot. A Wages Act in 
1986 reduced the powers of Wages Councils as a forerunner to their abolition 
seven years later. Three more Employment Acts in 1988,1989 and 1990 gave 
union members further rights over their officials, effectively abolished the pre- 
entry closed shop and established a Commissioner for the Rights of Union 
Members. The Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 
brought together all the legislation which concerned trade unions and the 
following year the Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act added yet 
more protection for employees including the right of not being unreasonably 
excluded from a union. The government claimed that it "had given the unions 
back to their members" and in so doing had removed the power of coercion on 
individuals without destroying the ability of trade unions to continue to carry 
out their legitimate functions. Collective bargaining, the most obvious of these 
functions, was unaffected and any settlements reached through that process 
remained unenforceable in law unless both parties agreed otherwise. 
This industrial relations strategy, which the more leftward leaning 
commentators described as "an assault on trade unionism" or "anti-trade union 
legislation", had some inevitable consequences. The demise of the closed shop 
together with the associated protection of non-unionists from discrimination in 
employment played some part in the drop in the number of trade union 
members. 42 Where union membership was small, there was often de- 
recognition of the trade union concerned43 and, within workplaces where 
unions were recognised, there was sometimes a fall in the proportion of 
employees covered by collective bargaining. In the middle of the decade there 
was a great deal of interest in single union agreements negotiated mainly by 
inward-investing Japanese companies but the number of such agreements was 
considerably lower than the heat which they engendered. It should, however, 
be noted that the Electrical and Plumbing Trade Union was expelled from the 
TUC for a period on account of its fiercely independent line on this issue. 44 
instead of presenting a united front to the government, the unions were too 
often engaged in internecine feuds, a situation which was reflected at local 
level in North East Scotland and thus weakened the impact of the Inter Union 
Offshore Oil Committee. 
The trade unions did not lack the will to oppose the Conservative 
government's torrent of legislation on industrial relations. What they did lack 
were resources and in 1980 there began a decline in the number of trade 
unionists that has continued to the present day. The warning of McCarthy 
almost twenty years earlier that investment in modern technology would be 
42 v. Appendix Ill. 
43 Derecognition of trade unions has already been dealt with in Chapter 3 at pages 43-47. 
44 It had refused to withdraw from a single union agreement which had involved the loss to 
another union of the negotiating rights that union had previously held. 
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associated with reduced demand for manual workers was felt suddenly and 
uncomfortably for employees in manufacturing. Between 1980 and 1995 an 
average of about 300,000 members have been lost to the trade union 
movement. Moreover, those losses in the mid 1980s were mainly in 
manufacturing where the density of manual worker trade unionism had been 
high. It was not surprising, therefore, that trade union leaders sought to 
concentrate their efforts in stemming this loss of membership and, where 
possible, avoided serious confrontations with employers; job preservation, for 
example, became more important than the level of annual pay increases. "New 
Realism" was a popular interpretation of a changed situation which was simply 
the acceptance of the old Scottish saying that "facts are chiels that winna ding" 
or, in the words of the New Testament, that it was no good kicking against the 
pricks. 45 
On the other hand, it must not be thought that trade unions had been rendered 
powerless in the face of all managerial initiatives. Where sound industrial 
relations had been established over the years through collective bargaining 
procedures there was little change. Union officers and managers who had built 
up a rapport between themselves were not going to lose the mutual advantages 
that this brought to employer and employee. Collective bargaining remained 
the usual and mutually acceptable way of establishing procedures for the 
avoidance of disputes and reaching agreement on terms and conditions of 
employment. Again, unions are law-abiding institutions, and while they were 
unhappy about much of the new legislation, they realised that they had to work 
within it. The pendulum of power had swung in the direction of the employers 
and the government certainly did not see the TUC as its social partner. 
Managers sought to introduce performance related pay and greater flexibility 
of working practices. On the whole they were successful because direct 
communications with employees helped to secure their commitment much 
more easily than when the sole communication channel open to managers was 
the trade union. Employees became more involved in the objectives of their 
companies and understood why their companies had to be competitive in order 
to survive. 
industrial disputes declined significantly and were confined in the main to the 
public sector: civil servants, teachers, NHS workers, water service workers. 
The year long strike of miners in 1984-85 was a disaster for the National 
Union of Miners because a large number of pits were closed permanently and 
the Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire section first refused its support and then 
founded a separate union. 46 After a year all that Arthur Scargill had achieved 
was a massive haemorrhage of his union's membership. The strike was 
notorious for the ferocity with which it was conducted but it had little effect on 
the rest of the nation which went about its business as usual. One of the main 
reasons for the failure of the strike was that the General Council of the TUC 
reftised to support the NUM by a substantial majority. White-collar trade 
45 The New Testament (Authorised Version) Acts of the Apostles, Chapter 9 v. 5. 
46 The Union of Democratic Miners. 
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unions with different traditions from those of manual workers now had a 
majority on the General Council. 
By the 1990s industrial relations in many organizations had become 
marginalised47 and had ceased to be a preoccupation with top mangers, who 
could now concentrate on matters such as planning and productivity which 
were more important for the long-term survival of their companies. There 
were dangers for the future here as Douglas Smith, Chairman of the Advisory, 
Conciliation and Arbitration Service, warned in an address to the National 
Conference of the Institute of Personnel Management at Harrogate in 1990.48 
Middle managers now approaching their fortieth year and being considered for 
promotion had not had sufficient experience of industrial disputes or tough 
negotiations with trade union leaders. Some day the pendulum of influence will 
swing back in the unions' favour49 and these managers will be exposed to a 
type of pressure for which they will not have been prepared. 
During the decade of Margaret Thatcher's premiership, the oil industry 
became firmly established in N. E. Scotland. Oil and gas were flowing from 
over fifty installations in the North Sea and the prospects of discovering 
ftirther reserves in commercial quantities were high. There was a downturn in 
the price of oil in 1986 but its effects were soon overcome during the 
following year. The oil majors viewed the national scene in industrial relations 
as one which had come into line with the approach that they had adopted when 
they had first recruited men to work offshore in the 1970s. Oil was very costly 
to extract from below the continental shelf and this reduced the concern 
managers might have industrial relations problems. Industrial relations were 
not ignored because each company sought to help its employees gain job 
satisfaction and had introduced procedures to deal swiftly with grievances and 
disciplinary issues. The common factor was that trade unions were not 
recognised for negotiating purposes except in the special circumstances of 
hook-up5O and in most cases were even debarred from representing members 
who had a grievance or were subject to disciplinary action. Just as the TUC no 
longer enjoyed any partnership status with the government, so trade union 
confederations continued to be unacceptable to oil companies as institutions 
which should be consulted on managerial policy. In this aspect of industrial 
relations, therefore, the offshore oil industry was very different from onshore 
organizations which, with few exceptions, maintained and developed their 
relationships with trade unions, including the use of collective bargaining 
47 It is interesting to compare the amount of newspace accorded to industrial relations in the 
Financial Times during the 1970s and early 1980s with what has appeared over the last ten 
years. 
48 Attended by the author. 
49 The author has studied the work of Neil W. Chamberlain who does not see bargaining 
power as a permanent attribute of union or management because power in industrial 
relations is relative to different strategies and tactics employed and to what may be 
described generally as environmental and institutional forces such as economic conditions, 
public opinion and national policy. 
50 The Bank of Scotland's Oil and Gas Handbook (4th edition, 1996) defines hook-up as "the 
activity following offshore development installation during which all connections and services 
are made operable for commissioning and start-up". 
65 
hh, 
processes. Towards the end of the decade, however, the industry experienced 
its first serious industrial relations problems and, much more importantly, 
suffered a disaster. The destruction by fire of the production platform, Piper 
Alpha, would have national, even international, repercussions. 
Sununary 
The purpose of this chapter has been to provide a picture of industrial relations 
in the United Kingdom, which brings out the contrast between what may be 
called standard practice of human relations policies and that adopted by the 
offshore oil operating companies during the thirty or so years since they have 
been active in the North Sea. It was a period when collective bargaining was 
generally accepted as the way in which terms and conditions of employment 
were regulated in British industry and therefore involved the acceptance by 
employers of the right of trade unions to negotiate on behalf of their members. 
This system was not acceptable to the offshore industry. The employers took a 
decision - not in any way fornolised 7 not to encourage trade unionS51 and 
refused to countenance any recognition of trade unions aboard their drilling 
rigs or production platforms, whether the workers were direct employees or 
employed by contractors. In this respect the oil operators were atypical of the 
rest of British employers and therefore the question of recognition became 
almost the sole objective of the trade unions which considered that they had 
rights to negotiate on behalf of offshore employees. 
Particular prominence has been paid to the effect upon trade union recruitment 
of the inflationary pressure under which governments laboured in the 1970s 
since the nature and practice of trade unionism was significantly altered by the 
change in membership which resulted from that recruitment and, a few years 
later, by the determination of the manufacturing industry to address the 
problem of high labour costs with increased investment in advanced 
technology. Attention has been paid also to trade union activity in the 1970s 
which was a prominent in a way'not experienced either before or since. 
During the 1939-45 war a system of compulsory national arbitration had been 
imposed in order that settlement of disputes could be reached without resort to 
industrial action. Government, employers and trade unions contributed to this 
tri-partite system and after 1945 the mutual respect, which had developed 
between employers and trade unions, was extended into their relationships as a 
peace-time economy was gradually restored. Agreements on pay and other 
conditions of work were reached through collective bargaining which depended 
on trade unions being recognized by the employers as legitimate partners in the 
process. Collective bargaining had become the bed-rock of the British 
industrial relations system and this was confirmed by the Report (in 1968) of 
the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations, which 
equated the extension of collective bargaining with improvements in industrial 
relations. 
51 Comment to the author by a former chief executive of a large oil operaring company. 
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Although other inward investors had been prepared to work within the 
industrial relations system of the host country, this was not acceptable to the 
oil operators. They rejected the macro-recognition culture towards trade 
unions and refused to negotiate employee pay and conditions of service, except 
in the very special case of "hook-up". This decision to distance themselves 
ftom. the onshore industrial relations system was, in their eyes, confirmed by 
the hostile reaction of the trade unions to government attempts to legislate for 
a more orderly conduct of industrial relations. This occurred during 1969- 
1974, which was a period that co-incided with the establishment of oil 
operations on the UK continental shelf Subsequent legislation introduced by 
the Labour government of 1974-1979 and the government's close relationship 
with organized labour over these years evoked even stronger hostility from the 
oil operators towards any recognition of trade unions. 
Behind the activities of governments and trade unions lay two interconnecting 
factors. One was the inflationary pressure which increased in intensity towards 
the end of the 1960s and the other was the expansion of white-collar trade 
unionism fuelled to a large degree by this pressure. Inflation reduces the real 
value of earnings and creates problems for employers. Since unions were 
perceived to be active in protecting their members' interests, recruitment 
flourished. Some of these new adherents of trade unionism were manual 
workers but the greater increase came from white-collar workers who had 
previously viewed trade unions as essentially manual worker organizations. 
Now experiencing serious erosion of their earnings and other differentials in 
comparison with manual workers, they flocked into trade unions as if they 
were safe havens which would protect them from the storm. Thus, while 
membership of trade unions increased throughout the 1970s, the growth came 
mainly from a sector of employment which shared few of the traditions of the 
older manual worker unions. 
By 1979 there were already clear indications that the constituent membership 
of British trade unionism was changing and, by implication, the way it would 
and could conduct its relationships with the government and employers. 
Nevertheless, writers on industrial relations believed that the power and 
influence which the trade unions had long been able to exercise would continue 
as a permanent factor in British political and industrial life. Keith Middlemas, 
for example, wrote that it is unlikely that a future government will make the 
mistake of treating the TUC as a mere agent. 52 
The extent to which many respected industrial relations authorities had totally 
misread the signs was demonstrated by the return in 1979 of a Conservative 
govemment, which would retain power for eighteen years. While leaving 
untouched the voluntarist nature of British industrial relations and ignoring 
suggestions that agreements reached through collective bargaining should 
become enforceable at law, the government enacted a series of statutes (such as 
the need to have a ballot of members before bringing them out on strike) 
which severely reduced the capacity of trade unions to carry out sanctions 
where industrial disputes had not been settled through other means. In 
52 Middlenias, K. (1979) op cit p. 454. 
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addition, McCarthy's forecast of 1962 that manual worker trade unionism 
would decline in proportion to the investment of British industry in advanced 
technology was realised and the continual decrease of trade union membership 
and unemployment in the manufacturing industries reduced further the power 
once exercised by organized labour. Trade union membership fell steadily 
from over 13 million at the beginning of 1980 to just over 8 million in 1995 
with most of the losses home by the manual worker unions. 
For the oil operators this merely indicated that the trade unions now had more 
important issues with which to concern themselves than recognition from 
offshore employers. It must, however, be remembered that, despite the 
industrial relations legislation of the post 1979 years, collective bargaining 
remained the most common method whereby terms and conditions of 
employment were agreed and that this could be achieved only when trade 
unions were recognised by employers as legitimate representatives of the 
employees' interests. The offshore industry therefore remains, at it has been 
from the start of its operations in the United Kingdom, atypical of British 
employers as a whole. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
hkhý 
NORWAY AND HER INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
The waters above the European continental shelf are shared by several other 
nations with a coastal littoral but only two concern us. One is The Netherlands 
where reserves of natural gas were first discovered offshore in the 1960s and the 
other is Norway which, together with Scotland, has been able to exploit the oil 
fields of the North Sea since the early 1970s. 
1 Norwegian History: a Brief Summary 
The links between Scotland and Norway go back to Viking times when the 
sovereignty of the Hebrides, Sutherland, Caithness, Orkney and Shetland lay 
with the Norwegian crown. Gradually Scotland acquired these territories over 
the centuries by conquest, treaty and dynastic alliance. The death in 1290 of the 
infant Maid of Norway, not long after her grandfather Alexander III had been 
killed in a dramatic riding accident, ' precipitated the war of independence with 
England which was not settled until after Bannockburn in 1314, Some remnants 
of old Norse law remain in Shetland in regard to land tenure (Udal law) and the 
cession to Scotland of Orkney and Shetland as part of the marriage settlement of 
James 111 (1460-88) can still be disputed on the grounds that the Scots never paid 
over the agreed sum of money. 
Thereafter, however, Norway has had a history very different from Scotland. For 
many years Norway was part first of Denmark and later of Sweden until she 
regained her total independence as late as 1905. The German attack on Norway 
in April 1940 and the subsequent occupation for five years served to unite the 
nation in a common purpose and to stimulate even further the feeling of 
nationhood. Military resistance was inevitably brief but it was effective enough 
to allow King Haakon VI I with his principal ministers to escape to Sco * 
tland and 
to continue the legitimate government, albeit in exile. The attempt by Germany 
to establish a Norwegian government in Oslo under Vidkun Quisling2 was 
derided by the people. After the war the nation concentrated upon regenerating 
the economy under the social-democratic governments which, with brief 
interludes, have ruled Norway since 1935. Until the coming of oil the economy 
relied upon the export of primary products, tourism and the long established 
shipping industry. 
I Presumably missing the way in pitch darkness horse and rider plunged over the steep cliffs at 
Kinghom in Fife. (1286). 
2 Quisling was tried and sentenced to death, a special exception having to be made in the law to 
carry this out. His name has entered the vocabulary of other nations (including UK) as an 
example of utter perfidy. 
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2 From Turbulence to Co-determination 
The economic historian Fritz Hodne 3 claims that emigration alone prevented the 
rise of insurrectionary working class movements in Norway during the last 
century and certainly the early years of the twentieth century witnessed 
considerable turbulence in industrial relations. Norway was not the only nation 
to experience industrial unrest at this time; the United Kingdom too had its 
problems in this respect .4 Nevertheless, the nascent trade unions, which in 1899 
had formed themselves into a national federation, Landsorganisasjonen i Norge 
(always referred to LO) negotiated as early as 1907 their first nation-wide 
contract with the Norwegian Employers' Association (Norsk 
Arbeidsgiverforening or NAF)I 
LO, almost from its foundation, has had a very close relationship with the 
Norwegian Labour Party (Den Norske Arbeiderpartei, more commonly known 
as DNA), which was founded in 1887. This integration has been so close at all 
levels of the organization that the two systems have been fittingly described as 
Siamese twinS. 6 While the constitution of the kingdom has from the outset 
implicitly granted freedom of association to workers, this relationship of the LO 
with DNA is another reason why, Norway, alone of all industrialised 
democracies, has never experienced any legal harassment of trade uiýiions. 
For Norway the 1920s were years of depression during which her trade unions 
were in sharp conflict with the employers. From 1930, however, LO appeared to 
changefrom an agent in class conflict to a domesticated collaborator in macro- 
economic planning. 7 Despite a DNA resolution in 1930 that it was opposed to all 
class co-operation, 8 LO began quietly to have discussions with the employers. 
These culminated in the Basic Agreement (Hovedavtalen) Of 1935 which 
covered all the earlier disputed issues, both wage and non-wage, and was to be 
valid for five years. Unofficial strikes and other industrial disputes did not 
vanish immediately but the Basic Agreement soon came to be accepted 
nationally as a social contract parallel with the Constitution. As the State 
Mediator remarked in 1939: whereas organizations met earlier as enemies at the 
bargaining table, the situation has changed. 771ey do not meet as enemies, but as 
opponents with a will to peace. 9 Freedom of association both in practice and in 
theory was now established on a firmer footing. The question of regulating by 
3Hodne, F. (1975) Economic History ofMorway 1815-1970, Tapir. 
4 It should be remembered that the decade before 1914 was a troublesome time for British 
industrial relations as well as Norwegian. The South Wales coalminers had adopted a syndicalist 
approach and strikes there and in other parts of the UK were conducted in a manner that 
brought out the military in aid of the civil authorities. 
5 In 1986 NAF merged with NIF (Norges Industriforbund4 which was concerned mainly with 
industrial policy) to form NHO (Nmringslivcts Hovedorganisasjon, the Confederation of 
Norwegian Business and Industry). 
6 Fivelsdal, E. (1965) White Collar Unions and the Norwegian Labour Movement. Industrial 
Relations, Vol 5 Part 1, p. 8 1. 
7 Schwerin, D. S. (198 1) Corporatism and Protest: Organizational Politics in the Norwegian 
Trade Unions, p. 17. Kent Popular Press, Kent, Ohio. 
8 ibid p. 17. 
9 Galenson, W. (1949) Labor in Norway, p. 176. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts. 
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law these basic labour rights has been subsequently discussed from time to time 
but the trade unions and the employers' organizations have always opposed this 
since they find the legal situation satisfactory and prefer as few regulations as 
possible. 
By the early 1960s Norway was a pleasant European backwater with a stable 
society, full employmentIO and a more than adequate GNP per capita. Its trade 
unions remained strong and there was little in the way of industrial unrest since 
in common with the other Scandinavian countries there was total acceptance of 
the negotiation procedures whereby terms and conditions of employment were 
agreed and, in contrast to Britain, of the dispute resolution procedures which 
were operated at national level through courts established for that purpose. 
During any contract period there is an obligation to resolve any dispute solely 
through negotiation or by referral to the Labour Court. Norway had become, as 
she remains, a societal-corporatist nation with co-operation between government 
and national organizations such as the trade union federations' I and the employer 
associations widely accepted as the appropriate method whereby the kingdom's 
interest is best served. As the historian T. K. Derry puts it: The Norwegians are 
great worshippers of law and system in theirpublic business. 12 It was this sense 
of the conduct of business operations in Norway, foreign as well as indigenous, 
which the oil majors failed to appreciate when they started to drill under the 
Norwegian continental shelf. 
3 Norwegian Institutions 
It is appropriate at this point to look at the nature of Norwegian institutions. This 
is done most easily by discussing briefly the ethos of the nation and then 
explaining how the industrial relations system functions virtually as part of the 
apparatus of state. 
(a) The Ethos of the Nation 
Professor Geir Lundestad, Director of the Nobel Institute in Oslo, believes that 
Norway is probably more unified than any country in Europe and certainly 
equality is a beliefstronger here than anywhere else. 13 
While patriotism has always been and remains strong as indicated by the 
unofficial national motto "Alle for Norge' (all for Norway), the ethos of the 
nation is equality. This word is sometimes confused with egalitarianism, which 
the Concise Oxford Dictionary defines as the attitude or belief of a person who 
holds the principle of the equality of mankind. In recent years egalitarianism has 
often been expressed in terms more redolent of envy than of honest search for 
10 On account of its small population and the opportunities created by the discovery of oil, 
Norway continued to enjoy full employment much longer than most European nations. It was 
not until the winter of 1988-89 that unemployment became a serious problem. v. Gjerde, B. 
(July 1992) The Labour Market in Norway. Norinform (produced by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs). 
II Compared with UK which has in its TUC bne federation of all trade unions, Norway has three 
separate federations representing employees of different status. 
12 Derry, T. K. (1957) A Short History offorway, p. 252. G. Allen and Unwin, London. 
13 Ledgard, J. Booming &rway basks in its go-it-alone golden age. (Scotsman, 7th July, 1995). 
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equality of treatment. Equality, by contrast, reflects more accurately the outlook 
of Norwegian society, which the then Prime Minister, Gro Harlem Brundtland, 
described as a compassionate form of capitalism which returns comprehensive 
weýfare benefits in exchangefor brutal taxation. 14 A synthesis of national norms 
of social responsibility and conceptions of equality have attained for Norway its 
objective of a classless society and this is the foundation of the political 
consensus so vital for the way in which the nation conducts its affairs. 
To a certain extent this has been achieved through a combination of two factors. 
One is that the population of only 4.3 million allows Norwegians, in the words 
of their King Harald V, to know each other personally. 15 The other is the 
tremendous wealth generated by the oil industry. Norway is second only to 
Saudi-Arabia16 in the export of crude oil and has natural gas in superabundance 
as well; the Troll platform, for example, has recently come on stream and is 
expected to produce 84 million cubic metres of natural gas each day over the 
next seventy years. The fiscal system distributes this wealth among Norwegians 
through, in the words of the Prime Minister mentioned immediately above, 
brutal taxation . 
An equal society was the goal which Norway set for herself almost from the 
formation of the state and she sought to work towards this through the 
establishment of institutions appropriate for a country of her size. Oil revenue 
has simply meant that Norway has achieved this goal earlier than she could ever 
have expected. The institutions preceded the discovery of oil and were therefore 
in place when the oil majors arrived. All trade unions of any size were already 
affiliated to LO, by far the biggest confederation of trade unions or to the 
Federation of Professional Unions (Akademikernes FellesorganisasJon) or to 
very much smaller confederations. Employing organizations were members of 
NAF and they surrendered full negotiating powers to it. As a counterweight to 
over-centralisation there is also a considerable amount of delegation to all 
organizations at local level. LO, by Article 13 of its constitution, 17 allows 
autonomy to member unions when new collective bargains are being negotiated 
and will intervene only if a new agreement has a possible financial effect upon 
another union. It may not even propose amendments to any agreement reached 
between a member union and an employer unless it has first discussed the matter 
with the union concerned. The government too promotes local decision making 
by devolving a great deal of power to the 17 counties and to main cities such as 
Oslo and Stavanger. It was not until 1958 that collective bargaining 
arrangements for public servants were permitted by law and they are modelled 
on practices which industry had developed over decades. Recent legislation 
increased the already considerable autonomy of some local authorities to include 
14 ibid. 
15 ibid. 
16 Lynghaug, E. (1995) Positive Power by Team Management. Fourth Offshore Installation 
Management Conference, The Robert. Gordon University, Aberdeen. 
17 Constitution of The Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) as amended 1993. 
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the right to depart from any collective agreement obtained through the 
machinery set up to reach a national bargain for all local government servants) 8 
(b) The Industrial Relations System 
The industrial relations system of Norway conforms to the Nordic Model. This 
means that it operates through a strong trade union movement co-operating with 
a centralised employers' organization within a tradition of political consensus. 
This definition of the Nordic Model and therefore of the Norwegian Model may 
be broadened by identifying four principal features which are central to its 
continuing success: a unified trade union movement with a much higher degree 
of organization than in most industrialised nations, a long tradition of collective 
bargaining, tripartite regulation of disputes through co-operation of state, trade 
unions and employers and consultation by the government of trade unions and 
employers on economic policy. 
In comparison with many nations such as Germany, Italy and France, where 
legislation provides basic rights in labour relations, Norway, like Great Britain, 
gives less legal protection to individual and collective rights. The United 
Kingdom, for example, did not implement the European Social Chapter of the 
Maastricht Treaty, (although the current government intends to reverse that 
decision). Norway, not a member of the European Union, sees no need for 
further legislation on individual rights, partly since trade unions have such a high 
membership of the working population (at the start of 1992 there were 1,299,955 
members of associations of wage earners out of a working population of about 
1,700,000) but mainly because the system works to the satisfaction of the nation 
as a whole. 
Both NHO and LO have highly centralised mechanisms and together constitute a 
bipolar power system without rival in the Norwegian economy. 19 Thus the 
industrial relations system is intertwined with decision-making on national 
economic policy to a degree unknown outside other Nordic nations. LO with 
around 800,000 members from its constituent unions is the largest association of 
wage-eamers and is consulted along with NHO by the government on all issues 
affecting the national economy. LO also represents a considerable number of 
public servants and negotiates on their behalf with their employer, the 
government. 
A good example of this tripartite approach is what at the time (1976) was 
referred to as the "Kleppe Package". Per Kleppe, the Finance Minister, reached a 
comprehensive agreement on wages and salaries after submitting his proposals 
to trade union and employer associations. He had discussions also with the LO- 
affiliated public service associations and the agricultural industry. The outcome 
was that an agreement on earnings and conditions of work was settled at national 
level for about 750,000 employees. Kleppe was obviously an astute and 
Is Smart, P. J. (1992) The Me of the Convention ofScottish Local Authorities as an Employers' 
organization with an International Comparison, p. 146. Unpublished thesis, The Robert Gordon 
University and Albwk, E. et al (1996) Nordic Local Government. pp. 205 - 218. Association of 
Finnish Local Authorities, Helsinki. 
19 Fivelsdal, E. op. cit. p. 8 1. 
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competent statesman but his involvement of trade union and employer 
organizations marked no innovative policy on the part of a government minister. 
All industrialised democracies have institutions devised to resolve disputes, 
when direct negotiations between employers and trade unions reach an impasse. 
In Norway these institutions are supported in equal degree by managements and 
trade unions and third party resolutions are accepted almost without question. It 
would, nevertheless, be incorrect to state that there is no industrial conflict at all; 
for example, between 1981 and 1991 there were 143 strikes involving 315,978 
workers leading to 1,772,007 working days JoSt. 20 Since this represents fewer 
than 60,000 working days lost per annum, it is scarcely a statistic to cause 
concern, even to a nation with a working population of under 2 million. 
Another aspect of the system is compulsory mediation, which was first agreed as 
far back as 1915. Government intervention is accepted as desirable by both 
employee and employer organizations because disputes introduce disorder into 
the system which they have negotiated with the government over the years. 
Mediation has become so much part of the industrial relations system that direct 
bargaining between employer and trade union is sometimes just a preliminary to 
the real bargaining where the parties argue their case before a mediator. 
Norway's industrial relations system has, however, been constructed in such a 
way that organizations outside the official trade union and employer associations 
can feel disadvantaged. This was certainly the case when OFS, an oil trade union 
outside LO, found its strategy of selective striking negated by an immediate 
employer lockout and government interpretation of this as a reason for using its 
power to intervene and to impose a settlcment. 21 
To what extent will a system devised essentially in the first half of the twentieth 
century meet the challenge of change in working practices and organization? In a 
recent publication22 Hans-Gordn Myrdal of the Swedish Employers 
Confederation raises some questions about the future of the Nordic and therefore 
of the Norwegian Model. He challenges as arrogant the claim by his compatriot 
Bernt Schiller that the Nordic experiences of labour relations are morally 
superior to other less democratic forms of labour organization and therefore 
represent the most attractive means of handling future challenges. 23 Myrdal 
asserts that the future almost certainly involves an increasing use of information 
technology and thus an associated decentralisation of organizations. This in its 
turn will pose a conflict between the traditional centralist institutions and small 
groups with their own particular objectives. Schiller, on the other hand, believes 
that the model is strong enough to retain its characteristic features through the 
self reliance which the system has developed among its participants. This will 
allow amendments to be grafted upon the model and thus meet the problems 
Myrdal foresees. 
20 Statistisk SentralbyrA. Oslo 1994. 
21 This is given in greater detail later in this chapter. 
22 Myrdal, H. G. (1995) Labour Relations - the Nordic Experience. European Foundationfor 
the Improvement ofLiving and Working Conditions, Dublin. Vol 10, pp. 12 - 14. 23 Schiller, B. (1994) The Future ofthe Nordic Model ofLabour Relations, pp. 73-74. Ile 
Nordic Council of Ministers, Copenhagen. 
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4 The Coming of Oil 
Who first referred to the Norwegians as "white Arabs" and when is unknown; 
but the term is clearly pejorative and refers to the distaste felt towards the 
nations of the Persian Gulf when they sought, successfully, to control the 
industry which was extracting so lucrative a commodity from their territories. In 
the early years of the oil industry in the Middle East all the expertise was held by 
the big oil companies and it was inevitable that the indigenous inhabitants could 
contribute only at the lower skill levels of employment. This they did docilely in 
the early days but gradually, as a greater understanding of the technology spread, 
increasing numbers of them became capable of accepting posts of greater 
responsibility. By the 1970s there was a sudden surge of patriotic fervour and the 
oil rich nations formed themselves into OPEC with all the consequences which 
have flowed from the formation of that body. The oil majors were less than 
enthusiastic about the Arab nations taking control of their own economic destiny 
and when the Norwegians sought to do the same after a considerably shorter 
gestation period, the operating companies reacted with the same initial 
resentment. Had they troubled to study the history of Norway in the twentieth 
century they would have made fewer assumptions about the host nation's 
willingness to adopt a disinterested approach to events off its shores. This sheer 
political ineptitude was exhibited at its worst when the first oil major on the 
scene, Phillips, gave employment to the Norwegian monarch's secretary under 
the impression that this would buy political influence at the highest level. 
In 1993 the Vice-President of the Norwegian Oil and Petrochemical Workers 
Union, Ketil Karlsen said - unions are a bit slow to react to changes. It is in 
their nature to hold back and the nature of this new industry took the unions by 
surprise. 24 Perhaps the Norwegians had themselves been somewhat lax in their 
historical research for it would not have been difficult to make realistic 
assumptions about the nature of the oil industrys conduct of operations in their 
waters. Exploration drilling began in 1966 and the companies involved were all 
from the USA since Norway, like Saudi Arabia before it, had no indigenous 
expertise in this industry. Obviously there was employment at the lower skill 
levels of the industry and this was carried out by Norwegians who soon learned 
the basic techniques that were required to perform the jobs competently. The 
industry, however, treated its locally recruited labour similarly to its treatment of 
the population of less developed nations, paying insufficient attention to the 
working environment and operating a "hire and fire" policy as labour 
requirements dictated. There was no redress for an employee who felt that he 
had been unfairly dismissed and any suggestion of a collective agreement 
between a drilling company and a representative body of the employees was 
brushed aside because the idea of a trade union presence anywhere in the 
industry was abhorrent. In short, the local people were not accorded the respect 
to which they believed that they were entitled, both as employees and as 
24 Karlsen, K. (1993) The Norwegian Experience p. 53. Proceedings of an international 
conference entitled "Workforce Involvement and Health and Safety Offshore" sponsored by 
STUC and others at Glasgow in March 1993 and published by STUC et al in November 1993. 
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Norwegians. Ojan Bergflodt, Deputy Leader of the Federation of Oil Workers 
Trade Unions, adds the interesting comment that the industry's culture was 
based on values completely different from what Norwegians had been taught at 
school. 25 As far as the companies were concerned they were operating as they 
had done in other parts of the world and the locals should understand that the 
industry was one which had neither the time nor the inclination to seek 
recognition -as model employers. Thus the fifteen year period from 1966 when 
drilling first began to 1981 when the Willoch Doctrine was formulated 
constitutes a period of discontinuity in the Norwegian political and social 
system. 26 
Some Norwegians have labelled these early years of oil and gas exploration "The 
Wild West Period"27 although even at this early stage some political regulatory 
machinery had been introduced through the establishment of an oil sector in the 
Department of Industry; thus the challenge of the new industry to Norway and 
her institutions was recognised at official level to some extent. In general terms, 
however, it can be described as a clash of cultures between an industry which 
had always operated with the minimum of accountability even within the USA 
and a people who had long been accustomed to governing themselves through a 
system of institutions which, they believed, served them well. Where 
employment was concerned this meant that terms and conditions of work were 
regulated through collective bargaining processes which were particular to 
Norway. 28 Moreover, employee participation in the day to day operation of an 
enterprise was the norm, especially in accident prevention, which went back to 
1910 when a Workers' Protection Act guaranteed employee membership on 
mandatory safety committees. A later Workers' Protection Act of 1956 did state 
that its provisions were applicable for offshore as well as onshore employment 
but because it was drawn up with fishing and marine transport rather than oil 
exploration in mind the drilling companies were able to claim that the act was 
not operable on their installations. 
LO soon realised that it had a battle on its hands and that it was dealing with a 
less scrupulous and tougher opponent than it had previously confronted. The LO 
strategy was immeasurably superior to that of the British TUC which left the 
issue to its affiliated unions, when a similar situation arose on installations in 
British waters. The sorry tale of ineptitude and intemecine squabbling which 
made it easy for the oil industry to defeat the British trade unions will be told in 
later chapters. The LO designated four trade unions which it considered to be 
appropriate to represent oil company employees and charged them with 
recruiting these employees into membership. In this they were unsuccessful and 
several reasons can be advanced to account for this. 
The first was physical access to the installations which, combined with the 
industry's scarcely disguised hostility to the whole concept of trade unionism, 
25 Dergflodt, 0. (March 1993) A Story ofNeglect. Occasional paper published by Hylo House, 
Wigan. 
26 This point was made by Professor Jan-Erik Karlsen, when the author visited Rogaland 
Research Institute, Stavanger in May 1995. 
27 Bergflodt, 0. op. cit. 
29 These processes were broadly similar across all five Nordic nations. 
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made it difficult to discuss with employees the benefits of representation by 
unions. Then there was the determination of the employers to resist any intrusion 
of a third party into the settlement of the terms and conditions of work which 
they were prepared to offer to their workers. In these, of course, the LO was 
facing the same difficulties which UK unions were to experience. There, 
however, the similarity ends. Karlsen suggests another reason for the failure, 
namely that the designated unions did not take the oil industry serioUSly. 29 Either 
they did not believe that there was much of a future for the industry or they 
preferred to devote their energies to maintaining their presence where they had 
been operating successfully over the decades. They may also have judged that 
the membership accretion which they could obtain offshore was too small for the 
expenditure on the efforts that were required. Another reason is that they just did 
not have sufficient knowledge of the industry to mount a credible campaign. At 
all events, after a few years, the LO decided that a totally different strategy was 
necessary and formed a new union specifically designed for all workers 
employed in the oil industry. Thus in 1977 there was founded Norske 01je og 
Petrokjemiforbund (NOPEF) - the Norwegian Oil and Petrochemical Workers 
Union. 
There was another very different cause behind the birth of a new trade union 
within LO. This was the emergence of another union, the Federation of Oil 
Workers or OFS (Oljearbeidcmesfellessammenslutning), which was not a 
member of LO and has remained independent since its foundation. It is of 
particular interest in any study of industrial relations in the North Sea oil 
industry on account of its curious origin, its militancy and its later influence 
within the British sector, when the OILC made its appearance. 
Workers in the earliest days of the offshore oil industry had to rely mainly on the 
Norwegian Seafarers' Union. This proved unsatisfactory and the other three LO- 
designated unions were considered equally ineffectual on account of their lack of 
experience of the industry as well as the hostility of the employers. In 1973 
Employees of the Phillips Petroleum Company Norway (PPCoN) formed an in- 
house union, which the company recognised. It seems unlikely that PPCoN had 
suddenly been converted to the gospel of full employee participation together 
with trade union recognition and a more probable explanation is that the 
company thought that a "sweetheart" union had been born, an innocuous staff 
association which it could manipulate with case. The Norwegian industrial 
sociologist, S. V. Andersen, believes the company was simply following a 
formula which had been successful in the past and quotes from an ICEF30 
bulletin of 1980/8 1. 
No industry has been subject to more employer control and manipulation of 
unions than petroleum, from state owned as well as private companies. In reality 
the oil companies created the in-house unions, this way they managed to keep 
the industry free from of independent unions. In-house unions, personnel 
29 Karlsen, Y, op. cit. 
30 International Federation of Chernical, Energy and General Workers'Unions (est. 1907). 
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associations, independent andfreefrom real democratic institutions are the rule 
rather than the exception. 31 
Whatever the reason the company soon found that it had a wildcat by the tail for 
the union immediately adopted safety measures as its the top priority. Soon after 
this Mobil and Elf began to explore in Norwegian waters and the Phillips 
workers assisted in the formation of similar in-house unions. Amalgamation of 
these and similar associations on other installations followed and thus OFS was 
founded, a union specifically for workers in the oil industry. To what extent the 
outcome of PPCoNs decision to recognise the in- house union has been 
interpreted by oil companies on the UKCS as a major error of judgment which 
they have no intention of repeating can be no more than speculation. 
OFS was concerned, initially at any rate, with direct employees of the oil 
companies. Contractors' men, who were offshore usually for short periods, had 
less interest in OFS and were broadly content to be represented by their LO 
unions which were based onshore. Ignoring the blandishments of LO this newly 
formed federation of workers adamantly refused to compromise its independence 
and set out on a course of strong and, at times, militant action to attain what it 
saw as legitimate demands. The following quotation gives a clear distinction 
between the philosophies of the two rival unions - NOPEF and OFS. 
You might have the impression that oil workers in Norway are on strike each 
and every year. Our own track record when it comes to industrial action, or 
rather lack of it, shows that we take our responsibilities very seriously indeed. 
NOPEF has had to leadjust one strike in its fifteen year history. I will not say 
who it is that is beingforced to take industrial action, but I have mentioned the 
name of the union. 32 
5 Organized Labour Asserts its Traditional Me 
it is always difficult and sometimes misleading if any particular event or year is 
used to mark an important change in the historical development of a theme. 
Nevertheless, 1977 is widely recognised as a significant date in the history of the 
Norwegian offshore oil industry because it serves as a watershed, separating the 
years when the employers in that industry exercised almost total autonomy in 
their modus operandi from the period when they were gradually brought into 
conformity with other Norwegian-based employers. 
There are several reasons which make 1977 significant but most important of 
these is that the Storting33 passed the Working Environment Act. In its 1992 
Annual Report the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate made this comment: 
The introduction of the Working Environment Act in 1977 is a crucial element in 
the process towards the institutionalization of the Norwegian oil industry. The 
act not only protected the workers'rights, but also forced a general process of 
31 Quoted in Anderson, S. V. (1988) British and Norwegian Offshore industrial Relations, p. 46. 
Gower Publishing, Avebury. 
32 Karlsen, K. op. cit. 
33 'Me Norwegian parlialnent. 
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co-operation between the supervising authorities, the oil companies and the 
unions. 
T. V. Quale made a similar point, when he argued that the act required conditions 
of work offshore to be improved continuously in tune with technological 
possibilities and social development and that employee participation must be a 
central measure both in assessing the quality of the work environment and in 
planninglimplementing changes. 34 
An official statement about the act is given below not just to confirm the 
interpretations quoted immediately above but to demonstrate the extent of the 
statutory obligation upon all employers to implement an employee relations 
policy very much in line with what the Norwegian trade unions had asked their 
government to enact. This 1977 act entitled Norwegian trade unions to a 
measure of power within , 
the offshore oil industry, that was far beyond any 
realistic hopes of British trade unions which, by that year, had still to recruit 
sufficient members offshore to make a claim, even for the simplest of 
representational rights, a credible proposition. 
Solution of an enterpriseýy working environment problems shall be reached 
through close co-operation between the management and the employees. A 
number of the Act's provisions expressly stipulate co-operation in questions, 
concerning, for example, technology, the organization of work, planning 
systems, building work etc. There follows a comment on the importance which 
the act lays upon individual judgment and professional responsibility and the 
text takes up again. Through their shop stewards the employees are also ensured 
influence over such questions as work on Sundays and public holidays etc. By 
virtue of the Working Environment Act formal institutionslbodies shall be 
established to ensure that the employees can exercise irfluence in working 
issues. 
In every enterprise covered by the Act (basically every enterprise that employs 
labour), one or more protection officers shall be elected, depending on the size 
and nature of the enterprise. It is the protection officer's duty to take care of the 
employees' interests in matters concerning the working environment and to see 
that the work can be carried out in a thoroughly safe and sound manner. 35 
Another reason for recognising 1977 as a useful date to divide earlier from later 
developments in the industrial scene offshore is the more positive interest taken 
by LO. As already stated, 36 LO had realised that its policy of expecting existing 
trade unions to expand into the offshore oil industry had failed lamentably and, 
moreover, a non LO union, OFS was, by contrast, successfully recruiting 
members. Accordingly, it founded that year a new trade union, NOPEF, which 
was designated to cater for all employees in the oil industry. 
34 Quale, T. V. (1986) Safety and Offshore Working Conditions: the Quality of Work Life in the 
North Sea p. 37. Norwegian University Press (distributed outside Scandinavia by Oxford 
University Press). 
35 The Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (1983) Industrial Democracy in Norway 
UDA 167/83 ENG. 
36 V. p. 77 supra. 
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A third reason which was to become increasingly associated with the drive for 
union membership - and thereby greater participation of non-managers in the 
operation of offshore installations - was accident prevention. The very name of 
the act meant that safety was implicit in its prime objectives. Three years were to 
pass before the dreadful tragedy of the Alexander Kielland, which capsized with 
the death of 123 persons. However, public and political concern had already 
been growing as a consequence of the number of serious accidents offshore. 
Justifiably or not, the oil companies were accused of attaching too low a priority 
to the provision of a safe working environment and their hostility to employee 
participation, especially through trade unionism, was suggested, if not asserted, 
as a contributory factor to these accidents. In 1975 there was a fire on the 
Ekofisk Alpha platform and three workmen died. Two years later a blow-out 
occurred on Ekofisk Bravo and, although no deaths resulted the pollution was 
immense leading the International Labour Organizaton to include it among the 
five offshore oil disasters which have had major repercussions on safety policies 
and regulations. 37 
For a full understanding of the position in 1977, however, an analysis of the 
reasons for the Working Environment Act is necessary. In the early years of oil 
exploration, few Norwegians were employed and the industry did not attract 
much attention from the government nor, must it be said, from the trade unions. 
Then rumours, followed by more substantiated allegations about the methods of 
work on installations such as uncontrolled hours of work, unsafe working 
practices and unprotected security of employment, began to attract comments. 
Once the government had decided that the rumours and allegations deserved its 
attention it found that it did not possess sufficiently reliable information upon 
which it could base any action. 
It was known that Spanish and Portuguese workers we: --. employed offshore in 
Norwegian waters and that many were accepting tours of duty that were as long 
as six months. The Norwegian inland revenue was the first national institution to 
become involved in employment offshore because expatriate workers requested 
that, although located in Norwegian waters and consequently paid in Norwegian 
currency, they should be taxed at the much lower rate prevailing in their own 
countries. This concession was not permitted but the case did draw public 
attention to the fact that there was a growing industry offshore. The government 
lacked the information necessary to introduce legislation because the drilling 
companies had claimed that the Workers Protection Act of 1956 referred to 
fishing and to marine transport but not to offshore installationS. 39 As a result the 
Labour Inspectorate (the Norwegian equivalent of the UK Health and Safety 
Executive) which was charged with ensuring the proper implementation of the 
1956 act did not include any comment or statistical data about offshore 
installations in its annual reports. 
37 International Labour Organization, Safety and Related issues pertaining to Work on Offshore 
Petroleum Installations. TMOPI/ 1993. The other disasters were the Sea Gem ( 1965: 13 lives 
lost), the Alexander Kielland (1980: 123 lives lost), the Ocean Ranger ( 1982: 84 lives lost) and 
the Piper Alpha( 1988: 228 lives lost), The Ocean Ranger was a Canadian installation. 
38 v. p. 76 supra. 
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To remedy this situation the government carried out a public inquiry into 
employment offshore and its report (NOU 1975: 3839) found that the bulk of the 
allegations were correct, not least that there was overt hostility towards the trade 
unions by the managements. This report allowed the government to proceed with 
legislation aimed at remedying problems which had developed in Norwegian 
employment practices as a whole since the 1956 Workers' Protection Act when 
there had been no offshore oil industry. The 1977 act applied to all employment, 
onshore and offshore (although mobile units were not brought within its scope 
until 1992) and so employment legislation was applied to the bulk of the 
offshore oil industry for the first time. Quale expressed the sentiments of the 
offshore installation managers at the passing of the act thus: There is nothing we 
can do, we just accept what we are being told to do by the government and 
unions etc, - it is very expensive, - but if this is the wa they want it, they can get Y 
it. 40 
At this point it must be remembered that Norway is a societal-corporatist nation. 
Much of the pressure on the government to force the offshore oil industry to 
conduct its business inside the same legal parameters as other enterprises 
operating within the nation had come from the trade unions or, more precisely, 
from LO. The Norwegian trade union confederation had its own agenda - 
statutory rights to engage in collective bargaining and other traditional 
representative r6les offshore, which in turn would smooth the path to increased 
membership of NOPEF and take the wind out of the sails of the upstart OFS. 
Nor was the government averse to this objective. Most importantly, it was 
seeking to tread a middle path between conciliating its electorate, which clearly 
disliked what it interpreted as the deliberate flouting of traditional Norwegian 
employment practice, and retaining the co-operation of the oil industry, which 
was now pouring capital into the economy and providing Norwegians with a 
higher standard of living than they could have envisaged a few years earlier. A 
significant contribution towards retention of the industry's co-operation could be 
gained by ensuring an orderly state of employee relations within the industry. 
The OFS was regarded as a loose cannon making life more difficult than it need 
be for oil companies and the growth of an LO union offshore, preferably 
associated with a decline in OFS influence, would restore greater order to the 
conduct of industrial relations. Just as LO could bring pressure on the 
government, so, in its turn, could the government bring pressure on LO if it 
believed this was required in the national interest. Although not by nature a 
compliant creature, the LO was committed to a form of collective bargaining and 
dispute resolution which had been long established and was widely acceptable to 
the nation as a whole. No such commitment could be expected from OFS. This 
argument was put succinctly by Andersen as follows: 
The recent interventions by the Government, parliament and LO have been 
motivated by macro-economic considerations, not by violations of workers, 
rights. OFS, rather than the international oil companies, is perceived to be the 
39 NOU is the abbreviation of Norsk Offentlig Utredningen, which translates as "Norwegian 
Official Publication". An NOU is a report carried out by the government when specific facts are 
needed on an issue of national importance. 
40 Qualc, T. V. op. cit. p. 33. 
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key source of the problem. Further successfor this union is regarded as a major 
threat to the corporatist system for wage settlements, which is under pressure 
already. 41 
There was no sudden surge of worker empowerment aboard offshore 
installations following the 1977 Working Environment Act for the simple reason 
that it was not possible for a new industry to transform its work practices 
immediately into the patterns of participation that had been common for decades 
among enterprises onshore. Moreover, although there was gradual modification 
of previous employment practices, a host of interconnected problems impeded 
the process. To begin with, according to Andersen, 42 both government and 
established unions persisted with their previous strategies for about another three 
years, and were reluctant to demand instant adherence to those parts of the act 
which the oil companies found most unwelcome. This could be interpreted as a 
sensible approach allowing the oil industry time to adjust to what was a totally 
new relationship with a host nation and their employees, its citizens. There were 
other more specific and certainly more complicating factors. For example, a fair 
proportion of the workers offshore did not come from union backgrounds and 
even those who did sometimes dropped their membership, not least because the 
salaries were high enough for them to adopt middle class attitudes and values. 
Many workers in any case did not reflect the political attitudes of LO and its 
close relationship with the Social Democratic Party, which is so dominant in 
Norwegian politics. Quale believes that the Norwegian offshore worker, sofar is 
not a typical labour movement affiliated member ofthe proletariat, - ifsuch exist 
anywhere in the country any longer. 43Another factor was the shift system with 
workers being flown to and from the installations at regular intervals and thus 
not experiencing a settled or routine work environment. Continuous work 
PC- 'ods were and remain long, with twelve hours not being unusual, and the 
physical effort left only the most dedicated of trade unionists willing to surrender 
free time to worker-employee relationships. 
The immediate operation of the act was impeded in the main by another matter, 
which was also to have considerable bearing on industrial relations on the UK 
continental shelf about a decade later. This was the presence on installations of 
contractors'and sub- contractors' employees of whom Bergflodt has this to say: 
.. the overwhelming problem was rooted in an age-old peculiarity of the oil business; the contractor and the sub-contractor systems. 
In the seventies and eighties, contract workers swarmed the North Sea, many of 
them without approved time systems which would have indicated periods 
offshorelonshore. More often than not, they were subject to minimal rates ofpay 
and inferior working conditions, "employed" as they were by dubious and 
obscure companies, address unknown. 44 
41 Andersen, S. V. (1984) Conj7ict over Lahor Relations in the Nonvegian Petroleum Sector. 
Report 3184. p. 90. The Norwegian School of Management Oslo. 
42 ibid. p. 88. 
43 Quale, T. V. 
, op. cit. p. 
23. 
44 Bergflodt, 0. op. cit. 
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From the very beginning contractors' employees muddied the field of employee 
representation offshore and, to some extent, have continued to do so, although 
Bergflodt, in the excerpt quoted immediately above, suggests a more chaotic 
situation than was really the case. Nevertheless, the operators, in both 
Norwegian and British waters, have always tried to distance themselves from the 
requirements of employment legislation by reducing, to the maximum extent 
possible, the number of direct workers on their installations. The building of the 
oil installations on the Frigg and Statford fields in the late 1970s was carried out 
in the main by experienced shipbuilding employees, who were already organized 
in the Iron and Metal Workers Union and within which they preferred to remain. 
Their leaders were accustomed to dealing with onshore employers and had 
difficulty in adjusting to the demands of offshore work. In addition, in these 
earlier days of the Norwegian offshore oil industry, the main contractors were 
often foreign companies. The construction of the Statford "A" installation, for 
example, was shared between three companies - Brown and Root, MME and 
Condeep, the last from Oslo and the two others from London. Even Norwegian 
contractors found it difficult to influence the operators because the oil companies 
did not join the Norwegian Employers Association until 1981 and in many cases 
did not feel inclined to take issue with the operators with whom they were 
involved for a limited time only. Pelion was heaped on Ossa when the 
contractors devolved work to their sub-contractors and working conditions were 
seen as secondary to the intricacies of the contract patterns. 
When it is recalled that there was also conflict between unions over the right to 
organize employees, it is perhaps not surprising that there was no immediate 
hannonisation of conditions of employment offshore and onshore. This had been 
a principal objective of the Working Environment Act. Chapter VI I of the act 
stipulated that all enterprises, which regularly employed at least 50 persons, had 
to establish working environment committees with equal membership between 
employer and employees. Safety delegates also had to be elected and were 
accorded considerable powers, including the right to require operations to cease, 
pending a visit by the Safety Inspectorate, if they considered them to be 
dangerous. Although the act makes no specific reference to trade unions, it was 
envisaged by its framers that the employee members of the environment 
committees would be trade unionists, preferably from NOPEF and that, likewise, 
the safety delegates (there had to be one for each separate shift and for different 
workstations) would be union members. This did not occur as quickly as had 
been expected because of the fragmentation of the trade union presence offshore, 
the control of the installations by employers who were less than enthusiastic 
about union power and the complex composition of the workforce arising out of 
the contractor system of work. The act did, nevertheless, permit the government 
to establish at a later date the rules concerning the composition of working 
environment conunittees and the right of local trade unions to appoint safety 
delegates. Soon it became incumbent upon employers to permit trade unions 
with 50% membership on an installation to appoint worker representatives on to 
the working environment committee. By the mid-1980s the act had gradually 
been moved into full operation offshore and the power of organized labour had 
been asserted in Norwegian waters to a degree unthinkable in the oil industry but 
a few years previously. 
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It will be appropriate to mention here another factor which accounted for the 
slow absorption of the 1977 act by the oil industry. In 1972 the government had 
set up the Norwegian State Oil Company or Statoil as it is usually known, the 
objective of which was to carry out exploration, exploitation, transportation, 
refining and marketing of petroleum. 45 Its other important function was to 
encourage rapid development of native expertise in petroleum technology and 
hence to improve the state's capacity to fully participate in all aspects of the 
industry. 46 The government realised that the best means ofgetting afull grasp of 
the petroleum operations is active participation at all levels of the activity. This 
may only be achieved through direct state involvement. 47 The state thus became 
an employer in the industry even if in the initial stages it was dependent on the 
co-operation of experienced operators such as Mobil with which it was first 
associated in the Statfiord field. In short, Norway was anxious to become a main 
player in the exploitation of her lucrative national resource. 
Regulatory control of the industry was recognised as essential and soon it 
became evident that a special agency would have to be created for this purpose. 
The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate was established in April 1973 with the 
joint responsibilities of enforcing legislation and planning future developments 
for Statoil. It was, however, given insufficient resources and its r6le of both 
regulator and planner was criticised as contradictory. There was thus a curious 
similarity with the Petroleum Engineering Division of the Department of Energy 
in the UK which was responsible for the enforcement of safety legislation in 
British waters from 1980 until 1989.48 This shortage of resources, especially 
staff, led to the accusation of weakness on the part of NPD where the interests of 
Statoil, and by implication of other oil companies, were concerned. There were 
even assertions that NPD was controlled by Statoil rather than the reverse and 
certainly NPD in the late 1970s appeared to carry out its duties through 
dispensations, such as exempting oil companies from legislation when its 
enforcement (the statutory duty of NPD) might seem to hinder the rate of 
exploitation. This was admitted some years later by the Director of NPD in 1984 
when he said that his organization had been kept behind in the growth of 
resources in relation to the growth ofactivities on the sheýfO 
In 1981 the oil companies, under pressure from the government, joined NAF and 
so became parties to all general agreements between it and LO. This meant that 
the Basic Agreement, thrashed out over the years 1982 to 1985, became 
applicable offshore. This is not the place to discuss in detail the Basic 
Agreement, a direct descendant of that signed in 1935,50 other than to mention 
that every enterprise with over 100 employees5l had to have a works committee 
with equal representation from management and employees. On offshore 
45 Visher, M. G. & Remoe, S. 0. (1984) The R61e of the State in the Norwegian Oil Sector, 
Politics and Society, 13, pp. 321 - 34 1. 
46 ibid. 
47 ibid. 
48 v. Chapter II infra. 
49 ibid. 
50 V. p. 70 supra. 
51 As compared with 50 as stipulated in the act a figure which still applied onshore. 
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installations it was accepted that the works committees and the working 
environment committees could be amalgamated as single bodies. Oil companies 
had now bowed to the inevitable. They had been driven to recognise trade unions 
for collective bargaining and other representational purposes, and where 
membership of working environment committees was involved, they had often 
to accept the nominees of the trade unions. On the other hand, while the oil 
companies were now having to operate within and not without the national 
industrial relations system, neither the government nor the LO had attained all 
their objectives. The main beneficiary of the legislation was OFS. 
6 Industrial Action and OFS 
The government and the LO had argued with the oil companies that industrial 
peace would be the probable outcome if the companies accepted the spirit as 
well as the letter of the Working Environment Act. It was a reasonable 
expectation that, once the Norwegian form of industrial democracy was 
operating offshore, any disputes could be resolved within the system established 
to deal with them. Norway, in common with other Scandinavian nations, has a 
Labour Court to which all disputes which arise during a period of a contract 
must be referred. These are 
* 
disputes of "right" and the Labour Court will decide 
in the case of any disagreement how a collective bargain is to be interpreted. 
Withdrawal of labour may not be used as a form of industrial sanction during the 
period of the contract. Disputes of "interest" can occur during negotiations for a 
new contract. If mediation, which is compulsory in this situation, fails, the 
unions are free to organize a strike. 
OFS was not a member of LO but it naturally took advantage of legislation 
concerning working environment committees and safety delegates as it was 
perfectly entitled to do; Norway, like Britain, does not disqualify any union 
outside the principal trade union confederation from the protection of its laws. 
On the other hand, OFS followed its own objectives and, not sharing the 
corporatist approach of LO, sought to circumvent government incomes policy 
which was dependent upon moderation in wage settlements during a national 
price and wage "freeze" from 1978 to 1980. 
The government, nevertheless, did allow national unions to carry out some 
limited negotiations during this period but OFS, representing considerably fewer 
than 50% of offshore employees, was not seen to be within this category. 
Membership statistics, especially of smaller unions, whether in the UK or in 
Norway, are often of dubious accuracy, not least because it is in the interests of 
the unions to make themselves appear bigger than they really are. In the United 
Kingdom, for example, the National Union of Mineworkers in the early 1980s 
was affiliating far more members to the TUC than were in employment in the 
industry. OFS in a paper published in May 199352 claimed a membership of 
6,000 while the Statistical Year Book 1994, an official government publication, 
gives 16,119 as the number of persons employed in 1992 in crude petroleum and 
natural gas production. Thus, as late as 1993 OFS could claim a membership of 
52 OFS. (1993) Mat is OFS and how did it come about? p. 2. Stavanger. 
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no more than 37% of offshore oil employees. A 1991 publication53 states the 
OFS membership as low as 4,100. It is, therefore, unlikely that OFS at the end of 
the 1970s had as high a percentage of offshore employee members as today and 
that, quite apart from being seen by the government as an irritant, it could not be 
considered to have national status and so be entitled to negotiate for an entire 
industry. 
Unsurprisingly, OFS realised that the inability to negotiate with the oil industry 
as a national union would be an admission of failure and so a series of strikes 
took place accompanied by lobbying on the political front in Oslo. By virtually 
surrendering toforce majeure - though small in membership OFS controlled the 
vital occupations offshore - the government conceded national status to the 
union. The next aim of OFS was to move from negotiating with individual 
companies to negotiating a common set of conditions with the three companies 
operating in Norwegian waters - Elf, Phillips and Mobil. The companies refused 
and OFS immediately took strike action effectively stopping all oil and gas 
production. It was almost as if this little union revelled in its power, especially as 
it enjoyed the benefit of a curious anomaly. While all contractors' men were sent 
back onshore, legislation made it necessary to retain most of the strikers offshore 
with pay so that the safety of the installations could be maintained. The 
government eventually intervened and referred the issue to the National Wage 
Settling Committee, which was faced with the problem that, for the first time in 
modem Norwegian history, an approved national union was being denied a 
collective agreement with an industry. OFS achieved its primary objective of 
obtaining a framework agreement whereby general conditions of employment 
such as working hours and duty rotas were to be applied commonly across the 
industry. 
This was seen by OFS as only a first step and soon industrial action was in train 
again as the union sought a common wage system recognised by all operator 
companies instead of the existing wide differences in wage levels and payment 
structures. Wearied by what they saw as continual harassment by the union, the 
employers surrendered and a common payment structure, which incorporated the 
most advantageous aspects of the individual systems, was agreed. This was also 
a break through on the preferred national system of wage negotiation whereby 
the government, LO and NAF settled payment levels with an eye to the national 
economy. The person responsible for this was Ame Rettedal, Minister for 
Municipal Affairs and Labour Relations in the government of K&re Willoch, 
Prime Minister of Norway from October 1981 to May 1986. He made it quite 
clear to the industry that if it did not begin to conform to the Norwegian pattern 
of reaching agreements between employers and employees there might be 
problems in the award of the next round of licences to explore for oil in 
Norwegian waters. It was this threat as much as anything else which brought the 
oil employers into the NAF as they realised it was no longer in their interests to 
operate apart from other employers and outside the support of the state. 54 
53 OILC. (1991) Striking Out, p. 84. OIC, Aberdeen. 
54 For a brief account of the origins of OFS and its philosophy see article by Per Chr Bonde, a 
board member of the union, in the November 1993 issue of Blowout, the OILC publication. 
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This policy which the government imposed upon the oil companies has come to 
be known as the "Willoch Doctrine", although the former prime minister has 
claimed in a letter to the author that he was notfamiliar with the expression and 
generously acknowledged thatpraisefor the achievements in bringing order into 
the bargaining between employers and employees in this industry should, 
however, be given primarily to the then minister. 55 The policy did confer some 
benefits on the offshore employers as well. They now had the support of NAF 
and the government in any further trials of strength with OFS. The govenunent 
has the legal power to require any lock-out or strike to cease if it judges the 
action likely to threaten life, public health or national security. The government 
has made extensive use of this power and every main wage negotiation has been 
subsequently referred to the National Wage Settlement Committee. The 
employers have also begun to use stratagems which the OFS claim to be unfair 
but which are no less unworthy than those adopted by OFS. Principal among 
these has been the practice of declaring a lock-out on all remaining installations 
when OFS has initiated a limited strike on one or two of them. Since this leads to 
the complete shutdown of all oil and gas production it has invariably meant that 
the government uses its interventionist powers. OFS has complained to the 
International Labour Office in Geneva about this, alleging that the practice is 
tantamount to ad hoc anti-trade union legislation and for a period Norway, of all 
nations, was placed on the ILO list of "less civilised" countries. 56 
OFS finally realised the limitation of its ability to mount successful strikes in 
1990, when the government intervened only 36 hours after a legal strike had 
started. Incensed at what they took to be deliberate provocation by their 
government, the strikers informed their union that they would defy the 
government and thus removed themselves from the protection of the law. 
Employers issued formal warnings to desist from industrial action and dismissals 
followed when these warnings were ignored. NOPEF threw its weight behind the 
employers hoping to garner some members from what it hoped would be an OFS 
d6bAcle. The strike was over within seven days and OFS had to start to rethink 
its policy and practice. 
its leadership did not consist of hotheads who had come together as a result of 
one particular occurrence. It had fifteen years experience of running a trade 
union and dealing with employers in an industry which it thoroughly understood. 
It secured reinstatement of all dismissed workers through quiet and sensible 
bargaining suggesting to the oil companies that these men were, after all, highly 
trained persons whom it would be expensive to replace with other employees 
who would need training and greater supervision. Doubtless certain 
understandings were extracted from the union by the employers as to the future 
conduct of its members when disputes arose; perhaps the employer 
55 The author finds the disclaimer by Mr Willoch mildly surprising since the term "Willoch 
Doctrine" was used by Professor Jan-Erik Karlsen when the author discussed industrial relations 
in the Norwegian oil and gas industry in 1995 and he has seen it used in some texts. Perhaps it 
indicates the modesty of the man. Since few research students can have had the honour of a 
letter direct from a prime minster, Mr Willoch's letter is included in the text of the thesis and not 
relegated to an appendix. 
56 OFS claimed that government action was in breach of ILO conventions 87 and 98. 
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Text cut off in original 
representatives even praised the Norwegian system of collective bargaining 
which they themselves had once treated with contumely and suggested that it 
should be adhered to at all times. The union has also been prepared to offer 
sympathetic action in support of disaffected groups of contractors' employees 
who have been denied support by their own unions onshore (possibly for good 
reasons). This in its turn has led to the operators putting pressure on their 
contractors to "sort things out quickly or lose the contract" and maintenance and 
construction companies have reached agreements with OFS. 
OFS is not like other unions in Norway. It has followed a policy of taking 
industrial action whenever it has believed that its members will benefit and it 
will probably continue to do so. This approach justifies the comment of Ronnie 
McDonald, the former General Secretary of the Offshore Industry Liaison 
Committee, that it is economistic in outlook, lacks any social dimension and 
exists solely for its membership. 57 It remains outside the societal-corporatist 
framework of Norway but it has one tremendous asset which will ensure its 
survival for the next few years at least. Offshore oil workers feel strongly that 
their occupation gives them an identity of their own and OFS responds to this by 
being a trade union that is specifically for them with no other constituency to 
compete for attention. This point will be taken up again when analysing the 
origins and practice of the Offshore Industry Liaison Committee, with which 
similarities are often made. 
As Karlsen stated in his paper, the turbulent industrial relations in the oil 
industry during the 1980s were certainly not the fault of NOPEF. 58 Such was the 
ferment in Norwegian offshore industrial relations in the 1980s that the nation 
seemed highly strike prone and it might have appeared that the "British disease" 
i. e. the propensity to withdraw labour at the slightest pretext, had been passed 
on to Norway. Bad weather, accidents and technical pruolems all occurred but 
their contribution to production irregularities were minimal compared to 
industrial disputes. The actions of the OFS could at times be criticised as 
irresponsible and, indeed, this was often the opinion of most Norwegians. It 
caused the government to adopt a policy which was untypical in the context of 
the nation's industrial relations history because oil revenues had become integral 
to the continuing prosperity of the nation. Yet it cannot be denied that 
Norwegian employees in the offshore oil and gas industry have much more 
favourable terms of work than prevail on British installations and that trade 
unions have secured the right to represent those employees who have taken out 
membership. To this satisfactory state of affairs OFS has made its own 
contribution. 
7 Summary 
over forty years have passed since Christopher Dawson stated that the essence 
of history is not to be found in facts but'in traditionS. 59 He suggested that a 
57 Comment to the author in February, 1995. See also Andersen, S. (1984) op. cit. p. 7 1. 
58 v. p. 78 supra. 
59 Dawson, C. (1957) The Dynamics of WorldHistory, p. 273. Sheed and Ward, London. 
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people's beliefs drive, shape and infuse energy into the societies they form. Their 
cultures arise out of three main influences : race, enviromnent and occupation or, 
as alternatively put, genetic, geographical and economic factors. To these must 
be added a fourth element, thought or the psychological factor. Yheformation of 
a culture is due to the interaction of all thesefactors; it is afourfold community 
-for it involves in varying degrees a community of work and a community of 
thought as well as a community of place and a community of blood. 60 Many 
years later Professor A. D. Smith of the London School of Economics shared 
Dawson's view when he defined a nation as a named human population sharing 
an historic territory, common myths and memories, a mass, public culture, a 
single territorial economy, and common rights and duties for all members. 61 A 
nation racially homogeneous, inhabiting a well defined geographical area of 
Europe which offered limited economic opportunities had developed a particular 
social tradition, which was the property of the whole society: this nation was 
Norway. It was this aspect of history that the oil companies had never felt the 
need to consider and it explains in large part the reaction of the Norwegians to 
the initial impact of the offshore oil industry; it was an assault upon their culture. 
Quale says much the same although he approaches the matter from the aspect of 
the oil companies rather than of the Norwegian culture. Transfer of experience 
from one part of one international oil company to another, is slow at best - and 
frequently only by chance. 62 This is at least one reason, he asserts, for their initial 
lack of understanding or acceptance of Norwegian traditions and conventions in 
the employment of its citizens. 
Strangely, as Andersen points out, in the earliest formation of its strategy for oil 
development the Norwegian government was most successful where it had least 
experience and least successfiall where it had most experience. 63 It secured vast 
revenues from the oil companies through its concession policy and the creation 
of Statoil, a publicly owned commercial company and it established the 
Norwegian Petroleum Directorate to determine the overall policy for the 
management of the industry. On the other hand, it allowed employee relations in 
the industry, as if in a fit of absentmindedness, to drift into a situation where it 
had to take remedial action or suffer unpopularity from the electorate. 
The explanation for this lies partly in the determination of policies and structures 
which would allow a valuable commodity, oil, to be exploited in the interests of 
Norway. This required a degree of control over the multi-national companies 
which were the organizations chosen64 to develop the resource but it had to be a 
form of control which did not antagonise them. The great Scottish divine, Dr 
60 ibid p. 5. 
61 Quoted by Edward Mortimer in the Financial Times on 31 st July, 1996. Unfortunately he 
gives neither the date nor the publication. 
62 Quale, T. V. op. cit. p. 65. 
63 Andersen, S. V. (1984) op cit p. 49. 
64 In the UK serious consideration was once given to the establishment of non oil-based 
consortia as alternatives to the oil majors in the development of oil and gas fields e. g. consortia 
of enterprises engaged in mechanical engineering, shipbuilding, oil ref ining together with oil 
users; Harland and Wolf, Trafalgar House, ICI and PowerGen examined the possibility, but 
decided that the risk was too great. Norway had not any enterprises sufficiently capitalised to 
make this a realistic proposition. 
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Chalmers (1780-1847), preached on the expulsive power of new affections by 
which he meant that new philosophies and interests can shut out from 
consideration other matters which still retain some validity in the circumstances. 
Thus, in its enthusiasm to control the oil industry in such a way as to enrich the 
nation, the government simply assumed that the needs of the employees, who 
would be operating the installations, would be protected. Such an assumption 
cannot be criticised too harshly because industrial relations in Norway were so 
highly institutionaliscd that little thought was given to the possibility that the 
national system would not operate as smoothly offshore as it had satisfactorily 
done for decades onshore. Just as the oil companies had given no thought to 
Norwegian traditions so had the Norwegians ignored the evidence of the oil 
companies' methods of doing business. 
The recuperative process did not take long and by the mid-1980s trade unions 
had gained a wide degree of recognition in the offshore oil industry. The 
government had certainly been of prime assistance through its willingness to 
legislate and pressure from that quarter as well as from the trade unions 
themselves brought the oil companies to the position where they saw that they 
could, in Allan Flanders' aphorism, only regain control by sharing it. 65 The 
government, however, did not quite attain its objectives. The Norwegian 
approach to industrial relations is based largely on the principle that the fullest 
involvement of trade unions means that union assistance is obtained in the 
regulation of costs and wages and in the avoidance of industrial disputes. The 
trade unions in Norway through LO arc regarded as full partners in the 
corporatist state that has evolved over the past sixty years, a system which would 
have problems for a more populous democracy but which is appropriate for a 
nation of 4.3 million. Yet as regards the offshore oil industry, by far the biggest 
contributor to the nation's GNP, industrial relations presents the curious feature 
of two trade unions, OFS and NOPEF, both recognised by the employers but 
with the former outside LO and continuing to operate totally independent of 
government policy. 
Special Notes 
(a) OFS The term OFS has been used throughout this chapter. These initials 
represented the original union when it was first formed by operators but as it 
attracted other groups of workers such as caterers it divided into divisions each 
with a separate name. It now consists of four divisions - operators, drillers, 
caterers and employees on floating installations - and although the name of "The 
Confederation of Oil Employees" replaced the earlier title which referred solely 
to operator employees, the new organization has the same initials and acts as an 
umbrella structure for all the divisions. 
(b) Statrjord Field StatfJord, discovered in 1974, is the world's largest offshore 
oil and gas field and in March 1995 it passed the mark of 3 billion cubic metres 
of oil produced. In November 1979 StatfJord "A" started production, while 
StatfJord "B" and StatfJord "C" came on stream in 1982 and 1985 respectively. 
Mobil was the operator for exploration, development and production until Ist 
65 Flanders, A. D. (1967) Collective Bargaining: Prescriptionfor Change, p. 32. Faber, 
London. 
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January, 1987, when Statoil assumed operatorship. In 1995 Statoil owned 42% 
of the field, Mobil 12.5% and ten other companies shared the rest. 
(c) Norwegian GDP The importance of oil to the Norwegian economy is shown 
by the following table. 
Year 1988 89 90 91 92 93 94 
Petroleum Sector 8.6 12.3 14.4 14.0 15.0 15.0 16.06 
% share of GDP 
% share of total 24.1 28.9 31.0. 32.2 32.0 33.0 34.0 
export value I I I I I I I I 
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CHAPTER SIX 
EARLY DAYS OF EXPLORATION FOR OIL AND GAS AND 
THE ASSOCIATED INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ISSUES. 
In the early 1950s the government of the United States of America issued what 
came to be known as the Truman' Proclamation. Oil was already being 
extracted immediately offshore in the shallow waters of the Gulf of Mexico 
and the USA deemed it prudent to lay title to its continental shelf. The term 
"continental shelf" is defined by the Bank of Scotland as the shelving area 
covered by shallow water around mq/or land masses. It may be 50 - 100 miles 
in width and merges into the steeper Continental Slope, and yet steeper 
Continental Rise, which descends to the ocean floor. 2 Other nations took 
similar action and the principles of these claims were endorsed in 1958 by the 
International Convention on the Law of the Sea. In the simplest terms the 
convention gives title to the geological strata under the seas while the seas 
themselves remain international. At first little notice was taken of this in 
Norway or Britain, the two nations which had by far the largest share of the 
continental shelf under the North Sea. Indeed, a Norwegian geologist, on 
learning that his country now had first, claim to any hydrocarbon reserves 
under its continental shelf, derided the possibility of the existence of oil to the 
extent of promising to drink every drop found there. 3 Even twelve years later, 
the Chairman of BP, Sir Eric Drake, believed that there will be no major oil 
fields discovered in the North Sea. 4 Six months later (November 1970) his 
company found the prolific Forties Field and the existence of oil in 
commercial quantities under the North Sea had become a reality. 
Some ten years earlier, however, Britain had become aware of the success 
enjoyed by the Netherlands which had discovered large supplies of natural gas 
on and just off its northern shores. Similar geological strata stretched from the 
Dutch into the British part of the continental shelf and it was decided to protect 
British title to it. This was carried out through the Continental Shelf Act of 
1964, which incorporated within British law the general principles of the 
Convention mentioned above and allowed the government to control, through a 
system of licences, the exploration activities of the transnational oil companies. 
I Early Accident Prevention Measures in Offshore Employment 
One of the first operators on the scene was BP which contracted with the 
owners of an ageing decapodal platform, the Sea Gem, for drilling work 43 
miles east of the Humber estuary. On 27th December, 1965 the Sea Gem 
collapsed and 13 of the 32 men on board perished. Thus very early in &. e 
1 Harry S. Truman, President of the United States from 1945 to 1952. 
2 Bank of Scotland International Division, (1996) Oil and Gas Handbook, p. 16. 
3 Visher, M. G. & Remoe, S. 0. op. cit. p. 325. 
4 In a BP publication (October 1965) on discovery of West Sole gas field. Also quoted in 
Callow, C., (1973) Powerfrom the Sea: the Search for North Sea Oil and Gas. Gollancz, 
London. 
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history of the North Sea oil industry there had occurred a spectacular accident 
with attendant loss of life. 
The following day the Minister for Power, Richard Marsh, ordered that a 
public inquiry in the form of a Tribunal be held into the causes of the accident 
and the operation of the safety procedures. The Tribunal's repore was 
published in July 1967. The cause of the collapse was shown to be entirely 
structural because tie bars between some of the legs had fractured but the 
safety procedures were criticised on account of their inapplicability for. a 
structure based offshore. From the industrial relations point of view two 
important consequences followed. 
Firstly, the Tribunal recommended that as in the USA there should be 
statutory provisions for regulating the management of Artificial Islands and 
Kred Structures on the Outer Continental Sheýf. Yhe Tribunal is of the opinion 
that a code of similar authority supported by credible sanctions ought to be 
made applicable to British structures of like kind. 6 The Tribunal was in effect 
stating that there was now off British shores a totally new industry for which 
no current statutory controls were appropriate. New legislation was thus 
necessary together with a different form of man management. Yet the form of 
man management which the Tribunal recommended was curiously at odds with 
the immediately preceding recommendation. It is unlikely that another drilling 
rig exactly like the Sea Gem will ever be constructed so the recommendations 
based upon what the Tribunal may think would have made the Sea Gem a safer 
structure are little to the purpose. 7 Despite this the Tribunal stated that the fact 
that the Sea Gem was lost in the character of a sinking ship suggests strongly 
that there ought to be a Master or unquestioned authority on these rigs. 8 Thus 
the nature of the power which came to be vested in oil installation managers 
has its origins in what some writer? see as a mistaken similarity between a 
fixed installation offshore and a vessel, whereas the analogy with an isolated 
land-based construction site might have been more appropriate. 
The second consequence was that at this early stage in the history of the North 
Sea oil and gas industry accident prevention was recognised as a very 
important factor in the management and operation of offshore installations. 
Accident prevention has been a constant theme in the subsequent history of the 
British North Sea oil and gas industry and one of the significant industrial 
relations aspects has been the failure of the trade unions, as distinct from the 
employees, to win acceptance from the oil companies that they have a 
legitimate role in the maintenance of a safe working environment offshore. 
5 HMSO, 1967 Cmnd 3409.. 
6 ibid Para 10.20). 
7 ibid Para 10.1. 
8 ibid Para 10.2 (iii). 
9 e. g. Macaulay, D. S. (1985) The North Sea Offshore Oil and Gas Industry: a Unique Arena 
for Industrial Relations. Unpublished thesis, University of Edinburgh. 
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Several working parties were established to consider the nature of the 
legislation required for offshore installations. Accident prevention was 
attracting a great deal of attention at this time and in 1970 a distinguished 
Labour party politician, Lord Robens, agreed to chair a committee of inquiry 
into the existing legislation, which was a morass of intricate and ill-assorted 
detail; for example, there were nine main groups of statutes controlling 
different industries and supported by over 500 subordinate statutory 
instruments and yet over 20% of all employees in Britain worked in premises 
not subject to any occupational health or safety legislation. The future scale of 
the oil and gas industry offshore was not envisaged and an opportunity to 
include it within the new comprehensive system of safety legislation was 
missed. Thus while the Robens Corm-nittee was collecting the evidence which 
was to support its recommendations, separate legislation went through 
parliament for employment offshore. This was the Mineral Workings 
(Offshore Installations) Act which received the royal assent in 1971. It 
empowered the Minister of State for Energy to make such regulations as he 
considered appropriate to secure a safe working environment on installations 
exploiting fuel and mineral deposits on the UK continental shelf and for a 
radius of 500 metres around such installations. 
The Robens Report was published in 1972.10 It was the basis of the Health and 
Safety at Work Act 1974 which remains the principal legislation on the subject 
more than twenty years later. A basic tenet of its philosophy was that 
persuasion of employers to act reasonably on accident prevention was 
preferable to compulsion and that there was no legidinate scopefor collective 
bargaining on health and safety. As was commented upon at the time, this 
latter assertion was somewhat unusual from a committee which had a Labour 
politician as its chairman and it was to prove a problem which the trade unions 
were never to overcome offshore. If the principle of voluntarism in the 
achievement of safe working environments was to apply to all land-based 
establishments with their millions of employees it was always going to be 
unlikely that any exception would be made for a few thousand offshore 
workers, especially when it had ýeen s? ecifically stated that collective 
bargaining had no legitimacy in this context. I Three years after the passing of 
the Health and Safety at Work Act, the Safety Representatives and Safety 
Committee Regulations 1977 gave to trade unions recognised by employers the 
right to appoint safety representatives empowered to demand the creation of 
safety committees. In every case the representatives were obviously trade 
union members and so in many onshore companies some elements of collective 
bargaining entered the provisions for accident prevention. 
This was never to be the case offshore in British waters. The position in 
Norway is quite different because legislation has enabled trade unions to 
10 HMSO, 1972 Crand 5034 (3 volumes). 
11 Ile question of voluntarism. in accident prevention and the effect of the Health and Safety at 
Work Act 1974 is well argued in Foster, J. and Woolfson, C. (1992) Trade Unionism and 
Health and Safety Rights in Britain's Offshore Oil Industry, passim. International Centre for 
Trade Union Rights, London. 
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secure a prominent r6le in the maintenance of safe working environments in 
establishments on its continental shelf. 12 In even starker contrast the trade 
unions which represent British seafarers are recognised by the employers and 
their inclusion on joint safety committees was recommended specifically in the 
Holland-Martin Report 13 which was published in 1969, an interesting date in 
this context, coming as it does between the findings of the Tribunal on the Sea 
Gem collapse and the Robens Report. The legitimacy of the trade unions as 
joint participants in the determination of safety policies has never been 
accepted by the employers in the offshore oil and gas industry. Perhaps the 
scale of the industry was not realised until after the flurry of interest in 
accident prevention which ended with the Robens Report but, whatever the 
reason, the British trade unions still do not exercise any representative r6le in 
collective bargaining or accident prevention in the offshore oil and gas 
industry. 
2 Early Industrial Relations Issues 
The West Sole gas field was discovered off the Humber estuary in 1965 and 
production began in March 1967. It was followed by further discoveries in the 
southern part of the North Sea mainly off the Norfolk coast. The discovery of 
oil, however, remained the principal goal, not least because the monopoly 
purchasing position of the British Gas corporation allowed that body to decree 
a low contract price, which discouraged further development. The Danes had 
found a small offshore oil field in 1966 but the significant find was made in 
Norwegian waters where the large Ekofisk field was discovered in November 
1969. Although one month later oil was discovered at the Arbroath 14 field 
about 125 miles east of Peterhead it was the Ekofisk find which was the more 
significant because it attracted towards that part oi the North Sea the 
exploration activity which culminated in the discovery of the Forties field in 
November 1970. Intense exploration of the UK continental shelf followed in 
what the geologists term the Central Graben, the area between the 56th and 
62nd parallels of latitude and the first two degrees of longitude east of the 
Greenwich meridian. From this time it has been common to refer to the 
Southern Basin which provides natural as and to the Northern Basin which 
provides mainly but not exclusively oil. ' 
The discovery of vast reserves of oil under the North Sea was one matter but 
its extraction was a daunting prospect. In the Middle East oil is located under 
the surface of the earth and the climate is conducive to its extraction. In Texas 
and Azerbaijan there are oil fields offshore but since the waters are shallow 
and the climate benign their exploitation had not posed technical problems of 
12 v. Chapter Five supra. 
13 HMSO, 1969 Command Paper, 4114. Committee of Inquiry into Trawler Safety. 
14 Some authorities say that it was the adjacent Montrose field that was discovered first but the 
DTI annual publication Oil and Gas Resources of the United Kingdom gives December 1969 as 
the date when Arbroath was discovered with Montrose as November 1971. 
'5 It was from this time that the Scottish National Party has argued that a Scottish nation 
separated from the United Kingdom is economically viable because "it's Scotland's oil". 
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the magnitude faced above the 56th parallel of latitude and consequently there 
were no lessons to be learned from operations in these locations. The North 
Sea with its deep water and harsh climate required offshore installations of a 
type and structure that would meet virtually any challenge that the most severe 
weather could offer. Accordingly there was a sudden demand for such 
structures, mainly semi-submersible platforms which incorporate legs that are 
not driven into the sea-bed but which terminate in pontoons filled with air as 
well as water allowing the whole structure to float at a draught of about 80 
feet. The platform is retained in the desired position by using eight or more 
enormous anchors weighing up to 20 tons. Shipbuilding and other large 
structural engineering firms won contracts to produce these behemoths and the 
history of industrial relations in the British offshore oil industry was thus 
begun. 
Nigg, situated on the beautiful Cromarty Firth in Easter Ross, was the unlikely 
location of the earliest industrial relations episodes in the history of the British 
offshore oil industry. Highland Fabricators had won a contract to build a 
jacket for the Forties field with mid-1973 as the target date for the float-out. 
Nigg offered to the constructors three advantages. It was located on the same 
latitude as the Forties field, it was in a development area within the terms of 
the Industry Act 1972 which meant that the company was entitled to 
considerable taxation advantages and it was virtually a "greenfield" site with 
no history of organized labour and its associated history of restrictive 
practices. However, the company soon had to surrender its hope of training 
sufficient numbers of local people to the engineering standards required by the 
nature of the task. Welding skills, for example, were so poor that one 
equipment supplier flew from the USA to find out why Brown and Root (the 
main contractor') was purchasing so many of his company's machines for 
gouging out faulty welds. 17 Brown and Root, which elsewhere in the world did 
not recognise or work with trade unions and which deliberately avoided 
Clydeside on account of its intransigent trade unionism, found itself with no 
option but to recruit skilled labour from that area. Since the Clydesiders lived 
up to their reputation as hard bargainers and Brown and Root fought every 
concession that was demanded, it was inevitable that the original target date 
was not met. It was 17th August, 1974, almost the last period of the year when 
a weather window is available for this operation, before the jacket was 
eventually floated out. Moreover, the company had expended over El million 
in bonus payments during 1974 in order to achieve this. The oil companies 
could not but be aware of the fabricators' difficulties in man management and 
their contribution towards the failure to meet the original target date by over a 
year. 
16 Brown and Root were attracted to Nigg by a remarkable local councillor, Isobel Rhind 
(1924-96). She wrote I read an article about Brown and Root planning to build oil-figs in 
Spain. Iphoned (Councillor) John Robertson. Why not Nigg? Then weflew down south to see 
Sir Philip Southwell, head of Brown and Root, in London. Obituary in Scotsman, 21st May, 
1996. v. Appendix BBB. 
17 Rosie, G., (1974) Cromarry, the Scramblefor Oil, p. 24. Canongate Publishing. Edinburgh. 
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Nor would the oil companies have failed to notice the power of organized 
labour in the long and complicated negotiations which dragged on for two 
years from mid-1974 when there was an attempt to obtain planning permission 
for the construction of an oil refinery at Cromarty. This curious tale 18 falls 
outside the scope of this thesis but the significant issue was the ability of the 
Nigg based workers, who supported the proposed development, to bring 
pressure on the Secretary of State for Scotland through their trade union 
leaders and one in particular, Tommy Lafferty of the Amalgamated Union of 
Engineering Workers, who was to have a prominent and subsequently tragic 
role in the aftermath of the Piper Alpha disaster. Although the Reporter19 who 
conducted the Public Inquiry advised against the project, the Secretary of State 
for Scotland, William Ross, rejected this view after being lobbied by the 
Scottish TUC which was anxious to retain job prospects in the Cromarty area. 
Eventually no oil refinery was built but when the Beatrice field was discovered 
in 1976 about 40 miles north east of Nigg a terminal was constructed to 
receive the oil and natural gas liquids. 
1974 also saw the first negotiations on offshore pay and conditions for 
employment in Scottish waters and the earliest evidence of the problems which 
the trade unions in Scotland were to face in their relationship with the oil 
majors offshore. BP had contracted with GEC Electrical Projects, Rugby for 
approximately 30 commissioning engineers to carry out electrical work on four 
Forties field rigs using company equipment manufactured at Rugby and GEC 
had negotiated an agreement for pay and conditions through their own 
engineers' trade union (ASTMS) representative at Rugby, Geoffrey Gilliatt. 20 
This agreement was signed on 17th September, 1974 and Gilliatt sent a copy 
to the union's area officer in the west of Scotland, Campbell Reid, who from 
th= date has been a prominent player on the offshore industrial relations 
scene. In acknowledging receipt of the document Reid congratulated Gilliatt on 
achieving the agreement and stated that there were three factors which were 
inhibiting the establishment of normal relationships with oil companies: the 
refusal by managements, as a matter of policy, to tolerate trade unionism 
offshore, the reluctance of managements to establish contact with trade union 
officials and the difficulty of recruiting members. These three factors have 
remained permanent features of offshore industrial relations 
There is a further significant comment in Reid's letter to Gilliatt; he asks 
Gilliatt for information on the offshore oil industry. Here we have a senior 
trade union official from Scotland seeking information about an industry where 
18 Rosie, G., (1978) The Ludwig Initiative: a Cautionary Tale of North-Sea Oil. Mainstream 
Publishing Company, Edinburgh. 
19 George Maycock of the Scottish Office. It is interesting that the advocate for the proposed 
developer (the USA entrepreneur Daniel K. Ludwig) was James Mackay who later became 
Lord Chancellor from 1987 to 1997. 
" Geoffrey Gilliatt's status within ASTMS is not clear. His branch secretary, writing to Clive 
Jenkins, refers to him simply as "one of our members* while Gilliatt describes himself as "an 
ASTMS representative working for GEC Electrical Projects". His correspondence is a model 
of clear English and suggests he must have been a most effective negotiator for his colleagues. 
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he hopes that his union will have a presence from a member based at Rugby in 
central England. Gilliatt's reply (17th October, 1974) is interesting and so 
relevant to the development of this thesis that one paragraph is quoted in full: 
Referring to the negotiations themselves, we found that the real facts were 
almost impossible to obtain. We know that our own management attempted to 
obtain information from every known offshore firm. Fortunately they too were 
unsuccessful. We actually finished the negotiations using bluff and threats. 
Four days later Gilliatt wrote to Reid to say that BP staff had learned of the 
pay and conditions agreed for the GEC contract engineers and had found them 
much better than their own. This had made them unhappy with the BP 
management and Gilliatt recommends a Bill Fifoot (described in Gilliatt's 
letter of 17th October as the first Engineer to go offshore) as a recruiting 
officer for the union among BP staff. BP management had also become aware 
of the GEC contract and did not like its probable consequences in relation to 
their direct employees. Gilliatt concluded by asking Reid to keep this 
information confidential in order to safeguard my source of information. 
In early November 1974 BP wrote to GEC Electrical Projects advising that it 
had changed its programme and requirements and that the agreement of 17th 
September no longer applied. Salaries were to be reduced by E136 per month 
(a huge amount in 1974), staffing was to be reduced from 30 to 8 and that the 
rotation pattern was to change from two weeks on / two weeks off to three 
weeks on / one week off. Gilliatt decided that such drastic amendments to 
agreed conditions of work and the unilateral way in which they had been 
imposed demanded that he seek assistance at a high level. On 8th November, 
1974 he wrote at length to William Price, Member of Parliament for Rugby, 
complaining of BP's method of doing business but in particular drawing to the 
attention of Price the virtually overt anti-trade unionism of the company. In 
particular he asked if it was possible 2 
for the government to make a statement 
of its policy towards trade unionism. 1 Gilliatt wrote to Reid three days later 
saying that 7he time has come to ask for National help from all sources 
possible. Price forwarded Gilliatt's letter to Michael Foot, Secretary of State 
for the Department of Employment and received an official reply on Ilth 
December, 1974 from the Minister of State, Albert Booth. 
This short letter 22 is of considerable interest on account of its final sentence. 
After saying that support for trade unionism in general will be ensured through 
provisions in the Employment Protection Bill which was in the early stages of 
its passage through parliament, the Minister of State wrote as follows: 
Naturally we are anxious to see the development of trade unionism on oil rigs 
as anywhere else, and I understand that the Companies have agreed to 
21 This letter is given in full as Appendix A. 
22 7his letter is given in full as Appendix B. 
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recognise trade unions when they have sufficient membership among those 
working on oil rigs to warrant this. 
The Employment Protection Bill was to receive the royal assent in 1975 and it 
gave to trade unions and their individual members as much protection as they 
sought. Yet for reasons which will be discussed later the provisions of the act 
were never to apply offshore, support for the development of trade unionism 
offshore was never provided by the government of 1974-79 to the extent that 
trade unionists felt they were entitled to receive from a Labour Party in office 
and "sufficient membership" was never attained on any offshore installation to 
extract the degree of recognition which trade unions needed to carry out what 
they saw as their legitimate functions. 
As regards the particular case of the GEC Electrical Projects this was settled 
in December 1974 when Gilliatt negotiated a new financial agreement with BP 
including the retention of the two weeks on / two weeks off pattern of 
employment. However, the focus of attention must now move to Aberdeen, 
where the trade unions had established a body to co-ordinate their policy 
towards the new industry on their doorstep, principally that of securing 
collective bargaining rights from the offshore employers. 
3 The Inter Union Offshore Oil Conunittee 
It was clear from the time that oil was discovered in commercial quantities off 
the shores of North East Scotland that Aberdeen would be the location of the 
oil companies' administrative headquarters. Indeed, by 1980 the term "Oil 
Capital of Europe" had entered common parlance. Not only was the city 
advantageously placed geographically but it offered a large harbour, an airport 
capable of expansion, effective rail communications and educational 
institutions such as an ancient university, an advanced technological institute 
which was later to be granted full university status and good state and private 
schools. In short, far from being the "ultima thule" of Britain, it was a city 
which offered many attractions to the type of business executive who would be 
managing the industry from company headquarters onshore. 
Aberdeen also shared with its regional environment a level of industrial 
disputes which was below the national average, although this was not a factor 
in the establishment of oil companies there. Various reasons for the placid 
industrial relations have been suggested such as the absence of large sized 
establishments, no history of industrial militancy and perhaps most importantly 
out-migration, which from 1951 to 1969 was the highest in any part of Great 
Britain. 23 Emigrants came from all classes but were preponderantly young 
skilled artisans and the author recalls attending a public meeting in 1966 to 
discuss ways of increasing employment opportunities in the region. The 
23 The North East of Scotland Joint Planning Advisory Conunittce. (1975) 7he Regional 
Report, p. 11. 
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discovery of oil totally reversed this situation but the decades preceding it had 
seen the development of strong local trade unions which were recognised by 
their members as useful agents in the defence of jobs and conditions of 
service. Rather unusually for a city of its population (under 200,000 at the 
1961 census) Aberdeen Trades Council employed a full-time secretary, which 
is an indication of the importance placed by local organized labour on their 
trade unions. During the 1960s this position had been held by James Milne24 
and it is interesting to speculate what might have been pattern of industrial 
relations in the oil and gas industry if this able and influential figure had not 
left Aberdeen in 1971 to become Deputy General Secretary and later (1975) 
General Secretary of the Scottish Trades Union Congress. 
One of the earliest - documents referring to industrial relations in the oil 
industry is a contract of employment dated 9th July, 1973 between the 
Mobilab Division of Smith International (North Sea) Ltd and its employees. A 
grievance procedure is incorporated but there is no mention of trade unions or 
of any other procedure. It is clear from documents in the OILC archiveS25 that 
the trade union branches in Aberdeen were already aware that the oil industry 
was likely to oppose any overtures for collective bargaining on conditions of 
employment and consequently they had begun in 1973 to organize cohesive 
action to redress this. It is not possible to be precise about the sequence of 
events at this stage because surviving correspondence between trade unionists 
is, infuriatingly for the researcher, often undated and so the contents of letters 
and documents have to be examined in detail to find the approximate 
chronological order. A North Sea Oil Action Committee (NOSAC) had been 
formed in October. 1972 at a meeting in Aberdeen called by CSEU unions 
with the original purpose of advocating a greater share of the construction of 
offshore vessels for Scottish yards. NSOAC, however, soon turned its 
attention to working and living conditions in the nascent offshore oil industry, 
where the charter rig companies, according to Bob Middleton 26 employed 
management techniques and imposed working conditions the likes of which had 
not been seen in Britain since the Industrial Revolution. " There is little 
evidence of the success claimed for this local group by Wybrow28 despite 
Middleton's statement that things may well have got worse and most certainýy_ 
would have continued longer, had it not been for the work of that Committee. 29 
Early in 1974 Danny Martin, Secretary of the Aberdeen District Committee of 
the Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Employees and a 
24 Although a member of the Communist Party he was tolerant of other political points of view 
and never allowed his political belief to affect his duty as the spokesman of the trade unions in 
Scotland. A lover of classical music his support for the arts is commemorated by an annual 
concert of music. 
'5 See comment on OILC archives at the end of this chapter. 26 Over the last thirty years Dr Middleton has been a proniinent figure in the Labour Party and 
in local government of North East Scotland. He was Convenor of Grampian Regional Council 
from 1990 to 1994. 
27 Wybrow, P. (1984) The Scottish Labour Movement and the Offshore Oil Industry. T. 
Dickson (ed) Capital and CLass in Scotland. Edinburgh, John Donald. p. 258. 
28 Ibid, passim. 
29 Ibid p. 259. 
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prominent local activist, wrote to CSEU unions that he had received a letter 
from the North Sea Oil Action Committee suggesting that his committee 
should convene a meeting of local full-time union officers who may have an 
interest in the Unionisation of Oil Rigs. 
The CSEU District Committee called a meeting on I Ith February, 1974 where 
representatives from four of the main constituent unions of CSEU were present 
along with representatives of the North Sea Oil Action Committee. At this 
meeting it was agreed that the unionisation of personnel on the drilling rigs 
and in other oil related employment should be seen as a matter of priority and 
that a special meeting should be convened to set up an organization, other than 
NSOAC, to achieve this. There were subsequent meetings of union 
representatives in March 1974 and it is highly probable that the Inter Union 
Offshore Oil Committee dates from April 1974 with William (Bill) Reid, the 
District Officer of the Transport and General Workers' Union as its secretary. 
Harvie3o states that this had the effect of replacing grass-roots enthusiasm with 
the inertia of the metropolitan union glite but there was little metropolitanism 
in a committee consisting entirely of locally based full-time trade union 
officials, who were far from inert in their endeavours to secure trade union 
protection for offshore employees, whatever the success of their committee. 
Using tortuous logic Harvie goes on to assert that union failure offshore arose 
mainly out of this inertia displayed by leaders such as Jones, Scanlon and 
Jenkins, a charge these men would have rebutted furiously. 
One of Reid's first actions on behalf of his newly founded committee was to 
write (again an undated letter) to all companies engaged in drilling to apprise 
them of the formation of the Inter Union Offshore Oil Committee and of its 
objective of establishing trade union membership offshore with associated 
collective bargaining rights. In addition, Reid invited the companies to send 
representatives to a meeting on 14th May, 1974 when progress towards trade 
union recognition would be discussed. The tone of the letter 31 with its threat to 
use industrial action if the companies rejected the invitation was unwise and 
more carefully chosen language without the threat of immediate industrial 
action might have achieved a better response. Although the letter was couched 
in terms normally used at that time by many trade union officers in their 
communications with managers it merely served to confirm in the minds of the 
oil companies their "We fixe" that British trade unions were organizations 
which sought conftontation rather than co-operation with employers. 
in a letter of 29th April, 1974 to Gary Morton, who was ASTMS Industrial 
Officer in North and NE Scotland, Reid stated that he had received one reply 
only and that was from the Norwegian drilling contractors Smedvig, which 
said that they could see no benefit in attending the proposed meeting. There is 
an interesting manuscript addition to the letter, presumably by Reid, which 
states that 18% of the world's oil supply vessels were in the North Sea and 
30 Harvie, C. (1994) Fool's Gold. 77ze Story of North Sea Oil. p. 238. London, Penguin. 
31 Ihis letter is given in full as Appendix C. 
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that industrial action could take the form of "blacking" all equipment for the 
oil rigs at Aberdeen airport. This would have been an unlikely achievement 
but that Reid was even contemplating this form of action indicates the frame of 
mind of local trade union officers who really believed that they had the 
industrial muscle to drive the North Sea employers into accepting them as 
representatives of their workers. The decision of all the other companies'to 
ignore Reid's letter ought to have given a clear message to the IUOOC of their 
attitude to any trade union overtures. 
In further correspondence with Morton during May, Reid wrote that he had 
secured an interview with the Administrative Manager of the South East 
Drilling Company (SEDCO) but there had been no more than an exchange of 
views. This is a pattern that has been repeated whenever trade union officials 
have sought interviews with oil company managers. The managers will politely 
decline to meet the trade union officials on the grounds that there is nothing to 
discuss or they will meet them only to establish or to maintain friendly 
relationships which are never expanded to discussion of even the possibility of 
recognition of trade unions for collective bargaining. Frustrated by his lack of 
success at SEDCO, Reid asked the Conciliation and Arbitration Service of the 
Department of Employment to intervene. It is perhaps indicative of the 
unequal struggle between the oil companies and the IUOOC that the letter sent 
by Reid to Morton reporting on the outcome of the meeting between SEDCO 
and the conciliation officer Tom Smith of CAS (later to become Head of the 
Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service in Scotland) refers to Smith as 
the "Circulation Officer". The letter is unsigned and it seems probable that 
Reid had to cope with so many other issues concerning his own union as well 
as the IUOOC that he had to send out some of his correspondence unchecked. 
By contrast, the oil companies had administrative departments with highly 
professional staff who could devote an appropriate amount of time and energy 
to carrying out the industrial relations policy of their firms, including careful 
scrutiny of correspondence. 
Smith had informed Reid'of the outcome of his discussions with SEDCO 
managers. The company would consider recognition of the union if a majority 
of its employees indicated that they required a union to represent them. This, 
again, became a standard pattern of answer to any union which asked for 
collective bargaining rights and since the terms and conditions of employment 
enjoyed by oil workers were at that time significantly better than what were 
available onshore for similar manual work the oil companies could be fairly 
sure that no such demand would come from their employees. In this same 
unsigned letter Reid suggests that the IUOOC decision to move against the 
company must now be enacted. We learn in a letter (10th June, 1974) from 
Roger Lyons, National Officer of ASTMS to his General Secretary, Clive 
Jenkins, that IUOOC have already launched their campaign. This was nothing 
more than a 24 hour withdrawal of facilities from SEDCO and a threat that if 
full organizational facilities were not offered the campaign would be extended. 
There was also mention of the possibility of talks with Shell and BP. 
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It was a 'contest between a fly and an elephant. So poor was the response to the 
call for industrial action that threats of widening the conflict were empty. 
Gradually the IUOOC members realised (as Gilliatt at Rugby had already 
concluded) that they were almost powerless by themselves and would need 
support from the government and from the Trades Union Congress if they 
were to achieve what they saw as a reasonable and far from radical objective - 
the same right to represent employees offshore as had long been accepted 
onshore often by the very companies such as BP and Shell which were now 
adamantly resisting them in the North Sea. The "Financial Times" published 
an article on 24th November, 1974 with the claim from Reid that BP had 
invited two IUOOC representatives to visit a drilling platform but on checking 
this with BP the author, Desmond Quigley, 32 had to write that confirmation of 
the offer offacilities was not availablefrom BP last night. Whether a visit took 
place or not is immaterial because Reid wrote the following month that BP had 
told him that the company was not interested in any union presence offshore. 
Indeed, far from assisting the IUOOC in its mission the article sowed 
dissension when it quoted Reid correctly in his statement that only four unions 
were actively recruiting offshore: TGWU, NUS, AUEW and the 
Boilermakers. This prompted a letter from Stan Davison, the Assistant General 
Secretary of the ASTMS to Campbell Reid 33 in Glasgow asking why ASTMS 
was not included among the four unions named. This is an early hint of the 
rivalry between unions in the recruitment of members from offshore 
companies which was to become a factor impeding the effectiveness of the 
IUOOC. 
In July 1974 Morton had been transferred to ASTMS head office in London. 
He appears to have had a more realistic view of trade union strength vis A vis 
the North Sea companies and had recommended to his union that since there 
was little scope for recruitment to ASTMS offshore (a point Davison had 
failed to note when he wrote to Campbell Reid) it would be more prudent to 
push for bargaining rights for junior managerial staff employed in the land 
based offices of the big companies. Employment opportunities there were 
growing by the day as large office blocks began to rise on the periphery of 
Aberdeen. His strategy was to build a sound base onshore and then seek to 
extend union influence offshore. The union officer selected for this duty was 
Campbell Reid at Glasgow, who had already become aware of the difficulties 
for trade unions in the offshore oil industry through his interest in the GEC 
Electrical Projects contract with BP in the Autumn of 1974. Reid asked for an 
office in Aberdeen and by the Spring of 1975 was established in the city, 
where his presence was soon felt on the IUOOC. 
32 He appears to have relied overmuch on information from Reid, who naturally wished to tell 
a better story than the facts justified. 
33 To avoid confusion the two Reids will henceforth always be referred to by their Christian 
names until the death of Bill Reid, except where there can be no dubiety e. g. in the next 
sentence which is carrying on the narrative. 
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It will be appropriate to give here the trade unions which constituted the 
IUOOC at May 1974: 34 
The Amalgamated Society of Boilermakers, Ship Builders and Structural 
Workers 
The Transport and General Workers' Union 
The Association of Professional and Executive Employees 
The National Union of Seamen 
The Union of Construction and Allied Technical Trades 
The Electrical, Electronic, Telecommunications and Plumbing Union 
The Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers (Engineering Section) 
The Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers (Technical and Supervisory 
Staffs) 
The Merchant Navy Officers Association 
The Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staffs 
4 The United Kingdom Offshore Operators Association 
In stark contrast to the trade unions the offshore oil producers had a 
representative body in place within a year of the granting of the UK's first 
round of licences in 1964. The UK North Sea Operators' Committee was an 
informal association of licence holders which provided for its members a 
forum for discussion on any matter affecting their industry offshore and, based 
in London, it was soon recognised by the government as the industry's voice 
in consultations on technical and administrative matters. The government had 
no experience of the exploitation of indigenous oil and gas reserves and thus 
welcomed the establishment of a forum consisting of representatives of 
companies which had international experience of the industry. It is highly 
unlikely that the members did not discuss from time to time what would be 
their policy on employment were reserves of oil to be discovered in 
commercially acceptable quantities offshore. When this happened it was not 
difficult to convert the existing Committee into a larger and more formal body 
by incorporating it in 1973 as the United Kingdom Offshore Operators 
Association with a constitution and a permanent staff. It was soon to consist of 
a Council of 25 members with 19 permanent and two ad-hoc committees. 
Fundamental to any analysis of the nature of the industrial relations that 
developed in the UK offshore oil and gas industry from the early 1970s is an 
understanding of the inter relationship of the UKOOA and the IUOOC. One of 
the more important of the UKOOA committees is its Employment Practices 
Committee with seven terms of reference of which only the first has relevance 
here: 
To pro 
' 
vide a forum where member companies can exchange opinions and, 
when necessary, formulate an industry viewpoint in the field 9f employment 
practices including training, employee and industrial relations. 35 
34 As supplied to Labour Weekly, a Transport House publication, by Gary Morton on 27th 
May, 1974. 
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It is therefore a body purely for internal discussion on employment issues upon 
which it might form a viewpoint but not a policy. This is spelled out with 
greater clarity in the terms of reference of one of its five sub-committees, 36 the 
Liaison Panel, the function of which is 
To act as a channel of communications for UKOOA on matters concerning 
employee relations which can be discussed in general terms on an exchange of 
views basis with Government, the Inter- Union Offshore Oil Committee and any 
other appropriate body approved by the Council. 37 
There follows a list of nine "approved" subjects for discussion together with 
the patronising comment that : 
These subjects were selected because discussion of them can help to create 
more realistic attitudes in Government and the IUOOC. 
What is, however, most noteworthy of all is the list of subjects which the 
Liaison Panel is not permitted to discuss with the IUOOC or any other body. 
These are such matters as terms and conditions of employment, sick pay, over- 
time, recruitment of employees, manning levels and complaints about 
individual companies, all of which are areas where employees seek to have 
trade union support. Thus the very issues for which the IUOOC was formed 
have been from the outset unacceptable areas for discussion between it and the 
oil operators as represented by the only body constituted to deal with industrial 
relations, the Liaison Panel of the UKOOA Employment Practices Committee. 
Moreover, the UKOOA specifically denies to the Liaison Panel any delegated 
authority to commit either the UKOOA or any of its individual member 
companies to any agreement whatsoever. The Liaison Panel's terms of 
38 
re..; ence were approved in 1976 at precisely the time when government 
policy was supporting trade union demands concerning recognition for 
bargaining purposes and imposition of closed shops. 39 It can, therefore, be 
suggested that the omission of what might be called collective bargaining items 
from the terms of reference was a reaction to what the oil industry considered 
to be undue partiality towards the trade unions. 
Although it was September 1976 when the UKOOA Council first approved its 
Liaison Panel's terms of reference, it was merely ratifying its practice over the 
previous three years. Its approach to industrial relations and its manner of 
coping with trade union attempts to alter that approach had been determined 
some time before the IUOOC was established. The UKOOA was totally 
different from any employer organization which the 1UOOC unions had 
previously confronted and it was already occupying the high ground in the 
offshore industrial relations field from which it was determined not to be 
35 Employment Practices Committee Infomation Booklet, UKOOA(1988), p. 3. 
36 The other four Sub-Committees were Training, Contractors' Liaison (Aberdeen), 
Contractors' Liaison (London) and Pay and Benefits. 
37 lbid p. 5. 
39 The Terms of Reference of the Liaison Panel are given in full as Appendix D. 
39 v. Chapter Four, pp.. 56 &57 supra. 
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driven. The UKOOA operates a simple industrial relations philosophy based 
on the premise that collective bargaining as practised in the rest of the United 
Kingdom is not acceptable to the offshore oil producers. Membership of the 
UKOOA does not prevent any company from entering into whatever 
negotiations it likes with a trade union but in effect the Liaison Panel's terms 
of reference are an accurate reflection of the industrial relations outlook and 
practice of the oil producing companies. 
5A New Industrial Relations Scenario 
Gradually the trade unions began to understand that the rebuffs which the 
IUOOC had received from the oil companies in 1974 had introduced a form of 
industrial relations with which they were unfamiliar. Adjustments would have 
to made but this was difficult because their leaders had emerged lover a long 
period when downright refusal from an industry even to discuss terms and 
conditions of employment had seldom been experienced. Any individual 
employers who had sought to distance themselves from trade unions had been 
dealt with by standard industrial action such as "blacking" of their goods or 
services and soon brought into line. The trade union movement was no 
stranger to confrontation and the use (or threat of use) of industrial sanctions 
to gain objectives was almost part of the day-to-day life of a union official. 
When Bill Reid wrote his letter of April 197440 to the oil companies in 
Aberdeen he used the language and tone which had become almost standard 
for trade union officers at that time. It was therefore difficult for them to move 
out of their usual direction of thought and their initial reaction might well be 
summed up in the famous French aphorism "Cet animal est tr6s m6chant; 
quand on I'attaque, il se d6fend". There was also another reason for the unions 
to be somewhat non-plussed at the employers' reaction. The Labour Party had 
been returned to power in a general election and the goverrunent was currently 
engaged upon a legislative programme which was designed to assist trade 
unions to carry out their functions with even greater freedom than before. 
As stated earlier in this chapter4l Campbell Reid had been an interested 
spectator in the negotiations between BP and GEC Electrical PrOjects and was 
aware of the pressure which oil company employees felt when trade union 
representation was contemplated. Writing in December 1974 to Davison, his 
union's Assistant General Secretary, he explained that normal methods of 
recruitment to their union could not apply in an atmosphere where it was 
believed that dismissal might well be the consequence for any BP engineer 
known to have met a union official. Reid also knew that his colleague at 
Rugby had managed to interest the Minister of State at the Department of 
Employment in the matter. 
40 v. p. 101 supra. 
41 v. p. 97 supra. 
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Attempts at direct negotiation with oil companies having failed in 1974, the 
IUOOC had to adopt a different and longer term strategy in 1975. It sought 
help from two quarters where it knew that it would receive a sympathetic 
hearing; one was the Trades Union Congress and the other was the 
goverm-nent. Indeed the IUOOC achieved what might be called a joint hearing 
of their difficulties when Tony Benn, the Secretary of State for the Department 
of Energy attended a meeting, of the TUC Fuel and Power Industries 
Committee on 12th June, 1975. He expressed his sympathy towards the trade 
union viewpoint and promised to consult them on the government's North Sea 
oil policy. He, could not, of course, commit himself on the question of 
recognition by the employers since industrial relations issues lay within the 
brief of the Secretary of State for Employment, Michael Foot, but Foot's 
support was virtually certain. Benn was as good as his word and on a visit to 
Aberdeen the following month he promised IUOOC members his assistance in 
the matter of recruitment of oil company employees to trade unions. The 
IUOOC was able to give Benn a specific case to use in any discussions with oil 
companies because the Shell drilling rig "Staflo" had 80% of its staff 
unionised, a figure confirmed by ACAS, but the company was refusing to 
acknowledge this. Then at its annual meeting in early September 1975 the 
Trades Union Congress passed Resolution 83 42 which agreed that the North 
Sea oil and gas industry be nationalised and proposed action in support of 
trade union recruitment including recognition of the Offshore Charter. 43 
implementation of Resolution 83 was referred to the Fuel and Power Industries 
Committee. 
While this was happening there was an important development offshore, which 
was to have a significant effect on employment in the industry. In September 
1975 BP produced the first oil from a British North Sea field, the Forties, and 
by 1978 this field was to reach peak production of oil and natural gas liquids 
(NGL). Up to 1975 trade union concentration had been, in the main, on 
recruitment and recognition issues relating to employment on supply vessels 
and drilling rigs, which were mobile in comparison with the fixed structures 
needed for production. Gradually other fields were to come on stream and the 
emphasis moved from exploration and drilling to production of oil and NGL. 
Thus while IUOOC was concentrating its efforts on securing recognition from 
the oil producing companies changes were already in train offshore which 
would introduce a new factor. This was offshore contracting which was later 
to become the dominant aspect of offshore employment. 
it is probable that Tony Benn suggested to the IUOOC the idea of a charter 
which would define the objectives of the trade unions in their struggle to 
achieve recognition from the oil employers. On 25th August, 1975 Campbell 
Reid wrote to his union's National Officer for Scotland, John Langan, that the 
So many items are offered from unions for discussion at the annual Trades Union Congress 
that the majority of them have to be drafted as "composite motions". These "composites" are 
often lengthy since they may have to represent as many as ten or more individual issues which 
are similar but not identical. A motion which is passed becomes a 'resolution" of Congress. 43 
v. infra. 
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charter was to be produced for Tony Benn. This would provide for Benn a 
statement of the basic common objectives of the trade unions and consequently 
allow him to represent their views at any appropriate opportunity. Certainly in 
early August 1975 Bill Reid had written to Campbell Reie that the IUOOC 
had decided to draft a charter of trade union objectives in the offshore oil 
industry and that the matter would be discussed at the next meeting on 19th 
August. Perhaps of equal importance Bill Reid informed his namesake that the 
lUOOC was now turning its attention to oil production. 
The IUOOC members must have moved swiftly in their drafting and 
subsequent publication of the charter because it was mentioned at the TUC 
meeting referred to above. From correspondence in the OILC archives it is 
clear that discussions were not always amicable for quotations from what 
appear to be some of the first drafts were different from the final version and 
gave rise to dissension in at least one quarter. In his letter of 25th August to 
Langan Campbell Reid stated that the final clause in the proposed charter listed 
Agreed Spheres of In/luence for Organising Oilrig Workers into Appropriate 
Unions after which there followed the names of five unions which excluded 
ASTMS and TASS. It is possible that Bill Reid, the IUOOC secretary, 
prepared the first draft and considered that there was no room for either union 
since three of the five unions mentioned had white collar sections. Whatever 
the reason Campbell Reid was able to inform Langan that the IUOOC now 
agreed that ASTMS should be included and in what appears to be the final 
version this offending clause is not included. (Once again Bill Reid's failure to 
put a date to documents makes it necessary to assume that the Copy 45 of the 
charter attached to correspondence around this time was the final agreed 
version. ) 
The charter was given the somewhat cumbersome title of Ae Charterfor the 
Unionisation of employees engaged in the Offshore Oil Industry within U. K. 
jurisdiction. There were ten clauses of which four require special mention. 
The first was as follows: 
That all Companies engaged in the Offshore Oil industry in exploration, 
extraction and production (and the servicing of same) recognise the right of the 
Inter-Union Offshore Oil Committee unions to recruit, represent and negotiate 
terms and conditions of employment for all employees falling within their 
spheres of membership. 
This first clause would have been worthless without the second which was the 
right of trade union officials to have access to installations. The fourth clause 
went even further than the right of trade unions to negotiate terms and 
conditions of employment because it sought the establishment of a national 
body to deal with all aspects of work offshore and upon which the unions 
would be represented. The ninth clause asked the government to make the 
44 Campbell Reid had missed the lUOOC meeting of 5th August, 1975. 45 This document is given in full as Appendix E. 
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award of future licences conditional upon the licence-holders agreeing to have 
their employees represented by the lUOOC unions. 
This may not have been intended as an ultimatum for the oil companies but it 
expressed an intention to achieve certain objectives which the oil companies 
would be unlikely to concede without a struggle. The UKOOA had laid its 
cards upon the table and, having read them, the IUOOC had taken measures to 
trump them. The unions had gained the support of the Secretary of State for 
Energy and so had a voice at cabinet level and it was known that the Secretary 
of State for Employment, another highly appropriate friend in the 
circumstances, was equally supportive. The TUC had been alerted and in 1975 
it had power and influence much greater than it wields, today. The time had 
arrived for negotiations at a level which the oil companies could not avoid, 
although that did not mean any retreat from their firm conviction that their 
industry was so different from any other that it was necessary for them to have 
as ftee a hand in employee relations as the law permitted. In addition they 
knew that the government, whatever it might say publicly, would go a long 
way to prevent any employment turbulence offshore. 
6 Summary 
This chapter has concerned itself with the impact made on industrial relations 
by the UK offshore oil industry over the eleven years from 1964. Early in this 
period there occurred the Sea Gem disaster which brought home the dangers 
inherent in the physical working environment within which the industry had to 
operate. Despite contemporary government interest in accident prevention 
which culminated in the Robens Report (1972) and subsequent legislation 
which remains basically unchanged today, separate arrangements were 
nevertheless drawn up for offshore oil employment through the Mineral 
Workings (Offshore) Act 1971. More surprisingly, the findings of the 
Holland-Martin Report (1969) on sea-fishing with its specific recommendation 
that trade unions had a vital part to play in accident prevention were not seen 
to be relevant for employment in the offshore oil industry. Although the 
philosophy underlying the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 was persuasion 
rather than regulation there was the general assumption that employees would 
be consulted through their trade unions; indeed three years later trade unions 
recognised by employers were given the right to demand the creation of safety 
committees. That the voluntarist principle in the arrangements for accident 
prevention offshore has remained unchanged from 1971 is much resented by 
the trade unions. 
Once oil had been discovered special offshore installations had to be 
constructed and from their observation of industrial relations at the Nigg site 
oil companies saw much to confirm their opinion that British trade unions 
could only hamper the effective operation of their businesses. From the trade 
union point of view there were early glimmerings that they were about to be 
driven back into what they regarded as the stone age of industrial relations 
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when membership of a trade union was seen as an act of disloyalty to the 
employer. By late 1974 the Department of Employment had been alerted to the 
overt anti trade unionism of BP as evidenced by the GEC Electrical Projects 
issue and the Minister of State had expressed faith rather than prescience in the 
ability of new legislation to guarantee freedom of association. 
In the late 1960s the oil producing companies had set up a joint organization to 
prepare employment policies for possible offshore work and when oil was 
discovered they incorporated it as the United Kingdom Offshore Operators 
Association (UKOOA). They excluded discussion on terms and conditions of 
employment in any contact with trade unions and so from the very beginning 
were prepared to deny to the trade unions any semblance of collective 
bargaining. The trade union branches in Aberdeen put together the Inter-Union 
Offshore Oil Committee but it lacked the professional and administrative 
strength of UKOOA. An invitation to the oil companies to attend a meeting to 
discuss recognition was not even acknowledged and the subsequent IUOOC 
industrial action was easily rendered futile. 
The total failure of their first major confrontation with the oil companies had 
brought humiliation to the local trade unions. They now recognised that new 
and longer term strategies would have to be deployed if they were to make any 
progress at all in their quest for the type of relationship they had enjoyed with 
other employers for several decades. Using their access to the TUC and the 
sympathy of the Secretary of State for the Department of Energy, the IUOOC 
members set out to attract support by drawing up a charter outlining their 
objectives, principal of which was the right to have full collective bargaining 
status with all offshore oil employers. 
The battle lines were now set. The oil employers were determined to resist all 
but the most anodyne of union demands and they knew that the government, 
despite the historical and formal connection of trade unionism with the Labour 
Party, was desperately anxious for oil to flow from the North Sea on account 
of the revenue it would earn for the nation. The trade unions also relied on 
government support and not unnaturally assumed that the forthcoming 
legislation on trade union rights would give them all the support their case 
required. This assumption cannot be criticised as naIvet6 because a Labour 
government had recently been returned to power and further legislation 
favourable to the trade unions had been promised. 
Special Note 
The author is deeply indebted to Mr Ronnie M'Donald, former General 
Secretary of the Offshore Industry Liaison Committee, for allowing him access 
to the archives held in his trade union office, (currently 6 Trinity Street, 
Aberdeen). The origins of the OILC will be discussed later in the thesis 
because it did not emerge until 1988. Mr M'Donald deserves the thanks of all 
researchers in the field of offshore industrial relations for ensuring that trade 
union correspondence from the earliest days of the oil industry in Aberdeen 
has been preserved. 
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It would be tedious and distracting for the examiners and any other readers if 
each incident in this and subsequent chapters were to be annotated with a 
footnote giving its provenance. The author gives the assurance that any 
statement or activity attributed to a trade union or trade union official can be 
authenticated by reference to the OILC archives. 
III 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
hh, 
MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES AND TRADE UNIONS : THE 
GOVERNMENT PLAYS ITS ROLE IN THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 
By late 1975 it was clear that there would have to be some compromise 
between the trade unions and the oil employers. The IUOOC had won support 
from the TUC and from the Secretary of State for Energy, Tony Benn, and it 
is almost certain that he suggested to the IUOOC that the Offshore Charter 
should be drawn up. ' For their part, the oil companies wished to avoid any 
unnecessary confrontation with the UK government even if its political 
philosophy was more benign and supportive towards trade unionism than they 
would have preferred. They must have been aware, however, that Britain's 
financial position urgently required the collection and injection of oil tax 
revenue and that this would make it unlikely that the government would 
support mandatory recognition of trade unions as demanded by the Offshore 
Charter. 
Before examining the process of negotiations that culminated in the 
"Memorandum of Understanding on Trade Union Access to Offshore 
Installations" and its associated "Memorandum of Understanding between the 
UKOOA and the IUOOC", it will be helpful to look at two related issues. The 
first is the earlier reaction of unions to non-oil multinationals in the UK and 
the second is the wider background to the conduct of industrial relations from 
the perspectives of the oil producing companies and the trade unions. 
1 Non-oil Multi-nationals in Great Britain 
The arrival in the United Kingdom of international companies seeking to 
exploit the reserves of oil in the North Sea had been preceded in the previous 
decade by other multi-nationals, almost all of them engaged in manufacturing. 
These firms found a system of industrial relations which was unfamiliar but 
instead of ignoring it they tried in their different ways to operate employment 
policies within that system. This included attempts to eliminate barriers to 
higher productivity such as demarcation and multi-union representation and 
such efforts were perceived in some quarters as an onslaught on trade 
unionism even although these practices were now heavily in retreat within 
certain successful British companies, particularly process industries such as 
chemicals and brewing. 
As early as 1963 British trade unions had become alarmed at the possible 
consequences for industrial relations of the inward investment by foreign 
companies, over 80% of which were North American. Would the subsidiaries 
of multi-national companies be prepared to accept the British pattern of 
industrial relations where trade unions enjoyed a greater presence than in the 
USA where union membership was already in serious decline? The earliest 
I v. Chapter Six, p. 107, supra. 
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motion on this topic brought before the TUC was in 1963 when the National 
Union of Bank Employees voiced concern that foreign firms - including banks 
and financial institutions - can establish themselves in the United Kingdom 
whilst providing salaries and conditions of service inferior to normal British 
practice. The TUC remitted this motion to its General Council but in the 
following year it debated and carried a motion put forward by the Association 
of Cinematograph, Television and Allied Technicians deploring the infiltration 
of foreign capital into British Industry for the purpose of acquiring control of 
key sectors of the British econonzy. In 1965 the same union was back with an 
even more strongly worded motion which complained of foreign companies 
operating in Britain which deny their employees collective bargaining rights 
and asked the TUC to instruct its General Council to draw attention to the 
attitudes of such companies who are guilty of anti-trade union behaviour. 
Again the motion was carried but it was not until three years later, 1968, that 
a large and long established manual worker union expressed its concern. This 
was the Amalgamated Union of Engineering and Foundry Workers whose 
motion called upon the (Labour) government to make it a condition that 
foreign firms recognise the British trade union movement and the rights of 
organised workers before they are allowed to operate in this country. It was 
highly unlikely that a British government of any political complexion would 
make trade union recognition a condition of accepting any inward investment 
from abroad. Moreover, it would have been contradictory of the TUC to ask 
the government to demand adherence by inward investors to particular aspects 
of industrial relations practice such as mandatory recognition of trade unions at 
the same time as they were battling to retain unfettered collective bargaining 
with no legal enforcement of agreements between unions and employers. 
There are limits to the amount of attention which the General Council of the 
TUC can pay to the many motions and resolutions that are remitted to it each 
September at the Trades Union Congress. It did, however, respond to the 
motion of the Chemical Workers Union in 1969 that it should study in depth, 
the economic and social consequences of these developments (growth of multi- 
national corporations) and report back to the 1970 Congress any change in 
trade union and Government policy needed to deal with the situation. The 
response took the form of a section on international companies and trade union 
interests in the 1970 TUC "Economic Review" and a TUC convened 
conference (October 1970) of affiliated unions with members in the employ of 
international companies in the UK. 
A summary of the decisions2 of this conference showed that while unions were 
eager that the industrial behaviour of multi-nationals should include adherence 
to the system of industrial relations in the host country, they were more 
concerned with the effects on job security posed by large organizations which 
had their decision centres outside the UK. After all, the AFL/C103 was at this 
2 They are given in full as Appendix F. 
3 American Federation of Labour/Congress of Industrial Organizations, the equivalent in USA 
of the TUC. 
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time expressing its anxiety about the effects on its members of what it called 
"runaway industries" which were transferring some of their component 
production to Europe and the developing countries in the Far East. , 
By 1969 management also had become interested in the responses of British 
trade unions to multi-national corporations, particularly American organizatons 
operating in Britain. The British-North American Committee (British-North 
American Research Association, National Planning Association of USA and 
Private Planning Association of Canada) had been founded that year and in 
1971 it commissioned John Gennard of the London School of EconoMiCS4 to 
carry out a study on labour relations in multi-national corporations, with 
special reference to American multi-nationals operating in the United 
Kingdom. Along with M. D. Steuer, also of the London School of Economics, 
he had already published a paper on the subject. 5 Interestingly, Gennard came 
to conclusions very similar to those arising out of the TUC conference referred 
to above. He, too, identified fear of unemployment as a principal theme and 
that since the balance of power in employment issues was heavily in favour of 
the multi-nationals the trade unions would seek to develop countervailing 
power through their membership of international trade federations and the 
international trade union movement. Gennard also criticised certain multi- 
national firms such as' IBM and Kodak for their refusal to recognise trade 
unions. When the report6 was ready for publication William Blackie, 
Chairman of the Board of Caterpillar Tractor Company, insisted on having a 
note of dissent included. He argued that multi-national corporations offered no 
less (and probably more) job security than indigenous employers and that there 
was no balance of power in favour of the multi-nationals because few of them 
made identical products in different countries and once there was substantial 
investment in fixed assets there was no flexible mobility. Of Gennard's 
comments on non-recognition of trade unions Blackie commented IBM and 
Kodak are criticised for policies which in effect strive to make employees so 
satisfied that they feel no needfor unions. 7 
it is interesting but pointless to reflect on what might have been the nature and 
content of Gennard's report had he been asked to carry it out even three years 
later when the international oil companies had established their massive 
presence in North East Scotland and their employment policies, especially 
towards the question of trade union recognition, were becoming apparent. 8 
Gennard's report, however, remains a useftil contemporary account of how the 
trade unions and multi-national corporations based in the United Kingdom 
4 Now Professor of Industrial Relations at Strathclyde University. 
5 Gennard, J. & Steuer, M. D., (1971) The Industrial Relations of Foreign Owned Subsidiaries 
in the United Kingdom. British Joumal of Industrial Relations, IX July 1971. 
6 Gennard, J., 0 972) Multinational Corporations and British Labour: A Review of Attitudes 
and Responses. British North-American Committee. 
7 v. Appendix CCC. 
8 By the end of the 1980s the amount of direct foreign investment in UK had increased 
significantly e. g. from Japan as well as North America. Its impact upon UK industrial 
relations attracted someresearch to which reference will be made later in this thesis. 
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viewed each other. The companies concerned were wholly engaged in 
manufacture and their problems related to that form of industry alone. We 
should, however, note the comments of William Blackie, particularly that 
relating to non-recognition of trade unions by a few inward investing 
companies. Already in 1968 the Amalgamated Union of Engineering and 
Foundry Workers had brought to the TUC a motion on this issue and by 1974, 
if not earlier, the policy which Blackie attributed to IBM and Kodak had 
become standard for the oil companies operating in the North Sea. It was 
going to be most difficult for the unions to mount a counter challenge. 
2 Comparison of Employer and Trade Union Perspectives of Industrial 
Relations in the Offshore Oil Industry 
As stated earlier9 the decision of the oil producing companies not to encourage 
trade unions was collective but not formalised. This cornment taken in 
conjunction with UKOOA policy that its Liaison Panel had no function other 
than to act as a communication channel on employee relations illustrates the 
skill with which the oil producing companies operated their industrial relations 
policy. The Liaison Panel had the appearance of an official organization 
delegated with some negotiating authority but although this was not so it was 
the only representative body of the industry available to meet the IUOOC. 
There was a curious contrast between the two organizations, which the 
employers were able to use to their advantage. Nominally and constitutionally 
the lUOOC was a highly cohesive body empowered to commit its members to 
specific objectives and to demand the adherence of member unions to any 
particular policy devised to attain these objectives but in reality it was far from 
cohesive and often riven with internal disputes. Thý. apparent attempt to 
exclude ASTMS from the trade unions permitted to recruit offshore'O was as 
nothing compared with a bitter dispute simultaneously in progress between 
NUS and TGWU over the right to recruit drilling ship personnel. 11 So bitter 
was the antagonism generated by this rivalry that Tony Benn mentions it in his 
diaries. 12 The Liaison Panel, on the other hand, despite its limited or almost 
non-existent powers in relation to its member companies, always presented a 
common view on employee relations issues to which all its members adhered 
although constitutionally there was no need for them to do so. 
Nevertheless the regular meetings at approximately three month intervals 
between the Liaison Panel and the IUOOC had some positive outcomes. Union 
and management understood each other's thoughts on current industrial 
relations matters. Again, it was not unusual for a rapport to develop between 
certain union and management representatives who attended regularly and this 
allowed them to raise issues of mutual interest either at the discussion table or, 
more commonly, in private conversation. A trade union officer would receive 
9 v. Chapter Four, p. 66. 
10 v. Chapter Six, p. 108 supra. 
IIv. p. 120 infra. 
12 Benn, T., (1989) Diaties 1973-1976: Against the 7"Ide, passim. Hutchinson, London. 
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some assurance that a matter would be investigated and the manager might 
receive some information which was of value to him. 13 Had these IUOOC / 
Liaison Panel meetings been wholly fruitless it is unlikely that they would still 
be taking place to-day. 
UKOOA was based in London14 which meant that communication with it was 
always formal and quite unlike the conduct of local industrial relations with 
meetings sometimes arranged at 24 hours notice. It has remained an 
organization of oil producers and has no contractors among its membership. 
This raises another important element in North Sea industrial relations. From 
the time of "first oil" it has become usual for the operator of the installation 
concerned to reduce gradually the proportion of direct employees and to 
replace them with contractors' men. While, ostensibly, the industrial relations 
policies of contractor companies are not a subject for discussion at meetings 
with the IUOOC the contractors understand that it will not be in their interests 
to introduce policies and practices of which the operators disapprove. Any 
doubts on this matter were to vanish in 1990 when the operators made it clear 
that no contracts would be signed with any employer who had entered into a 
post- construction agreement with a trade union. 15 
Two further matters should be noted. The first is that in the UK and other 
nations of Europe there was at this time a high degree of centralisation of 
collective bargaining which contrasted with the North American preference for 
company autonomy in industrial relations. Industry-wide negotiations and 
agreements were common in Britain but foreign owned firms negotiated 
independently of other employers in the industry. This was true, for example, 
with Ford and Vauxhall and when Chrysler took over Rootes it immediately 
withdrew the firm from the Motor Manufacturers Association. In oil, Esso and 
Shell already negotiated separately and when other oil majors arrived on the 
scene, most of them North American, it was not surprising that one of the 
fundamental tenets of UKOOA policy was its insistence that it was not an 
organization which could or would commit its individual members to any 
common course of action. The IUOOC, on the other hand, was composed of 
unions which were accustomed both to collective bargaining on an industry 
wide scale and to integrated action in pursuit of mutually agreed objectives. 
This difference between the structure and operational practice of the two 
bodies was never fully perceived or perhaps understood by the unions and 
rendered the relationships between them less useful than they might otherwise 
have been. 
The other matter was the very strong, albeit informal, relationships of the oil 
company executives in Aberdeen with each other. While retaining their 
commercial rivalry the companies encouraged meetings among their executives 
13 Ibis point was made to the author in 1995 by a senior AEEU official. 
14 Its Aberdeen office was not opened until 1990. 
15 V. Chapters 12 and 13 infra. 
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to discuss common interests. The following information was provided to the 
author by a personnel manager of a large oil company. 
(Company's name) did have membership of UKOOA but it became rather 
bureaucratic and the local personnel managers felt that London was too 
dominant. Accordingly, a group of managers in the personnel area decided to 
meet monthly on an informal basis and thus was founded "The Oily Group". 
No minutes or records were kept apart from manuscript notes made by 
individuals for their own use. Membership was not by invitation but rather like 
the effect of "word of mouth" about a restaurant; if one hears that the fare is 
good one is tempted to try it. So it gradually grew to about twenty personnel 
managers of the larger companies. Mile it would be wrong to say that 
decisions were made on pay, conditions and policy towards unions there was 
general agreement on what should be a common approach to the personnel 
aspects of their jobs. If any member's company acted out of line, an 
explanation was sought at the next meeting. 
3 Government Support for a Dkente 
It is important to remember that the discovery of oil in the North Sea and the 
subsequent establishment by the oil companies of a major presence in the 
United Kingdom co-incided with a period in British politics when industrial 
relations had a very high profile. 16 Trade unions had opposed the Labour 
government's proposals to introduce greater discipline into collective 
bargaining and later refused to operate within the structure imposed by the 
Conservative government's Industrial Relations Act 1971. Almost oblivious to 
the v; arnings on the industrial relations policies of multi-national companies 
which had been voiced at the TUC only a few years earlier, the trade unions in 
North East Scotland and elsewhere expended their energies in seeking to 
reverse the hated Industrial Relations Act which they believed placed 
intolerable restrictions on their right to free collective bargaining. 17 
When a Ubour government was returned to power in the General Election of 
February 1974 the Industrial Relations Act became immediately a dead letter 
and trade unions believed collective bargaining could be resumed in its 
familiar form of no legal restraint and trade union representation of 
employees. This may have been so for the bulk of the country but it was not to 
happen in the offshore oil and gas industry. While trade union activity and 
interest had been almost wholly absorbed in the struggle against the Industrial 
Relations Act the offshore industry had quietly and inexorably established 
itself and its employment practices in East Anglia and North East Scotland. In 
common with large organizations in North America these companies had the 
16 V. Chapter 4 passim. 
17 In 1971 a leading official of the AUEW in North East Scotland was asked to comment on 
certain aspects of the Industrial Relations Bill which was then going through its later 
parliamentary stages. He declined on the grounds that he had been far too busy fighting the bill 
to have ever read it. 
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services of well qualified and specialist staff to formulate and carry out their 
industrial relations policies. Since trade unions were regarded essentially as 
one of the constraints to be dealt with at the level of operating deciSions'8 there 
was no role for them in industrial relations policies of any major company. 
When, eventually, the trade unions realised what had happened and tried to 
assert themselves it was too late as the total failure of the IUOOC industrial 
action in June 197419 demonstrated. For this reason they had sought the 
assistance of the TUC and the government. 20 
By the autumn of 1975 it must have seemed to the IUOOC that their objectives 
were attainable if not yet secured. In December 1974 the Minister of State at 
the Department of Employment had written that the government was anxious 
to see the development of trade unionism on oil rigs and that he understood 
that the oil companies would recognise unions when membership warranted 
this. 21 The Secretary of State for Energy was supportive, had promised 
consultation on the government's North Sea oil policy and was probably 
instrumental on his visit to Aberdeen in July 1975 in persuading the IUOOC to 
draw up its charter for unionisation. The TUC had supported the aims of the 
charter. This was all in conformity with the Social Contract whereby the trade 
unions were supporting the government's economic policy in return for 
government assistance on industrial relations matters such as this. 22 The oil 
producing companies could not now remain silent, when the member of the 
British government responsible for their industry was urging consultations 
with the trade unions. They realised that it would be preferable to make some 
concessions towards the trade unions rather than to be seen to submit to 
pressure from the government. 
The Secretary of State for Energy assigned J. S. Liverman, a Deputy 
Secretary of his Department, to interview senior managers in the oil producing 
companies in order to sound out their opinions on the form of relationships 
they were prepared to accept with trade unions. Benn arranged a meeting on 
17th November, 1975 which Liverman attended along with trade union 
representatives, civil servants and two ACAS representatives. Liverman gave 
an interim report on the oil companies' responses to his suggestions but the 
trade union representatives ignored his realistic advice that there was very little 
that the oil companies would concede on recognition. Although the trade 
unions were assured that their concern about access to installations for 
recruitment purposes had government backing, 23 this was the sole area where 
specific support was promised. The reality of the situation was that a new 
round of licensing for exploration offshore was due and the government had no 
intention of making trade union recognition a condition of granting a licence as 
Is Herman, E. S.. (1981) Corporate Control: Corporate Power. Cambridge University Press. 
19 v. Chapter Six, p. 103 supra. 
20 v. Chapter Six, pp. 107-109 supra. 
21 V. Chapter Six, pp. 98-99 supra. 
22 V. Chapter Four, p. 58 supra. 
23 A detailed account of this meeting is given in Appendix G. 
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requested by the unions in their Charter for Unionisation. 24 On the other hand, 
the unions were advised that within a few months the provisions of the 
Employment Protection Act 1975 would apply to offshore as well as onshore 
employment and consequently this would allow trade unions to request the 
Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service ( ACAS) to organize secret 
ballots on union membership. Thus, while the government was easing the way 
for the trade unions to approach the oil producers, the responsibility for 
establishing their membership offshore remained with the trade unions 
themselves. Sterling was coming under strong pressure and the government 
did not want to experience even minor differences with the oil producers at 
this time. 
Liverman carried out further discussions with UKOOA and reported back at a 
meeting held on 30th March, 1976 under the chairmanship of John Smith, 25 
the Minister of State for Energy. This meeting was attended by the Minister of 
State for Employment, Albert Booth, civil servants from both departments and 
six trade union representatives, three from the TUC General Council and three 
from the IUOOC, (Bill Reid, John McConachie and Harry Bygate). The 
minute of this meeting26 is interesting from several points of view. The 
measured tones of the able Scottish advocate John Smith rise off the page as he 
outlined the government position, namely: unionisation offshore best achieved 
through co-ordination of all parties; sensible for the lUOOC to have a wide 
role in that objective; government could best act as a bridge between unions 
and operators; meeting should be held as soon as possible with the operators to 
discuss a code of industrial relations practice. His choice of words expressed 
encouragement for the trade unions but avoided any commitment by the 
government to do more than that. Very different was the comment of Harry 
Urwin of the TGWU whose suggestion that the operators and the trade unions 
could accept the Ten Point Charter as a basis for discussion showed how little 
he understood the situation. More realistic was the approach of the local 
AUEW representative, John McConachie, who pointed out that membership of 
unions was small because of difficulty of access to installations and that this 
was an issue which could be addressed at a meeting. Smith then invited 
Liverman to report on his discussions with the oil operators and the civil 
servant poured some cold water upon both government and union aspirations. 
The operators did not accept the lUOOC as a reliable body with whom to 
negotiate and, in any case, UKOOA could not, by terms of its charter, 
negotiate on behalf of individual employers. UKOOA Council, nevertheless, 
was recommending to its members that they should agree to the requests of 
unions for access to installations offshore provided that such visits could be 
fitted in with normal operational requirements. Perhaps grasping at this one 
positive response from the employers, the Department of Energy had prepared 
a Memorandum of Understanding which could serve as a basis for discussion 
between the oil operators and the trade unions. 
24 V. Chapter Six, pp. 107-109 and Appendix E. 
25 Leader of the Labour Party 1992 -1994. 26 This minute is given in full as Appendix H. 
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4 Early Inter-Union Dissension 
While these important negotiations had been taking place there had been some 
petty quarrelling which was a harbinger of greater dissent that was to weaken 
IUOOC influence. As stated earlier, ASTMS had fought off an attempt by 
IUOOC (or possibly by TGWU in the person of Bill Reid) to exclude it from 
recognition as a union with a legitimate interest in recruitment offshore. 27 By 
January 1976, possibly prompted by Campbell Reid, Roger Lyons, the 
National Officer of ASTMS, felt it was necessary to assert the right of his 
union to be recognised as one which should have a major r6le in offshore oil 
industrial relations and he requested the TUC Fuel and Power Industries 
Committee on North Sea Oil to put on its agenda for a forthcoming meeting 
with Benn General hostility towards white collar unionisation by oil 
companies. A few days later we find Reid informing Lyons that "hostility" is 
rather too strong a term to use because he had never met any from the 
companies and that his complaint was rather that they were stalling us all 
along the line because they were clearly not at all happy at the idea of 
unionisation. The Fuel and Power Industries Committee must have 
communicated with Lyons on the item which he wished to have on the agenda 
because a few days later Lyons wrote to its secretary that We have practically 
no members as yet employed in the offshore industry. This was the problem 
which Reid was seeking to address in Aberdeen where he was experiencing a 
less than co-operative attitude from the manual trade unions. It must be 
remembered that Campbell Reid was a relative newcomer on the Aberdeen 
union scene and his union was viewed as a somewhat unwelcome addition to 
the unions already seeking to recruit in this difficult field. Fighting his corner 
Reid complained to Lyons in April, 1976 that he ought to have been a delegate 
at the meeting chaired by John Smith on 30th March, 1976 because all three 
IUOOC representatives were from essentially manual worker unions. Later 
events suggest that his exclusion may have been deliberate. 
This inter-union rivalry between ASTMS and other IUOOC members was a 
mere family fracas compared with the very public dispute between NUS and 
other unions, principally TGWU, which broke out in October, 1975. There 
had always been some rivalry between NUS and TGWU over rights to recruit 
workers in shipping but there had been for some time a general consensus that 
employees on inland waterways and coastal shipping were the province of the 
TGWU while NUS, another constituent member of the British Seafarers Joint 
Council (BSJC), catered for merchant seamen. A dispute arose over rights to 
recruit on establishments to which the generic title semi-submersible is given 
and which is defined as a floating platform, vessel or drilling rig which 
achieves its stability by "ballasting down", 
27 V. Chapter Six, p. 1018 supra. 
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i. e. taking water into ballast compartments in its hUll. 28 Semi-submersibles 
operate to their best advantage in rough weather areas such as the North Sea 
and were therefore preferable to drill ships of that era with their conventional 
hulls which were more susceptible to wave and wind movement and could 
suffer long periods of shut-down in bad weather (although they did have the 
advantage of being able to move more rapidly from one location to another). 
Not long after its foundation the IUOOC had agreed that semi-submersibles 
would not be regarded as ships but as installations although a drilling rig in 
movement across the sea to a new location is clearly a ship. Moreover, BSJC 
unions already had agreements with some operators whose base was in 
merchant shipping and one of these was Houlder Brothers. Back in August 
1975 three BSJC members of IUOOC, NUS, MNOA and AUEW(E), together 
with the Master Mariners Staff Association and the Radio and Electronic 
Officers Association, negotiated an agreement with Houlder Brothers in 
respect of the semi-submersible rig Dundee Kingsnorth, which was about to 
return to UK waters from Norway. The main beneficiary of this would be 
NUS. Apparently fearing that this could lead to mass recruitment by NUS on 
all semi-submersibles, Jack Jones, the General Secretary of the TGWU, 
weighed into Tony Benn on Ist October, 1975 when they were on their way to 
meet a delegation of union officers concerning union recognition offshore. 
This was rather unfair on the Secretary of State for Energy who, for several 
months, had been assiduously striving to assist the trade unions and would 
continue to do so. Benn simply replied that he was not in charge of the NUS 
and that perhaps TGWU had been dilatory in recruitment offshore. 29 That 
Jones could upbraid a minister of the Crown for his alleged failure to support a 
narrow TGWU point of view is another illustration of the influence which the 
leader of the largest trade union in the country was able to wield. 30 
The Dundee Kingsnorth incident did more hann to the IUOOC than to the ego 
of Jack Jones. Quite reasonably, lUOOC considered that it should have been 
consulted and in a letter to the General Secretary of AUEW(E) Bill Reid stated 
that it undermines the viability and credibility of the committee, particularly in 
the light of adverse comments already made by other employers in the offshore 
industry. Thus, within two years of its foundation and before it had achieved 
any of the objectives for which it had been formed, lUOOC was being 
weakened by petty internal feuds. Moreover, at the meeting of 17th 
November, 1975, Liverman had raised obliquely the question of the degree of 
recognition which the trade union movement was willing to accord to the 
IUOOC and David Lea of the TUC had indicated, equally obliquely, that this 
was yet to be decided. Later in the discussions that day Lea had mentioned that 
there would always be cases when there would be separate agreements between 
employers and trade unions and instanced the Dundee Kingsnorth as an 
example. 31 
28 Bank of Scotland International Division, (1996) Oil and Gas Handbook ' p. 50. 29 Benn, T. . (1989) Against the ride : Diaries 1973-76, London, Ilutchinson. 30 V. Chapter Four, p. 57 supra. 
31 v. Appendix G. 
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5 The Dkente Achieved 
Since discord among trade unions over recruitment rights had long been a 
feature of the UK trade union system, the squabbling which involved the 
TGWU and NUS and the suspicions which ASTMS and the manual worker 
unions exhibited towards each other were not seen as anything out of the 
ordinary. They deflected neither the trade unions nor the government from 
pressing on towards the goal of an agreement with the oil operators. As stated 
aboVe32 Liverman had reported at the meeting of 30th March, 1976 that the 
Council of UKOOA had recornmended to its members that they should allow 
trade union officers access to installations and he had produced a draft 
memorandum for discussion. Further progress on the draft memorandum and 
its implications for the industry was sufficient to convince the Secretary of 
State for Energy that another meeting, where the oil employers would be 
present, would probably result in agreement and thus settle the matter which 
must have been trying his patience sorely. He convened a meeting in the 
House of Commons on 11th May, 1976. The Minister of State for Energy 
(now Dr Dickson Mabon) and the Minister of State at the Department of 
Employment (now Harold Walker) were present along with, significantly, the 
Director-General of UKOOA and senior managers from seven major oil 
producers. The trade union representatives consisted of Frank Chapple 
(General Secretary of the Electrical Trade Union) and Harry Urwin, who were 
representing the TUC Fuel and Power Committee, together with Bill Reid and 
a few other members of IUOOC including Campbell Reid. While the official 
Press Notice33 does not mention the Memorandum of Understanding which 
Liverman had read out in draft at the meeting of 30th March, 1976, copies 
with the proposed wording must have been available for discussion. As the 
Press Notice stated, this was the first time that government, trade unions and 
operators had sat down together. The r6le of the IUOOC was examined with 
the government welcoming its formation as a means of harmonising the 
interests of the several unions concerned. It is clear from the final wording of 
the Memorandum that UKOOA had been persuaded at this meeting to 
acknowledge IUOOC as an organization which represented the interests of 
trade unions, although this did not imply acceptance of it as a negotiating 
body, not least because UKOOA itself did not negotiate on behalf of its 
constituent members. Perhaps UKOOA hoped that this form of recognition 
would be seen as a conciliatory gesture since the Minister of State at the 
Department of Employment made it perfectly clear that the government was 
going ahead with its earlier promise of extending the provisions of the 
Employment Protection Act 1975 offshore. Access to installations was 
recognised as a special problem and it was decided to hold further discussions 
to define more precisely an understanding on future requirements. 
32 v. p. 119 supra. 
33 v. Appendix 1. 
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Fortunately for researchers, Campbell Reid reported the main details of the 
discussions in a memorandum to John Langan, his union's National Officer in 
Scotland. 34 We -learn from this that the operators agreed in principle to provide 
facilities, including transport, for IUOOC officers to visit offshore rigs and 
platforms. The final wording of the Agreement (obviously the Memorandum of 
Understanding) had still to be tidied up so that it met the approval of both 
operators and- unions but Reid did not expect that there would be any 
difficulties arising. There was another point that was not mentioned in the 
Press Report. This was the refusal of the operators to discuss the Charter of 
Unionisation on the grounds that they had not had time to discuss it fully. As 
Reid percipiently observes, this was a circumlocution for saying that they were 
unhappy about it and that it was wiser for them to accept the broader principle 
of access by the union officers to their offshore installations. After all, access 
did not necessarily mean that their employees would apply for trade union 
membership. 
As Campbell Reid foresaw in his memorandum, no further difficulties arose 
and the Memorandum of Understanding on Trade Union Access to Oil 
Installations was accepted by both the trade unions and the employers. Having 
successfully brokered this agreement the government went ahead with an 
Order in Council whereby the provisions of the Employment Protection Act 
1975 would apply offshore from 21st June, 1976. The Order in Council 
included the statement 77ze Order will provide new trade union recognition 
procedures and protect trade union membership and activities. 
Before discussing the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding it will 
be appropriate to look at one consequence of the meeting of II th May, 1976. 
This is the recognition of IUOOC by UKOOA, which, z late as March 1976, 
had regarded IUOOC as unreliable and therefore unsuitable as a body with 
which UKOOA was prepared to be associated. The Memorandum of 
Understanding was agreed in its final form by late May 1976 and on 2nd 
September, 1976 UKOOA's Council approved the terms of reference of the 
Liaison Panel of its Employment Practices Committee. These included a list of 
nine topics which were selected because discussion of them can help to create 
more realistic attitudes in Government and the IUOOC. 35 Even the term 
"back-handed compliment" cannot be applied to this highly subjective 
comment and it is not unreasonable to surmis6 that the reference to realistic 
attitudes had its origin in the opinions expressed by trade union representatives 
during the recently concluded negotiations preceding the Memorandum of 
Understanding. On a more positive note the two representative organizations 
began by January 1977 to meet at three monthly intervals. This was to lead 
fairly swiftly to an agreement between IUOOC and UKOOA Liaison Panel 
originally entitled "Memorandum of Understanding between the UKOOA and 
the IUOOC-. Guidelines through which Recognition may be Achieved". 
34 v. Appendix J. 
35 V. Chapter Six, p. 105 supra. 
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The trade unions believed they had won a victory. The government had 
expended a great deal of effort to achieve the d6tente and, feeling that it had 
discharged its Social Contract obligations towards the trade unions in their 
quest for recognition by the North Sea oil operators, withdrew from the scene. 
Industrial relations offshore were now a matter for the employers and the trade 
unions. 
6 The Memorandum on Access and the Guidelines on Recognition: an 
Analysis 
Because their results bore little relation to the expectations of the unions and 
the government, both the Memorandum of Understanding on Trade Union 
Access to Offshore Installations and The Guidelines on Recognition must be 
subjected to some analysis. The Guidelines are given in Appendix K but the 
Memorandum is short enough for it to be given in full and thus facilitate swift 
access to its terms. 
"The Government is extending employment legislation to offshore areas in 
order to contribute to secure industrial relations between employers and 
workers. This legislation includes the recognition provisions of the 
Employment Protection Act 1975. 
Access of union officials to workers offshore does however present particular 
difficulties. It is the agreed intention of the Government, the operators and the 
unions designated by the 1UOOC that all reasonable action should be taken to 
facilitate access by the companies' normal transport facilities. The operators 
have therefore individually agreed that they and, as far as they are able to 
inj7uence them, the sub-contractors working for them, will take appropriate 
action under agreed arrangements to be entered into to ensure that trade union 
officials designated by the 1UOOC are, on request, granted reasonable access 
to all their offshore installations. 
it is not possible to lay down exact details of conditions of access. These must 
depend on operational circumstances and the number of requests made by 
unions. However, the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service will be 
available to assist employers and unions faced with any particular difficulties. " 
The above is the full text of the final agreement. The author has found36 a 
copy of the agreement which excludes the phrases shown above in italics and 
he hazards the suggestion that it may be the original wording of the draft 
memorandum which was the basis for discussions at the meeting of I Ith May, 
1976. Support for this view is provided by a comment of Campbell Reid in his 
memorandum to Langan37 where he states that the oil companies will provide 
the transport. This, it must be emphasised, was a major concession gained by 
the trade unions because travel by helicopter (the only practical method) was 
both expensive and difficult to arrange for persons other than oil industry 
36 In the thesis of Dr A. A. lbom. 
37 TbiS is the memorandum of 14th May, 1976 which is given in Ul at Appendix J. 
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employees. The phrase designated by the IUOOC is used twice. Here we see 
that the Memorandum is to apply exclusively to IUOOC members and thus it 
constituted a "mini-Bridlington"38 agreement. On the other hand, concessions 
were not made solely by the employers because the trade unions had to allow 
the insertion of a clause, which released the oil companies from any 
requirement to make adherence to the terms of the agreement binding upon 
their contractors. 
The Memorandum on Access and the Guidelines on Recognition were seen, at 
least by trade union officials, as complementary because once offshore 
employees had been recruited there would be a natural progression towards 
recognition. However, analysis of both documents demonstrates how puny 
were the gains for the trade unions. The trade union representatives may not 
have been hoodwinked into believing that they had achieved something other 
than what was really the case, but as regards the Memorandum on Access they 
had entered into an agreement couched in terms sufficiently imprecise for 
employers to ignore or manipulate them at will. Moreover, the terms of the 
two agreements fell far short of the Trade Union Charter for Unionisation of 
Employees. 39 Of the ten points in the Charter only one, the right of access to 
installations, had been agreed by the employers ( although a second point, that 
on an agreed disputes procedure, was negotiated at a later period). Matters 
such as union negotiation of . terms and conditions of employment, 
incorporation of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 offshore, a National 
Board for dealing with wages, conditions and regulations offshore, compulsory 
membership of trade unions with a check-off system for subscriptions, future 
licences conditional upon companies recognising IUOOC unions as 
representatives of their employees, stand-by vessels and supply ships to 
cc-form to British manning and safety standards, all failed to appear in the 
agreements. As Campbell Reid mentioned in his letter, the unions accepted a 
rather weak excuse for the terms of the Charter to be passed over and this was 
probably a result of their eagerness to secure their first objective, access to the 
installations. 
The first and the third paragraph of the Memorandum on Access require little 
comment. The Employment Protection Act 1975 was conceived on the 
assumption that most workers would be trade unionists but while this was so 
onshore it was not the case offshore. Consequently recognition provisions 
could apply only once sufficient workers had been recruited and sought 
recognition of their trade union by the employer. Perhaps the trade unions 
were sanguine enough to believe that mere access of their officers to the 
installations offshore would suffice to garner recruits. Paragraph three 
recognises that operational circumstances had to have some bearing upon the 
rights of access but it was unrealistic to believe that ACAS could assist in any 
significant way when particular difficulties arose. 
38 At the 1939 TUC held at Bridlington it was agreed that no affiliated union should recruit 
members in an industry or organization where another affiliated union already held negotiating 
rights. This was to avoid "poaching" of members from one union by another. 
39 V. Chapter Six, p. 108 supra. 
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The weaknesses of the Memorandum on Access are more fundamental when 
the second paragraph -is considered. Having gained the point that access to 
their installations would be the responsibility of the operators, this left the 
arrangements in the hands of the operators who, the trade unions were soon to 
find, did not go out of their way to "facilitate access". The time when a trade 
union officer found himself available to go offshore might not fit in with the 
operational requirements of the installation that he wished to visit. Besides, a 
seat on a helicopter was in itself a problem because extra personnel sometimes 
had to be flown out at short notice and allocation of a seat was not always 
resolved in the trade union officer's favour; in the months following the 
ratification of the Memorandum on Access there were a few cases of 
"bumping", when a trade union officer, already at the heliport and expecting 
to go offshore, was informed that, regrettably, his place in the helicopter had 
to be taken by a company employee who was needed on the installation. There 
is no suggestion that this was deliberate discourtesy and eventually this 
problem disappeared but not before the immediate impetus of the 
Memorandum on Access was beginning to decline. 
There was also the question of the reception and treatment of the visiting trade 
union officer once he did arrive on the installation. It took a few months 
before most companies established a practice whereby the visiting officers 
were to be recognised as guests and given appropriate accommodation for 
interviewing prospective members. It is commonly believed by many trade 
unionists that the visiting officials were deliberately given a room adjacent or 
near to the OIM's office in order to deter oil workers from coming to see the 
union visitor. A more likely explanation is that the most suitable 
accommodation was in the office segment of the installation and that it would 
have been discourteous in the extreme to expect the guest to achieve his 
purpose without an opportunity for discussions to be held in private and in 
reasonable comfort. In addition, it could have been dangerous to allow a 
visitor the "free run" of the installation because of his unfamiliarity with the 
many hazards attending life offshore. It later became the practice of most firms 
for a representative of the personnel department to accompany the trade union 
officer to ensure that the arrangements for his visit were satisfactory. 
The granting of reasonable access to installations referred to the willingness of 
an operator to accede to requests from trade union officials who wished to go 
offshore. Logically, this should have come first in the paragraph with the 
matter of transport following. The addition to the original draft of this 
Memorandum of Access of the words "under agreed arrangements to be 
entered into" was a restrictive covenant in favour of the employers, although it 
might not have seemed so at the time. It permitted the operator to refuse 
consent for a visit on the grounds that no agreement had been reached on the 
issue. However, by far the biggest drawback in the whole Memorandum was 
the fact that contractors needed to offer similar facilities to trade union officers 
only "so far as they (i. e. the operators) are able to influence them". This was 
patently a "let-out" clause for the operators but its importance was all the 
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greater since the proportion of personnel who were direct employees of the 
operators was about to decline sharply. Within a few years the majority of the 
workers offshore were contractors' employees. Today it is estimated that 
fewer than 20% of offshore workers are directly employed by the operators. 
The Guidelines for Recognition was an agreement whereby recognition was 
restricted to unions in membership of IUOOC and any approach to an 
employer for recognition had to made through lUOOC. Once the basis of a 
"common interest group" had been determined by union and management the 
question of whether there was "significant membership" would have to be 
referred to a third party. The subsequent agreement would, however, only be 
representational and if a negotiating agreement was sought there had to be a 
ballot in favour of the trade union making the request. 
The Guidelines exhibited three weaknesses from the point of view of an 
agreement designed to assist trade unions to obtain recognition by the oil 
operators. The first was that it assumed success for, at least, some trade union 
officers in their recruitment offshore under the terms of the Memorandum on 
Access. To demand recognition without the backing of a large proportion of a 
"common interest group" would have attracted a rebuff from an employer. 
Events were to show that, in the American idiom, the union officers rarely 
reached this first base. The second weakness was that even if sufficient 
numbers of employees in a "common interest group" were recruited by a 
union, the agreement with the operator would be purely representational. 
Negotiating rights were obtainable only through subsequent balloting. The 
third weakness was that, unlike the Memorandum on Access, any UKOOA 
member was free to modify or amend any of the steps in discussion between 
themselves and the 1UOOC. In a way this was a reminder to IUOOC that 
UKOOA was not a negotiating body and that any member of UKOOA 
remained free to make the arrangements that it wanted - or none at all - when 
any trade union (possibly a non-IUOOC member) approached it on the matter 
of recognition. 
With the advantage of hindsight we can see how these agreements were 
disappointing for the trade unions. Possibly the only lasting benefit has been 
that UKOOA recognised IUOOC as an organization with which it was 
prepared to discuss - but never to negotiate - employee relations offshore. 
Despite the intervention of members of the government at levels as high as the 
Cabinet (Tony Benn) and the considerable time spent on detailed discussions 
by Ministers of State (John Smith, Harold Walker) and their civil servants, the 
trade unions have been unable to make any headway offshore. There have been 
occasional flurries of interest in trade unionism when employees on an 
installation have felt aggrieved over a particular issue and sought union 
support but little of lasting advantage has ever accrued to the unions. As a 
later chapter will show, the union officers continued in what must have 
seemed, even to them, the fruitless task of striving to recruit members among 
oil workers but by the mid-1980s more important matters were engaging the 
attention of trade unions as their memberships went into serious decline. 
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The efforts of government ministers, their civil servants and the trade unions 
can be summed up no better than in the words of the poet Horace in his "Ars 
Poetica": 
Partutient montes : nascetur fidiculus mus. (The mountains went into labour 
and gave birth to the smallest of mice). 
A large share of the cause of that result must be attributed to the operators. 
They had succeeded in defending their exclusivity very cleverly, giving what 
appeared to be generous concessions in the knowledge that the interpretation of 
the agreements gave them sufficient opportunity to frustrate trade union 
objectives. 
7 Summary 
By 1975 the oil operators were prepared to listen to proposals for some form 
of accommodation with the trade unions, especially as the government 
favoured such a development. 
They were not the first multi-national organizations to establish themselves in 
the United Kingdom. Manufacturing firms had arrived in the late 1950s and 
the early 1960s and from 1963 to 1970 at every meeting of the Trades Union 
Congress alarm had been expressed at the possible effect upon union members. 
Since the centres of decision making were outside the UK, job security rather 
than industrial relations was the main concern of the unions as was 
demonstrated by a TUC review in 1970 on inward investing companies. 
Management was also interested and the British North America Committee 
commissioned a study on labour relations in multi-national corporations with 
special reference to USA firms operating within the United Kingdom. The 
author, John Genna d, came to conclusions similar to those of the TUC review 
and he suggested that the trade unions would seek to develop their links with 
international trade unionism to counter the strength of these corporations. 
Gennard's criticism of IBM and Kodak for refusing to recognise trade unions 
drew a note of dissent from one ex-patriate manager who considered that these 
two companies' outlook was to be commended because they were providing 
conditions of service which made trade unions superfluous. 
The oil operators have always sought to exclude trade unions from their 
installations. They were a cohesive body organized in UKOOA, which never 
negotiated on behalf of its members in a way that was understood by IUOOC. 
Within Aberdeen itself, which was emerging as the oil capital of Europe, there 
were regular but informal meetings of executives of oil operating companies 
where a common approach to personnel aspects such as pay and conditions of 
service was agreed with total absence of written documentation. Unlike 
UKOOA, IUOOC suffered sporadic outbursts of petty internal feuding, usually 
over rights to recruit certain classes of employee. 
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Throughout the premiership of Edward Heath (1970-1974), when the trade 
unions were heavily engaged in fighting the Industrial Relations Act 1971 to 
the virtual exclusion of any other aspects of employment, the oil operators 
were establishing themselves in North East Scotland. When, rather too late, 
the trade unions finally turned their attention to the oil companies and found 
themselves regarded by the industry as little more than an irrelevance, they 
sought help from the TUC and from the government which was currently 
introducing legislation favourable to trade unions as part of the Social 
Contract. Government ministers investigated the views of both employers and 
unions and eventually brought both sides to the conference table, where 
agreement was reached on the access of trade union officials to offshore 
installations for the purpose of recruiting. The trade unions, however, were 
soon to find that this agreement on access and a subsequent agreement on 
recognition delivered far less than they had expected. This was mainly on 
account of provisos, favourable to the employers, which the unions, in their 
eagerness for a negotiated settlement, had allowed into the final document. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
hh, 
THE FIRST STRIKE OFFSHORE 
Over a three month period from November 1975 there occurred an industrial 
dispute offshore which, though small in relation to the number of persons 
involved, served to confirm in the minds of both trade unions and oil 
companies the unacceptable attitude of the other towards the conduct of human 
resource management offshore. It represented a clash between two very 
different traditions, namely the deeply held conviction of British workers that 
they had a right to question managerial decisions which involved loss of 
employment in contrast to the authoritarian approach of American management 
which the industry considered necessary for successful operation in a difficult 
and often threatening physical environment. The inter-relationship of owner 
and operator of the installation in question added another dimension to the 
incident and demonstrated the complex nature of the oil industry as a whole. 
By a curious coincidence the dispute also took place just at the time when there 
was a surge of interest in the conduct of industrial relations offshore. A few 
weeks earlier the TUC had passed a resolution' proposing action in support of 
trade unionism offshore and the IUOOC was using the arrival of the first oil 
produced from a British North Sea field to draw public attention to the need 
for full representative rights for offshore employees. Moreover, it was during 
these three months that the government was making every effort to 
2 
persuade 
the oil operators to offer some sort of recognition to the trade unions. 
At the time of the dispute the drilling rig Venture One was located 150 miles 
east of Dundee. It was owned by Dixilyn (International) ,a Swiss-bascd 
company which was a subsidiary of Dixilyn of Houston, Texas and serviced 
out of Dundee by Shore Base Services, another Dixilyn company. Those 
aboard worked for Dixilyn (International) but were remunerated by Pelyn of 
Geneva. The operating company was Conoco which had subcontracted the 
work to Placid Oil. Late in afternoon of 3rd November, 1975 a trainee crane 
operator, William Cowan, whom the rig superintendents now considered 
sufficiently competent to carry out routine work without supervision, was 
asked by two roustabouts to lift some collars. The senior tool pusher, Peter 
Stoppler, noticed that the roustabouts were not using tag-lines and ordered that 
no further lifting was to be done until these safety devices were attached. Since 
none was immediately available the roustabouts signalled to Cowan that he was 
to "hold" and, without communicating further, went off to the marine store to 
fetch ropes. Before they returned a third roustabout came from another part of 
the rig and asked Cowan to lift a 12 foot pipe. Cowan, unaware of the 
instructions of Stoppler about tag-lines, lifted the pipe to its required position, 
whereupon Stoppler, who had seen the crane in operation, dismissed him on 
the spot. Jim Winters the crane operator, who in the drilling industry is also 
the deck superintendent of the roustabouts, felt that rather rough justice had 
been meted out to his trainee, especially as no injury had resulted and he asked 
1 v. Chapter Six, p. 107 supra. 2 v. previous chapter. 
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Stoppler to reconsider his decision. Stoppler refused. That evening "A" crew 
discussed the matter. They agreed that Al Shaw, the junior tool pusher and 
second in command of the rig under Stoppler, should be invited to discuss the 
matter with his superior and seek reinstatement of Cowan. If this brought no 
change, Winters and David Robertson, a welder with considerable experience 
of negotiations of this nature, were delegated to seek an interview with 
Stoppler and to tell him that if the position still remained unchanged the men 
would withdraw their labour until a senior manager of Dixilyn (International) 
came out to Venture One to discuss what the men saw as a threat to job 
security. 
Shaw agreed to speak to Stoppler but he refused to retract his decision. The 
following morning Winters and Robertson approached Stoppler but they, 
too, were told that he would not reinstate Cowan. In accordance with their 
decision of the previous evening "A" crew withdrew their labour whereupon 
Stoppler dismissed Robertson for inciting the others to what he called 
"mutiny". At 12: 30 p. in. Stoppler informed them that he had sent for two 
helicopters to remove them from Venture One and that if they would not board 
them he would summon the police. In fact he had already communicated with 
the Dundee Police requesting the presence of as many officers as were 
necessary to remove "A" crew from Venture One but had been told that he and 
his employers must settle this matter on their own. By this time "B" crew were 
aware of what was happening and fearing a complete withdrawal of labour 
Stoppler began to negotiate with Robertson and his colleagues. At one point he 
said that he was prepared to renew both crews if the need arose but finally he 
agreed against my betterjudgmen? to reinstate both Cowan and Robertson. 
On return to Dundee at the end of their two week shift the members of "A" 
crew were summarily dismissed, the Dundee inanager of Dixilyn 
(international) commenting that the re-instatement of the men had been a 
compromise in order to avoid any incident which wouldjeopardise the lives of 
4 the other 62 persons aboard . 
There were two interpretations of the decision to re-instate and then dismiss 
not only Cowan and Robertson but the other eight men of "A" crew as well. 
The company view was that the re-instatement had been merely a temporary 
measure to prevent any further disruption of work on Venture One and that the 
dismissals had been entirely justified because the company could not, in the 
interests of safety, afford to employ men who sought to challenge a manager's 
authority with strike action. Naturally, the men took an entirely opposite view. 
A fellow worker had been dismissed, the rig manager had reffised even to hear 
their explanation of what had happened and consequently they were left with 
no option but to withdraw their labour. There was no disciplinary procedure to 
follow although the TGWU had already asked for one to be laid down. 
3 Both quotations are from a manuscript account of the incident prepared on 5th November, 
1975 by "A" crew for the manager of Placid Oil at Dundee, whom they wished to see on their 
return onshore. A copy was made and is now in the archives at the OILC office in Aberdeen. 4 Statement to the press, mid-November, 1975, by Bernard Shooter, manager at Dundee of 
Dixilyn (International). 
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Stoppler had then negotiated and had re-instated Cowan and Robertson. "A" 
crew had worked normally until the end of their tour offshore and had been 
summarily dismissed on arrival in Dundee on account of an incident which 
they believed had been settled some days previously. 
On the Venture One the employees involved in the incident had acted as they 
normally did in similar situations. Robertson had been a shop steward in 
previous employment and had taken the leading r6le in a situation with which 
he was familiar: seeking to reverse a managerial decision to dismiss a fellow 
worker. He was merely the chosen spokesman for a specific group of workers 
and in doing so was acting no differently from hundreds of other shop 
stewards in other parts of the United Kingdom. In the industrial milieu where 
he and the others of "A" crew had been accustomed to work such contretemps 
were usual and once the issue was settled it was forgotten by men and 
managers. The industrial milieu of the oil industry was, however, quite 
different for it was one where such confrontations were not acceptable and 
consequently employees who indulged in this lack of discipline could not be 
tolerated. In the argot of the UK offshore industry which was already 
developing, such persons were NRB (not required back). 
David Robertson was not prepared to accept this treatment. He and the other 
nine entered a claim to the Industrial Tribunal for unfair dismissal. More 
importantly, he mounted a campaign to persuade Dixilyn (International) to 
reverse its decision and to make public the nature of employment offshore. As 
Bill Reid, whom Robertson brought quickly into the picture, commented The 
lads in the North Sea are working in conditions similar to those which existed 
in British industry in the nineteenth ccniury. 5 This was an exaggeration in its 
totality but an accurate enough description of the untrammelled disciplinary 
power of the oil companies to dismiss employees at will. It was not easy for 
Robertson to organize matters because he (and two others) lived in Aberdeen 
while the other seven lived in Fife, Dundee and the north of England. He 
received great support from his wife, Loma, whose secretarial skills were 
invaluable in the preparation of statements for the press and in correspondence 
with the IUOOC, union officials, MPs, the former employers, ACAS and the 
other dismissed men not to mention sending and receiving telephone messages. 
The contest between one man and an international organization appeared at the 
outset no more than a forlorn hope but a considerable amount of success was 
to attend his efforts. 
The IUOOC gave full support because it saw that this was a test case, if not 
for trade union recognition then at least for an acceptable disciplinary 
procedure in offshore employment. Bill Reid, the secretary of IUOOC, was 
also the District Officer of the TGWU of which union all the men were 
members except Robertson whose union was the Doilermakers and 
consequently Reid had a direct involvement in the case. The TGWU had 
5 Statement to Aberdeen Peoples Press, January, 1976. Precise date not known since 
photocopy of relevant passage, now in the archives of the OILC office, excluded the date. 
132 
"blacked" the Venture One and although this did not prevent recruitment it 
kept the issue alive especially when support was later received from the 
International Transport Federation. The TGWU asked for a meeting with 
Dixilyn (International) and was refused and the same answer was given to 
ACAS whom Reid had asked to intervene. Ae CAS (sic) and ourselves have 
been snubbed by the company 6 reported Reid. Meetings were held with 
Conoco, the charterers of Venture One and the Dundee Docks Branch 
Committee of the TGWU. Dixilyn (International) remained adamant and 
continued to refuse to discuss the issue. 
Events moved quickly in late January/early February 1976. David Robertson 
believes that Conoco had become tired of the matter and had "leant" on 
Dixilyn (International). While this can be no more than speculation there was 
no doubt of the mood of the Dundee dockworkers, all TGWU members, who 
first threatened to "black" the three supply vessels servicing Venture One and 
then did so on 26th January. This industrial action was called off after three 
hours when the company agreed to meet union representatives on 6th 
February. 
"A" crew's wisdom in not putting all their hopes on a favourable result from 
the Industrial Tribunal had been demonstrated a few days earlier when the 
Industrial Tribunal decided that since they had been working outwith British 
territorial waters their case could not be heard. Nationally trade union leaders 
with members in offshore employment complained that this ruling left their 
members unprotected and demanded an amendment to the law, which 
eventually brought offshore workers within its scope. Another similar case was 
bound to have come along but "A" crew of the Venture One can claim to have 
started a train of action that led to greater protection for people in offshore 
employment. 
Present at the meeting on 6th February, 1976 with the Dixilyn (International) 
managers were Harry Bygate, secretary of the Aberdeen Branch of the 
National Union of Seamen, Bill Reid and David Robertson. The outcome was 
satisfactory on the whole for the ten men who were re-instated as from that 
day and had thus attained their prime objective. On the other hand they were 
not offered employment on Venture One, understandably since Peter Stoppler 
was still in charge there, but on Venture Two, which was currently being built 
in Finland. While the subsequent history of the men at Pori in Finland, which 
David Robertson laughingly refers to as "exile", is another matter, certain 
conclusions can be drawn from this strike. 
The first is that it was possible in 1976 for one determined man to contest 
successftilly onshore what he saw as unfair disciplinary action offshore. It 
needed determination and David Robertson had this quality in abundance. As 
he said just before Dixilyn (International) caved in I wouldn't like us just to be 
6 Statement to the "Press and Journal". Again the precise date is not known as the photocopy in 
the OILC archives excluded the date. 
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re-instated and then everything forgotten about. I'd like something to grow 
from thisfight. 7 It also required organization and this was achieved by efficient 
communication skills and effective involvement of trade unions. The IUOOC 
played its part but the crucial factor was the enlistment of the Dundee dockers 
in support of the dismissed men. Without their "blacking" of supplies to 
Venture One it is unlikely that Dixilyn (International) would have been 
brought to the negotiating table. 
Public sympathy is always important in recruiting support of others not 
directly involved. Although the newspapers did not give full details of what 
had happened on Venture One on 3rd and 4th November, 1975 there was a 
general awareness that, whatever one thought about trade unions and shop 
stewards, the employer in this case had been less than fair. It was certainly 
grist for the IUOOC because the company was demonstrating all the worst 
features of what was believed to be typical American macho-management with 
Peter Stoppler almost a caricature of the tough uncompromising oil executive. 
Robert Hughes MP lambasted the affair in which his constituent, David 
Robertson, had become the central figure. 
It is ludicrous for a company to treat industrial relations in this way - and the 
sooner there is stronger trade union organisation on the rigs the better. 
Everyone would benefit from stronger unions, or at least proper 
8 consultations. 
Although the circumstances were quite different it is interesting to compare the 
success of this strike with the failure of the lUOOC to extract recognition from 
the oil companies in mid 1974. The industrial action taken on board the 
Venture One arose out of the dismissal of one employee, which his fellow 
workers considered to be utterly unfair and this was compounded when the 
company dismissed an entire shift on their return onshore for having provided 
support for their colleague. This stimulated a well organized campaign to 
secure re-instatement to which lUOOC gave assistance but the company 
showed no sign of paying any heed until sympathetic action by the dockers in 
Dundee demonstrated the strength of feeling on the issue. By contrast the 
attempt by IUOOC to win collective bargaining rights in 1974 had been poorly 
co-ordinated and lacked any emotional appeal or focus. 
it is highly probable that there were some lessons from the Venture One 
episode that were not lost on the oil employers. In determining their policy on 
conditions of employment it is likely that the oil companies saw the value of 
some compromise between unqualified authoritarianism and over-conciliatory 
management. After all, sophisticated paternalism was soon to become the 
hallmark of offshore industrial relations. This is a policy aimed at the 
provision of conditions of work, which are sufficiently attractive to employees 
7 Comment to Aberdeen Peoples Press, February, 1976. 
a "Press and Journal", a few days before the meeting on 6th February. 1976. Ibis quotation is 
taken from the same set of photocopied documents referred to at footnotes 3,5 and 6 above 
which unfortunately were not annotated with the actual day of publication. 
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to persuade them that they have no need for trade union protection. 9 This is 
not to assert that there is no genuine intention to provide security of 
employment and good pay with attractive fringe benefits, because the oil 
companies have as responsible an attitude towards their employees as any 
other industry. On the other hand, a contented workforce with a minimum of 
grievances is poor recruitment ground for trade unionism especially when one 
considers the short term outlook of so many British manual workers. 
As the following chapters will show, the trade unions never gave up their 
struggle to attain recognition for collective bargaining but apart from little 
flurries of success in recruitment this objective has remained as distant a 
prospect as ever. The story of the Venture One industrial dispute does not, 
however, end here. David Robertson's hope that something would grow out of 
his fight was disappointed but more than a decade later he was to emerge again 
as one of the founder members of the Offshore Industry Liaison Committee 
and to play a significant r6le in the industry's employee relations. 
v. Chapter Seven, p. 114 supra. Conunent of W. Blackie. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
THE CALM BEFORE THE STORM: THE TWELVE YEARS 
FROM THE MEMORANDUM ON ACCESS TO PIPER ALPHA 
After four years of intense industrial relations activity within the oil and gas 
industry culminating in the Memorandum on Access and the Guidelines on 
Recognition there followed a twelve year period which, by comparison, was 
almost quiescent. Using nautical terminology industrial relations sailed straight 
ftorn the "Roaring Forties" into the "doldrums" where they remained until they 
re-entered stormy waters with startling suddenness on 6th July 1988. After the 
Piper Alpha disaster on that day some aspects of the industry were never to be 
the same again while others, particularly industrial relations, after a period of 
frenetic activity, were to slip back into the torpidity from which they had been so 
uncomfortably aroused. 
The events of this twelve year period will be examined by an analysis of several 
different themes, all interconnected and all illustrating, to a greater or less 
degree, the inherent weaknesses which impeded the trade unions in their efforts 
to wrest from the oil companies the form of recognition to which they aspired. 
Although the British trade unions were at the apogee of their power during the 
early years of this period, ' the British North Sea oil and gas industry had no 
difficulty in maintaining its own mode of industrial relations wherein trade 
unions had the smallest of parts. 
1 The Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staffs 
Mergers of trade unions were made easier by the Trade Union (Amalgamation) 
Act, 1964. One of several amalgamations was that of two unions catering mainly 
for technical staff - the Association of Supervisory Staffs, Executives and 
Technicians and the smaller Association of Scientific Workers - which merged in 
1968 to form the Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staffs! 
The union was energetic in its recruitment and by 1980 had increased its 
membership to 491,000 compared with approximately 90,000 which had been 
the combined membership at the time of the merger. 
ASTMS was successful because it was an organization mainly for salaried 
employees and not simply the "white collar', arm of a union where the 
membership consisted largely of manual workers. It was thus seen as a rival by 
traditional manual worker unions such as the Transport and General Workers' 
Union, the National Union of General and Municipal Workers, the Amalgamated 
Union of Engineering Workers and the Iron and Steel Trades Confederation, all 
of whom had "white collar" sections. 
The new union's first major confrontation with manual worker unions came 
during 1968 in the steel industry, which had been nationalised in 1967 as the 
British Steel Corporation. DSC found that it had inherited 29 individual unions 
1 v. Chapter Four, p. 57 supra. 
2 Renamed 1988 the Manufacturing, Science and Finance Union (MSF) on amagamation with 
TASS. 
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with negotiating rights and attempted to rationalise its collective bargaining 
procedures by recognizing only those unions already accepted as representing 
manual workers. This excluded ASTMS which had been organizing in some 
plants for several years. Together with the Clerical and Administrative Workers' 
Union (another excluded union) ASTMS called a strike in a car plant which was 
an important customer of BSC. This inter-union dispute was referred to a court 
of inquiry 3 and in his evidence Dai Davies, General Secretary of the ISTC, stated 
with brutal frankness the rationale behind his organization's objection to any 
recognition by BSC of these two unions. 
One of the consequences of technological development is that the pattern of the 
labourforce in steel is changing. There is a rise in the proportion of clerical, 
technical, administrative and supervisory staff at the expense of production 
workers. All the indications are that this trend will continue. The Confederation 
has been negotiatingfor clerical, administrative and supervisory stafffor almost 
halfa century and it does not intend to allowfresh competition in thisfield. 4 
The court of inquiry nevertheless concluded that the two unions had strong 
grounds for inclusion in the national negotiating machinery, provided that the 
predominance of the steel union was recognized in the distribution of places on 
the union side of the machinery. The BSC reluctantly accepted the decision to 
the extent of agreeing to local recognition of the two unions, where membership 
justified it. The manual worker unions, however, would not tolerate this and 
prepared to direct their members not to receive instructions from supervisors 
who were in C&AWU or ASTMS, a stance which, after some initial hesitation, 
the General Council of the Trades Union Congress supported. 
Eventually 
5a compromise was reached whereby those unions in the TUC Steel 
Committee negotiated with BSC at national level and, as stated in the report of a 6 
later court of inquiry, further negotiations take place at works group, individual 
works and even departmental level in respect of employees in membership of 
locally recognised unions. This successful defence of its recognition rights in a 
few BSC plants was an important victory for the newly formed union but it did 
not endear ASTMS to the older established unions. Other inter-union differences 
involving ASTMS were to follow and the the leaders of the larger manual 
worker unions came to exhibit a scarcely disguised hostility towards its General 
Secretary, Clive Jenkins, 7 who was largely responsible for the initial and 
subsequent amalgamations of several small unions which created ASTMS. 
3 1968 Report ofa Court ofInquiry under Lord Pearson into the disputes between the British 
Steel Corporation and certain oftheir Employees, Cmnd 3754,1 IMSO, London. 
4 ibid. para 8, p. 8. 
Iron and Steel Trades Confederation, National Union of Blast Furnaccmcn, TGWU, GMWU 
and National Craftsmen's Co-ordinating Committee. 
6 1975 Report ofa Court oflnquiry into a dispute between the National Union of 
Blasyurnacemen and the British Steel Corporation. Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration 
Service, London. 
7 Tley managed to exclude him from the General Council of the TUC until its fonnat changed in 
1983. 
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From about 1975 ASTMS implemented a policy of widening its recruitment to 
include craftsmen as well as managerial staff. As regards the North Sea offshore 
oil and gas industry it broadened its appeal even wider by accepting into 
membership every grade of employee. This vigorous recruitment had the joint 
effect of further antagonising other unions and enabling ASTMS to become the 
only union with any significant membership in the southern sector of the North 
Sea. Later, in 1988, through its absorption of TASS the union strengthened its 
presence enen more because it became a signatory to the Offshore Construction 
Agreemene along with AUEW, EETPU and the then independent Boilermakers' 
Society. 
2 Unionisation of Phillips Petroleum Company UK 
As stated earlier ASTMS did not open an office in Aberdeen until the Spring of 
1975. By contrast, ASTMS was already well established on the East Anglian 
coast from where offshore gas had been piped ashore to the terminal at Bacton 
since 1968 (Leman Field) and 1969 (Hewett Field). The union had attracted 
some membership and by 1976 felt that it was now strong enough to justify a 
claim for recognition from Phillips Petroleum Company UK on the Hewett 
Field. The company acknowledged the union's request for discussions but told 
ASTMS that it must pursue the matter through the Inter Union Offshore Oil 
Committee in Aberdeen. This can be taken at its face value with Phillips 
believing that this was the appropriate route for the claim to be processed but 
Roger Spiller, the ASTMS Divisional Officer in East Anglia, was to say late? 
that it was merely a stratagem to divert the claim away from the area. 
What is undeniable is that the claim sparked off another inter-union dispute 
about the r6le and authority of the IUOOC in the North Sea oil and gas industry. 
Spiller had informed his National Officer, Roger Lyons, of the company's reply 
and Lyons wrote in January 1977 to David Lea, Head of the TUC Economic 
Department and secretary of the TUC Fuel and Power Industries Committee, 
who had been closely involved in the negotiations leading up to the 
Memorandum on Access. Lyons made the reasonable point that since IUOOC 
was based in Aberdeen it could do little to assist a claim for recognition off the 
East Anglian coast. The following month Stan Davison, Assistant General 
Secretary of ASTMS, wrote to inform Campbell Reid that IUOOC had been 
allocated responsibility to operate in the northern sector of the North Sea and 
thus had no locus in the Phillips affair. In his reply, " which mainly described the 
animosity displayed towards ASTMS by other 1UOOC members, Reid agreed 
that the IUOOC's remit did not cover the southern sector of the North Sea and 
that this was a decision which the TUC Fuel and Power Committee had already 
reached. Campbell Reid warned Davison that the IUOOC thought it wrong to 
split coverage of oil and gas and would raise the matter at a meeting to be held in 
March. 
: v. p. 166 infra. 
In a letter to Roger Lyons, National Officer, 18th October, 1977. 
10 C. Reid to S. Davison 16th February, 1977. 
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This meeting of the Fuel and Power Industries Committee (FPIC) was convened 
on 23rd March, 1977 at Congress House, London. It was chaired by Frank 
Chapple of EETPU and there were representatives of every union with an 
interest in the oil and gas industry including Lyons, Davison and Reid of 
ASTMS and Urwin and Reid of TGWU. Lea was also present as secretary of the 
Committee. There was one subject on the agenda: "Trade Union Organization in 
the North Sea Offshore Area7. The chairman introduced the discussion with the 
reminder that by Resolution 83" of the 1975 Trades Union Congress the FPIC 
was charged with, inter alia, securing orderly progress towards full trade union 
organization in the North Sea area. The discussion had greater relevance to 
issues which will be dealt with later in this chapter but reference must be made 
here to the question of the sphere of authority of the IUOOC. Frank Chapple said 
that the FPIC understood that the IUOOC's activity was restricted to the northern 
sector of the North Sea and was supported by Harry Urwin who added that it was 
not the responsibility of this TUC committee to adjudicate on demarcation 
problems in the offshore oil and gas industry. Bill Reid retorted that this 
prevented IUOOC from approaching the oil multi-nationals involved on a co- 
ordinated all union basis wherever they happened to operate. " This view found 
little support and in his remarks at the conclusion of the meeting the chain-nan 
reaffirmed that it was not the TUC Fuel and Power Industries Committee's 
function to adjudicate on spheres of influence in particular energy sectors, even 
one as important as North Sea oil. '-' 
Bill Reid did not take kindly to the opinion of the FPIC that the IUOOC must 
confine its operations to the northern sector of the North Sea and he wrote in 
strong terms to Lea defending the right of IUOOC to be consulted about union 
affairs in the industry as a whole. " He resented in particular a statement by 
Davison (not in the minutes of the FPIC meeting but apparently made there) that 
the IUOOC's remit was limited to facilitating the offshore visits of trade union 
officials. Reid went on to say that ASTMS was seeking sole negotiating rights 
from the company and that since IUOOC was a multi-union body Phillips 
understandably thought that it was appropriate to rder the claim to his 
committee in order to avoid inter-union rivalry. He warned Lea that, if ASTMS 
was to be successful in its wish for each union to fight its own comer on North 
Sea matters, the IUOOC would cease to have any raison d'etre. 
In a letter to Davison Lea appears to see some merit in Bill Reid's argument and 
to have conceded to 1UOOC the right to deal with the Phillips representation 
issue on the grounds that this gave support to IUOOC. " Davison drafted but did 
not send a letter to Lea objecting to what Campbell Reid calls a "voltc face" in a 
letter to Spiller. " Some sort of compromise, however, must eventually have been 
worked out at a meeting of the FPIC on 27th July, 1977 because on 5th August, 
11 v. Chapter Six, p. 107 supra. 
12 Minute of meeting of the TUC Fuel and Power Industries Committee 23rd March, 1977. 
13 Minute of meeting of the TUC Fuel and Power Industries Committee 23rd March, 1977. 
14 W. P. Reid to D. Lea l3th April, 1977. 
15 D. Lea to S. Davison 24di May, 1977. 
16 C. Reid to R. Spiller 21 st June, 1977. 
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1977 Davison wrote to Clive Jenkins, Roger Spiller and Campbell Reid that a 
letter should be expected any dayfrom Bill Reid confirming our right to agree 
recognition with Phillips with the blessing of the IUOOC ASTMS was not to 
seek sole negotiating rights because there was a possibility that EETPU could 
also recruit some members and so this was perhaps a minor victory for IUOOC 
whose EETPU representative may have insisted on this. It represented a sensible 
outcome because ASTMS achieved almost all that it wanted while IUOOC 
retained what it believed to be its legitimate authority in all North Sea industrial 
relations matters. That its authority was recognised is demonstrated in a letter of 
Roger Spiller in December 1977 when he submitted to Roger Lyons the 
proposed wording for a ballot paper to be issued to staff of Phillips Petroleum 
UK: Do you wish ASTMS on behaýr of IUOOC to be granted collective 
bargaining rights? " 
It had taken over a year for ASTMS to obtain the approval of its trade union 
confr6res for a recruitment drive in one company involved in natural gas 
reclamation. There now followed what can best be described as a game of 
industrial relations chess between the union and the company, the moves being 
made very slowly and the company's defence being difficult to penetrate. The 
union asks for recognition on the grounds that its numbers justify it but the 
company doubts this claim to significant membership; the union asks for a ballot 
of employees and the company refuses; the union threatens to ask the 
Department of Energy to intervene in its favour and the company concedes the 
ballot; the ballot shows that there are 35 members of ASTMS out of a staff of 77 
but the company refuses to accept the figure and seeks independent verification; 
Spiller, the Divisional Officer, agrees and offers to submit the union's Yarmouth 
branch register for independent scrutiny but Phillips Petroleum UK now insists 
that the ballot must include the company's on-shore employees as well, thus 
introducing a totally new element into the dispute. 
There was activity too at national as well as local level. Understandably 
impatient with the company's tactics Lyons, the union's National Officer, wrote 
to the Secretary of State for Energy, Tony Benn, requesting that he help to 
expedite the procedure for recognition. " Benn replied that he would let Phillips 
know his view that there should be a proper conclusion of the discussion about 
recognition on offshore platform. " Lyons acknowledged Benn's reply and added 
the information that one of the means by which Phillips hoped to prevent an 
agreement being reached was by making it almost impossible for union off Iccrs 
to visit offshore company platforms. " Within three weeks Lyons was again 
writing to Benn asking for his intervention on the grounds that the company was 
abusing the Memorandum on Access by seeking to include onshore personnel 
who were never referred to until the company had exhausted every other 
obstacle to recognition over a nearly two year period. " 
17 R. Spiller to R. Lyons 14th December, 1977. 
18 R. Lyons to T. Benn 22nd December, 1977. 
19 T. Berm to R. Lyons 13th January, 1978. 
20 P- Lyons to T. Benn 19th January, 1978. 
21 R. Lyons to T. Benn 10th February, 1978. 
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Meanwhile in East Anglia the industrial relations chess match had resumed. The 
company cannot understand the union's refusal to include onshore personnel in 
the ballot and the union continues to assert that it is offshore personnel alone 
who are the subject of this particular claim; the company will not agree that a 
vote for recognition of ASTMS is the same as a vote for the union to be granted 
full negotiating rights but the union replies that whatever may be the practice in 
the USA a vote for membership in the UK implies a desire for collective 
bargaining; ' the company informs its Hewett employees that a ballot on 
recognition for ASTMS has been arranged but questions the worth of any union 
involvement and ASTMS counters with leaflets explaining the value of union 
membership; a ballot takes place and the result is a victory for the union; the 
company accepts that it will enter into collective bargaining with the union. 
By August 1978 the company and the union had agreed a formula for negotiation 
rights. Thus the persistence of the union officers assisted by considerable 
prodding from the Secretary of State had achieved the ASTMS objective. On the 
other hand the number of employees concerned, about 80 at most, was dcrisory 
in relation to the amount of time expended by company and union officials, not 
to mention the Secretary of State for Energy. The union regarded the concession 
of negotiation rights by Phillips Petroleum UK as a victory for a principle to 
which the union movement was committed and hoped that it would be a 
forerunner of many other similar agreements offshore. Phillips was later to 
concede a negotiation agreement on its Maureen Field in the northern sector of 
the North Sea but it remained the only major oil company to do so. ASTMS was 
the most energetic of the trade unions in pursuit of recognition by oil companies 
but its subsequent agreements were purely representational and it never repeated 
its success with Phillips Petroleum UK. 
3 Inter-union Rivalry over Spheres of Influence 
One reason for the protracted negotiations over the ASTMS claim for 
negotiation rights on the Hewett Field had been what Stan Davison, Assistant 
General Secretary of the union, described as hurd1cs created within the 
movement. ' Disputes over rights to recruitment and representation have long 
been the bane of British trade unionism despite attempts to reduce them and the 
Inter Union Offshore Oil Committee was not immune from this form of 
pernicious anaernia. Even if the disease was not fatal it enfeebled the 
organization in ways which diminished its effectiveness. 
(a) ASTMS and Manual Worker Unions 
Signs of this had been exhibited in its first year of existence. Bill Reid had not 
included ASTNIS among the unions activc in offshorc recruitment when 
22 R. Spiller to M. R. Heffner, Hewett District Superintendent, Phillips Petroleum. 14th February, 
1978. 
23 S. Davison to C. Jenkins et al 5th August, 1977; conununication referred to at pp. 139/140 
supra. 
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interviewed for an article which appeared in the "Financial Times". " While this 
may well have been true, his comment was unwise because it suggested that 
ASTMS was not interested in membership offshore and almost immediately 
Campbell Reid was transferred to Aberdeen. Initially Campbell Reid had to 
struggle to secure recognition for himself and his union. " It will be recalled that 
in its first draft of the "Charter for the Unionisation of employees engaged in the 
Offshore Oil Industry within UK jurisdiction7' the IUOOC had attempted to 
specify spheres of influence for particular member unions. This had been to the 
liking of neither ASTMS, which had been ignored, nor NUS, which had been 
engaged in a dispute with TGWU over recruitment on semi- submersibles. There 
was thus no mention of spheres of influence in the final version of the Charter 
but the internal divisions brought about by the attempt wounded the credibility 
of the IUOOC at an early stage. "' 
The omission of any reference to spheres of influence in the Charter for 
Unionisation" and the grudging acceptance by IUOOC of the Dundee 
Kingsnorth agreement represented little more than an armistice in an inter-union 
war that came near to destroying the IUOOC. The attempt by Bill Reid to 
include spheres of influence in the Charter had been aimed at the avoidance of 
the demarcation disputes which had so often weakened union attempts to secure 
employer recognition. Indeed this had been one of the two prime purposes of 
establishing the IUOOC. At the meeting'& which had been convened on II th 
February, 1974 by the Aberdeen District Committee of the Confederation of 
Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions two decisions were made; one was the 
need for maximum co-operation between unions and the other was that spheres 
of influence ought to be decided regarding classes of labour organised by the 
respective unions. Bill Reid's attempt to include spheres of influence in the 
Charter for Unionisation can, therefore, be quite fairly interpreted as an attempt 
to fulfil a remit given by the CSEU to the lUOOC. He was unfortunate that the 
Dundee Kingsnorth incident was bubbling over when the Charter was being 
drafted but his clumsy attempt to cut ASTMS out of the North Sea simply added 
another union which opposed any pre-deten-nination of spheres of influence. 
Inter-union dissension was quiescent if not totally absent throughout 1976 but 
from the start of 1977 ASTMS and other IUOOC members were going at each 
other hammer and tongs. Campbell Reid suggested that, if a member union 
should reach with an employer a representational agreement where none 
previously existed, then the union should be allowed single union status. This 
immediately aroused the hostility of the manual worker unions" which, we learn 
from Campbell Reid's letter to Davison in February 1977, were adamant that 
there must be a sphere of influence agreement. When Reid asserted that no such 
24 v. Chapter Six, p. 103 supra. 
25 v. Chapter Six, p. 108 and Chapter Seven, p. 120 supra. 
26 v. account of the Dundee Kingsnorth incident at Chapter Seven p. 121 supra. 
27 This shortened title of the document will be used in future. 
28 v. Chapter Six, p. 101 supra. 
29 We know ftom a manuscript comment on Campbell Reid's lUOOC agenda that Jirruny 
McCartney of the Doilermakers' Society was his principal antagonist. 
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ageement had ever been accepted and was supported to some extent by the 
IUOOC Secretary, Bill Reid, the other union officersfell that ifI continued to be 
present they would not be prepared to sit down with me at any meetings with 
UKOOA and that ASTMS should be expelledfrom IUOOC. '* There seems little 
doubt that Campbell Reid was technically correct on the matter whereas the 
other union officers, particularly those of manual unions, believed that his 
outlook was contrary to the whole spirit of the IUOOC. 
Bill Reid went so far as to write to Clive Jenkins" to complain about the ASTMS 
policy of seeking to organize all personnel who come within the staff 
categorization, adding that IUOOC might as well disband if unity of purpose 
was not agreed. Jenkins disdained to answer in person and Davison replied 
somewhat curtly on his behalf telling Reid that the meeting of 23rd March" 
showed that it was not appropriatefor IUOOC to define spheres of influence. 
The disagreement over whether or not there were spheres of influence arose 
principally out of the very poor administrative practices of the IUOOC. A 
memorandum from Campbell Reid to Davison on 3rd March, 1977" makes this 
clear. He states that the meetings of IUOOC had been very informal and, infact, 
veryfew minutes have been issued, a matter which I have been trying to pursue 
for a some considerable time. Campbell Reid was accustomed to strict 
administrative practices and the informality of lUOOC meetings where 
important decisions were, apparently, not being minuted, must have been most 
frustrating. This short communication has two other interesting pieces of 
information. The first is that while he understood the spheres of influence on 
drilling rigs had been settled there was still no agreement on f"ed production 
pla(forms. Since this was where the bulk of offshore employment would now be 
found, it explains why each IUOOC member was anxious to recruit membership 
and why ASTMS was determined not to concede any ground to the manual 
unions. The second is that Reid mentions his union's policy of winner take all 
which had aroused the ire of other IUOOC members and was the subject of Bill 
Reid's letter of complaint to Clive Jenkins. " 
The attempt to push Campbell Reid and ASTMS to the periphery of trade 
unionism in the North Sea oil industry continued throughout the summer of 
1977. As Davison was to write to Clive Jenkins the truth is the other trade 
unions do not want us in this industry. " For example in May the National 
Maritime Union of America linkcd with dockworkers on the Scottish cast coast, 
the NUS and AIJEW to work for unionisation offshore and together formed a 
sub-committee of the IUOOC operating under the auspices of the International 
30 C. Reid to S. Davison 16th February, 1977. 
31 W. P. Reid to C. Jenkins 9th March, 1977. 
32 Davison was referring to the meeting of the TUC Fuel and Power Industries Committee. v. pp. 
137 &138 supra. 
33 Appendix L. 
34 v. supra. 
35 S. Davison to C. Jenkins 8th June, 1977. 
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Transport Federation. In letters"' to Davison, Reid complains that he was not 
invited to the first meeting of this sub-committee and that he had not yet been 
able to go offshore. In addition, he expressed his doubts about the wisdom of the 
IUOOC policy of being prepared to accept representation rights for individual 
member unions in the hope that this was just a preliminary step to securing full 
collective bargaining agreements at a later date. He was shrewd enough to see 
that this arose out of unjustified euphoria following the Memorandum on Access 
and events were to prove that his foresight was better than that of his IUOOC 
colleagues. 
It must not be implied that Campbell Reid was a querulous individual immersed 
in petty disputes on recruitment issues. He was doing no more than his duty by 
informing his superiors of the attitude taken to their union by the traditional 
manual unions. He was unrelenting in his pursuit of membership both onshore 
and offshore and in carrying out the normal duties of a trade union official 
towards all his members irrespective of their employment. By May 1978 he 
appears to have become more acceptable to the other union officers because he 
was one of a delegation of three IUOOC members who went to Stavanger, 
Bergen and Oslo to have discussions with Norwegian trade union officials. 
Relationships between the two Reids do not seem to have ever been easy for 
which Bill Reid must accept much of the blame on account of his less than 
welcoming attitude to the other when he arrived in Aberdeen. When later 
Campbell Reid himself became secretary of IUOOC, we find him writing a 
somewhat tart letter to his namesake complaining of not being informed about a 
visit to an oil company for what he believed (erroneously) to have been a 
recruitment visit and which, therefore, should have been arranged through 
IUOOC. As stated earlier in this chapter, Campbell Reid found Bill Reid's lax 
administration hard to tolerate and this, together with the wrangling between the 
unions, accounts for the virtual failure of IUOOC to achieve its principal 
objective, namely, the unionisation of offshore employees. In view of Campbell 
Reid's earlier complaints about the lack of consideration for his union from Bill 
Reid one cannot avoid being amused to read a letter of complaint from Bill Reid 
to his successor stating that it is nine months since he was offshore but your 
goodsetfhas a continuing presence on every visit. " 
(b) The British Seafarers Joint Council and the Inter-Union 
Offshore Oil Committee 
There can be little doubt that Bill Reid had hoped that the thorny question of 
spheres of influence would have been resolved at the meeting called by the FPIC 
of the TUC on 23rd March, 1977. Reference has already been made to this 
meeting in the section on the unionisation of Phillips Petroleum UK workers. 
Before the meeting David Lea sent out a useful background paper giving the 
main points which had arisen over the last three years when recruitment offshore 
had become an important enough issue to involve the govenimcnt in the person 
of the Secretary of State for Energy, employers as important as Sir Eric Drake of 
36 C. Reid to S. Davison 3rd and 15th June, 1977. 
37 W. P. Reid to C. Reid 18th October, 1982. 
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BP and the national officials of several trade unions. The principal purpose of the 
meeting was to advance the recruitment of offshore employees for which 
agreement on spheres of influence was a necessary preliminary. 
Almost nothing was determined to Bill Reid's satisfaction. Frank Chapple's 
anodyne concluding remarks where he threw back to the IUOOC the whole 
matter of spheres of influence have been quoted above. "' Worse, the discussions 
on recruitment of employees on semi-submersibles degenerated at one stage into 
a far from fraternal argument between NUS and TGWU, while the Engineering 
section of AUEW (a member of the British Seafarers Joint Council) suggested 
that difficulties might be resolved if national officers of the trade unions attended 
IUOOC meetings. The Dundee Kingsnorth incident" still rankled in Bill Reid's 
mind and he said that the classifications of BSJC, a national body, cut across the 
classifications of the IUOOC; for example many planned semi-submersible 
drilling rigs would not be self-propelled and, since their working environment 
would not be that of a ship, IUOOC had therefore allocated recruitment to 
TGWU. He did not relish the presence of representatives of BSJC (a national 
body) at meetings of IUOOC (a local body) and accused BSJC of impeding the 
efforts of his committee to extend trade union organization to all the companies 
involved in offshore exploration. 
The major conflict within the IUOOC was between the unions which were 
members of BSJC and those which were not. Participation in BSJC gave its 
member unions extra clout and another source of authority. Bill Reid, 
presumably acting as a TGWU officer rather than as secretary of IUOOC, 
continued to assert that there was every justification for his union to recruit 
employees on semi- submersibles and at a meeting of IUOOC and BSJC 
representatives argued the case for three hours only to find not a single IUOOC 
member supporting him. " By the end of 1977 there was also a third interested 
party - the Liaison Panel of UKOOA. When BSJC approached some oil 
companies asking for recognition of NUS and AUEW members, the Liaison 
Panel asked why the claim was not being made in accordance with "Guidelines 
through which Recognition may be Achieved", the agreement entered into 
between themselves and IUOOC in June 1977. " This agreement clearly 
stipulated that applications for recognition would be made by the IUOOC on 
behaý( of one or more member unions and yet here was another organization 
acting independently of IUOOC. It was not surprising that G. P. Hovcrkamp 
(Mobil), Chairman of the UKOOA Liaison Panel, wrote to Bill Reid expressing 
his members' disquiet at the incursion of BSJC into the negotiating field and 
saying that he thought IUOOC was the appropriate Trade Union body to the 
exclusion of others, to conduct discussions with UKOOA. " At an IUOOC 
meeting eleven days later the BSJC unions threatened to withdraw from IUOOC 
unless they got their way and so, faced with the alternative of disintegration or 
38 v. p. 139 supra. 
39 v. Chapter Seven, p. 121 supra. 
40 C. Reid to S. Davison 5th August, 1977. 
41 v. Chapter Seven, p. 127 supra. 
42 G. P. Hoverkamp to W. P. Reid 6th February, 1978. 
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acceptance of the BSJC position, the 1UOOC formally recognised semi- 
submersibles, drill ships and pipe laying barges as a BSJC sphere of influence. It 
was now established within 1UOOC that the responsibility for their member 
unions was henceforth restricted to production installations, 43 a position which 
Campbell Reid had earlier recognised as "de facto" if not "de jure". 
The whole credibility of IUOOC as a negotiating body was now at stake and one 
can sympathise with the position in which Bill Reid found himself, not least 
because he had opposed BSJC policy from the time of the Dundee Kingsnorth 
incident. One can sympathise also with Tony Benn who had persuaded the oil 
operators to reach this accommodation with the unions in the interests of sound 
employee relations within their industry and now learned that IUOOC, which 
was, after all, merely an alliance of trade union officials based in Aberdeen, had 
introduced a major amendment to the Agreement on Guidelines. He wrote to Bill 
Reid on 3rd March, 1978 reminding him that since the agreement was tri-partite 
in nature the IUOOC must secure the approval of UKOOA. Benn was a member 
of the Cabinet and must have been heartily sick of petty squabbling among 
unions to whom he and the Secretary of State for Employment had already given 
considerable support in their attempts to recruit members. Nevertheless he found 
time to write again to Reid" suggesting that in his negotiations with UKOOA he 
should stress that spheres of influence for both BSJC and IUOOC allowed an 
orderly approach to industrial relations offshore and that if U'KOOA was 
prepared to accept it then this letter could, therefore, be taken as an agreement 
that in future our Memorandum of Understanding of May 1976 should be 
interpreted in the sense that matters relating to mobile drilling rigs will be 
handled through BSJC. Reid communicated in this vein with UKOOA but the 
employers remained unhappy and indicated their displeasure to Benn, stating 
that they still preferred to have all negotiations with trade unions through 
IUOOC. In a conciliatory answer the Secretary of State said; I appreciate 
UKOOA's desire for all negotiations to be through one organisation and had 
myseýr hoped that the 1U00C would play that r6le, but now fear this is not 
possible. He then added the comment that if the r6les are distinguished it is not 
impossible to have sound agreements without discrepancies. " 
There was little else UKOOA and for that matter FPIC could do but accept what 
was in effect a "fait accompli". For IUOOC it was a defeat because its frailty had 
been exposed at the first real challenge to its authority within the trade union 
movement. For Bill Reid and his Transport and General Workers Union, 
however, it represented merely the temporary closurc of one avenue of 
recruitment to which they could return when circumstances were more 
favourable. 
An opportunity presented itself in 1980. Some TGWU members employed by 
South East Drilling Corporation (SEDCO) were transferred from production 
platforms to the company's semi-submersible rig H and sought recognition from 
W. P. Reid to T. Benn 17th February, 1978 and C. Reid to S. Davison 20th February, 1978. 
T. Benn to W. P. Reid 8th March, 1978. 45T. Benn. to G. Williamson, Chairman of UKOOA, 30th May, 1978. 
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SEDCO. Following preliminary discussions with the company Bill Reid asked 
Campbell Reid' to submit through lUOOC a claim for recognition and 
negotiating rights to SEDCO at the same time justifying this blatant breach of 
agreed policy on semi-submersibles on the ground that his members have 
attempted to force the issue. " Campbell Reid communicated with SEDCO"and 
subsequently a meeting was held between company representatives and the two 
Reids to discuss representation only, SEDCO having first made it absolutely 
clear that negotiating rights were not on the agenda. "' This meeting was soon 
known to BSJC which was furious and at a meeting of IUOOC in August its 
representatives refused to concede any ground to TGWU even although SEDCO 
had indicated a preference for TGWU. In a memorandum of 12th November, 
1980 " to Davison, the Assistant General Secretary of his own union, ASTMS, 
Campbell Reid sought advice on how he should act in this imbroglio. He feared 
that unless TGWU withdrew there would be a deterioration in the relationship 
within the IUOOC and he also wanted to ensure that as secretary of IUOOC he 
did not endorse any policy which was counter to that of ASTMS. Davison's 
advice was to seek the assistance of the TUC or STUC. " Meanwhile Bill Reid, 
who was now the chairman of IUOOC, had upset BSJC even further. In a letter 
to Campbell Reid, Jack Bromley, Chairman of BSJC Offshore Oil Committee 
complained that Bill Reid had justified TGWU recruitment on SEDCO by 
accusing the seafaring unions of lack of activity in organizing semi-submersibles 
in the North Sea. 52 
The issue had now become too great for lUOOC and so Campbell Reid, taking 
the advice of Davison, wrote to Bill Callaghan at the Economic Department of 
the TUC requesting the TUC to intervene in the BSJC/TGWU dispute. He asked 
for an early meeting because, as he said to Callaghan, he feared that TGWU 
would withdraw from IUOOC and consequently make that body lose 
credibility. " A meeting was arranged for 12th May, 1981 but it was postponed to 
4th June, 1981, which meant a five months delay. Present were Bill Reid, four 
representatives of BSJC unions, Campbell Reid and four TUC representatives, 
one of them, David Lea, taking the chair. 
At this meeting Bill Reid repeated his accusation that BSJC was ineffectual in 
recruiting offshore and claimed that his union now represented about half of all 
SEDCO employees. Warren Duncan of NUS, the BSJC union which felt most 
threatened by TGW`U, argued that semi-submersibles, drill ships, and pipelaying 
barges had been clearly defined as part of the BSJC unions' sphere of influence 
by the February 1978 agreement " and that seafaring unions did not know if 
TGWU aimed to extend its claim to organize not just on the SEDCO vessels 
46 Campbell Reid had been elected secretary of IUOOC in November 1979. 
47 W. P. Reid to C. Reid II th June, 19 80. 
49 C. Reid to F. James 18th June, 1980. 
49 F. James to C. Reid 20th June, 1980. 
0 Appendix M. 
1 S. Davison to C. Reid 19th November, 1980. 
52 J. Bromley to C. Reid 24th November, 1980. 
53 C. Reid to B. Callaghan 8th January, 198 1. 
54 Minutes of TUC Meeting of 4th June, 1981 on North Sea Oil Issues. Appendix N. 
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currently at issue but elsewhere as well. The poor recruitment results, added 
Duncan, were on account of the refusal of the oil companies to talk to his union. 
In a summary of the points raised at the meeting there was one which 
acknowledged the fundamental difficulty which was causing this inter-union 
fracas: it was recognised that the different constitutions of unions belonging to 
the IUOOC meant that there would be different arrangements for IUOOC 
members consulting their unions. Since there had been what the minute refers to 
as subsequent developments over the last three years the parties were advised to 
consider the scopefor elucidation ofthe February 1978 agreement in the light of 
these developments and were promised that the YTJC would use its good ofji'ces 
tojacilitate the achievement ofthis elucidation. 
Somewhat surprisingly this elucidation was achieved. By October 1981 an 
agreement called The Joint Statement of Intent on Recruitment on Semi- 
Submersible Rigs - the UK trade unions are fond of using the language of inter- 
national diplomacy - was ready for the signatures of both BSJC and IUOOC. " 
Employees within the category of "marine personnel" were reserved for BSJC 
while other personnel were open to recruitment by other IUOOC unions. In 
January 1982 Campbell Reid infonned SEDCO that the dispute had been 
resolved and that the IUOOC was to be one channel through which discussions 
on recognition were to take place. "' One month later there was still no response 
from SEDCO, 57 which may well have forgotten about a claim that originated 
almost two years earlier and since there is no further correspondence on the 
matter it must be left to conjecture whether TGWU obtained a representation 
agreement with the company. On the other hand we know that SEDCO never 
even entertained the possibility of entering into any relationships with the 
National Union of Seamen, the BSJC member with the greatest interest in 
recruitment of "marine personnel". 
The dispute over rights to recruitment on scmi-submcrsiblcs had continued for 
about five years before it was settled through TUC intervention with tile type of 
sensible solution which IUOOC had been established to work out for itself. As in 
the protracted negotiations concerning the ASTIVIS claim for recognition by 
Phillips Petroleum UK, the number of employees over whom BSJC and TGWU 
had wrangled for so long was tiny in relation to the total offshore workforce. 
Worse, the degree of inter-union rancour engendered by the lengthy dispute was 
high and consequently enervating. By 1982, when the conflagration finally died 
down, the IUOOC had shown itself to be a weak and pallid creature, its members 
more interested in scoring points over each other than in directing their energies 
towards the recruitment of offshore employees and thus becoming an 
organization which the oil industry could treat with contumely if not contempt. 
" C. Reid to J. Bromley 8th October, 198 1. 
56 C. Reid to F. James 27th January, 1982. 
57 C. Reid to W. P. Reid 25th February, 1982. 
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(c) Professional Divers and Industrial Action 
Without divers there would be no North Sea oil stated S. A. Warner who was 
Chief Inspector of Diving at the Department of Energy from 1974 to 1985. " 
This is a somewhat exaggerated claim but without the services of divers it would 
have been impossible to establish the oil industry in the North Sea as we know it 
today. Divers are needed when platforms are being commissioned and for their 
maintenance when they are in operation. They were certainly well remunerated 
in the years of exploration and there was a joke in common currency about their 
alleged wealth. "What do divers do when they are decompressing? They count 
their money". This masks the reality of a profession which commands high 
financial rewards on account of its high skill content and the dangers inherent in 
the work. In September 1987 Cecil Parkinson, Secretary of State for Energy, 
opened the National Hyperbaric Centre in Aberdeen to assist divers to recover 
from nitrogen narcosis (colloquially "bends"), which can often happen when a 
diver returns from operating over 150 feet below the surface and decompression 
is too rapid. " 
There are no reliable statistics on diving until 1971 but 55 divers were killed in 
the North Sea oil and gas industry between that year and 1984. This was a high 
proportion in relation to the numbers employed and was one of the reasons for 
setting up the Burgoyne Committee. " Divers are not militant although they are a 
very cohesive and tightknit working group. One of them told the writer Alvarez 
that they were an exclusive club and once you join it there aren't too many 
alternatives for you. "' Yet this cohesion was not extended to common 
membership of one union because about 500 were members of ABPD (the 
Association of British Professional Divers ) while NUS claimed another 1,000. 
In October 1979 Hamish Gray, the Minister of State at the Department of 
Energy, met an IUOOC delegation in London to discuss relationships between 
the employers and the divers. Warner, Chief Inspector of Diving, was present 
and this was the first occasion when a minister in the new government (the 
Conservative Party had been returned to power in a general election in June) 
made it clear that if any disputes broke out in the North Sea oil industry the 
government would not intervene. 71e Ministcr stated that in the event of an 
industrial dispute, his Ministry would not get involved. " 
Divers were involved in a flurry of disputes in the mid-1980s. Divers and their 
support personnel on the Ninian Northern platform went on strike in May 1983, 
primarily to publicise a grievance. Chevron, their employer, simply dismissed 
them summarily and had them flown onshore. Exactly a year later ABPD 
members carried out a general 48 hour strike that deserves mention purely on 
account of the novel method which the men used to communicate with each 
other. Wives and girl friends sent coded messages ostensibly giving 
3g Warner, J. and Park F., (1990) Requiem for a Diver, p. 12. Brown, Son and Ferguson, 
Glasgow. 
" The centre also carries out research on the medical aspects of diving. 
60 v. Chapter II infra. 
61 Alvarez, A. (1986) A Reporter at Large - Offshore 11. The New Yorker, January 1986, p. 79. 62 Minute of meeting of lUOOC, 18th October, 1979. 
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arrangements for a reunion party when in fact the date and time of the 
forthcoming strike were conveyed. This otherwise unimportant example of 
industrial action illustrates the type of stratagem initiated by workers when they 
are offshore and want to discuss employment issues privately with colleagues 
either onshore or on other installations. 
By 1985 ABPD realised that the union was too small and its members too thinly 
dispersed across the North Sea to make any impact upon employers. They 
therefore had themselves certificated as an independent union and sought an 
alliance with ASTMS. Campbell Reid offered them limited assistance but since 
ABPD was not an affiliate of the TUC and therefore not a member of IUOOC he 
made it clear that his union could not represent ABPD members as if their union 
had amalgamated with his. Reid's offer was little more than a helping hand but it 
incensed Warren Duncan, his NUS opposite number who was also at the time the 
IUOOC chairman. Duncan wrote to the Norwegian union, NOPEF, asking the 
Norwegians to have nothing to do with ABPD. A somewhat bemused Lars 
Myhre, general secretary of NOPEF, replied to Duncan saying that he could not 
understand why NUS was insisting that its relationship with NOPEF was 
dependent upon NOPEF having no relationship with ABPD. He reminded 
Duncan that ABPD was also associated with the National Maritime Union (a 
USA union) and, like NOPEF and NUS, was a member of the International 
Federation of Transport Unions. "' This storm in a very small teacup was resolved 
through the good sense of Campbell Reid who managed to placate Duncan by 
telling Myhre that any assistance given to ABPD by ASTMS would be very 
limited in its nature. " As it happened ABPD was soon to merge with EETPU 
(Electronic, Electrical, Telecommunications and Plumbing Union) and the NUS, 
which was virtually bankrupt by 1989, formed with other transport unions the 
new National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers in 1990. 
Only one diver perished on Piper Alpha and he was a visiting consultant, not one 
of a group directly employed by the operator. This group, it has been suggested, "' 
survived because the mutual dependence of divers which is a characteristic of 
their profession, had led them to prepare their own preplanned escape route, 
which they followed instead of the official procedure. This cohesiveness of 
divers contrasts with the independent nature of each diver's psyche and thus 
makes them interesting subjects for psychologists. " They are not traditional trade 
unionists and, while their impact on industrial relations has been tiny, even that 
was an unintended contribution to the inter-union disputes which have prevented 
organized labour achieving its aspirations offshore. 
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4 Memorandum on Access : the False Dawn of Offshore Trade Unionism 
Government intervention to assist the trade unions in their relationships with the 
North Sea oil and gas industry had culminated in the Memorandum on Access 
and the Guidelines on Recognition. In view of employer suspicion if not 
outright hostility to trade unionism this had been a considerable achievement and 
it was perfectly reasonable for Tony Benn and other government ministers to 
consider that since they had played their part in honouring the social contract it 
was now up to the unions to pursue their objectives offshore without much 
further assistance. As stated earlier" the concessions wrung from the industry 
promised more than they were ever to deliver and by the mid-1980s the initial 
euphoria of the trade union officials had given way to near pessimism and 
perfunctory attendance to offshore matters often became the nonn. In part this 
was because trade unionism as a whole, especially manual worker trade 
unionism, had begun to suffer a severe haemorrhage of membership, a problem 
which was more important to address than recruitment of a limited number of 
new members offshore. Principally, however, it was employer hostility to the 
whole concept of trade unionism and despite the Memorandum on Access there 
was a deliberate policy to prevent any encroachment of trade unionism onto 
offshore installations. One form of this policy was to weed out trade unionists at 
interviews as in the case of British National Oil Corporation when it was 
recruiting for the Beatrice installation and the Clyde platform between 1982 and 
1984. 
Interviewers were instructed to ask each applicant if he was a member ofa trade 
union, what he thought of trade unions and whether he would be keeping on his 
membership. This was an attempt to prevent recruitment of militants and, of 
course, applicants soon learned that it was politic to declare no interest in 
unions. It seems probable that about 80% of the technicians retained 
membership but thefigure was lowerfor operators, who were rccruitedfrom a 
very wide background and included a large number who had never been 
61 unionists anyway. 
Some account of the efforts to recruit offshore following the Memorandum on 
Access will now be given to show the problems which confronted the trade 
union officials and accounted for their lack of success. It will be useful to start 
with some comments selected from a discussion entitled "North Sea 
Unionisation" in the World this Weekend, a BBC Radio 4 current affairs 
programme broadcast on 28th May, 1978 69 to coincide with the second 
anniversary of the agreement on the Memorandum on Access. In addition to the 
presenter, Gordon Clough, the participants were Bill Reid (TGWU), Harry 
Bygate (NUS), three unidentified offshore workers, Peter Page (Personnel 
67 v. Chapter Seven. 
68 This information was supplied to the author by a former personnel manager of BNOC. 
61 The author listened to this programme and made notes for use in his lectures on industrial 
relations. 
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Director, Shell UK Ltd), Nicholas Jones (a journalist) and, in a studio elsewhere, 
the Secretary of State for Energy, Tony Benn. 
Jones began by predicting that there would be industrial strife offshore because 
despite the steadily increasing number of employees unions had won bargaining 
rights on only five out of 35 exploration rigs and four out of 50 oil and gas 
platforms. " Reid said that the employers preferred a non- union situation while 
the three oil workers said that they were not interested in trade unionism and 
rejected the union demarcation divisions then common onshore. Jones thereupon 
introduced a related matter. The Secretary of State had originally intervened in 
order to persuade oil companies to allow officials onto their installations and 
more recently the government had made this a condition of their granting all new 
North Sea exploration licences. 
Page answered that point as follows: The pace of negotiation is dictated by the 
employees themselves. If our employees werefeeling in exactly the same way as 
Mr Benn, no doubt Mr Benn would not befeeling this way because we would 
have reacted slightly differently. 
Jones came back with his prediction of the near inevitability of strikes offshore. 
On Shell's Wildcat rig a strike of the caterers had been avoided only because the 
contractor had increased pay and recognised the right of NUS to negotiate. This 
allowed an opening for Bygate who claimed his union was now negotiating the 
first offshore catering agreement in the North Sea and that it would serve as the 
basis for all other agreements with offshore catering contractors. He concluded 
this contribution to the debate with words drawn from the primaeval, swamp of 
trade unionist vocabulary: and God help thefirms that don't want to come if? and 
talk to the unionsfrom then on. 
In response to a question from Jones about whether the government should 
intervene directly on the side of trade unions Benn had this to say: Oh, 
absolutely. One of the strongest cases is, of course, safety. 771e key r6le of trade 
unions, even ahead of wage negotiations, is to see that safety regulations are 
properly carried through. Jones put another question to the Secretary of State for 
Energy: Ry are you trying to quicken the pace towards union recognition 
rather than leaving it to the unions themselves? Benn replied: Well, many of 
these companies have operated in the Middle East, where they have been dealing 
with Arab workers, or maybe in Venezuela and the attitude of some of the oil 
companies in the past, world-wide, has been very primitive. I dont think you 
would have imagined one of the big American companies would have thought of 
trade unions in Saudi Arabia. 
These excerpts from the broadcast illustrate four separate attitudes towards the 
organization of employees offshore; those of the trade unions, the employers, the 
employees, and the senior member of the goverrunent concerned with the 
industry. Two years after the Memorandum on Access had been agreed Bill Reid 
70 He did not say which they were nor the nature of the bargaining arrangements. 
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is already exhibiting some doubts about the possibility of success and Bygate 
utters threats in the language of a trade unionism that is fast becoming dated; 
Page gives the measured rational comment of a man who knows that his industry 
is in control of the situation; the contributions of the three workers explain the 
pessimism of Reid and the understandable disinclination of the employers to 
concern themselves with an issue which is not interesting their employees; Benn 
retains his messianic approach to trade unionism offshore, which has been a 
hallmark of his tenure of office. 
Why had so little progress been made over two years by the trade unions in their 
quest for greater membership and recognition rights offshore? The short answer 
is that too few employees saw any need for a trade union and their employers 
were not going to dissuade them from that point of view. While there was never 
any overt hostility to trade unionism by the oil companies it would be correct to 
say that they adhered formally to the letter of the Memorandum on Access rather 
than to its spirit (as argued in greater detail in a previous chaptei"). 
It all appeared rather different in the summer of 1976. The Memorandum of 
Understanding on Trade Union Access to Offshore Installations seemed a 
passport to a land of opportunity. The far left wing Aberdeen People's Press 
rushed out a pamphlet' in which it stated the unionisation of the North Sea is 
inevitable. The more cautious Campbell Reid wrote to his union's National 
Officer that there was a membership to fight for now that access offshore was 
assured. " He also advised Bill Reid to convene an early meeting of IUOOC 
because unions should start immediately to demand facilities to recruit offshore 
and not allow things tofall back. ' Campbell Reid himself moved quickly and 
went offshore in August to the BP installation on Forties Field. 
It is significant that he had to report7' that about 150 of the 200 employees were 
contractors' men and that there was little interest among BP employees. Thus at 
an early stage in the history of the North Sea oil industry trade union officers 
were already having to confront another obstacle which would continue to 
impede recruitment offshore, the growing preponderance of contractors' 
employees compared with the oil companies' own direct employees. Many of the 
contractors' employees were former sea-going marine engineers, who had 
accepted lower rates of pay than were current in the merchant marine in favour 
of a more regular family life. 
Other trade union officers experienced similar disappointments and by January 
1977, a mere seven months after the Memorandum on Access had been agreed, 
Bill Reid was complaining to Tony Benn that the oil companies regarded it as 
only a public relations exercise and that managements make it clear to the 
71 v. Chapter Seven, pp. 124-128. 
72 1976 Oil overTroubled Waters. Aberdeen People's Press. 
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employees that their industry cannot afford to be involved with trade unions. ' In 
this same letter Reid asked the Secretary of State for Energy why Her Majesty's 
Government, which held a majority of control in some fields, could not take the 
initiative to involve trade unions for the legitimate expression of the workforce 
in a truly meaningful way and, further, requested him to chair a meeting of 
representatives of Shell Exploration and Production (who were considered to be 
among the more intransigent of the employers) and IUOOC. Benn declined. On 
the 18th January, 1977 there was the first official meeting of the Liaison Panel of 
UKOOA and IUOOC. 7' All ten unions of IUOOC were represented and the 
Liaison Panel of UKOOA was represented by seven of the largest oil companies 
operating in the North Sea. The Liaison Panel made it clear to IUOOC - as it 
would have to do on many subsequent occasions - that it was not a negotiating 
body. 7" There was one item on the agenda which drew into sharp relief the 
different perspectives of the two bodies towards employee representation. This 
was the question of consultative committees which the oil companies had 
established on most of their installations; the IUOOC saw them as a device to 
inhibit the development of trade union activity whereas the Liaison Panel 
considered them to be the normal medium of communication between a 
company and its employees. Twenty years on from that first meeting the 
consultative committees remain and attract the same comments from employer 
and trade union. 
Throughout 1977 some visits were arranged and did take place but the results 
were almost universally disappointing for the trade unions. Campbell Reid told 
Davison that Shell was messing us around" and nothing came of a request from 
Davison to David Lea that the TUC should assist in obtaining more frequent 
access to installations. "O It must be remembered that simultaneously with this 
problem of access to offshore installations there were in progress the bitter inter- 
union dispute over spheres of influence and the unseemly squabble between 
IUOOC and BSJC, both of which were already occupying a lot of TUC time. " 
A few representational agreements were won but no negotiation rights. The 
unions at one point tried to extend negotiation rights to other Shell installations 
on the ground that such an agreement had existed for some time on the drilling 
rig Stadrill. ACTSS, the white collar section of TGWU, had made a claim for 
negotiating rights on the Shell platform Brent Delta and, replying to Bygate as 
secretary of IUOOC, the company laid down with brutal clarity its policy in 
respect of union claims to negotiate tcrrns and conditions of employment. It 
included the following statement which was similar in content to replies given to 
trade unions by other oil companies which had been and were to be approached 
76 W. P. Reid to Tony Denn, 14th January, 1977. 
77 it will be appropriate to mention at this point that soon it became the custom for the lUOOC 
on a day assigned for discussions with the Liaison Panel of the UKOOA to meet in the morning 
and discuss matters which it would raise with the Liaison Panel of the U'KOOA at the joint 
meeting in the afternoon. 7lic groups lunched together. 78 v. Chapter Six, p. 105 supra. 79 C. Reid to S. Davison, 12th May, 1977. 
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on the subject of recognition: any claimfor a negotiating agreement could not be 
made in respect ofa singleplatform or unit, or combination ofplaybrm or units, 
but would have to embrace all such platforms and operational and production 
units (including Spar Buoy). The only exception to the foregoing would be in 
respect of the drilling rig Stadrill which would continue to be regarded as an 
entity in its own right for both representational and, should it be appropriate 
later, negotiating purposes. " This was how Shell and other companies had 
decided to interpret and use the term "common interest group" which appears in 
the third and fourth clause of the Guidelines Through Which Recognition May 
Be Achieved agreed between IUOOC and UKOOA Liaison Panel in June 1977, 
the weaknesses of which agreement from the trade union aspect have already 
been discussed in Chapter Five. 
By the end of 1979, although trade union officials continued to make forays 
offshore in search of members, there is more than a touch of defeatism in the 
correspondence of the union officers. Campbell Reid refers to agreements of a 
limited nature in a letter to LO in Norway " and ten days later outlines for his 
National Officer, Roger Lyons, the difficulties faced in trying to interest offshore 
workers in trade unionism. " 
Over a year later Reid informed Lyons that there was no concrete improvement 
on recruitment either onshore or offshore' and in February 1981 had to report 
that, despite a visit offshore, not a single recruitment form had been returned 
from Shell's Brent Field. Yet Campbell Reid was the most vigorous of the 
Aberdeen based trade union officers and ASTMS took the major share of what 
new members were recruited. 
Throughout the 1980s union officers continued to pursue what was becoming a 
lost cause although they were now without the support of Tony Berm who had 
followed an interventionist policy in his attempts to persuade the oil companies 
to accept trade unions as industrial partners. It was now government policy that 
recognition offshore was a matter entirely for the unions and the employers. 
Berm's successor, Nigel Lawson, delegated to his Minister of State, Hamish 
Gray, the employee relationship aspects of the oil and gas industry and although 
Gray and Campbell Reid were always on good terms Gray was not prepared to 
put his departmental weight behind trade union aspirations offshore. In 1982 the 
IUOOC sought the aid of the Secretary of the Trades Union Congress, Lcn 
Murray, who complained to the Secretary of State for Energy that trade union 
ofji'cials designated by the Inter-Union Offshore Oil Committee have been 
confronted with delays and obstructions which are undoubtedly ill breach of the 
Memorandum of Understanding signed in 1976. After raising some other 
complaints, including the charge that Mobil was hiring union-avoidance 
consultants Murray concluded by asking whether the Memorandum of 
82 D. M. Fraser, Administration Manager, Shell UK Exploration and Production to I I. Bygatc, 
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Understanding has been unilaterally abrogated by the UKOOA or the 
Government or both. " The Secretary of State replied that there was no question 
of the government withdrawing from the terms of the Memorandum of 
Understanding which he hoped would continue to operate satisfactorily for all 
the parties involved and that he agreed with the comment of his Minister of State 
in an earlier letter to Campbell Reid" that ifarrangements were going wrong, we 
would share the concern expressed and I reiterate this now. " This response to 
the Secretary of the TUC was a courteous but straight denial of Murray's 
allegations that access to installations was being impeded by employer 
intransigence. The government just did not want to become embroiled in 
offshore industrial relations and this was finally made clear in 1985 when Alec 
Buchanan-Smith, who had succeeded Gray as Minister of State, refused to 
intervene in disputes between IUOOC and oil operators. "' 
Relationships between company and union representatives nevertheless never 
broke down completely and in purely personal terms remained cordial. Views 
were exchanged at meetings of the IUOOC and the Liaison Panel of the UKOOA 
and a useful rapport often grew over time between particular union officials and 
employer representatives who met there and on other occasions. On the other 
hand employers never proffered any assistance on recruitment other than 
arranging offshore visits and, as shown above, met with adamantine refusal any 
suggestion that negotiating rights might be discussed. To illustrate the tactics 
employed by both union and company when a recognition issue was set in train, 
we can look at how the Phillips Petroleum Company dealt with the matter. " 
Early in July 1984 Campbell Reid wrote, as secretary of IUOOC, to Jim 
Cheetharn the Administration Manager of Phillips Petroleum, asking for a 
meeting to discuss trade union representation on the company's Maureen 
platform. Cheetharn replied on the last day of August agreeing to a meeting but 
informing Reid that his company had held meetings on Maureen with their 
employees who had made it clear that they did not want to be represented by any 
IUOOC signatory union. Reid responded in late September suggesting a meeting 
with Cheetharn at the end of October or early in November. (Reid was not being 
dilatory; he had to attend the annual meetings of the TUC and tile Labour Party 
which take place in September and October. ) There was a meeting with 
Cheetharn in November where no progress was made and shortly after that Reid 
asked for a visit to be arranged to Maureen and to Glomar Arctic 11, where there 
had been an accident. Cheetharn replied towards the end of January 1985 that the 
accident was not remotely concerned with the operational activities on the 
Maureen plaVorm and consequently of no direct concern to the employees. In 
the summer of 1985 Reid again raised the issue of trade union rcprescntation 
96 L. Murray to N. Lawson, II th November, 1982. Appendix Q. 
87 H. Gray to C. Reid, 21 st June, 1982. Appendix R. 
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with Cheetharn who again asserted that the employees were not interested. The 
IUOOC still wanted a meeting about Maureen and Reid wrote to Cheetham, in 
December only to be asked what was the purpose of the meeting. At the end of 
February 1986 Reid told Cheetharn that the purpose was to discuss a possible 
Common Interest Group and how Phillips intend to comply with the 
UKOOAIIUOOC Memorandum of Understanding on Recognition. A meeting 
was arranged for May. Before that there was a UKOOA Liaison Panel/IUOOC 
quarterly meeting in March at which the unions complained that Phillips 
Petroleum and two other oil majors were refusing to discuss the criteria for 
recognition on their installations and that this contravened UKOOA's obligations 
under the Memorandum. LJKOOA answered in its now time-honoured way that 
it had no control over individual companies. When Ian McFarlane (AEU), now 
Chairman of IUOOC, and Reid met Cheetharn and other Phillips representatives 
recognition was again discussed after which the IUOOC reported that Phillips 
Petroleum had agreed to declare the criteria it would apply in recognition issues. 
Cheetham. refuted this and again said that the Phillips Petroleum employees on 
Maureen did not want a trade union. Two days later at the June quarterly meeting 
of UKOOA Liaison Panel/IUOOC the unions complained that Phillips was not 
being co-operative on recognition. 
The action now moved to a higher level. On 6th June, 1986 Reid wrote to J. 
Pierson, Employee Relations Director of Phillips Petroleum claiming that both 
he and McFarlane had left the meeting with the clear understanding that the 
company had agreed to representational and bargaining rights and that they 
wanted this confirmed in writing. Somewhat uncharacteristically the usually 
diplomatic Reid threatened that unless Pierson replied within ten days the matter 
would be pursued through other (unspecified) channels. Pierson resented the tone 
of the communication adding I would not cause any unnecessary delay in 
responding to you but he invited McFarlane and Reid to discuss the issue with 
him in London. Little seems to have been achieved by the trade union 
representatives because in November Reid wrote to Pierson saying that he had 
heard nothing from him since their meeting. Reid had twice been out to Maurcen 
and asked for another meeting with Pierson in January 1987. Pierson did not 
reply until January and then only to say that he was leaving the matter to be 
handled locally. It happened that a letter from Reid crossed Pierson's in the post 
and this communication might well have been wordcd even more strongly than it 
was had Reid first received Pierson's rebuff courteous. Reid asked why he had 
not had a reply to his letter of November and warned that he was going to raise 
the matter with the TUC. I can only take itfrom this (presumably the lack of a 
reply) that the company are intent on placing every possible barrier in the way 
of the Trade Unions. A few days later Cheetham, obviously informed by Pierson 
that the matter had been returned for him to deal with, asked Reid to arrange a 
meeting with him and a day in late April was agrecd. This mccting made no 
difference to the Phillips Petroleum policy on recognition of trade unionism and 
apart from the company regularly appearing on IUOOC minutes as one of the 
more recalcitrant employers as regards union recognition we hear no more about 
the claim until May 1988. At a meeting of the IUOOC that month there is a 
minute to the effect that there has been no response from Phillips Petroleum for 
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requests for preliminary discussions on recognition. Eight weeks later came the 
Piper Alpha tragedy and both unions and employers had their agenda 
dramatically altered. " 
The discussions with Phillips Petroleum on the possibility of recognition of trade 
unions on one platform began in July 1984 and lasted for four years. They 
started with a request by the IUOOC for a meeting on recognition and four years 
later absolutely nothing had been achieved. There is an almost plaintive cry in 
May 1988 that there have been no responses from Phillips Petroleum and other 
companies to requests for just those same preliminary discussions which IUOOC 
had sought from Phillips nearly four years earlier. The experience of IUOOC 
with other companies such as Shell, Chevron and Mobil was different in detail 
but similar in the tactics used by the employer and in the final result. Even 
allowing for a union claim to be discussed by company staff this alone cannot 
account for gaps of several weeks before replies were sent, which suggests that 
these delays may have been deliberate and intended to draw out the discussions 
beyond a point when employees, and perhaps even trade unions, would maintain 
any interest. The attitude of all oil operators towards any form of recognition was 
what the IUOOC minute of July 1987 describes as totally obstructive. A few 
representational agreements were gouged out of some employers where there 
was union membership above the normal for an offshore installation but these 
were the exception and were very far indeed from conferring the leverage which 
a negotiation agreement gave to trade unions and without which unions were of 
little consequence to an employer. 
It is far from surprising that the trade unions by the middle 1980s were 
thoroughly disillusioned with both the Memorandum of Understanding on Trade 
Union Access to Offshore Installations and the Guidelines Through Which 
Recognition May Be Achieved. This is reflected in the minutes of tile lUOOC 
and by March 1988 the Memorandum on Access was declared by the IUOOC 
representatives at their quarterly meeting with the Liaison Panel of the UKOOA 
to be totally worthless. To a great extent the unions were the authors of their own 
misfortunes. A close study of the Guidelines should have made it clear to any 
competent trade union officer that this agreement was more likely to be a barrier 
to trade union recognition than an aid. The explanation for this apparent 
uncritical acceptance of the Guidelines by the trade unions lies in the general 
belief among trade union- officials that once the question of access to offshore 
installations had been settled in their favour recruitment would be simply a 
matter of signing up willing employees. This done, the Guidelines could apply to 
their advantage or, if recruitment was particularly high on certain installations, 
the more difficult clauses could be breached. After all these two agreements were 
reached during a period in industrial relations history when trade unions were 
still increasing in membership and political power. The oil industry was, 
however to prove that it was very different from tile industries with which 
British trade unions had been accustomed to deal and since recruitment offshore 
91 Mr Cheetharn's account of the ASTMS attempt to secure Official recognition by Phillips 
Petroleum Company on Maureen is given in Appendix S. 
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was so paltry the companies were able to develop their own industrial relations 
policies. These were founded upon direct employee-management 
communications by means of consultative committees? ' which dispensed with 
the need for any third party such as a trade union. 
5 Offshore Catering 
Since there are few social activities available on an offshore installation, meals 
there are an important feature of an employee's life. This is recognised by the oil 
companies and, although the veritable haute cuisine of the early days of 
exploration is now only a memory, if not a legend, employers know that good 
food and comfortable sleeping accommodation contribute significantly to job 
satisfaction. For this reason the oil companies have always played a direct but 
covert r6le in the industrial relations of their catering contractors. 
Contracts are awarded by competitive tender and usually last for two years with 
an option of another year. Catering is a highly labour intensive industry and the 
manpower budget is seldom below 50% of total costs. Two studies" have shown 
that collective bargaining is a feature of labour intensive industries since it 
provides a measure of stability through regulation of wage rates and reduction of 
labour turnover. The catering industry does not differ from other labour intensive 
firms and the TGWU had enjoyed full negotiating rights in most industrial 
catering organizations by the time oil was discovered offshore. Nevertheless, 
when the oil industry first sought tenders for contracts the catering firms did not 
enter into discussions with trade unions on pay and conditions of employment. 
Perhaps this was because the caterers feared that any form of recognition might 
damage their prospects with clients known to be averse to trade unionism. More 
probably, it was because their first aim was to win contracts from a wealthy 
industry and the niceties of negotiating rates of pay for offshore work were 
ignored. Some companies recruited Spanish and Portuguese ivorkers for whom 
offshore catering pay was attractive. In a report to the Department of Energy in 
January 1978 Bill Reid stated that the catering companies feared that a 
unionised labour force will affect their prospects of gaining and holding 
contracts, especially where the competition from companies employing Spanish 
and Portuguese nationals threatens their prosperity. " The result was that by 
1978 offshore contract catering was exhibiting all the signs of an industry out of 
control with labour turnover between 150% and 300% per annum and almost any 
person willing to work offshore being recruited. Inevitably this resulted in a 
deterioration in the standard of the service which the clients were entitled to 
expect and in demands by the trade unions (TGWU and NUS) for negotiating 
rights to be extended offshore. 
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93 Flanders, A. (1968) Collective Bargaining: a Theoretical Analysis. British Journal of 
Industrial Relations V1. Beaumont, P. and Gregory, M. (1980) The R61c of the Employer in 
Collective Bargaining Industrial Relations Journal X 1. 
" W. P. Reid: second quarterly report to Department of Energy, 23rd January, 1978. 
160 
This prompted the oil companies to intervene. There had already been a threat of 
a strike by catering staff on the Shell Wildcat rig which had been averted only 
because the contractor agreed to increase levels of pay and to grant full 
negotiating rights to the NUS. The union leader had warned that his union would 
seek to extend this agreement to all other offshore catering contractors. " The oil 
companies did not want to surrender any industrial relations initiative to the trade 
unions and they were also aware of another factor which might possibly lead to 
this. The Industrial Training Act (1964) was still in force and this gave certain 
statutory powers to the various Industrial Training Boards which included the 
Hotel and Catering ITB. All ITBs had trade union representation on their 
governing bodies and consequently the oil companies were anxious to ensure 
that their catering contractors did not fall foul of the ITB. " The oil operators 
therefore saw that it was in their interests to persuade the catering firms to form 
themselves into the Catering Offshore Trade Association (COTA). This 
organization established four grades of employee; steward, leading steward, 
baker and chef. Minimum rates for these grades were established and though it 
was never made public the rates were set by the client companies. Oddly for oil 
companies but done entirely "sub rosa". the caterers were encouraged to discuss 
pay and conditions with the relevant unions and thus collective bargaining was 
introduced into one part of the oil industry. 
The operators let it be known that once standardised wages and conditions had 
been reached they would ensure that contracts would be awarded only to 
contractors who observed what came to be called COTA conditions. The larger 
oil companies as a rule limited to four the number of tenders each was prepared 
to consider and seldom gave any indication of what they regarded as an 
acceptable price; it was up to the caterers to work out a cost appropriate to 
themselves but incorporating the COTA conditions as regards their employees. 
This intervention in the affairs of another industry is less surprising when one 
looks at the terms of reference of UKOOA's Employment Practices Committee. 
Number 4 reads: To encourage major contractors engaged in workfor member 
companies to ensure a reasonable degree of uniformity in terms and conditions 
of employment. This was the practice of the oil companies in the case of contract 
catering and, if it required some recognition of trade unions at second hand, that 
was acceptable provided it was not a stepping stone into the oil industry itself. 
Thus the oil companies brought stability to contract catering and with it the 
standard of service which they required. They never once allowed themselves to 
be caught in a position where their manipulation of the COTA rate attracted a 
direct approach from a union which was negotiating wages and conditions with 
representatives of the contract caterers. 
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Manipulation is not too strong a word to use in this circumstance. Dr Alix Thom 
was told in the course of her research in the mid-1980s that during one annual 
negotiation between employers and unions the person leading the employers' 
side was telephoned by a representative of the operators, who gave instructions 
on the terms of offer the caterers should make to the unions. " COTA had the 
attributes more of a club than of an employers' organization. Some COTA firms 
had no union members - and consequently no union agreements - while others 
had trade union memberships varying from 25% to 65% among their 
employees. " One catering company recognised TGWU and was prepared to 
discuss with it any business other than remuneration. At the annual negotiations 
on wages and conditions COTA did not negotiate as a body with the trade unions 
but was represented by delegates, usually from the larger catering firms which 
had union members. It was just understood that the pay and conditions of service 
which emerged from the annual negotiation would apply across the whole 
industry. Neither COTA nor the oil companies ever acknowledged that there was 
such a thing as the COTA rate. For example, in the course of negotiations on pay 
in 1986, UKOOA refused a request by TGWU that it issue a press release stating 
its member companies would not accept catering bids unless they were based on 
the COTA rate. 
This unusual structure did not make it at all easy for the trade unions to 
represent their members. In addition, the TGWU had a particular internal 
difficulty in the late 1970s because current union policy was to delegate 
authority to shop stewards and in offshore catering they were scattered across the 
North Sea on isolated installations with the consequent difficulty of maintaining 
communications. This was the main reason for the failure of industrial action in 
July 1979 when the catering companies rejected a demand for a massive wage 
increase. It was natural for offshore employees to discuss their respective 
earnings and catering staff knew the extent of the differential between their 
remuneration and that of direct oil workers. However, bcrcft of easy 
communication with their full time officers who would have advised a more 
realistic demand, the shop stewards insisted on a figure of over 150% on the 
hourly rate which the employers were bound to reject out of hand. The 
employers countered with an offer of 22% which the shop stewards found 
unacceptable and a strike began. 
Referred to in the local press as the T-Bone Strike, itself a misnomer since the 
days of luxury catering offshore had passed, industrial action stuttered to a halt 
after three weeks. Small in itself, the strike demonstrated the difficulty of 
organizing industrial action offshore and lessons learned by the trade unions 
were possibly remembered ten years later when STUC- rccogniscd unions were 
to avoid direct involvement in industrial action offshore. The catering shop 
97 Thom, A. A. 1989. "Managing Labour under Ertreme Risk: Collective Bargaining In the 
North Sea Oil Industyy " Chapter 9. Unpublished Ph D thesis for Robert Gordon's Institute of 
Technology. 
98 In a report to B. Callaghan, Secretary, Economic Department, TUC on 4th December, 1985 
Campbell Reid estimated that 40% of North Sea offshore catering staff werc unionised. 
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stewards were too sanguine in their belief that industrial action would seriously 
affect oil production. 
Only about half the catering workers (on the whole TGWU and NUS members) 
supported the action but another factor was the refusal of the Aberdeen 
dockworkers, themselves TGWU members, to "black" supplies to oil 
installations. There was some support at Aberdeen Airport but this was 
circumvented by flying offshore workers to and from other airports. The net 
result for the employees was a wage increase in line with recommendations from 
the operating companies and some minor fringe benefits. The lack of support for 
the strikers from member unions was given by Harry Bygate as his reason for 
resigning as Secretary of IUOOC although since it was November 1979 before 
he did so there is always the possibility that he had found the office conflicted 
with his own union's adherence to BSJC in the dispute over rights to recruit on 
semi-submersibles and drilling rigs. The minute of the November 1979 meeting 
of IUOOC is yet another example of that body's inherent weakness. In response 
to Bygate's complaint that his union, NUS, had received insufficient support 
from the other unions, despite the IUOOC promise of 100% support, " his 
brother officers could only claim that they were not in a position of being able to 
instruct their members. 
The strike had also been a trial of strength for the newly formed COTA. The men 
on strike were mainly from four of the larger companies with which the trade 
unions had negotiating rights. If these companies conceded a large wage increase 
it could make them uncompetitive unless the clients were in agreement and the 
rates of pay would then become general across the industry; in other words they 
would become the COTA rate although, of course, this term was never used in 
public. The exploration, drilling and production companies all let it be known 
through the usual channels that any large wage increase should be resisted and 
this steeled the nerve of the catering companies to hold out, a stance which was 
soon justified as the strike began to falter after only a few days. The client 
companies adopted their firm action since they were aware that any significant 
increase in catering wages would prompt a similar claim from their own 
employees. 
COTA had survived this first challenge to its structure (one cannot say authority 
for, strictly speaking, it had none) but seven years later there was an industrial 
relations issue, which posed a far greater threat. In 1986 the world price of oil 
had slumped from a high of $30 a barrel to, at one point, under $10. Offshore 
employers were laying off staff and looking to reduce their costs in every 
possible way, not least in catering. This was particularly severe on the catering 
contractors because drilling alone had reduced its activity by about 40%. At this 
juncture an operator accepted from Phoenix Catering, a member of COTA, a bid 
calculated on the basis of staff payments which were E2,000 per annum below 
the COTA rate. Phoenix Catering justified its bid on the grounds that there was 
no agreed rate for offshore work and that in any case it had not cut its 
99 IUOOC minute of 6th Augustý 1979. 
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employees' remuneration, which was utter sophistry since it had never 
previously operated a contract offshore. TGWU demanded that Phoenix Catering 
be expelled from COTA and, together with COTA firms where it had collective 
bargaining agreements, prepared a written statement that there was such a 
measure as a COTA rate. Both the union and the caterers feared that if one 
operator was successful in obtaining a contract where COTA rates were not paid 
other firms might also be driven by economic necessity to follow suit. 
Here again the hidden hand of the oil companies intervened. The majority of the 
COTA companies refused to sign the prepared statement claiming that there was 
a COTA rate but the next three contracts awarded were to catering firms which 
made it clear that they were paying the COTA rates. Phoenix Catering was 
expelled from the organization. In addition, although it was the time for the 
annual negotiation on pay and conditions, the TGWU officials (the NUS had 
now very few members in catering) wisely recognised that the time was not 
propitious to submit a claim. Instead there were months of low key negotiation 
through the now accepted COTA channel and a small increase was agreed from 
January 1987. 
Collective bargaining has existed in offshore catering since 1978 because the 
oil companies wish it and not as a result of trade union pressure. Offshore 
catering companies are not unlike the marionettes who move as their owner pulls 
the strings. The oil companies do not own the catering companies but they are in 
a very strong position to control them. To a large extent the tenders for contract 
revolve round manpower budgets which have been virtually set by the clients 
although their influence on COTA is never publicly acknowledged. Where unrest 
among catering staff may spill over into their own operations the oil companies 
are quick to influence events through avenues that are direct but never 
acknowledged. It is highly probable that the Phoenix Catering issue was 
discussed at the monthly meeting of "The Oily Group"" and that the members 
agreed that, in the interests of maintaining calm employee relations at a difficult 
time for the industry, they would advise their companies that only tenders based 
on COTA rates should be accepted. Just as everyone involved knew that there 
was a COTA rate but never admitted its existence, so too did everyone know that 
it was a facade behind which the catering companies operated and that where 
industrial relations were involved it was the oil companies which made the 
decisions on their contractors' behalf. 
6 Summary . 
The United Kingdom offshore oil and gas industry was a new industry which 
soon became hugely profitable for the British economy and it was natural for the 
trade unions to seek involvement. They had continuous support at the highest 
level from Tony Benn, the Secretary of State for Energy, but their hopes of 
recruiting any significant proportion of offshore workers must have been fading 
too v. Chapter Seven, p. 117 supra. 
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even before the Labour government fell in mid-1979. This was three years after 
the Memorandum of Understanding on Trade Union Access to Offshore 
Installations and, despite many visits to installations and platforms, offshore 
workers could not be persuaded to seek membership. Occasionally there was 
interest when a contentious issue arose on an installation but it was never 
possible for the unions to translate these into anything like a sustained demand 
for trade union membership and support. 
Two factors, one philosophical and the other practical, stand out in any 
consideration of the reasons why the trade unions achieved so little after the high 
hopes engendered by the Memorandum of Understanding. The first is that oil 
companies have always placed a strong emphasis on the corporate membership 
of all employees within their industry and consequently trade union allegiance 
was regarded as incompatible with company loyalty. Individual membership of 
a trade union was acceptable but any attempt to coalesce union membership on 
an installation into the nucleus of a coherent trade union branch was not to be 
tolerated. It would lead to the introduction of a third party which would separate 
direct communication between employee and employer and thus offcnd the 
corporate spirit of the industry. 
The second factor was inter-union rivalry. ASTMS eventually secured 
negotiating rights on two gas platforms but only afler months were wasted in 
determining whether 1UOOC had a legitimate r6le in the natural gas fields off 
East Anglia. In Aberdeen there was an attempt by the manual worker unions to 
marginalise ASTMS when it opened an office in the city. The NUS, a trade 
union which was already a declining force, engaged in an unseemly brawl with 
TGWU over recruitment rights on semi-submersibles and even threatened, 
through its membership of the British Seafaring Joint Council, to imperil the 
future of the IUOOC if it did not get its way. When the TGWU had to accept 
defeat on this issue it sought revenge by sleight of hand when some of its 
members were transferred to a semi-submersible and it claimed recognition 
rights from the owner, SEDCO. That affair was referred to the TUC and by the 
time it was resolved any chance of an agreement with SEDCO had gone, further 
wounding the public credibility of IUOOC. 
Without being hostile to trade unions the incoming Conservative government did 
not share the Labour Party's ideological commitment to their aims and 
objectives and gradually withdrew from the industrial rclations scene offshore. 
The unions, despite losing support from such an influential quarter as the 
government, continued to fight for recognition offshore but by about 1983 they 
must have realised that their efforts were out of proportion to the results 
obtained. Writing in 1982 Carson"' estimated that membership was never higher 
than 20% and two years later, when unions claimed a membership of 28%, 
Macaulay pointed out that only 150/. were represented through any negotiated 
101 op. cit. p. 213. Carson's figure is from an unpublished Ph D thesis by P. Watson, Dundee 
University: Trade Union Activity in the Offshore Oil Industry. 
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agreement, principally the Offshore Construction Agreement. 102 Penetration was, 
thus, low in spite of all the efforts put into recruitment. 
Sheer, dogged persistence prevented officials like Campbell Reid from giving 
up. Following the traditional pattern of claiming membership and seeking to 
argue the union's case, he fought a long and apparently"' fruitless battle with 
Phillips Petroleum. More realistic was the comment made in 1984 to Macaulay 
by J. Melvin Keenan, then a TGWU District Officer: a new and radical 
approach is necessary if the organization of offshore workers is to proceed at 
anything like the pace necessary to secure full union rights within the next 
decade. '04 
A few employers were prepared to concede representational agreements but from 
these toeholds on the rockface of management opposition no trade union 
succeeded in winning the right to negotiate terms and conditions of employment 
across any company or even for a single installation with the specific exception 
of Shell's drilling rig Stadrill and Phillips Petroleum's gas platforms on the 
Hewett and Leman Fields. By contrast most of the oil companies engaged in 
exploration and production offshore remained content to leave in place the 
negotiation rights which they had conceded to trade unions in earlier years in 
respect of their shore-based operations. This seemed utterly illogical to the trade 
unions but the employers approached their "upstream7' interests in a very 
different way from their older established "downstream" interests. This 
pragmatism was shown when labour relations became a problem in offshore 
catering. In pursuit of their own interests the oil companies pcrsuadcd the 
catering contractors to negotiate directly with the trade unions; at the same time 
they continued to hold the belief that their own interests were best served by 
opposing all trade union attempts to secure negotiating rights in the offshore oil 
industry. 
There was, nevertheless, one important area of offshore employment where a 
collective bargaining agreement had been in place almost from the inccption of 
the North Sea oil and gas industry. This was the Offshore Construction 
Agreement, which must be the subject of a subsequent chapter. 
102 Macaulay op. cit. p. 75. The Offshore Construction Agreement will be discussed in a later 
chapter. 
103 ASTMS obtained negotiating rights after Piper Alpha. v. Appendix S. 
10' Macaulay op. cit. p. 9 1. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
REASONS WHY THE TRADE UNIONS FAILED TO RECRUIT 
ANY SIGNIFICANT MEMBERSHIP OFFSHORE 
The previous chapter dealt with industrial relations from the Memorandum of 
Understanding on Trade Union Access to Offshore Installations to the explosion 
on Piper Alpha in July 1988, a period of almost exactly 12 years. Union 
campaigns to secure recognition from the employers, the stratagems used by the 
employers to keep industrial relations a "union free" area and the inter-union 
rivalries which etiolated the IUOOC have been described and analysed. Inter- 
union disputes, unco-ordinated recruitment campaigns and management 
antipathy to the whole concept of any effective union presence offshore were, 
however, insufficient reasons in themselves for the failure of the trade unions to 
recruit members and secure collective bargaining rights. Had the offshore 
employees wanted third party representation on their behalf they would have 
brought in the trade unions, which were the only credible organizations able to 
provide it. It is, therefore, necessary to look behind the exertions of the trade 
union officials and the managers in order to discover why the employees 
themselves were so resistant to unionisation. There were also logistical problems 
which made a major contribution to the managerial objective of keeping the 
unions at arms length. 
1 Logistical Problems 
Location was always the main problem. At first offshore employees were few in 
number and worked on mobile exploration vessels but from 1975 oil began to be 
delivered onshore from fixed production installations. These required greater 
numbers of employees and they were permanent locations. They presented, 
therefore, a better target for trade unions as Campbell Reid had foreseen early in 
1977 when he complained to Davison about IUOOC concerning itself with 
spheres of influence on drilling rigs and ignoring the fixed production platforms. ' 
The disadvantages to recruitment were nevertheless immense, quite apart from 
the deermination of the oil companies to do all in their power to discourage the 
incursion of trade unionism into their industry. 
Despite the Memorandum on Access it was not easy for trade union off iccrs to 
travel offshore because accommodation on helicopters was often at a premium 
and arrangements to stay overnight could not always be fitted in to the timetable 
of the visiting official or the return helicopter flight. Again, the installations were 
widely scattered across the North Sea and thus the frequency of the visits to 
particular installations was considerably lower than the overall number of visits 
might suggest. Len Murray, Secretary of the Trades Union Congress, had sent 
G. Williams, the Director General of UKOOA, a copy of his letter to Nigel 
Lawson, where he complained about delays and obstructions faced by IUOOC 
1 v. Chapter Nine, p. 144 supra. 
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representatives in their attempts to travel offshore. ' Williams replied 3 with a 
strong denial and said that in 1980 and 1981 there were 9 and 21 visits 
respectively and, by the end of November 1982, there had been 13. Whether this 
argues the case of either UKOOA or IUOOC is unclear but it does indicate that 
offshore visits by trade union officials were not sufficiently frequent to stimulate 
interest among the employees. 
The work pattern on installations also militated against any careful preparations 
by an official to make as wide an impact as possible upon the employees. At any 
time that a trade union official landed on an installation it would be the exception 
if one half of the direct workforce was not on shore leave and the other half 
either at work or taking a much needed rest after a twelve hour shift. The official 
was fortunate therefore if he could talk to more than a small fraction of the 
employees on any installation because even if men were permitted to leave their 
workstations few were at all interested. Most of those on their twelve hour rest 
period were more likely to prefer relaxation and slumber than a discussion on 
trade unionism. 
There is another factor which has been surprisingly ignored in the many 
comments on trade union difficulties in recruiting offshore. This is the absence 
of union activists aboard the installations. In a factory, ship yard or large office 
located on the mainland, interest in a trade union revolves round a nucleus of 
activists who assume the duties of shop-steward which includes recruiting new 
members, collecting subscriptions and representing employees in minor 
confrontations with the management. Full-time trade union officers are available 
to give back-up to the shop stewards when required but do not normally engage 
in recruitment of new members. When an organization opens new premises it is 
usual for the local trade union official to establish contact with the management 
and leave it to any members who find employment there to seek recognition as 
representatives of the workers. While it would be quite incorrect to say that there 
were never any local union activists on offshore installations they were seldom 
in sufficient numbers to make any real impact even if they were elected as 
spokesmen on a company's consultative council. Without even a semblance of 
union framework in place on most installations offshore recruitment was made 
even more difficult. It can be likened to trying to build a house without 
foundations. 
Trade unionism is more likely to become established where there is a settled 
workforce. Employees come to know each other, are able to understand the 
different tasks required of each other by the management and seek to coalesce 
into separate interest groups while sharing common membership of a 
community. If some disagreement arises with management over remuneration or 
a disciplinary decision it is highly probable that the workers will want to express 
their side of the argument. If there is not already a shop steward system in place 
2 v. Chapter Nine, pp. 156 & 157 supra and Appendix 
3 G. Williams to L. Murmy, 18th November, 1982. 
168 
one will soon arise in order that there can be a channel of communication 
between employer and employees. This is trade unionism in its basic form. 
A settled workforce was not a feature of the early years of the oil industry and 
this inhibited the emergence of trade unionism. Roughnecks and roustabouts, the 
terms applied to the bottom grades of manual employees, constituted the largest 
group aboard an installation and since they carried out the tasks which were least 
pleasant and most hazardous they should have provided fertile ground for trade 
unionism. That they did not is accounted for by their huge labour turnover in the 
period 1975 -1979. Research carried out by Dr Jarries Vant, then Project 
Manager with the Petroleum Industry Training Board, revealed labour turnover 
on North Sea oil installations to be high and widespread In some instances it 
had annualised as high as 400%. 4 The reason was that the oil companies were 
accepting virtually anyone willing and physically able to do the work and were 
applying no other selection criteria. Further research by Vant on the Southern 
Gas Fields found a similar situation although the labour turnover was not as 
high. ' In both cases the oil companies accepted the research findings and 
implemented the suggestions for relevant selection criteria, and this reduced their 
labour turnover inuncnsely. " This, however, was too late for the trade unions 
because it had been vital for them to make an impact within at least two years of 
the Memorandum on Access. It was late 1980 by the time labour turnover was 
brought down to more manageable proportions and by then a non-union culture 
had become established. It can thus be argued that one reason for the failure of 
trade unions to recruit members and establish an interest in their services was 
poor employee selection. Without realising it the companies had impcdcd the 
formation of trade union organization by operating a selection policy for 
roustabouts and roughnecks which ensured that there was no continuity of 
eirployment among the very people on whom the unions depended for their 
initial breakthrough into the offshore industry. 
As stated above, one half of the complement was likely to be onshore when a 
trade union officer made a recruitment visit to an installation. Attempts to 
interest employees in trade unionism at the heliport when they arrived onshore 
were soon abandoned as impractical but was there not an opportunity to arouse 
interest during the fortnight most of them spent offshore? Again the unions faced 
an insuperable problem in that the majority of the employees lived away from 
4 Vant, J. H. B. and Livy, B. (1980) Offshore Selection Criteria: Roughnecks and Roustabouts. 
Petroleum Industry Training Board. An abbreviated account was published in Personnel 
Management Vol 12 No 4 April 1980. 
5 Vant; J. H. B. and Livy, B. (1981) 4 Preliminaq Investigation into Personnel Selection 
Cyaiteriafor Production Operatives in the Southern Gas Fieldy of the North Sea. Petroleum 
Industry Training Board. 
6 The application of selection criteria has not found favour with all companies. In 1990 the 
author supervised a project of a third year student attached to the personnel department of a well- 
known oil company. One of the student's tasks was to look at job applications and accept people 
without interview to work offshore. If anyone proved unsatisfactory the OIM informed the 
personnel department and he was dismýissa This process was less expensive than calling men 
for interview at company headquarters in Aberdeen. 
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Aberdeen. In 1979 the homes of the offshore workers were in the following 
areas: 
Grampian 2,700 
Strathclyde 1,500 
Tayside 600 
Highland 400 
Non UK 600 
Lothian 300 
Borders 300 
Central 300 
Other UK 3JO0 
Total 10,400 
Scottish Economic Bulletin 1980 
Four years later the figures were not significantly different although a slightly 
higher percentage came from Grampian. Thus it would have been very difficult 
to bring together sufficient offshore workers to discuss the advantages of trade 
union membership unless there was some important issue which would attract 
them. This was not to happen till after Piper Alpha. Occasionally attempts were 
made by the IUOOC such as hiring a room in the Music Hall but the response 
was always disappointing. 
2 Employee Attitudes to Trade Unionism 
It is not too difficult for an activist to understand why there may be apathy 
towards a cause he is advocating but it is more difficult for him to accept why 
there is hostility. In the case of trade unions their officcrs are accustomed to 
dealing with apathy and see it as their duty to convince employees by argument 
and example that their interests, particularlyjob preservation and caming levels, 
will be protected by membership of a union. Hostility is another matter. Trade 
union leaders know that some employers, and this includes the oil companies, 
wish to have as little to do with them as possible. On the other hand they find it 
find it hard to understand why employees should exhibit antipathy towards an 
organization that has supported working class aspirations for more than a century 
and can offer some protection against managerial decisions that are to the 
detriment of employees. 
Yet even before oil was brought ashore for the first time in 1975 unions were 
experiencing this antipathy towards them. In one of the first books' publishcd 
about the offshore industry Mervyn Jones wrote about employees who gloried in 
the freedom this new industry offered to them in their work environment. They 
fclt they were at the forefront of a new age, pioneers in an industry which was 
going to change the face of the United Kingdom, which paid well and which had 
no demarcation lines or other restrictive practices to complicate methods of 
work. Some of them brought offshore memories of recent confrontations with 
traditional trade unionism. One man told Jones No-body on this rig 1vants the 
unions to come in. Union blokes don't want to work, they just talk and start 
7 Jones, M. and Godwin, F. (1976) 7he Oil Rush. Quartet Books, London. The text is by Jones 
and the photographs by Godwim Ile quotations used here come from The Offshore Tigers 
(New Statesman, August 1975), an article contributed by Jones very soon afler his research had 
been completed and before his book had been published. 
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strikes. Another commented: Why did I come here from Birmingham? Because 
there's no bloody strikes that's why. They're always making you go on strike 
whether you want to or not. Back home I was always on strike or on the dole. ' It 
is accepted that these may be extreme views although Jones claimed that they 
were held by many whom he interviewed. 
By contrast there were those who, as in any community, were simply apathetic, 
representing the type of people who unquestioningly pay or do not pay union 
dues according to the prevailing employment culture. More important, because 
they held strong opinions about trade unions, were former sea-going personnel 
and ex-servicemen. One of Vant's recommendations to the oil companies was 
that they should seek to employ men over 30 with a settled home life and within 
that rather wide group he identified ex-servicemen as the most likely "stayers"! 
About six years later the novelist and poet, A. Alvarez, commented that many of 
the people employed on the North Sea oitfleM are ex-servicemen, used to 
obeying orders. " A former director of one of the largest oil companies disagrees 
with Alvarez that obedience to orders makes ex-servicemen good offshore 
employees. Rather it has been their ability to manage things in a logical way and 
their experience of co-operating well with one another as a soldier does when his 
platoon is in action. They come with no pre-formed views on demarcation and 
consequently are prepared to be flexible in the tasks they arc asked to perform. 
They are occupationally attuned to a working life which rcflects the type of 
discipline necessary offshore and they expect their employer to look after their 
welfare as has happened in the armed services. Having no experience of trade 
unions, they do not see their relevance to them in civilian life. " These men have 
never been significant in numbers but they represent a particular group which 
can influence other oil workers and their arguments against the acceptance of 
trade unionism offshore have been expressed in less emotional and more rational 
terms than those quoted immediately above. 
Another factor was status. It is perhaps hard to recall that over twenty years ago 
a far higher proportion of manual workers than today were remunerated on 
hourly rates and did not receive sickness pay when they were absent through 
sickness other than that due under the National Insurance Scheme. By contrast 
salaried staff usually enjoyed pay schemes under which their remuneration was 
unaffected during periods of illness up to certain limits and their entitlement to 
holidays was calculated on more generous bases of time and amount. The 
biggest differential between the salaried and the hourly paid staff and the one 
which rankled most in the minds of the latter was that superannuation schemes 
almost never applied to them. By 1980 this division of a company's employees 
a Jones, M. and Godwin, F. Op cit. 
9Vant, J. H. B. and Livy, B. (1980) op cit. 
'0 Alvarez, A. (1986) A Reporter at Large: Offshore. These were two articles in The New Yorker 
on 20th and 27th January, 1986. These were expanded into a book Offshore: A North Sea 
Journey published in 1987 by Sceptrc, New York. 
" Comments made to the author by the former director in the course of a structured interview. 
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into "trusted" and "not trusted"" was very much in retreat but the head of 
personnel of an oil major informed the author that in the period 1975 to 1978 
many of his company's offshore staff came from the mining, oil refining and 
other related sectors where they had been hourly paid with all the disadvantages 
that went with that status. " From the very beginning of their employment on his 
company's installations - and, as far as he was aware, on those of all other major 
companies - the men were treated as "staff'. the now rather old fashioned term 
for salaried employees. This was a tremendous improvement on their previous 
terms and conditions of employment and he said that the treatment which they 
receivedfrom their employer turned many awayfrom militancy. It is, therefore, 
not correct to say that the oil industryfought off the trade unionsfor the trade 
unions could notfightfor better conditions ofwork or betterpay. 
This same head of personnel gave an interesting comment about a particular set 
of circumstances which arose in 1978 on one of his company's installations. He 
described the OIM as very much the old style boss. His usual response when 
even the slightest of queries was raised about an instruction was I'll have that 
man's ass off this rig. "' The TGWU began to have some success in recruitment 
and a representational agreement was reached. However, this was as far as the 
employees wanted to progress with trade unionism and the head of personnel 
believed that job security was the ultimate goal of the employees. To demand 
negotiating rights as well would have been pointless because up to 1986 pay and 
conditions offshore offered a better reward than could be obtained for work 
onshore. When this particular OIM was transferred there was a gradual loss of 
interest in trade unionism within the company and by 1984 enthusiasm had 
waned. 
It seems probable that the superior pay and conditions of service in offshore 
employment when compared with onshore practice was the prime factor in the 
lack of interest displayed towards trade unions by offshore workers. The merest 
fraction of the membership of most trade unions was employed offshore" and the 
levels of pay which the unions were trying to achieve for their members in other 
sectors of employment was, in most cases, lower than those already being paid 
offshore. It was a trade union official himself who put this view in simple direct 
words. One of the problems of trade unionism is that the higher a man's wages 
the more watered down his individual trade unionism becomes. " High earnings 
also allowed house purchase and since trade unionism was often perceived as a 
12 These terms were used in an internal report prepared about 1949 by Dr Fleck for ICI which led 
to it becoming one of the first large companies in the private sector to offer common conditions 
of service to all its employees. Dr Fleck later became a director of ICL 
13 It used to be claimed that one reason for the sudden unionisation of clerical and administrative 
employees from about 1978 was their realisation that manual workers were not only better 
remunerated than they were but were now also enjoying the same staff conditions e. g. 
superannuation, which destroyed the previous social differential between them. 
14 Being American he could not pronounce "arse". 
The NUS was an obvious exception. 
Bygate, H. (1976). Oil over Troubled Waters. Aberdeen People's Press. Bygate was a district 
officer of the NUS and for a time secretary of IUOOC. v. Chapter 9, pp. 152-153 supra. 
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commitment to industrial action anything which might imperil the monthly 
mortgage repayment was avoided. 
In visits to installations which followed after the Memorandum on Access, some 
trade union officers experienced a grudging acceptance of their presence on 
board and were submitted to the kind of surveillance more appropriate for 
persons of dubious character. Campbell Reid told the author that on one occasion 
he appeared to have a "minder" who even followed him into the lavatory. " 
However, as has already been mentioned, " it soon became the practice for union 
officers to be accompanied onto installations by company representatives, 
usually from the personnel department, to ensure that they had appropriate 
premises in which to carry out their interviews and were treated with the 
courtesy due to a visiting guest. This was successful in its prime purpose and 
complaints from trade union officials about their reception and treatment almost 
disappeared. 
There was, nevertheless, an aspect of this courtesy r6le which neither the trade 
unions nor the employers had foreseen. A middle ranking personnel manager 
who had accompanied trade union officers offshore on several occasions told the 
author that his presence provided an opportunity for the employees on the 
installations to speak to a management representative and so allow an issue to be 
raised directly and not through a third party. Another personnel manager 
remarked that there was one trade union officer whose appearance undermined 
his credibility from the outset. This union man usually wore scruffyjeans, a 
jacket covered with badges (CND etc), a cap on the wrong way with badges and 
very long hair. Some of the employees said to the personnel manager: no is 
that weirdo? He does not think that we will allow him to represent us does he? 
Thus there was at least one union officer whose sartorial choice served to 
confirm offshore workers in their negative attitude towards trade unionism. 
The fundamental reason for the failure of the trade unions to recruit employees in 
the offshore oil industry is that their approach was flawed from the outset. They 
assumed that offshore installations were little different in their management and 
personnel from engineering plants onshore and consequently they used standard 
recruitment tactics. They took the attitude "See what bcnerits we can bring to 
offshore employees". They carried out no preliminary research into the nature of 
offshore employment and this is surprising since the major unions had research 
departments which could have advised on strategy. When success did not follow 
recruitment drives there was a tendency to blame others, particularly the oil 
operators. Yet most operators had voluntary agreements and experienced no 
difficulties in reaching them. BNOC, later Britoil, finding that its employees did 
not want trade unions developed a staff council, where issues were discussed and 
settlements reached. So successful was this staff council that when Britoil was 
about to amalgamate with BP, it discovered that BP believed that Britoil was 
unionised. " 
17 Campbell Reid deliberately chose a lavatory four storcys below where he was interviewing. 
18 v. Chapter Seven, p. 126 supra. 
19 Statement to author by a former Britoil director. 
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Any investigation into employee attitudes towards trade unions cannot ignore a 
paper published as recently as 1996 " where particular attention is paid to the 
view of Tommy Lafferty, the AUEW District Secretary. In the autumn of 1978 
offshore construction engineers had pay and rotation pattern grievances which 
their union, the AUEW, was attempting to settle with the Offshore Contractors' 
Association. Impatient with what they took to be undue delay in reaching an 
agreement the men came out on unofficial strike in January and early February 
1979 and tried to spread the dispute by picketing onshore oil company premises. 
Lafferty advised his members to ignore these pickets because he was anxious to 
convince the industry of the advantages of negotiating agreements with 
responsible trade unions. Work was eventually resumed towards the end of 
February but not before there had been acrimonious exchanges in the local press 
between the unofficial strike leaders and Lafferty. 
A decade later Lafferty was interviewed by Sewel and identified the 
circumstances of the 1979 strike as one of the most important factors in 
explaining the lack of trade unionism off-shore. According to Lafferty, the men 
saw it not only as a massive defeat, but as them being let down by their union. 
From then on it had becomejar more difficult to motivate the men to take an 
interest in trade unionism, at least until the late 1980s. " 
This episode may well have been a factor in the failure of trade unions to arouse 
the interest of offshore workers but it did not have the importance attributed to it 
by Lafferty. This man's judgment was not always sound and while the unofficial 
strike of early 1979 may, in retrospect, have seemed to him to have led to the 
repercussions he claimed, there is very little evidence to support his view. 
Moreover, the strikers were seeking to influence negotiations on the Offshore 
Construction Agreement and held their principal mass meetings in Glasgow, not 
Aberdeen. Again, this event took place right in the middle of the "Winter of 
Discontent" when there were so many strikes that there was no reason why this 
one example should have been particularly remembered or have had any lasting 
effect. Finally, employees engaged on production installations were not involved 
and they were, by 1979, the principal target of the trade unions. Scwcl and Penn 
do not mention any other local trade union leaders except Ronnie McDonald and 
this author suggests that discussions with Campbell Reid would have brought 
more balance to their article. The evidence available demonstrates that there 
were other lower profile but more enduring factors which accounted for the 
attitudes of offshore employees to trade unions. These have been argued earlier 
in this chapter. 
20 Sewel, J. and Penn, R. (1996) Trade Unionism in a Hostile Environment: an Account ofthe 
, 4ttempts to organize the North Sea Oil Industry between 1970-1990. This is a chapter in Trade 
Unionism in Recession edited by Penn, R., Gallie, D. and Rose M. Oxford University Press. 
21 Sewel and Penn op cit p. 299. 
n v. Chapter Four, p. 59. sUpra. 
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3 Summary 
The disinclination, to put it no stronger, among offshore employees to join trade 
unions is of particular interest because it was in sharp contrast to what was 
happening onshore. The early years of the offshore oil and gas industry co- 
incided with continuous growth in trade union membership across the United 
Kingdom as a whole, as the following table demonstrates. 
UNITED KINGDOM TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP 1975 -1981 
1975 11976 11977 11978 11979 11980 11981 
11,656,418 1 12,132,773 1 12,718,911 113,053,596 1 13,212,354 112,636,355 1 12,31 
Annuai Keports ot thC týCMIICatlon Utlicer 
Moreover, the accord on the Memorandum of Understanding was reached at a 
time when the government was actively promoting industrial democracy as part 
of its Social Contract with the unions and its direct intervention in the employee 
relations of the offshore oil and gas industry was part of that policy. In 1975, the 
year before the Memorandum on Access was agreed, the Bullock Committee had 
been set up to investigate the practicalities of trade union membership on the 
boards of private companies and ACAS had been established with the general 
duty to improve industrial relations through the extension of collective 
bargaining. At no period in British history, before or since, has trade unionism 
wielded such influence in the political life of the nation and this makes all the 
more interesting its almost complete lack of appeal to employees in the offshore 
oil and gas industry. This was the time when the unions needed to make their 
breakthrough into the offshore oil industry but, for the reasons given above, 
principally the lack of any basic research into the nature of the industry, they 
failed to do so. It was too late by 1979 because the political power of trade 
unionism was already waning despite another increase in membership and it was 
soon to hurtle downhill as manufacturing, the main base of British trade 
unionism, began to shed employees and therefore union members in their 
hundreds of thousands. Total trade union membership N1 by two million 
between 1981 and 1988 with most of the losses among manual workers. The 
political and industrial climate was now antipathetic to trade unionism and 
attempts to attract membership among offshore workers were almost hopeless 
from the outset. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND ACCIDENT PREVENTION 
During Edward Heath's premiership (1970-1974) drilling ships roamed the 
Scottish and Norwegian waters of the North Sea and Lord Robens chaired a 
committee, which examined the current legislation affecting safety at work. The 
report' of this committee became the basis of the Health and Safety at Work Act 
1974. The discovery of oil in the North Sea and the philosophy underlying the 
new safety legislation, although totally unconnected at the time, together 
provided the germ of a disagreement which continues to simmer until the present 
day. 
Under the Health and Safety at Work Act there is a statutory obligation on all 
UK employers to provide a safe working environment. This general requirement 
is supplemented with further legislation where there are hazards specific to an 
industry such as nuclear power. By the very nature of its technology and location 
the North Sea oil and gas industry has presented special problems in the 
establishment and maintenance of a safe working environment. World-wide the 
industry has experienced many accidents, some attended by great loss of life and 
of the five major disasters listed by the International Labour Office as having had 
a ma . or effect on safety policies and regulations, three have occurred in the 
North Sea. These did not include the air accident off Shetland when 45 oilmen 
2 died in a helicopter crash . Since trade unions have always regarded accident 
prevention as one of their prime purposes it is not therefore surprising that they 
have pressed to become accepted as organizations which have a legitimate 
interest in the establishment of safe working practices offshore. In this objective 
they have been frustrated by the oil companies and, to a lesser extent, by the 
government; the former, as a matter of policy, have opposed any trade union 
influence within their industry and the latter has given no statutory r6le to trade 
unions in the maintenance of safety offshore. 
The attitudes of management and organized labour to accident prevention in the 
oil and gas industry have already been introduced to this thesis in Chapter Four 
but it is important to repeat the philosophy which underlay the Robens Report 
and therefore the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974. The Robens; philosophy 
replaced prescriptive legislation with regulations which set safety goals but lcft 
to the employer the decision concerning the means of attainment; in short, 
persuasion to act reasonably was seen as preferable to compulsion. Since this 
philosophy encompassed the principle of voluntarism there was, said Robcns, no 
legitimate scopefor collective bargaining in accident prevention discussions. It 
would be incorrect to claim that oil companies use this philosophy to justify their 
refusal to involve trade unions in the practice of accident prevention offshore 
because their attitude is far less subtle: they simply do not want to negotiate with 
trade unions on any issue. On the other hand the Robens philosophy has certainly 
1 v. Chapter Six, p. 94 supra. 
2 v. Chapter Two, p. 28 supra. 
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fostered improved accident prevention across British industry although its 
introduction offshore came almost two decades later. When, after Piper Alpha, 
he was invited to report any recommendations which he thinksfil to make with a 
view to the preservation of life and the avoidance of similar accidents in the 
future, 3 Lord Cullen 4 found that far from having accepted the Robens philosophy 
the oil industry had remained detailed, prescriptive, rigid and piecemeal, and 
ineffective, because the end result was a compliance not a safety culture. What 
was needed was a wholesale reform along goal-setting lines. 5 His 
recommendations and the subsequent legislation represent what Roderick 
Allison, Chief Executive, Offshore Safety Division has termed the logical 
culmination ofthe Robens philosophy. 6 
1 Accident Prevention and the Trade Unions before Piper Alpha 
Concern for the safety of employees in the new offshore industry had not been 
entirely allayed by the accident prevention provisions contained in the Mineral 
Workings (Offshore Installations) Act, 1971.7 Margo MacDonald MP alleged in 
January 1974 that the government was Prepared to put exploitation of the oil 
before safety. The Department of Trade and Industry and now the Department of 
Energy appear to be permitting proper considerations of safelyfor those directly 
and indirectly involved to be b)passed in the haste to get hold of the oil and its 
8 
revenues. Neither she nor anyone else of any prominence drew attention at that 
time to the conflict of interest which existed where the government department 
overseeing the oil industry was the same body responsible for safe working 
practices within that industry. 
This was at a time when the main activity in the industry was drilling and when 
the first production platforms were in the course of design and construction. 
There seems little doubt that on some drilling ships the determination to find oil 
meant that safety was not always accorded high priority even if some of the 
evidence is anecdotal rather than empirical. There was no legal obligation to 
report dangerous occurrences as was the case with land-based employment. The 
brutal comment of one drilling superintendent has been quoted earlier9 and the 
oil industry consultant, Dr J. H. B. Vant, has stated to the author that lots of 
accidents went unreported and there was cover-up of accidents, especially in the 
case ofdrillers. 
Cecil Parkinson, Secretary of State for Energy, 13th July, 1988 to Lord Cullen. 
Lord Cullen, the judge appointed by the Secretary of State for Energy to head the Public 
Inquiry into the causes of the explosion on Piper Alpha. See also note 29 infra. 
5 Roderick Allison, Chief Executive, Offshore Safety Division, October 1996 Preparingfor the 
Major Opportunities, 4fforded and the Challenges Presented by the Current Changes in the 
Offshore Safety Regime-the HSE Perspective. Paper presented at "Safety '96" conference, 
Aberdeen. 
6 Allison, R. op cit. 
7 v. Chapter Six, p. 94 supra. 
a Hansard (House of Commons) 16th January, 1974, columns 690-69 1. 
9 v. Chapter Two, p. 29 supra. 
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The trade unions in the immediate aftermath of the 1977 Memorandum on 
Access were sanguine about their ability to recruit members and thereby win 
from the oil companies the recognition which they considered to be their due. 
They assumed that they would secure negotiation rights which would include 
joint determination of safe working practices for they had, after all, wide 
experience in accident prevention. Were they not, through the Trades Union 
Congress, represented on the Health and Safety Commission and other national 
bodies with tripartite membership of employers, employees and the government? 
As already mentioned to Tony Benn saw the monitoring of safety regulations as a 
more important factor in trade unionism than wage negotiation. He even seemed 
to imply that unions should assume a quasi- governmental r6le in this respect 
and that for this reason the government should intervene directly on their behalf 
in their struggle for recognition by the employers. By this time (1978) the more 
realistic union officers must have had some doubts about the outcome of their 
recruitment forays offshore but they continued in the hope that the early 
difficulties which had beset their visits - unsuitable accommodation, unhelpful 
installation management staff, last minute withdrawal of helicopter seat 
reservations - would be overcome. The return to power of a Conservative 
government in 1979 did not affect the offshore recruitment visits but 
increasingly they came to be regarded as almost fruitless. 'Me trade unions thus 
needed a new strategy. They had failed to recruit offshore employees in 
sufficient numbers to extract from the oil companies any negotiation rights from 
which involvement in accident prevention would follow. The unions now 
pondered if the normal order of priority could be reversed and if accident 
prevention itself could be used as a vehicle whereby they could bring the oil 
companies to accept them as legitimate representatives of their cmployccs? 
Statutory Instrument 500 of 1977 was a possible way. 
The full title of Sl 500 is "rhe Safety Representatives and Safety Committees 
Regulations" (often abbreviated to SRSC Regulations). SI 500 empowers 
recognised trade unions to appoint safety representatives at a place of work and 
to require employers to establish a safety committee if one does not already 
exist. These rights were accorded, it must be noticed, not to employee 
representatives but specifically to trade unions. Before considering this matter, 
however, it is necessary to look at the Burgoyne Committee. 
The Mineral Workings (Offshore Installations) Act 1971 empowered the 
Department of Energy to regulate accident prevention measures for the North 
Sea oil and gas industry. The same government department was later entrusted 
through the Submarine and Petroleum Pipelines Act 1975 with safety matters 
relating to operations involving pipework and similar equipment associated with 
underwater technology. In 1977 the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 was 
extended offshore by an Order in Council but this made virtually no impact since 
accident prevention remained the responsibility of the Department of Energy and 
certain Regulations such as SI 500 and the Reporting Incidents, Deaths and 
10 v. Chapter Nine, p. 153 supra. 
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Dangerous Occurrences were still not applicable offshore. 11 Nevertheless, to 
assist the Health and Safety Commission in its offshore responsibilities, the 
government, established in the following year the Oil Industry Advisory 
Committee (usually abbreviated to OIAQ which advises the Health and Safety 
Commission (HSQ on the protection ofpeople at workfrom hazards to health 
and safety arising from their occupation within the oil industry and the 
protection of the public from related hazards arising from such activities. 12 
OIAC consists today, as it did at its foundation, of eight nominees from both the 
employers and the trade unions and meets four times a year. Also in 1978 an 
agency agreement was entered into whereby the Petroleum Engineering Division 
(usually abbreviated to PED) of the Department of Energy would represent the 
HSC in monitoring government safety regulations offshore. This odd 
combination of the HSC having the nominal responsibility for offshore safety 
but the Department of Energy exercising the regulatory powers was described as 
a schizophrenic set-up by Foster and Woolfson in a publication on trade unions 
and accident prevention offshore. " 
Margo MacDonald"' was not the only public figure to voice concern about the 
safety of workers employed offshore. There was gradual but growing concern on 
this issue as the industry began to move into production as well as continuing to 
explore possible new fields. Diving attracted particular attention on account of 
the profession's high fatality rate. 55 divers lost their lives in northern European 
waters (almost all in the North Sea) between 1971 and 1984. Accordingly the 
government decided in 1978 to set up a Committee of Enquiry under the 
chairmanship of Dr J. H. Burgoyne with the following terms of reference: 
To consider sojar as they are concerned with safety, the nature, coverage and 
effectiveness of the Department of Energy's regulations governing the 
exploration, development and production of oil and, &-j off-shore and their 
administration and enforcement. 
To consider and assess the r6le of the Certifying authorities. 
To present its report, conclusions and recommendations as soon as possible. 
The Committee consisted, in addition to the Chairman, of a technical consultant, 
(Professor Blyth McNaughton, Head of the Department of Mechanical and 
Offshore Engineering at Robert Gordon's Institute of Technology, Aberdeen 15 ), 
two trade unionists ( Roger Lyons of ASTMS and John Miller of TGWU) and 
four industry representatives. Proceedings were carried out in the usual fashion 
with representatives of the oil and gas industry, the Health and Safety Exccutivc, 
the TUC and other relevant organizations being invited to give evidence and to 
attend meetings, which were held over forty full days. One of those who gave 
11 Attention is drawn to Dr Vant's comment (p. 177 supra) on failure to report accidents. 
12 Definition of duties by Mark Addison, Chairman of OIAC, Health and Safety News. Issue 11. 
February 1995. HSC. London. 
13 Foster, J. and WoOlfs0n, C. (1992) Trade Unionism and Health and Safety Rights in aritain 's 
offshore Oil Indust7y, p. 4. International Centre for Trade Union Rights, London. Although not 
an impartial account of offshore safety this publication is scrupulously accurate on factual 
matters and provides valuable information on the Burgoyne Conunittee. 
4 v. p. 177 supra. 
Now The Robert Gordon University. 
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evidence was Lieutenant Commander S. A. (Jackie) Warner, the Chief Inspector 
of Diving at the Department of Energy. He registered his deep concern that 
urgent amendments to the offshore diving regulations were being held up 
unnecessarily. In a book about the diving industry which he and a journalist 
wrote some ten years later Warner said that this criticism of the HSE arose out 
of its attempt to separate divers into four categories depending upon their skill, 
qualifications and experience. In his brusque quarter-deck language Warner 
castigated the HSE for making a right cock-up of the designations chosen for the 
four standards which led to serious probleins especially with regard to 
training. 16 
The evidence from the TUC 17 was part of its strategy to secure recognition from 
the oil companies and thus it concentrated heavily on the contribution which 
their affiliated unions could make to safety on offshore installations. It began 
with an ILO statement on accident prevention drawing attention to the difference 
in the standards of work environment between those nations which had 
legislation providing for the establishment of safety committees attended by 
workers' representatives and those which did not. Immediately thereafter there 
followed the TUC opinion that without the extension of the Safety 
Representatives and Safety Committees Regulations to offshore installations 
there is no effective means whereby the interests of the workers can be properly 
represented in relation to health and safety matters. This was the card that the 
trade unions had been seeking to play from about 1978 and a government 
Committee of Enquiry presented them with a wonderful opportunity to do so. 
The TUC went on to ask for the full extension offshore of the Health and Safety 
at Work Act 1974, together with the ending of the agency agreement with PED. 
The evidence concluded with the statement that the Committee should note the 
consistent opposition of certain companies to trade union recognition and that 
token non-union staff Health and Safety Committees, launched by certain 
offshore employers, have in no way ameliorated the situation. As a document 
this submission to the Burgoyne Committee is important since it expresses 
succinctly the view of the trade unions on accident prevention and their 
perceived attitude of the oil companies towards them. In particular the TUC 
sought the application offshore of SI 500 which would mean that the employers, 
despite their consistent opposition to trade unions, would have to establish 
accident prevention committees where the employee membership would be 
union appointees. 
Not surprisingly the oil companies argued (through UKOOA) that SI 500 was 
quite inappropriate in relation to offshore installations. In the language of 
compromise the Report concluded that there should be safcty committces on all 
offshore installations but drew back from making any rccommendations as to 
16 Warner, J. and Park, F. (1990) Requiemfor a Diver. p. 88. Brown, Son and Ferguson. 
Glasgow. 
17 The TUC's written evidence ran to about ten pages and included views on technical tmtters 
such as the control of the prevention of blowouts. Only the industrial relations aspects have been 
dealt with here and the full TUC submission on this (Item IV of its evidence) is reproduced as 
Appendix T. 
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their composition. The Report also advised the retention of the agency agreement 
with the PED. In general, the conclusions and recommendations of the Burgoyne 
Committee of Enquiry 18 contributed to improved accident prevention offshore 
and, with one exception, reflected the unanimous opinion of its members. The 
two trade union members agreed that the government shall discharge its 
responsibility for offshore safety as a single agency but, not accepting that the 
PED continue in this r6le, issued a long note of dissent wherein they proposed its 
replacement by the HSC and the extension of the provisions of the Health and 
Safety at Work Act 1974 (including SI 500) to offshore installations. 
it is easy to be wise after the event and the Piper Alpha disaster is always 
brought in as evidence against Burgoyne for its decision to leave the PED as the 
body responsible for the implementation of safety offshore. Foster and Woolfson 
argue that in doing so Burgoyne represented a tragic missed opportunity to 
harmonise offshore and onshore safety procedures. " Burgoyne's claim that the 
oil industry required special knowledge and that therefore the Robens philosophy 
was not relevant is disputed by Foster and Woolfson who point out, that since 
the HSE was already responsible for petrochemicals onshore it would be equally 
effective offshore. They were also able to claim with some justice that PED did 
not implement some of Burgoyne's recommendations, particularly in respect of 
the interface of pipelines and platforms, where the possibility of a dangerous 
malfunction was foreseen. Sufficient attention to safety procedures and 
equipment in that area, including the installation of emergency shut-down 
valves, did not receive the attention recommended by Burgoyne because PED 
remained grossly understaffed and under-resourced. " 
In defence of the majority report it must be said that since PED had been so 
recently allocated responsibility for offshore safety there had been little time for 
any appraisal of its performance. Warner believed that the right decision had 
been made because the HSE required consultation between government, industry 
and the trade unions and this would retard decision making. He was fairly caustic 
about the contribution made to the Burgoyne Committee by its two trade union 
members asserting that, since one of them attended for four days only and the 
other for a total of five full days and fourteen half days, their note of dissent after 
such small exposure to the evidence indicated a closed mind. The trade unions 
would consider no other organization but the 11SE taking over offshore safety 
which would, of course, have given them access to the vast offshore cmpirefrom 
which they were being kept out by the industry. " He did not seem to rccognise 
that the two trade union representatives were simply proposing the TUC view 
and that it would have been strange if they had done otherwise. 
Access was the aim of the trade unions. Although Burgoyne did not rccommcnd 
acceptance of SI 500 offshore he had recommended the appointment of safety 
" Burgoyne, J. N. (1980) Offshore Sqfety. ý Report ofthe Committee. Cmnd 7866. ]London 
HMSO. 
'9 Foster and Woolfson op cit p. S. 
20 Foster and Woolfson op cit p. 6. 
21 Warner and Park op cit p. 92. 
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committees on each offshore installation. 22 On the principle that half a loaf is 
better than none the unions tried to use this as a route into the oil industry. Yet 
progress was so painfully slow that four years elapsed before a sub-committee of 
the OIAC was established to address the issue. This sub-committee took another 
year to circulate a discussion document, and met once in 1987 and again in 
January 1988 before Piper Alpha rendered any further meetings superfluous. Its 
history is a prime example of the ability of the oil companies to defeat any 
innovative measure which could possibly have led to an official presence of 
trade unions on their installations. 
There is some documentation on this matter which is interesting from the 
industrial relations aspect. Jack Bromley, Assistant General Secretary of the 
Radio and Electronic Union, writing to Campbell Reid in June 1982 to support 
the nomination of a NUS official to OIAC, adds that the maritime unions were 
very concerned at the lack of involvement of the Trade Union representatives 
who sat on the Burgoyne Committee. ' This echoes the criticism of Warner on 
the attendance of the trade union representatives at meetings of the Burgoyne 
Committee. 24 Since Bromley makes no comment about safety committees 
offshore it is reasonable to conclude that OIAC had not yet addressed this 
Burgoyne recommendation and indeed there is no documentation in IUOOC files 
on the matter until 1984. 
This is not surprising ý since the first official document emanating from the 
Department of Energy about Burgoyne's recommendations on safety committees 
is dated 8th November, 1984 . 
25 It is from B. W. Hindley, a Principal Inspector, 
presumably with the PED, and, together with some trade union comments upon 
it, makes rewarding reading if approached in the context of industrial relations 
offshore. 
Two small but relevant points deserve comment before the content of IfindleY's 
letter is analysed. The first is that the name of the addressee (Campbell Reid) is 
mis-spelled, the organization of which he is secretary is incorrectly titled, the 
address is also mis-spelled and the post code is incomplete. This may be just 
carelessness at a clerical level but a letter is the responsibility of the person who 
signs it and failure to insert the correct name of an organization and its secretary 
can be interpreted as an indication of their value to the sender. This letter was not 
rcfcrring to a matter of slight importance but a request from a government 
department to a body which had a prime concern in the implementation of the 
Burgoyne Report recommendations. The second point is that Hindley stressed to 
Reid that his letter was being sent on an informal basis. Too much may be read 
into that statement but the lack of any urgency in implcmcnting Burgoyne's 
recommendations on safety committees offshore is once more obvious when it is 
rccalled that although four years had passed since the publication of the report 
consultation was only at an informal level. 
22 Burgoyne, J. 11. op cit para 5.96. 
23 J. Bromley to C. Reid 18th June, 1982. Appendix U. 
24 v. p. 181 supra. 
25 Appendix V. 
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Hindley began by stating that the Burgoyne Report had recommended the setting 
up of safety committees on each offshore installation to which members would 
be elected, appointed or co-opted and he quoted the Report where it said it did 
not consider it essential to embody these principles in mandatory regulations. 
The letter went on to say that it would nevertheless be appropriate to consider 
whether the requirements for safety committees and representatives already 
implemented onshore (i. e. SI 500) could be used to introduce appropriate 
standards for the offshore oil and gas industry. Hindley then explained some 
practical difficulties which would arise if this course of action was adopted. 
Sl 500 placed duties on the employer who was the individual responsible for 
health and safety at a place of work but in the case of offshore installations there 
were generally several employers on account of contractor work. Consequently, 
if SI 500 were to be applied offshore, each set of employees would be entitled to 
elect safety representatives and so the situation would be unmanageable. The 
greatest difficulty was the stipulation by Sl 500 that safety representatives had to 
be members of recognised trade unions, a status enjoyed by only a few unions on 
a very limited number of installations. Thus, concluded Hindley, it would be 
necessary to proceed along different lines if Burgoyne's recommendations on 
safety committees were to be implemented. 
He saw three possible options. One was that the owners of the installations or 
pipeline works could set up safety committees and appoint representatives from 
among all those working on the installations or pipelines. Another option was for 
the owners to set up safety committees and appoint representatives who were 
trade union members, whether their union was rccognised or not. His third 
option was that each employer on an installation or involved in pipeline work 
appoint safety representatives from among his employees subject to the 
overriding control of the owner of the offshore installation orpipeline works. 
If one of these proposals was agreed there was then the question of the 
mechanism by which it would be implemented. Here the options were limited to 
two. The preferred proposal would be embodied in mandatory regulations or it 
would be implemented according to Departmcnt of Energy guidelines. Burgoyne 
had favoured the latter because it permitted wider flexibility to make 
arrangements best suited to the circumstances on each installation. 
As was to be expected the trade unions were less than satisfied with the 
proposals. J. Melvin Keenan of the TGWU told Campbell Reid that mandatory 
regulations would, at least, make the operators work towards reaching some 
accommodation from the union point of view but that not one of the three 
proposals for membership of the safety committees was acceptable since they all 
lead (SiC)26 the initiative and control very firmly with the owner of the 
installation or the several employers. Ifeel that we should try to devise a method 
26 Presumably he meant "leave". 
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that will, ifpossible, leave the control in the hands of the Unions or at any rate 
the employees. 27 
The view of Warren Duncan of the NUS was similar. He, too, favoured 
mandatory regulations. He was prepared to accept the second proposal for 
membership "faute de mieux" but believed that the unions should seek to add the 
words "in conjunction with the trade unions" after "ownee'. More interesting, 
however, was his additional comment about employers and their attitude to trade 
union attempts to become involved with offshore accident prevention. He had 
attended a meeting of OIAC six months earlier where the employers had stated 
catagorically (sic) that under no circumstances would they entertain the idea of 
Trade Union representation on Safety matters in the Offshore Industry. He 
described the debate on this subject as pretty irate and concluded his letter to 
Jack Kinaharn at NUS Head Office with the gloomy but prophetic comment I 
believe we will get bogged down with consultation and discussions and 
consensus seeking. " 
By mid-1988 desultory discussion on safety offshore was still continuing 
through the OIAC sub-committee but progress was minimal. When Burgoyne 
had recommended the appointment of safety committees, the unions had hoped 
for the extension offshore of SI 500 but the employers had quickly recognised 
this as a threat to their autonomy and had managed to prevent it. Accident 
prevention, like the Memorandum of Understanding on Trade Union Access to 
Offshore Installations, had provided no bridge across which the unions could 
enter the offshore fortress of the oil companies. They were as far as they ever had 
been from breaking the unilateral control of the employers over the working 
enviromnent of the offshore oil and gas installations. 
2 The Explosion on Occidental Caledonia's Piper Alpha Platform 
A great deal has been written about the Piper Alpha disaster. Some survivors 
have written graphic accounts of their escape; the causes of the explosion have 
been investigated by highly experienced oil technologists and subsequently 
published; the government immediately ordered a public enquiry, which was 
chaired by the Scottish judge, Lord Cullen, whose report 29 led to significant 
changes in the law as it applied to accident prevention in the offshore oil and gas 
industry; even before the publication of the Cullen Report the government used 
its powers under the Mineral Workings (Offshore Installations) Act 1971 to 
introduce new safety measures offshore. The causes of the fire which destroyed 
Piper Alpha have no part in this thesis but since there were inevitable indust: rial 
relations consequences a brief account of the tragic event is apposite. Being no 
scientist, the author prefers to provide the summary of the disaster given by the 
27 j. Melvin Keenan to C. Reid, 23rd November, 1984. 
2" W. Duncan to J. Kinaham, 6th December, 1984. Appendix W. 
29 Cullen, The Hon. Lord, (1990) The Public Inquiry into the PiperAlpha Disaster. Vol I& 11. 
Cmnd 13 10. IIMSO London. 
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Chief Executive of the Offshore Safety Division of the Health and Safety 
Executive. 
On 6th July 1988,167 men died in the explosions andfire on the Piper Alpha 
fixed oil production platform in the North Sea. This was the biggest death foil in 
Britain for over 50 years; and the largest ever apart from major underground 
mining catastrophes. 
The immediate cause was the emission of a leakage ofgas condensate, resulting 
from the pressurisation of pipe work which was undergoing maintenance. The 
first explosion led quickly to a large crude oil fire. Yhe heat from the fire 
resulted in a rupture of a riser on a gas pipeline from another platrorm, 
producing a second and much bigger explosion, some 20 minutes after thefirst. 
After that, the fire built up rapidly, fuelled by ruptures of further risers from 
connecting pipelines. A further massive explosion occurred some 50 minutes 
after the initial event. Following this, the structural collapse of the platform was 
hastened by afurther series ofeaplosions. 
The rescuers faced an impossible task. Helicopters could not approach due to 
extensive smoke. All escape was by sea. 
Extraordinary courage was shown by the crews of the fast rescue craft, who 
repeatedly approached the great heat of the fire, to search for survivors. Two 
rescue crew died in the accident and a number of those involved received 
bravery awards. " 
It is also appropriate to add here Paragraph 14.52 of Lord Cullen's Report which 
gave a r6sum6 of the mismanagement of accident prevention on Piper Alpha by 
the operator, Occidental(Caledonia). 
General observations 
14.52 The evidence which I have considered in this chapter should be 
considered along with my observations in Chapters 11-13. It appears to me that 
there were significantflaws in the quality of Occidental's management of safety 
which affected the circumstances of the events of the disaster. Senior 
management were too easily satisfied that the PYW (Permit To Work) system 
was being operated correctly, relying on the absence of any feedback of 
problems as indicating that all was well. They failed to provide the training 
required to ensure that an effective PTIV system was operated in practice. In the 
face of a known problem with the deluge system they did not become personally 
involved in probing the extent of the problem and what should be done to resolve 
it as soon as possible. They adopted a superficial response when issues ofsafety 
were raised by others, as at the time of Mr SaIdana's report (he had suggested 
(June 1987) the possibility of an oil/gas riser rupture) and the Sutherland 
prosecution (following a fatal accident September 1987). Theyfailcd to ensure 
that emergency training was being provided as they intended Platform 
30 Barrell, A. C., (1994) North Sea Safety After Piper Alpha, p. 7. Royal Academy of 
Engineering and Royal Society of Edinburgh Lecture. 
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personnel and management were not prepared for a major emergency as they 
should have been. 
There was no suggestion from Lord Cullen that this typified in any way the 
approaches to the provision of safe working environments by other oil operators. 
Nevertheless an appalling disaster had taken place. Lord Cullen, having first 
exposed Occidental's inadequacy, both technically and organizationally, in 
preventing the catastrophe, (Volume One of the Report) then proposed radical 
changes in the management of accident prevention offshore (Volume Two). The 
Executive Summary of both volumes provides an excellent abstract of Lord 
Cullen's findings and recommendations and is included among the special 
appendices. 31 
3 Immediate Post-Piper Alpha Developments in Accident Prevention 
Television brought the horror of Piper Alpha into every home in the United 
Kingdom. The government was prompted into an immediate response and, not 
surprisingly, the reactions of the trade unions to the disaster included the claim 
that had there been appropriate trade union involvement in the operation of 
safety procedures on the installation the disaster might have been averted. For 
the oil companies the public inquiry into Piper Alpha represented the first serious 
challenge to their virtually autonomous rule in the North Sea. 
(a) Government Response. 
Seven days after Piper Alpha (the name of the installation is now commonly 
used in reference to the disaster without any accompanying word such as 
6'disastee' or "explosion") Lord Cullen was appointed to chair a public enquiry 
into the accident. Since many months would inevitably pass before his 
investigation could be completed and his report made available, the government 
took other measures designed to improve the management of accident prcvcntion 
offshore until new and comprehensive legislation could be cnacted. Using its 
powers under the Mineral Workings (Offshore Installations) Act 1971 it 
introduced by an Order in Council the Offshore Installations (Safety 
Representatives and Safety Committees) Regulations 1989 (Statutory Instrument 
971) which required that there should be a safety committee on every offshore 
installation; unlike Sl 500 of 1977 no right to appoint members of safety 
committees was granted to recognised trade unions. 32 
(b) The Employers' Response 
It was only natural for the oil companies to present themselves as responsible 
organizations, which identified safe working environments as thcir top priority. 
On the whole this was probably true of most ma or operators, although no j 
31 The Executive Sununary and other relevant documcntation are reproduced in Appendix EEE. 
32S. 1.971 was based on draft proposals for safety committees offshore which OJAC had been 
discussing but on which little progress had been made on account of the conflicting views of the 
trade unions and oil companies on the manner in which employee representatim would be 
appointed. 
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company can avoid the possibility of an error of judgment or a failure to follow 
standard procedures. Almost all offshore installations had safety committees of 
some type in place at the time of Piper Alpha but they varied widely in 
composition and effectiveness. While there do seem to have been some cases 
where complaints by employees regarding the safety of their work environment 
resulted in discontinuance of their employment these were few and at this 
distance in time are now impossible to quantify. One senior personnel manager 
said that there was a grain of truth in the NRB action among the less-enlightened 
drilling companies in the 1980s but to say that NRB was the immediate response 
to anyone who raised a safety issue would be badpublicity. A personnel director 
commented apart from the humanitarian aspect of safety, which all good 
companies respect, it is only sensible to keep your employees safe and 
demonstrate to them that your working practices are the safest possible in the 
circumstances. The personnel manager of one of the largest operators claimed 
that there was no change in procedures post-Cullen as the company already had 
in place regular safety committees on all its installations while another asserted 
that injuries are now in decline in percentage terms over the lastfew years and 
this trend began before Piper Alpha. " 
As part of its strategy to redress the industry's image as one which gave a low 
priority to employee safety, UKOOA commemorated the twenty fifth 
anniversary of oil and gas exploration in the North Sea (1989) with a special 
publication. In the chapter on safety there appeared the following sentences. The 
basic approach of the industry is to ensure that there are well designedfacilities 
and that high quality people run them with procedures of a high standard. - 
Concern for human safety comes before purely commercial considerations. In 
any event, a safe installation is more reliable and more profitable than an unsafe 
one. 34 
Perhaps the accident prevention r6gime on Piper Alpha had been far worse than 
on any other installation in the North Sea and possibly no other operator was 
guilty of what Lord Cullen called a superfilcial attitude to the assessment of the 
risk of major hazard. " What is certain is that the oil companies immediately 
after Piper Alpha mounted a damage limitation exercise. In particular they 
carried out thorough appraisals of their equipment and the safest methods of 
utilisation. For example, in the two years 1989 and 1990 the locations of ovcr 
400 emergency shut down valves were checked and more than 150 wcrc 
repositioned. Evidence to Lord Cullen was presented by 64 expert witnesscs of 
whom 34 were from operating companies in membership of UKOOA. Two 
months after Lord Cullen published his report Dr Harold Hughes, Director- 
General of UKOOA, summariscd their contributions in a special article'6which 
shows how UKOOA had depicted an industry at the forefront of modern safety 
management practices. Piper Alpha had been a tremendous jolt to their industry 
33 These four conunents were made to the author during interviews on accident prevention. 34 UKOOA, (1989) The North Sea Achievement, p. 29. UKOOA. London. 
35 Cullen Report para 1.14. 
36 Hughes, H. (199 1) The offshore industry's response to Lord Cullen's reconunendations. 
Petroleum Review, 45, pp. 5-8. 
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and it would have been irresponsible of the operators if they had not at once set 
about urgent re-appraisals of our management practices and hardware. " 
Consequently by the time Lord Cullen took evidence from UKOOA 
representatives they were able to give a lengthy and accurate account of the 
industry's current accident prevention measures. 
It was obvious to UKOOA that the trade unions would use Piper Alpha as an 
argument to win for themselves some form of mandatory recognition such as the 
extension of SI 500 offshore and UKOOA was determined to avoid this. 
Changes in the working environment of all installations offshore were bound to 
follow Lord Cullen's report but there were some areas where the operators could 
argue that no change was required. In particular they were determined to retain 
control of industrial relations on their offshore installations. 
This was revealed at the first quarterly meeting of IUOOC and UKOOA within 
seven weeks of Piper Alpha. The trade union organization asked UKOOA if their 
members had any further thoughts about the introduction of SI 500 (The Safety 
Representatives and Safety Committees Regulations) and received the answer 
that the operating companies believed that the existing regulations offshore were 
by and large satisfactory and that there was no need to extend the Regulations to 
the offshore industry. " This was the argument which UKOOA laid before Lord 
Cullen when their representatives gave evidence at the public inquiry. 
(c) The Trade Unions' Response 
It would be utterly unfair to say that the trade unions saw Piper Alpha essentially 
as an opportunity too good to be missed; their sympathy for the families of Piper 
Alpha victims was no less than that of others and was in some ways greater. 
There still lies dormant within the British trade union movement a particular 
sentiment which wells up when a major industrial disaster happens and is 
expressed by workers sharing directly rather than indirectly the grief of the 
bereaved. This accounts, in part, for the manner in which some trade unionists 
gave evidence to Lord Cullen since they genuinely believed that the companies' 
opposition to trade unions deprived employees of a voice in the management of 
accident prevLtion offshore and was a factor in Piper Alpha. It may also 
account for the evidence of one trade union official being described to the author 
as scurrilous in the extreme bearing no relation tofacts. 39 
Perhaps the union officers overplayed the safety issue when they declared to 
Lord Cullen that accident prevention was the main industrial relations factor 
offshore. If one adds together the various issues arising offshore which can be 
classed as industrial relations in the years beforc Piper Alpha, wage rates and 
earnings emerge as the principal factor. On the other hand they were able to 
argue that on account of their wealth of experience in accident prevention trade 
unions could make a positive and constructive contribution to improvcd safety 
37 Hughes, H. op cit. 
38 lUOOC minute of meeting with LTKOOA on 24th August, 1988. 
39 Comment by a senior personnel manager. 
I 
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offshore. 40 The trade union officers had a realistic hope that when he made his 
report Lord Cullen would recommend that oil companies should offer the type of 
recognition they had so long been refused. 
4 The Cullen Report 
41 
Lord Cullen sent his report to te Secretary of State for Energy, John 
Wakeham, on 19th October, 1990 and it was published three weeks later on 12th 
November. It consisted of two volumes, the first providing an account of the 
disaster and the second his recommendations on the measures necessary to 
improve accident prevention offshore. The trade unions were greatly 
disappointed that Lord Cullen made no recommendation for trade union 
appointment to offshore safety committees. As expected, he proposed that there 
should be a new regulatory body for the industry and by April 1991 a special 
division of the HSE, the Offshore Safety Division (OSD), had replaced PED. 
The HSE (and through it the OSD) was responsible to the Health and Safety 
Commission and there was thus now some official trade union influence on the 
industry. This influence was, however, remote, and a poor substitute for the 
direct representation on offshore safety committees to which the trade unions 
aspired. 
Lord Cullen went to some lengths to explain why he did not recommend the 
appointment of trade union representatives to offshore safety committees. fie 
said that his remit did not extend to matters of industrial relations, whether or 
not the point at issue is a controversial one, as it is in the case of the offshore 
work(orce. " but, possibly out of courtesy to the trade unions, he did not leave it 
at that. In the following paragfaph" there appear the words, much quoted 
subsequently by supporters of the trade union position, I am prepared to accept 
that the appointment of offshore safety representatives by trade unions could be 
of some benefit in making the work of safety representatives and safety 
committees effective. This comment, however, was prefaced with the words In 
the light of the evidence which I have heard, which admittedly came almost 
entirelyfrom trade union witnesses. UKOOA had argued quite the opposite, 
maintaining that the 1989 regulations (SI 971) were adequate and that there was 
no evidence that trade unionists were more concerned than other employees with 
accident prevention. In any case they did not prevent a trade union member 
becoming a safety representative and having trade union support. " Tbus Lord 
Cullen proposed to the government that the arrangements regarding employee 
40 This point was strongly argued by Roger Lyons, now Assistant General Secretary of MSF 
(formerly ASTMS) and were reproduced in some detail by Lord Cullen at paras 21.79 and 21.80 
of his report. 
" "Me findings and recommendations of those parts of the Cullen Report relevant to this thesis 
are contained in a special appendix entitled "Cullen Report". 
42 v. Cullen Report para 21.83. 
43 v. Cullen Report para 21.84. 
44 v. Cullen Report para 21.8 1. 
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representation offshore should remain as they stood . 
45 He nevertheless lcft some 
slight hope for the trade unions because he noted that the regulatory body 
intended to review the 1989 regulations after two years of their operation. He 
suggested that the regulatory body might amend the existing scheme so as to 
require that safety representatives are appointed by trade unions in certain 
cases, such as where a trade union had achieved recognition in relation to a 
substantial aspect of labour relations and had a substantial membership on the 
installation in question. " 
When the regulatory body reviewed SI 971 at the end of 1991 virtually no trade 
union had achieved substantial membership on any installation and there was 
therefore no reason for it to recommend that membership of statutory safety 
committees should include trade union appointees. It is also possible that board 
members were aware of a recently published report commissioned by the HSE 
on the effectiveness of Sl 500.47 The authors, while not recommending that trade 
unions lose the powers granted to them under SI 500, concluded that the 
approach of the management of an enterprise is still the most crucialfactor in 
determining the extent to which it is able to develop its health and safety 
organisation. 48 Moreover, they went on to remind HSE that the provisions for 
trade union appointed safety representatives were part of the Social Contrace9 
under which the government passed a package of legislative rightsfor employees 
and encouraged the development of more solid trade union organisation, in 
exchange for promises of pay restraint from the trade unions. " By 1990 
commitment to collective bargaining as a basic institution of the regulation of 
industrial relations is no longerparamoun? ' and it would have been unlikely for 
a Conservative government to have disregarded the regulatory body's 
recommendations to the extent of requiring appointments of trade union 
nominees to offshore safety committees. 
Any last hope that the trade unions entertained of securing their offshore 
objectives went with the publication of what is usually referred to as the Spavcn 
Report. 52 This was a report on the effectiveness of SI 971 carried out under the 
auspices of the University of Aberdeen Offshore Study Group for the IISE. From 
the evidence gathered in 1992 across a wide spectrum of the offshore oil and gas 
" There was one minor exception and this was the transference of the cost of safety training 
wholly to the operator. This released the smaller contractors ftom the burden of meeting the 
costs of training their elected safety representatives but it was of scant interest to the trade 
unions. 
46 v. Cullen Report para 21.85. 
47 Walters, D. and Gourlay, S. 1990. Statutory Involvement in Health and Safety at the 
Workplace: A Report of the Implementation and Effectiveness of the Safety Representatives and 
Safety Committees Regulations 1977. HSE Contract Research Report No 20/1990.1IMSO 
London. 
48 Walters, D. and Gourlay, S. op cit p. 10 1. 49 v. Chapter Four, p. 58 supra. 
50 Walters, D. and Gourlay, S. op cit p. 126. 51 Walters, D. and Gourlay, S. op cit p. 127. 52 Spaven, M., Ras, H., Morrison, A. and Wright, C. (1993) The Effectiveness of Offshore Safety 
Representatives and Safety Committees-A Report to the Health and Safety Executive.. I ISE 
Report OTO 93 012, HSE Information Services, Sheffield. 
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industry during which 63 current safety representatives were interviewed, 
Spaven reached 38 conclusions, only two of which related to trade unions. One 
was that trade unionists, if elected onto offshore safety committees, should be 
permitted by their employers to attend trade union-provided training courses. 
This was hardly controversial but it was the other conclusion that put paid to any 
lingering hopes among the trade unions that a direct r6le might be found for 
them on offshore safety committees. 
Support for increased involvement of trade unions in the work of Safety 
Representatives is considerable among offshore workers. However there is no 
clear majorityfor a system of union appointment of Safety Representatives, and 
such a system, if widely applied, would present doliculties for the 
representational rights of non-members of trade unions. " 
5 Conflicting Perceptions of the Trade Union Rble In Accident Prevention 
The totally different perceptions of trade unions and employers towards the 
management of accident prevention offshore have prevented them reaching any 
compromise. The trade unions believe that accident prevention cannot be 
separated from industrial relations because methods of work and the 
environment within which that work is carried out directly affect an employee's 
well-being. They contend that when a conflict of opinion on the safety of a 
working environment arises a trade union or a representative with trade union 
backing is in a better position than an employee to argue the case. 
Understandably, they draw attention to Norwegian trade unions which enjoy 
statutory backing for their direct participative r6le aboard installations operating 
above Norway's continental shelf. The different status of Norwegian unions was 
brought into sharp focus by an oil installation manager of Elf Petroleum Norge at 
a conference on the oil industry in 1996 when he said that a major cost reduction 
exercise had been carried out by a steering committee which included a trade 
union member. 54 Unions cannot share responsibility because that belongs wholly 
to management but British trade unions consider that they ought to be able to 
influence decisions on accident prevention in the same way as their Norwegian 
brothers. This right has been granted to British unions onshore under Sl 500 and 
is a substantive right which they will never willingly surrender. 
With equal determination the oil and gas employers will seek to prevent trade 
unions from enjoying similar rights offshore. This is unequivocally stated in the 
evidence of oil company representatives to the House of Commons Energy 
Committee in 1991. An MP had asked Robert McKee, who was then chairman 
of Conoco, if a safety representative on an offshore installation was not in a 
better position to carry out his responsibilities if he was supported by a trade 
union. McKee answered I cannot think of any case individually where anyone 
has gotten into a conflict about safety things. nere is certainly lots ofiliscussion 
53 Spaven Report para 6.4.1. 
. 54 Christian Hansen at the Fifth Oil Installation Managers Conference organized by The Robert 
Gordon University at Aberdeen on 16th April, 1996. 
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and debate, especially if it is something that is controversial that others do not 
agree with, but everyone has a forum in which to put their ideas 
forward ....... management invariably supports them. 
" The rationale of the 
industry's policy in this matter was given more succinctly by the Director- 
General of UKOOA, Harold Hughes, when he told the Committee that the 
connection between the management of offshore safety, and trade union aspects 
of industrial relations is, at least in our minds, tenuous. ' 
In conversation with the author, a former operations director of an international 
oil company translated this concept into more concrete terms. He argued that 
accident prevention is best achieved on a project basis where the safety 
committees act like audit committees looking at all aspects of the work carried 
out on their installations. Consequently, to be an effective member of a safety 
committee it is important that each member understands the entire breadth of the 
operations of the installation. If an accident has occurred, the immediate question 
must be "Where did we go wrong? " and in order to answer this question there 
must be full comprehension of the safety aspects of individual jobs. There is thus 
no benefit from the presence of a trade union nominee because an ordinary 
employee, competent at his task and knowledgeable about the processes 
involved on the installation, will make an excellent contribution to the 
maintenance of a secure working environment. This is what is now happening 
offshore and the safety committee system is proving its worth. 
In any case there is a forum where trade unions and oil industry employers meet 
on a regular basis and discuss accident prevention. This is the Offshore 
Petroleum Industry Training Organisation (OPITO), the origins of which go 
back to the Petroleum Industry Training Board (PITB). Training Boards vested 
with certain statutory powers were set up under the Industry Training Act (1964) 
to improve standards of training across all major industries and accident 
prevention, an inevitable concomitant of training, received its due attention. By 
1980 the government considered that most ITI)s had achieved their purpose and 
closed them down, apart from a few where training was decrned still to need 
government support and persuasion. The oil operating companies had been 
appalled at the laxity of accident prevention among some of their contractors and 
for this reason UKOOA asked for the PITB; to be among those that were to be 
retained. The government decided to allow the offshore side of the existing PITB 
to survive as a statutory body, the Offshore Petroleum ITD, but to wind down 
the onshore side which had a short existence as the Petroleum Training 
Federation. Several years later the Offshore Industry ITI) became the non- 
statutory Offshore Petroleum Industry Training Organisation (OPITO) which 
remains with us to-day. As in the PITB and the Offshore Industry ITD tradc 
unions continue to be involved as full members in the work of OPITO and 
contribute their views on safety as well as on all other matters concerned with 
employment offshore. 
55 Seventh Report, Session 19901199 1, House of Conunons Energy Cornrnittee, Offshore Safety 
Management HC43 p. 42. HMSO. 
56 lbid p. 23. 
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Arguments over the differing perceptions of employee and union participation in 
accident prevention were not confined to installations on the United Kingdom 
continental shelf. In April 1986 Roger Lyons and John Miller, who now 
57 
represented the TUC on OIAC , attended a meeting in Geneva of the Petroleum 
Committee of the International Labour Organization. In discussions on an agreed 
Resolution of ILO concerning freedom of association in the petroleum industry 
a fierce debate took place on the interpretation of the term "independent workers' 
representatives". Miller and Lyons wanted this to be rendered as "trade union 
representatives" but met strong opposition not only from the multinational oil 
companies, which they had expected, but also from the ILO administrative staff. 
The latter insisted that successive ILO conferences and the ILO Governing 
Board had always used the term "workers' representatives". During informal 
consultations with representatives of non-English speaking nations Miller and 
Lyons found that "independent workers' representatives" was widely accepted as 
meaning "trade union representatives". The UK, USA, Australian and Canadian 
trade union representatives along with their Norwegian confr6res agreed at a 
meeting of the Workers' Group at this conference that references to "'Workers' 
representatives" were not in the best interests of developing trade union rights in 
the Petroleum Industry, as supported by ILO Conventions and previous 
Resolutions of the Petroleum Committee. " 
Thus the trade unions could not even claim that the oil companies were in breach 
of any agreed Resolution of the International Labour Organization. Not that the 
oil companies relied on this since it was almost a question of semantics and not 
strong ground to defend. If the trade unions wanted to fight for their preferred 
interpretation that was their business but the industry would oppose any change 
if and when it was proposed. 
Interpretation of "independent workers' representatives" and whether or not 
accident prevention is an industrial relations matter requiring a trade union 
dimension are relevant to any debate on the management of offshore safety. 
Their weakness from the trade union aspect is that the unions have far too few 
members in employment offshore. Indeed, trade union membership is so poor 
that it renders superfluous any debate based on the premises of an interpretation 
of an ILO Resolution or of the employers' dictum that safety management 
offshore needs no trade union input. To use military parlance the unions just do 
not have enough troops on the ground and the reasons for this have been 
analysed and discussed earlier. 59Lord Cullen had said that the regulatory body 
might amend SI 971 to require safety representatives to be appointed by trade 
unions but this would be where a union had achieved a substantial membership 
on the installation in question. Only one has done so, MSF, on Phillips' Maureen 
installation and this happened immediately aftcr Piper Alpha. 60 No other union 
57 They had also been the two TUC representatives on the Burgoyne Committee. v. p. 177 supra. 
58 Part of Report to TUC by Miller and Lyons on the meeting of the ILO Petroleum Conunittee 
at Geneva 9th -17th April, 1986. v. Appendix X. 59 v. Chapter Ten. 
60 v. p. 2 of Appendix S.. 
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61 can claim any success and, as already stated , the regulatory body made no 
requirement concerning the appointment of trade union representatives to 
offshore safety committees. This remains the position today. 
Trade unions and offshore operators have diametrically opposed policies on the 
management of accident prevention. The operators, perhaps with a certain degree 
of arrogance, believe that they can best exercise this responsibility where, 
working on the joint consultative principle with elected safety representatives, 
they retain unchallenged control of working environments. Shell Exploration and 
Production's head of safety and environment legislation has asserted that the new 
regulations encouraged workforce participation in the safety process through 
the statutory safety committees. "' The trade unions believe that, despite the 
protestations of the employers, there are times when the demands of production 
will outweigh proper considerations of safety and that only trade union 
representation can provide the protection which offshore workers require. This 
view has been expressed in a 1995 paper presented at the Leith International 
Conference by Dr Charles Woolfson and Dr Matthias Beck '63 two academics 
who argue that the industry's drive to reduce its overall costs - for which the 
term Cost Reduction Initiative in the New Era or CRINE had been coined - may 
well be accompanied by a longer run deterioration of safety standards. 64 Not 
unnaturally UKOOA has ripostcd with an instant and indignant rebuttal wherein 
it has declared that the huge sum of Obný5 has been spent on improving offshore 
safety since 1990 and that the accident statistics demonstrate an ever reducing 
accident rate. 66 UKOOA further contends that the paucity of trade union 
membership offshore indicates that their employees are satisfied with things as 
they are. 
Academic support for this view is provided by some recent research carried out 
by the Offshore Management Centre of Ile Robert Gordon University in 
conjunction with the Norwegian University of SciencC. 67 The mainly non- 
unioniscd. British workers appear to be just as satisfied with safety on their 
installations as the unionised Norwegian workers. 68 Trade union safety delegates 
did not prevent the Alexander Kielland tragedy and it seems unlikely that British 
61 V. P. 190 supra. 
62 Seager, A., 1995 Maximising Safety into the Next Century. Expro-update (a Shell in-house 
rublication). 
3 Beck, M. and Woolfson, C (1995) The Piper, 41pha Disaster and the Hidden Deregulation of 
Britain's Offshore Oil Industry. (The term "Leith" is given to an annual conference on offshore 
safety which was held in its first few years at Leith but now takes place at different venues in 
Scotland each year. The 1995 conference was at Aberdeen. ) This paper was later published (also 
1995) as an occasional paper by the University of Glasgow but with an amended title: Seven 
Years after Piper Alpha: Safety Claims and the New Safety Case Regime. 
64 Beck and Woolfson, op cit p. 3. 
65 V. UKOOA statement published by the Dundee Courier and Advertiser, 7th December, 1996. 
66 Appendix Y. 
" At Trondheim, Norway. 
68 Fleming, M., Flin, R., Mearns, K. Gordon, R. and Rundmo, T. (1997) A Comparative Study of 
Risk Perception and Safety in UK and Norwegian Offshore Personnel. Offshore Technology 
Report OTO 96 049 prepared for the Offshore Safety Division of the UK Ilealth and Safety 
Executive. 
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trade union appointees to a safety committee could have prevented Piper Alpha. 
Norwegian and British managerial cultures differ but there is no conclusive 
evidence of greater levels of stress among one or the other workforce who share 
the common problems of employment on isolated installations in the North 
Sea. 69 
A contrasting opinion to Woolfson and Beck has been expressed by another 
academic, Peter Kidger, who has argued that since there is statutory participation 
by trade unions on safety committees in workplaces onshore, there has been little 
opportunity to study the experience of committees where the employee 
representation is not union influenced other than on installations offshore since 
1989. He even goes so far as to suggest that the system operating on North Sea 
oil installations provides a useful model which could be drawn upon for 
application onshore. "' Kidger's argument is based on the Robens principle that 
in their joint consultative approach to offshore safety the oil companies are 
interpreting correctly the philosophy of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974. 
Nine years have passed since Piper Alpha. As a direct result the management of 
accident prevention was considerably altered and industrial relations were 
affected to the extent that safety committees had to conform to a certain 
structure. This structure, however, has been designed to encourage joint 
consultation and thereby has helped the employers to impede trade union 
attempts to win that direct participation for which they have always striven. 71c 
IUOOC71 trade unions, while retaining representation on safety committees as an 
objective, have left it to academics such as Dr Woolfson to fight this battle on 
their behalf. The employers remain vigilant in their defence of the current system 
which denies representation to trade unions. The senior HSE official who said 
that the perfect safety management system is one where inere are shared values" 
was looking for a nirvana into which the oil companies and the trade unions are 
unlikely to enter. 
6 Summary 
When Lord Robens looked at industrial safety in the early 1970s he found a mass 
of prescriptive legislation. He advised that this approach should be jettisoned in 
favour of a philosophy based upon the setting of goals where the manncr in 
which they were attained could be left to the employer. He saw no legitimate 
scope for collective bargaining although there was the tacit assumption that 
organized labour would participate in the setting and monitoring of the safety 
'9 Offshore Technology Report OTO 96 049 (note 69 supra) is a distillation of the research of the 
five authors over the period 1992-1997. Rundrno's contribution was in the area of stress 
measurement. 
70 Kidger, P., (1993) op cit pp. 21-35 and Should Union Appointed or EjeCted Safety 
Representatives be the Modelfor the UK? University of Salford Working Paper No 9003. 
71 The attitude of OILC (which is excluded from IUOOQ is different. Its primary objective is 
direct representation on offshore oil safety committees and it continues to f ight for this. 
72 Spaven Report p. It 7.. 
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goals. This philosophy was embodied in the Heath and Safety at Work Act 1974 
and three years later SI 500 - The Safety Representatives and Safety Committees 
Regulations - gave to recognised trade unions the statutory right to demand the 
establishment of accident prevention committees where none existed and to 
appoint representatives to them. 
The Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 was extended offshore in 1977. 
However, this had a minimum effect on offshore industry since its regulatory 
powers were delegated to the Petroleum Engineering Division of the Department 
of Energy and SI 500 could not apply since it could be invoked only by 
recognised trade unions. In. consequence a compliance rather than a safety 
culture emerged offshore where trade unions were denied participation. 
British industry has always recognised trade union interest in accident prevention 
as legitimate and the TUC has representation along with industry and the 
government on the Health and Safety Commission. When the trade unions 
realised that their recruitment efforts offshore had failed they tried to use safety 
as a vehicle which would bring them to the offshore negotiating table. It was a 
strategy that was pursued over many years but which ultimately failed although 
there were occasions when it seemed events on the national stage (Burgoyne 
Committee and Piper Alpha) might have assisted the unions to attain their 
objective. 
From the very start of the North Sea oil and gas industry's entry onto the British 
scene fears and warnings had been expressed about the industry's commitment to 
safe working environments. An Oil Industry Advisory Committee (OIAC) had 
been formed in 1978 but the catalogue of deaths and serious injuries among 
employees led to the government setting up the Burgoyne Committee to 
investigate and to advise on offshore. safety. Here was an opportunity for the 
trade unions. to advance their point of view before a body which could 
recommend to the government that they had a contribution to make in accident 
prevention offshore as well as onshore. Trade union officers gave evidence 
critical of the employer policy of refusing to negotiate with them and of the 
token non-union staff safety committees on installations. They demanded the 
extension of SI 500 offshore and the replacement of PED by the HSE. The 
employers argued to the contrary and the Burgoyne Committee's report (1980) 
made no recommendations which upset the status quo. Safety committees were 
recommended for every installation but their composition was delegated to a 
subcommittee of OIAC which did not start serious negotiations until 1984. 
Mainly on account of its trade union representatives insisting on some form of 
mandatory trade union membership of offshore safety committees no agreement 
had been reached before Piper Alpha. Trade union correspondence over the four 
years 1984-88 indicates total dissatisfaction with Department of Energy 
suggestions on the make up of the Burgoyne- proposed safety committees since 
each suggestion left total control with the employers. Burgoyne had not provided 
the unions with a bridge to cross into the offshore oil and gas industry. 
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Nor did Piper Alpha, which had far fewer consequences for industrial relations 
than the extent of the disaster had portended. Lord Cullen was appointed to chair 
a public inquiry but the oil companies mounted a damage limitation exercise 
aimed at showing that the unacceptable level of accident prevention procedures 
and practice on Piper Alpha was exceptional and that the industry was highly 
responsible in its approach to the provision of safe working practices. The 
government had introduced SI 971 requiring a safety committee on every 
offshore installation but, unlike SI 500, it made no provision for trade union 
membership as of right. The trade unions argued before Lord Cullen that they 
had a legitimate part to play in accident prevention offshore and that the 
contribution of organized labour towards the maintenance of safe working 
environments had been demonstrated by the successful part played by trade 
unions within the Norwegian oil and gas industry. The Cullen Report (1990), 
however, concerned itself principally with the introduction of specific safety 
procedures and made no recommendation for the mandatory appointment of 
trade union representatives onto safety committees. It suggested that if a trade 
union were subsequently to achieve substantial membership on an installation 
the existing safety committee scheme might be amended to allow trade union 
appointees. 
Neither the regulatory body in 1991 nor the Spaven Report in 1993 saw any 
reason to suggest that trade unions should have a statutory right to participate on 
accident prevention committees offshore. The trade unions had not been able to 
recruit the substantial number of members which, Cullen had indicated, might 
justify such appointments and Spaven believed that the representational rights of 
non-members of trade unions would be infringed if employee representatives 
were to be limited to trade unionists. 
Industrial relations offshore have continued to develop along paths where the 
trade unions may not tread because the employers have been able to deny them 
access. The joint consultative approach which conforms to the preferred 
industrial relations mode of the employers is putting down ever deeper roots in 
the industry through the statutory safety committees on each installation. The 
trade unions long battle to secure mandatory rights in appointments to these 
safety committees has been lost and with it any prospect of collective bargaining 
in the foreseeable future. 
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CHAPTER TWELVE 
OFFSHORE CONTRACTING 
Derbyshire was the site of the earliest discovery of oil in the United Kingdom. 1 
In the 1930s and early 1940s exploration was undertaken there and in other parts 
of the country2 with further small onshore discoveries made after 1950. As in the 
United States of America, all the drilling of onshore sites was done by 
contractors and self-employed persons and not by the operators, although by 
1955 BP had developed its own teams for this work. Hence, when it was known 
that there were huge reserves of oil and gas in the North Sea, BP and other 
operators had no alternative but to hire American drilling companies which alone 
had the necessary technology and experience for exploration on this vast scale. 
These drilling companies brought with them a rough, at times brutal, 
authoritarianism to their employee relationships. In the early days of the industry 
in the North Sea it was not unusual for men to be refused further employment 
because the chief driller did not like them or, on the flimsiest of grounds, did not 
think they were pulling their weight. The unadulterated absolutism practised by 
one chief driller has already been described in an earlier chapter' but gradually 
British employment law came to have a moderating effect. 
By 1974 a new form of contracting had arrived offshore and it expanded in 
relation to the number of oil fields discovered. This covered the engineering and 
related work involved in hook-up which may be defined as the activityfollowing 
offshore development installation (of a plaffiorm) during which all connections 
and services are made operablefor commissioning and start-up! Almost from 
the beginning the relationships between the contractors and their employees 
engaged on hook-up have been regulated under special offshore construction 
agreements negotiated between contractor organizations and trade unions. 
From the time of their commissioning the installations are in permanent need of 
maintenance and servicing and the operators devolve this responsibility to 
contractors. There are only about twenty operators but thousands of contracting 
companies ranging from local one-man enterprises to engineering companies 
such as Brown and Root which are comparable in size to the opcrators 
themselves. By 1990 about four fifths of all offshore workers were employed by 
contractors and in stark contrast to the hook-up stage (somctimes also callcd 
construction) their terms and conditions of employment have never been 
discussed with the trade unions! 
1 Shale oil had been produced at Pumpherston in West Lothian ftorn the middle of the 19th 
century It was derived from aromatic hydrocarbon and converted into naphthalene but had 
limited uses as a fuel. In any case it could not compete with liquid petroleum which became 
available before the end of the century. 2 Interestingly, Dr J. H. B. Vant, to whose research in the oil industry reference has been made 
above and later in this chapter, was present at Tuxford, Nottinghamshire in 1942 when a 
Canadian firm was drilling for oil and he observed some of the work being carried out. 3 v. Chapter Eight 
4 Bank of Scotland International Division Oil and Gas Handbook. 1989. op cit. 
5 Electrical work is an exception. v. p. 201 infra. 
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1 Offshore Construction Agreements 
(a) Their General Pattern 
An offshore platform is something like a miniature oil refinery and 
petrochemical complex situated on an offshore island with the power 
requirements (which it must generate itself) of a town of 20,000 inhabitants. 
There must also be accommodation for about 200 persons or more together with 
administration and technical facilities. When there is major work in progress, 
such as during hook-up or large structural modifications, extra accommodation 
may be needed for as many as seven hundred persons and in such cases sleeping 
quarters are provided in "flotels", which are temporary surface modules moored 
adjacent to the installation. Today most platforms are concrete and can be 
finished in sheltered onshore locations where much of the hook-up and 
commissioning can be completed before the platform is towed out. In the 1970s 
and 1980s, however, hook-up was a much more complicated and lengthy 
process. This is how it was described in a 1984 publication. 
Steel jackets (the legs or substructure of the steel playbrm) are floated to 
location on barges or flotation units, in the horizontal position, launched, up- 
ended and placed on the seabed by controlled ballasting. After piling into the 
seabed, the deck and modules are lifted onto the top of the jacket. Modules are 
large "boxes" containing all the equipment necessary to operate the plaýform. 
Even the crews'quarters are lifted onto the pla(rorm as fullyfittcd out modules, 
usually with the helipad on top. After installation several months are required 
for hook-up and commissioning of equipment before the play"orm is ready to 
start operating. " 
It was in 1974 that the Oil Chemical Plant Constructors Association (OCPCA) 
started to have discussions with UKOOA on the probable manpower needs 
offshore once the installations were ready to be floated out into the North Sea 
and constructed. It was soon clear to the operators that the OCPCA firms would 
have to rely to a great extent on employees with strong trade union 
affiliations'who were currently building the jackets and modules at the onshore 
construction sites such as Nigg and Loch Kishom. Most of the other men needed 
for work on hook-up contracts would be in different forms of engineering 
production or maintenance onshore and also accustomed to having their 
conditions of employment settled through the process of collective bargaining. 
Since the operators had already incurred immense expenditure on the exploration 
and development of their fields they were anxious to see as quick a return as 
possible on their investment, especially with the price of oil at $30 per barrel. 
They foresaw that this would not happen if companies which were awarded 
hook-up contracts suddenly ceased to negotiate with trade unions. 
6 The Institute of Petroleum (1994). Know More About Oil -The North Sea. p. 15., Mis edition 
updates the maps but retains the 1984 text. 
7 The influence wielded by trade unionists at the Nigg construction yard has been discussed in 
Chapter Six, pp. 96-97 supra.. 
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Accordingly the OCPCA drew up a model agreement on terms and conditions of 
work and submitted it to the operators for their comments. After further 
discussion their approval was obtained and thus there was initiated the practice, 
which continues to the present day, of the operators retaining a considerable 
amount -of control over the pay and conditions of work of their contractors. 
Woolfson, Foster and Beck' are almost certainly correct when they say that the 
operators always ensured that there was a differential in favour of their own staff 
in order to retain their loyalty and to implement, at least in the first decade and a 
half of oil production, a divide and rule policy. 
By the end of 1976 operators and contractors were ready to consult the 
appropriate craft trade unions led by John Baldwin, General Secretary of the. 
TUC National Engineering Construction Committee. Since the proposed pay and 
other conditions were attractive, collective bargaining rights guaranteed and shop 
steward activities permitted, the first hook-up agreement was reached with the 
minimum of difficulty. Its formal title was the Northern Waters Offshore 
Construction Agreement. 
Thus, while retaining their own adamantine opposition to the recognition of trade 
unions, the operators accepted that during hook-up work contractors could 
recognise trade unions and negotiate rates of pay, which were high enough to 
deter most workers from any unofficial industrial action. In addition shop 
stewards would be allowed to perform their traditional functions and so minor 
disputes could be settled before they escalated into stoppages of work. 
The content of an agreement on pay and conditions for workers engaged on 
hook-up does not differ in essence from that of the many others specifying rates 
of pay, hours of work and disciplinary procedures across the whole range of 
British industry. There is, however, one notable difference; workers employed on 
production, drilling, maintenance, underwater pipelaying, diving, catering and 
any other duties not designated as engineering construction or electrical 
installation work are excluded from the agreement. This means that, although a 
worker engaged in direct hook-up employment can raise a matter through his 
shop steward, such a facility is denied to a worker, possibly in the same union, 
who is laying pipes or carrying out general maintenance. Moreover, when all the 
hook-up work is completed and oil is extracted from the occan bed, the 
agreement immediately lapses and employees can find themselves within the 
course of twenty-four hours bereft of trade union protection and remunerated 
under different and usually less advantageous conditions of employment. In the 
jargon of the industry "first oil" is the description given to the earliest successful 
extraction of oil for commercial purposes and terminations of hook-up contracts 
are said to take place "from first oil". 
At intervals unions and management negotiate a new offshore construction 
agreement or OCA. The original contracting parties were, for the employers, the 
8 Woolfson, C., Foster, J. and Beck, M. (1996) Payingfor the Piper p. 91. Mansell, London. 
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Oil and Chemical Plant Constructors' Association (OCPCA) and the Electrical 
Contractors' Association and for the trade unions the Amalgamated Union of 
Engineering Workers (AUEW), Electrical, Electronic, Telecommunication and 
Plumbing Union (EETPU) and the General Municipal Boilermakers and Allied 
Trade Union (GMBATU). In 1984 the employers set up the Offshore 
Contractors' Council to represent their interests including that of negotiating the 
OCAs. (Unfortunately, to some extent, OCA has now become also the 
abbreviation for the Offshore Contractors' Association, the title which replaced 
the Offshore Contractors' Council in 1996 but the chance of any confusion is 
slight. ) Ostensibly these OCAs are negotiated solely and freely between the 
signatory parties but the operators have always made sure that no clause is 
injected which is not to their liking. The degree of influence exercised by the 
operators over OCAs is not, however, as great as that which they are able to 
wield over the catering contractors! 
(b) The SJIB Offshore Post-Construction Agreement 
There is one anomalous offshore agreement. Determined though they are to keep 
trade unions off their platforms once they are in production, the operators make 
an exception in the case of electricians employed by contractors who are 
members of the Scottish Joint Industry Board (SJIB) for the Electrical 
Contracting Industry. The reasons for this can only be a matter of conjecture. It 
may be the operators believe that the possibility of any industrial action is 
remote because the length of a contract is oflen short and sometimes the numbers 
of electricians few. Another reason may be that when this issue first arosc the 
operators wanted to foster what other trade unions decried as the EETPU 
penchant for currying favour with managements. " Again, the decision may have 
been reached on the pragmatic grounds that any fracas between an employee and 
the SJIB contractor on an installation can affect the whole functioning of the 
installation. Whatever the reasons, the operators agree to the union and the SJIB 
negotiating Offshore Post-Construction Agreements. Rates of pay arc 
nevertheless lower than those earned on hook-up and the agreement does not 
apply to electrical workers whose employers are not members of the Electrical 
Contractors Association. Similar agreements have been sought by trade unions 
representing other categories of worker but have never been conceded. 
2 Disputes during Hook-Up Contracts 
There have been few disputes between contractors and their employees engaged 
on hook-up work and this may be the result of the prudence of the operators in 
accepting traditional trade union and management relationships offshore. Only 
two disputes deserve attention. 
9 v. Chapter Nine. 
10 By the mid-1980s single union bargaining had become an objective of employers and the 
EET? U was fairly unscrupulous in how it achieved that status for itself, It eventually led to 
EET? U being suspended for some time from the TUC. In 1992 the AEU (formerly AUEW) 
amalgamated with the EETPU to form the AEEU. 
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(a) The Ninian Field Dispute 
The first of these arose out of an understandable complaint on the part of the 
contractors' employees on hook-up. Originally, both the oil companies and the 
contractors had operated work cycles of two weeks offshore and one week 
onshore but in 1978 the operators added a week to the onshore period, thus 
equalising the time spent offshore and onshore. The contractors' employees, 
however, were still required to work under the original agreement. There were 
also grievances over pay and travel allowances which exacerbated the unrest. In 
September 1978 hook-up workers on Chevron's Ninian field went on unofficial 
strike and were airlifted onshore. Within a fortnight trade union officials had 
persuaded -their members to return on the understanding that the principal 
grievances would be addressed during negotiations for the 1979 OCA which 
were about to take place. However, impatient with what they saw as lack of 
progress on a new OCA, their shop stewards brought them out on strike again in 
the first week of January 1979 with rates of pay now assuming greater 
significance. Throughout January and into February the strike spread to several 
other North Sea platforms involving as many as 4,000 offshore workers at its 
peak. It took intervention by the Under-Secretary of State for Energy, Dr 
Dickson Mabon, and national officers of the trade unions to secure a resumption 
of work by the end of February on the understanding that negotiations with the 
Offshore Contractors' Council would be resumed. The national officers agreed a 
settlement with OCC and although its terms were rejected by the workers it was 
nevertheless implemented by the employers without any subsequent unrest. In 
short, the strikers had gained very little at some financial cost to themselves. 
Some authorities" believe that the manner in which the full time trade union 
officers handled this dispute was an important factor in the apathy, to put it no 
stronger, displayed by offshore employees towards un;, ja recruitment drives in 
the 1980s. Yet it is difficult to identify another course of action that the trade 
union officers could have followed. Unofficial strikes always pose difficultics for 
trade unions but the dispute in 1978/79 could not have happened at a worse time. 
The Memorandum of Understanding on Trade Union Access to Offshore 
Installations had been agreed in 1976 followed in 1977 by the Guidelines 
through which Recognition may be Achieved. Offshore Construction 
Agreements had been accepted by the operators for hook-up and union officers 
were now anxious to extend this recognition to include installations which had 
come on stream. They were pressing this case on the grounds that negotiations 
on pay and conditions could be conducted in a structured and orderly manner and 
that the disciplinary and grievance procedures which would form part of any 
agreement would provide a channel for swift resolution of issues without resort 
to industrial sanctions. To maintain the credibility of their case for recognition 
the trade union officers had to adhere to the current OCA and not endorse the 
unofficial action which was now taking place. Moreover, when the strike 
Committee tried to spread the disputc by setting pickets outside oil-relatcd 
"Penn, Rand the Lord SeweL (1996) Trade Unionism in a Hostile Environment pp28&318 of 
Trade Unionism in Recession (edited by Penn, R., Gallie. D. and Rose, R). Oxford University 
Press and Woolfson, C., Foster, J. and Beck, M. (1996) op cit pp 93-94.. 
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establishments onshore, Tommy Lafferty, the AUEW district secretary, advised 
his members to ignore them. 
Interviewed by Lord Sewel in 1989 Lafferty stated that the inability of the 
unions to support the strikers other than by attempting to negotiate a new OCA 
(which the employers refused to do until the strike was over) was neither 
understood nor accepted by the unofficial strikers. He sensed that the strikers felt 
let down and he claimed that attempts to recruit offshore were often frustrated by 
accusations that when union support was needed, as in 1978n9, it had been 
denied. " Woolfson, Foster and Beck simply say that a divide was created 
between union officers and offshore construction employees many of whom 
exhibited cynicism and apathy towards union attempts to recruit members in the 
1980s. " 
There is little. evidence fior Lafferty's claim that subsequent disappointing 
recruitment figures reflected employee disenchantment with trade unions over 
the manner in which the construction workers' grievances had been handled in 
1978/79. The dispute took place during the "Winter of Discontent" when strikes, 
both official and unofficial, reached a height unprecedented since 1926 and the 
unofficial construction workers' action in the North Sea was just one among 
many throughout the United Kingdom. Again, as research carried out by Vant 
and Livy 14 showed, there was a constantly changing workforce offshore and it is 
unlikely that some sort of folklore about trade union neglect of employee 
interests would have been generated and passed down to every new worker. 
More credible reasons for poor recruitment success offshore have already been 
given in Chapter Eight. 
(b) The Easington-Rough Dispute 
The second strike which merits attention moves on to the less familiar waters of 
the southern part of the North Sea off the East Riding of Yorkshire. The Rough 
gas field was discovered in 1968 but the decision to develop it with a pipeline to 
Easington, the nearest town on the coast, was delayed until after 1980. lie 
dispute in 1984 is accordingly given the name of the Easington-Rough sit-in. 
The usual arrangements with contractors were made for hook-up but since the 
work was demanding in its technology and likely to last scvcral months it was 
necessary to recruit employees with the requisite expertise. Inevitably this meant 
that the majority of the workers were men who had scrvcd contractors in the 
northern part of the North Sea and were accustomed to conditions of 
cmployment negotiated under the current Northern Watcrs Offshorc 
Construction Agreement. This OCA did not apply in southcm waters where the 
men found that pay and other allowances were infcrior" to those prevailing in 
northcrn waters. In 1984 they "sat in" for four weeks, adopting this tactic 
12 Penn, R. and the Lord Sewel, op cit p. 299. 
13 Woolfson, C., Foster, J. and Beck, M. op cit p. 94. 
14 Vant, J. H. B., and Livy, B. op cit. 
15 The conditions of employment were not "grossly inferior" as claimed by the OILC in its 1991 
publication "Striking Out" published by the Offshore Information Centre, Aberdeen. 
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because it meant they could prevent any further work being done by replacement 
labour. Their unions negotiated a settlement which met the main demands of 
their members and simultaneously established their right to recognition from the 
contractors. This Southern Waters Agreement became a model for subsequent 
hook-up agreements in that sector of the North Sea until 199,16 and although 
work in northern waters still attracted better pay and allowances there were 
sound reasons for this. The climate there makes the physical conditions of work 
more unpleasant, there is greater travelling time from shore to installation (up to 
three hours in comparison with twenty to thirty minutes) and employment on the 
more remote platforms has to be compensated with additional special 
allowances. 
3 Developments in Operator-Contractor Relationships 
(a) The Drive to Reduce Costs 
Reference has already been made in the previous chapter to CRINE (Cost 
Reduction Initiative in the New Era). The origins of CRINE go back to 1986 
when the international price of oil plummeted from near $30 a barrel to below 
$15 17 and pressure to identify savings was compounded by the expenditure 
incurred in order to meet the stringent conditions on safety requirements 
following the Piper Alpha accident. By 1990 production and revenue were still 
falling and E. J. P Browne, Chief of BP Exploration, stated: 
Competitive advantage within the upstream business is governed by the simple 
equation: Profit = volume multiplied by (price - costs). As a company we cannot 
control the price and so we are left with two variables over which we have some 
control - cost and volume. As to cost I think the central thrust ofgetting rewards 
for the stockholder lies in driving down not only the operational costs - that is by 
achieving the lowest costs for exploration, development and production - but 
also by driving down the costs of running the business. 7hat is a continuous 
process - not a one off cost cutting exercise. It is something we must keep doing 
in order to maintain our coMPetitive position. " 
In particular, operators were becoming concerned at the high cost of engineering 
work in the North Sea as compared with work of a similar nature in the Gulf of 
Mexico and the Far East and it was through the initiative of the government and 
the industry that CRINE was established. It has a small secretariat funded jointly 
by government and the industry and is very similar to its Norwegian cquivalcnt 
NORSOK. The CRINE secretariat co-ordinatcs the work of committees, the 
membership of which is drawn largely from the oil industry and to which it has 
delegated the responsibility to investigate the perceived areas where cost 
reductions can be implemented. In October 1992 as part of the initiative 
16 By the 1991 OCA wage rates were equalized but special allowances for travelling time and 
work on remote installations remained. 
17 Briefly it fell below $ 10. 
Browne, E. J. P. (1990) BP Erploration Performance and Strategy. BP. 
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UKOOA members committed themselves to a joint investigative project on cost 
saving with representatives of contractors. 
Some two years earlier the two main British companies, Shell and BP, concerned 
that costs were rising and revenue declining, discussed this problem with 
Michael Heseltine, President of the Board of Trade, who subsequently ordered 
his department to investigate competitiveness on the UK Continental Shelf The 
DTI Report of the Working Group on Competitiveness in the UK Continental 
Shelf was published in February 1993 and, as stated by Tim Eggar, Minister for 
Energy, it calledfor a wide - ranging culture change across the industry to meet 
new market conditions, with 29 recommendations for action by the industry and 
Government". By November 1993 the first CRINE recommendations" had been 
published with expectations of a 30% reduction in capital costs over the next two 
years. 
The findings of both the DTI and CRINE reports were similar in their essential 
points and both recognised that standardization of industrial and business 
practices was the prime objective. This meant that operators and contractors 
would have to work in harmony. As the Minister of Energy stated in April 1994 
New approaches were evident in development projects throughout 1993, with 
contractors and suppliers involved early in project planning and having a more 
direct input into identifying areas of cost saving. " 
This collaboration between operators and contractors portrayed more than 
anything else the culture change to which the Minister of Energy had referred. 
Whereas previously operators and contractors had regarded each other as 
adversaries, a totally new set of characteristics began to emerge in thýir 
relationships, which, in their turn, had an impact upon industrial relations. ' As 
already statedthe Offshore Construction Agreements were usually drawn up in 
ways which ensured that the pay and conditions of contractors' employees were 
less attractive than those enjoyed by the direct staff employed by the operators. 
In some cases there were even different dining and amenity areas on 
installations. When operators began to study ways in which unnecessary costs 
could be eliminated, they realised that such distinctions between men who were, 
after all, employed in the same industry and had the same objective of producing 
oil and gas, were not in their interests. A new form of relationship began to 
develop whereby operators and contractors sought ways of working together 
19 Eggar, T., (1994) The Energy Report p. iii. Department of Trade and Industry, I IMSO, 
" CRINE Secretariat (1993) Cost Reduction Initiativefor the New Era Report. St Paul's Press, 
London. 
21 Eggar, T., (1994) op cit. 
22 Green, R. L. (1994) Collaborative Relationships between Producers and Contractors in the 
UK Oil and Gas Production Industry. Ibis paper, presented at the British Academy of 
Management Annual Conference, is an authoritative account of the position reached by mid. 
1994 in the development of better relationships between operators and contractors. 71ic author is 
indebted to his colleague, Dr Green, whose research on partnering between operators and 
contractors carried out at The Robert Gordon University has been of great assistance in this 
segment of Chapter 10. 
23 v. p. 200 supra. 
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harmoniously for mutual benefit. Operators came to appreciate the value of 
dealing with fewer contractors (BP announced in August 1993 that it was 
reducing the number of its major contractors from 300 to 100") and this was 
inevitably accompanied by improvements in relationships between contractor 
and client since communication became regular and more frequent. One 
particular benefit of the new culture was that it rendered superfluous the 
expensive checking of technical competence because no contractor was going to 
risk his reputation for reliability through failure to deliver work of the standard 
required by his client. In short, mutual trust became the essence of partnerings" 
or alliances, the latter term usually being applied to an agreement whereby an 
operator and his contractors will work towards common goals and share any 
gains or losses. 
As the professional association for engineers and scientists in the oil industry, 
the Institute of Petroleum considered that it must contribute its considerable 
influence to discussions on these new developments and in May 1995 organized 
Scenario Planning Workshop which offered some structure and thinking about 
the future of the offshore industry. The workshop identified 14 key "drivers" 
which would shape the industry over the next two decades. The third of these 
"drivers" was the development of relationships within the industry which was 
defined as follows: 
At best, there would be streamlined and synergistic relationships between 
operators, suppliers and other contractors and subcontractors. 77icy would be 
well managed and driven by agreed common goals. " 
The tendency to apply the word "partnering" to all such relationships must be 
avoided since their nature and size can be very different. " One agreement may be 
no more than a willingness by the supplier to accept a lower price from the 
operator for the security of a long-term contract. An agreement where there 
would be an identifiable degree of partnering would be one in which operator 
and contractor combine their expertise to improve standards and design 
including joint ownership of any resultant technology. More advanced than that 
will be the form of alliance where one operator and several suppliers combine to 
work together to achieve a degree of synergy that might have been impossible 
under the old one-to-one customer-supplier relationship. " Finally there is the 
delivery by the client of almost the whole operation to one "lead" contractor who 
will manage the other contractors. 
In some cases the proportion of contracted personncl on board an installation has 
now become so high that Sandy Clark, Chainnan of OCA, commcntcd Howfar 
are wefrom the day our member companies become responsiblefor operating 
24 Aberdeen Petroleum Revicw, Nos 32 &33, August, 1993. 
25 ThiS is rather a clumsy word but it is used to avoid "partnuship" which has a specific legal 
connotation. 
26 Upton, D., (1996) Waves ofFortune, p. 109. John Wiley, Chichester. 
27 Upton, D. ibid p. 15 1. 
" Upton, D. ibid P. 15 1. 
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the platform on behatf of the oil company? ' lain Bell, Secretary of OCA, said it 
was good news for his organization that the multi-nationals were concentrating 
more and more on producing and selling oil and gas and leaving the rest to 
contractors. It means more work for his members, who will in future be 
responsiblefor designing, building, operating and eventually disposing of rigs 
for the multi-nationalS. 30 
In almost all fields the oil producing companies had always used contractors to 
look after specific ! parts of the operation such as production chemicals and 
maintaining the downhole pumps. From these traditional forms of out-sourcing 
the offshore contractors have now expanded their contribution to the industry to 
include the designing and building of rigs and platforms, commissioning them at 
sea and carrying out maintenance and repair to the point where they can accept 
responsibility for the entire offshore operation on behalf of the oil companies. 
Indeed, within months of Clark's comment, Sun Oil had sold its Balmoral field 
to AGIP which inunediately contracted it out to Brown and Root and Oryx UK 
Energy had handed over to Atlantic Power and Gas almost all its operations on 
the Hutton, Lyell and Murchison fields only a year after it took over these three 
fields from Conoco. 
The cost of producing a barrel of crude oil in the UK sector of the North Sea had 
risen from $2: 50 to $4: 00 between 1989 and 1991 and this was higher than in 
any other oil province. 31 It was for this reason that the objective of the new 
relationships was to reduce costs. It isn 'I philanthropy: the aim is to secure the 
best commercial advantage. " In their monumental and authoritative work 
Woolfson, Foster and Beck 33 stress this feature to the point where the positive 
aspects of collaboration become obscured. They assert that the operators 
controlled the whole process so that the costs of reducing expenditure were 
borne entirely by the suppliers and that the bargains were for that reason very 
one-sided. The operators were now in a position to tell contractfirms precisely 
what they had to do: form alliances, use low cost methods, co-operate in the 
development of standardized systems and above all cut their own costs. if 
suppliers were not willing to work on those term. they would be out of the 
ring. 34 
The authors deduce from this that the contractors had to look for operational 
savings and that these were found through a reduction in accident prevention 
measures. This is one of the principal themes of their book and is outside the 
29 Offshore Contractors' Council Annual Review 1994. 
30 Fraser, S. Safety Hopes buried at Sea. Scotland on Sunday, p. 8.22nd October, 1995. 
31 Report of the Working Group on Competitiveness in the UK Continental Shelf. Department of 
Trade and Industry, February 1993. 
32 Roxborough, 1. (1993)A voiding Infringement qfProcuremenL/Competition Law in partnering 
Agreements and Consortia Bidding. This was a paper given at Ile Practicalitics of Successful 
Partnering and Closer Working Relationships Conference, Aberdeen, 7th & 8th December, 
1993. IIR London. 
33 Woolfson, C., Foster, J. and Beck, M. op cit. 
34 Woolfson, C., Foster, J., and Beck, M. op cit p. 315. 
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remit of this thesis. It should be added, however, that the oil industry has 
resented this slur on their reputation and has used every opportunity to rebut it. 
(b) The Effects on Industrial Relations 
The emphasis in alliances and partnerings is on collaboration, on team working, 
on recognition that problems need joint resolution not complaints that another 
group is at fault and in general where customer and supplier develop such a 
close and long term relationship that the two work together as partners. " The 
transfer of personnel from operator to supplier is a consequence of these 
developments and, while the ratio of operator to contractor personnel does not 
remain unchanged, it would be totally incorrect to state that on installations there 
has been simply a transfer of some staff from the operator's to the contractor's 
payroll. Sometimes whole functions have been moved from the direct 
responsibility of an operator to a contractor but this would be carried out over 
several months. When an operator has decided to outsource a particular function 
this has come about as a result of careful discussions within the operator's 
company followed by a tightly negotiated contract with a supplier. The operator, 
no longer needing certain of his employees, will have made them redundant and, 
since they had skills for which contractors were now looking, it was inevitable 
that some found themselves back in their previous jobs but under a different 
employer. Indeed, for many former direct employees of an offshore operator, 
redundancy pay brought a substantial financial bonus because the gap in 
obtaining new employment could be as short as a few days. Again, as a result of 
a decision to reduce the number of contractors, there were occasions when afirm 
already on contract to an operator became, instead, a sub-contractor responsible 
to a main contractor. 
The change of status from direct employee of an oil company to that of a 
contractor has not always been achieved with total harmony although there has 
never been any significant industrial action. When direct staff have learned that 
contractors will be taking over their work some have immediately fclt threatened 
by redundancy while existing contractor staff, in their turn, may also have fclt 
threatened because they will have been unsure whether they will be able to cope 
with the responsibilities which their new jobs will entail. 
36 This will be 
particularly the case where there is delay in the implcmcntation of the new 
working methods. These disturbances of familiar employment patterns provide 
situations highly appropriate for negotiation by trade unions on behalf of those 
affected but since the operators, apart from a few rare examples such as Phillips 
Petroleum, have never conceded collective bargaining to trade unions, and the 
contractors have fallen in with this policy as regards their offshore employees, 
third party intervention has seldom been involved. 
A member, of the DTI Working Group on Competitiveness in the UK 
Continental Shelf 37 had been Campbell Christie, General Secretary of the 
Scottish TUC and he had insisted on the inclusion in the Report of some 
Roxborough, 1. (1993) op ciL 
Green, R. L. op cit. 
37 v. p. 205 supra. 
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commitment by the industry to consult trade unions. He was, however, a single 
voice and the employers were able to lessen the effect of the commitment by 
insisting that consultation should be at national level. As already argued in 
earlier chapters the unions at national level had achieved little since 1977 and 
tended to immerse themselves in pointless disputes about rights to recruit 
offshore workers. If national officers of trade unions did seek talks with 
employers they were turned down on the grounds that they had insufficient 
membership offshore to justify their claim to represent employees. More 
importantly, the insistence that any consultation should be at national level 
effectively excluded the Offshore Industry Liaison Committee, whose activities 
were beginning to alarm employers. 
Accordingly, this immense change in the structure of the offshore oil and gas 
industry with its accompanying re-alignment of employee-employer 
relationships affecting thousands of workers took place with the minimum of 
consultation with organized labour. All the evidence indicates that trade unions 
were informed at national level when a major development took place but that 
any thought of negotiation was absent from the minds of operators and their 
suppliers. The OILC was able to make an occasional impact but its small 
membership and exclusion from the Scottish TUC allowed employers to ignore 
it with impunity. 
The operators, however, could not have carried through these changes without 
the application of a carefully considered industrial relations policy. Thcy never 
practised collective bargaining in the sense that it is a confrontational exercise 
wherein the opposing objectives of management and labour arc gradually 
modified to the point where a compromise solution is reached. Instead they used 
the alternative process of joint consultation so dcrided by the trade unions as 
ineffectual on the grounds that the employees inevitably have the weaker 
bargaining counters. Offshore installations have some similarities to a factory or 
other land-based establishment but their isolation hundreds of miles out in the 
North Sea makes it almost impossible for workers on one installation to enjoy 
easy communication with workers on another. This makes it difficult to mount 
joint or supportive industrial action when workers on one installation believe that 
they are being unfairly treated by their employer. On the other hand the physical 
location, the nature of employment and the regular contact among everyone on 
board render each installation "sui gencris". Consequently a major transfer of 
work following a collaborative agreement was able to be carried out after full 
consultation between employee representatives and operators on an agenda 
which referred to spccific installations and not to general employment issues 
within the industry. In this way industry-wide disruption was avoidcd. 
The discussions which concluded with mutually satisfactory settlements rcquircd 
skill and patience and give the answer to those who asscrt that industrial 
relations personnel in the industry are little more than administrators of centrally 
devised policies. Any fears of the employees were allayed in a manner which can 
be described as a major victory for the joint consultation process over that of 
collective bargaining. The lcngths to which the operators were prepared to go to 
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assist a smooth passage to new working alliances were remarkable even for the 
most enlightened employers of the 1990s. An example of this is when Chevron 
decided to sell its interest in the Ninian field to Oryx UK Energy. Chevron flew 
38 
a prominent Aberdeen solicitor out to one of its installations where he remained 
for five days during which any employee who was unsure of his legal rights 
could have them explained to him in private. 
39 
For some employees, particularly those with many years of service, the change 
in their conditions of service allowed them huge financial benefits if they 
decided to accept redundancy terms. The operators agreed to pay redundancy 
payments far beyond the minimum amounts stipulated by statute and, in 
addition, pensions were offered at the age of 50. In exceptional cases this could 
mean retirement from the industry with a six figure redundancy sum and a 
pension. It is therefore not unfair to say that the oil operators prevented any 
industrial relations problems arising as a result of the new working arrangements 
offshore through the simple method of making it worthwhile financially for their 
employees to accept the companies' terms. 
There were exceptions none more so than when BP handed over most of its 
accounting to Arthur Andersen without any consultation at allý 0 However, the 
fact that these movements of offshore workers among different employers were 
accomplished without resort to industrial action represented a triumph for the 
industry's preferred method of managing its employee relationships. 
(c) Payment in the Offshore Contracting Industry 
This symbiotic relationship between operators and OCA members is seen at its 
clearest in the manner of tendering and in the payment structure of the industry. 
When an operator requires work from a contractor it is today unlikely that a 
general invitation to tender will be published in the local press or appropriate 
trade journals. Where once contractors were selected on the basis of the 
minimum cost tender, it is now more usual for a few contractors, who have won 
the confidence of the operator over a number of years, to be invited to tender. In 
addition they will almost certainly have been involved in a collaborative 
agreement with him. To have won such confidence from a major operator is a 
prize jealously and carefully guarded by contractors ensuring that they provide a 
service that satisfies their client on account of its high technical quality and 
completion within the time agreed. The contractors make certain that during the 
period of the contract their human resource management is in accord with the 
industrial relations practice of their clients. 
it is also in the interests of the operators that they are au fait with the contracting 
industry's system of remuneration. Employees on an installation will be in one 
of three categories. They may be direct employees of the operating company and 
38 February 1997. 
39 Information supplied to the author by the solicitor. lie was heavily occupied throughout his 
stay. 
40 Its accounts staff had no idea that they had a new employer until they arrived at work one 
Monday. 
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these are usually salaried administrative and higher technical staff members. The 
others will either be direct employees of contractors or agency staff, the latter 
preferring to sacrifice any benefits accruing to continuous employment status 
(e. g. superannuation, right to claim unfair dismissal) in favour of the higher 
remuneration which their independence attracts. Currently, for example, a lead 
engineer is likely to be paid about E65,000 per annum if he is an agency 
employee compared with about ; E47,000 if he is employed by either the operator 
or the contractor. 
Any tender for an offshore contract is determined in large part by labour costs 
which are almost always the highest percentage of any contractor's outgoings. 
These labour costs are now calculated in a most precise and detailed manner, 
which leaves scope for only the slightest difference in remuneration between 
employees engaged on similar duties on different installations under different 
contractors. 
4 The Fight for Post-Construction Agreements 
As already stated, once an oil platform has been fully commissioned and made 
ready for "first oil" the operators revert to their standard industrial relations 
practice of refusing to recognise trade unions. The trade unions have made 
enormous efforts to wrench post-construction agreements from the industry but 
the operators have refused even to discuss the possibility. Although, as 
demonstrated in a previous chapter, 41 the high hopes engendered by the 
Memorandum on Access and the Guidelines on Recognition had been succeeded 
by near total disillusion in the mid 1980s, some account must be given of the 
attempts made to obtain post-construction agreements. 
The operators accorded scant, if any, praise to the trade unions for their refusal to 
support their members' unofficial action during the Ninian field disputes of 1978 
and 1979.42 The unions continued to argue the value of a post-construction 
agreement for the employers and by mid-1981 had a strategy in place. Three 
Labour members of parliament, John Prescott (Hull), Bob Hughes (Aberdeen) 
and Ernie Ross (Dundee) agreed to act as a liaison group for the trade unions in 
the House of Commons. 43 They and the IUOOC issued a "North Sea Chartee', a 
documen t44 listing twenty objectives, including recognition of trade unions and 
grant of negotiation rights but the operators refused to discuss the "Chartee, in 
whole or part. John Baldwin, General Secretary of the National Engineering 
Construction Committee, won agreement from his organization's constituent 
members that NECC should approach the industry for talks at national level on 
post-construction agreements. He wrote to George Williams, Director-General of 
UKOOA, suggesting that there should be discussions on an agreement similar to 
offshore construction agreements and supported his argument by pointing out 
4t Chapter Nine. 
42 v. pp. 202-203 supra. 
43 C. Reid to IUOOC, 5th June, 198 1. 
44 v. Appendix Z. 
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that there was a growing number of contractors' men offshore who were not 45 
represented by trade unions. The reply came within seven days and was 
predictable. UKOOA was not a negotiating body and in any case its Liaison 
Committee, which met the ITJOOC regularly, was responsible for employee 
46 relations offshore. That was where the issue should be raised. 
Baldwin then attempted to persuade the Oil Chemical Plant Constructors' 
Association (OCPCA) to start negotiations on a post-construction agreement. 
The extent to which the contractors were in thrall to the operators was admitted 
with astonishing frankness in the letter from OCPCA which declined the offer of 
discussions with NECC. The client oil companies had made it very clear to us 
that they could not support such an agreement. "" The reason for this was that the 
operating companies considered that any post-construction agreement would 
have been almost unworkable. Employment in the North Sea oil industry varied 
in its nature according to an installation's requirements. Contractors' men were 
part of a mobile work force moving from one installation to another or from 
contractor to contractor as opportunities for work presented themselves. There 
were changes, too, in the companies which obtained contracts on particular 
installations. For these reasons a post-construction agreement covering all 
installations would have been inoperable. In addition, national and industry-wide 
agreements were in retreat by the mid 1980s. In 1983 Keith Sisson and William 
Brown wrote that there are already signs that managements are trying to shift 
the emphasis away from collectiye bargaining to joint consultation. A clear 
consequence of this would be diminished willingness of management to codif y 
matters in written agreements . 
49 Sisson and Brown were to be proved correct in 
their assessment of employer/employee relationships as Kessler and Bayliss 
confirmed nine years later, when they referred to a continuation in the reduced 
importance of industry-wide collective bargaining. 49 
More specific in its reftisal to countenance trade union presence offshore was 
Mobil North Sea:. When Campbell Reid asked to visit Beryl "N', T. P. Boston, 
the company's Employee Relations Manager, replied that a visit from him would 
jeopardize our immediate objective to resolve the issues through direct 
consultation with our employees. " While this comment related to Mobil North 
Sea's own staff it was clearly the policy which would apply to all contractors' 
personnel. Mobil North Sea, however, was to find that its industrial relations 
policy was now attracting the attention of the General Secretary of ASTMS, who 
never turned down any opportunity to engage in conflict with employers. Clive 
Jenkins, informed by his National Officer, Roger Lyons, of Campbell Reid's 
treatment by Mobil North Sea, accused" Thomas Kempner, Principal of Henley 
Management College, of running courses which had a large element of anti-trade 
"s J. Baldwin to G. Williams, 12th June, 1981. 
"' G. Williams to J. Baldwin, 18th June, 1981. 
47 T. Garfit to J. Baldwin, l4th March, 1983. 
48 Bain., G. S. (editor) (1983) Industrial Relations in Britain, p. 153. Basil Blackwood, Oxford. 
49 Kessler, S. and Bayliss, F. op cit p. 98. 
50 T. P. Boston to C. Reid, 26th July, 1982. See Appendix AA. 
51 C. Jenkins to T. Kempner, 26th August, 1982. 
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unionism; in a phrase current at the time, he accused Kempner of "union 
bashing". He was already aware that Mobil North Sea was receiving assistance 
on employer-employee relationships through a Henley College course run by 
consultant called de Board and without any evidence he linked Boston's letter to 
the advice emanating from the consultant. An angry Kempner replied 
52 that his 
college was not in the business of advising employers on how to avoid trade 
unions or how to subvert them. Jenkins riposted 53 with the accusation that 
Henley had organized a three day workshop on management competence for 
Mobil North Sea managers where the effect would be to sharpen up these 
managers' attitudes to oppose the unions. In a short answer 
54 in which a sigh of 
exasperation can almost be heard, Kempner says he can see no anti-union 
content in the course and tells Jenkins Your life seems to be very hard andfull of 
conflict. , 
As Buchan found in his research which was carried out in the period 1981-1983, 
there was a decrease in the number of contractors with any trade union 
agreements at all and an increase in the number of small non-unionised 
contractors paying low rates during this period of high unemployment. 55 
Although it must by now have seemed a futile exercise, the trade union officials 
in Aberdeen kept on trying to bring the employers to the negotiating table. Their 
desperation to obtain a post-construction agreement is demonstrated by their 
offer in January 1985, before the commencement of negotiations on a new OCA, 
to concede a complete standstill on wages in return for a post construction 
agreement. This might have seemed a generous offer until it is recalled that at 
this period hook-up work had declined dramatically from its peak around 1980- 
81 and that most employees offshore were now contractors' men engaged upon 
maintenance and general repair work. The offer brought the inevitable refusal 
from the employers. The following January the trade union officers charged with 
negotiating the 1986 OCA initially refused to reach an agreement with OCPCA 
unless the terms of the agreement applied to maintenance work as well. They did 
have some support from OCPCA and indeed an agreement applicable to work in 
the Northern Waters was reached between the Offshore Contractors' Council and 
the trade unions. It was even published as a handbook but the oil companies 
again made it clear that contractors operating under a trade union negotiated 
agreement would not be acceptable offshore. Nevertheless on certain BP 
installations it was used "sub rosa" by personnel managers as a guide in 
56 discussions on payments and disciplinazy issues. 
Later that year when the international price of oil fell dramatically" contractors 
were glad to get any work offshore and neither they nor their employees were in 
any position to negotiate. It is estimated that between July and December 1986 
52 T. Kempner to C. Jenkins, 6th September, 1982. See Appendix BB. 
5' C. Jenkins to T. Kempner, 17th September, 1982. 
54 T. Kempner to C. Jenkins, 30th September, 1982. 
'513uchan, J. McD. op cit pp. 361 & 365. This was also the time when the decline in 
manufacturing employment was at its height. 
56 Information passed to the author by a former BP personnel manager. 
57 v. p. 204 supra. 
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around 10,000 oil-related jobs were lost. In March 1987 Bob Eadie of the 
EETPU complained to the Parliamentary Select Committee on Energy that 
despite a membership of 90% among electricians and plumbers working offshore 
51 on post-construction work there was no union agreement . This was little more 
than a squawk of indignation about a state of affairs which neither he nor a 
parliamentary committee could alter. Two years were to pass before there was 
further trade union agitation for a post-construction agreement and by that time a 
new force had appeared on the Aberdeen oil scene. This was the Offshore 
Industry Liaison Committee whose origins were largely concerned with a grass 
roots demand for a negotiated employment agreement for all offshore workers. 
5 Summary 
A full understanding of industrial relations in the offshore oil and gas industry is 
impossible unless it is realised that the operators alone have decreed the policy. 
Had they been employers of all offshore personnel this would have been 
unremarkable but from the early 1980s only about a fifth to a quarter of them 
have been direct employees. The rest have been employees of contractors and it 
has not been unusual to have several different firms engaged on contracts on one 
installation. Consequently the contracting system has meant that that there has 
been a continually shifting population offshore and quite apart from operator 
hostility to trade unionism this mix of employees has constituted a huge barrier 
to trade union recruitment. From around 1990 when the advantages of partnering 
began to be realised operators have reduced the number of contractors on 
installations but contractor employees have continued to constitute ever higher 
proportions of the offshore workforce. Nevertheless, no matter how long and 
amicable has been a contractor's relationship with trade unions onshore, he will 
be in no doubt that a tender for work offshore will be unacceptable if he has 
negotiated the terms and conditions of work with a trade union. 
It was a different matter at hook-up and the historical precedent of the offshore 
construction agreement reached through collective bargaining remains unaltered, 
although the nature of this operation has changed greatly in recent years. This 
demonstrates the pragmatic nature of the oil companies' industrial relations 
policy which is driven not by consistency but by a fairly narrow self-interest of 
what they perceive to suit them best at different stages in the life of an oil 
installation. It was not surprising that trade unions, having been invited to 
negotiate terms and conditions of employment for their members employed on 
hook-up, assumed that this would be followed by negotiations on post- 
construction agreements. The trade unions have sought post-construction 
agreements for almost twenty years but have yet to record a sinple success, with 
the exception of EETPU in the restricted case of SJIB contracts. 9 
5' R. W. Eadie to P. Silk, Clerk to the All-Party Select Committee on Energy, 6th March, 1987. 
59 v. p. 199 supra. 
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Hook-up agreements were not devoid of disputes. The unofficial action in the 
winter of 1978-79 in the Ninian field which spread to other North Sea platforms 
embarrassed trade union officers who were still trying to persuade the operators 
of the value of negotiated terms and conditions of employment. Deprived of the 
support of their unions the strike collapsed and views differ on how far this 
affected subsequent trade union efforts to retain and recruit members among 
offshore employees. The strikers in the 1984 Easington-Rough dispute showed 
that remaining on the installation was a sound tactic and this was remembered 
five years later in the 1989 and 1990 disputes. 
When the oil price collapsed in 1986 there began a drive in the oil industry to 
reduce costs, and this has continued up to the present day. One area where the 
operators looked for cost reduction was in offshore contracting and this, together 
with government support, encouraged oil companies and their contractors to re- 
appraise their relationships. This has resulted in the development of partnering 
schemes where operator and contractor no longer see their relationship as simply 
that of company and client but as an alliance with shared objectives. These 
relationships will be, as quoted earlier in this chapter, well managed and driven 
by agreed common goals. 60 
As regards industrial relations it has meant that the operators have been able to 
reinforce their own particular goal of permanent exclusion of trade union 
influence from offshore production units. Some writers link this with the parallel 
development of CRINE (Cost Reduction Initiative in the New Era) and support 
the trade union claim that it has been accompanied by rising injury and fatality 
rates because savings have been made on accident prevention measures. 
The almost total absence of industrial unrest offshore during the steadily 
increased outsourcing of work by the operators deserves attention. 61 Trade 
unions and therefore collective bargaining have played and continue to play no 
part in the discussions which have surrounded the changes affecting thousands of 
workers. The acceptance by so many employees of new conditions of work must 
be attributed in large part to the skills of the operators' employee relations 
specialists. There are always fears of redundancy and other issues affecting 
employment in situations of this nature and the joint consultative procedures 
have been shown to be successful. Mobil North Sea was not the only company to 
garner success from its determination to pursue direct consultation with its 
employees. 62 As a result of visits to several human resource departments of 
operating companies the author obtained a high opinion of the ethical approach 
to industrial relations by the companies and the professional skill of those 
appointed to carry it out. 
60 Upton, D. op cit p. 109. v. p. 206 supra. 
'51 The industrial disruption offshore during the summers of 1989 and 1990 had a different 
provenance and will be discussed in the next chapter. 62 
v. p. 212 supra. 
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THE OFFSHORE INDUSTRY LIAISON COMMITTEE 
It is now necessary to look at the Offshore Industry Liaison Committee. In 
analysing the emergence and survival of a trade union determined to challenge 
the traditional unions for the allegiance of employees in the offshore energy 
industry, detail and incident play a great part. As already stated in the 
methodology, this causes an untidy but unavoidable structure when history has 
to be interpreted through an examination of the activities of individuals over a 
brief period of time. ' In addition, as one of Richard Cobb's successors' has 
pointed out, to adhere strictly to narrative at all times suggests a coherence which 
will obscure the fundamentally chaotic quality of contemporary experience. 
There was no coherence in the sudden irruption of the OILC onto the offshore oil 
scene, not least because its origins are somewhat uncertain. The impact of OILC 
is not so much one of events to which individuals have reacted but more of 
individuals who have determined the events which have brought a new actor 
onto the stage of the offshore oil industry. In particular it is the creation of one 
man whose organizational ability and natural talent for public relations together 
with a sheer determination to succeed in his mission enabled a new trade union 
to be formed. 
The popular assumption that OILC was a direct outcome of the Piper Alpha 
disaster is an excellent example of the logical fallacy "post hoc ergo propter 
hoc"' where sequence is confused with consequence. There are significant events 
in history such as Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo and Gorbachev's policy of 
devolving power within the USSR which have had consequences directly 
attributable to them. On the other hand, although Piper Alpha was a significant 
event in the history of the oil industry because it prompted immediate and wide- 
ranging legislation concerning offshore working practices, other conditions in 
the industry continued unaffected. Indeed, it can be argued that OILC and the 
industrial relations climate which it engendered would still have happened had 
Piper Alpha never taken place. In a paper given at a fringe meeting of the TUC at 
Blackpool on 5th September, 1989, Ronnie McDonald, the virtual founder of 
OILC, said that trade unions had become utterly impotent and that By the time 
Piper came along thefeeling was already afoot that something had to be done. ' 
1 The Genesis of the Offshore Industry Liaison Committee 
(a) The IUOOC and Post-Construction Agreements 
The agitation for a post-construction agreement, which was discussed in the 
previous chapter, provided the soil in which the seeds of OILC were nurtured. 
1 v. Chapter One, p. 13. 
2 Niall Ferguson, Fellow in History of Jesus College, Oxford writing in The Spectator, 17th May, 
1997. 
3A rough translation is "it happened after the event and therefore was caused by that evenf'. 4 McDonald, R., (1989) Discussion Document - Offshore Industry Liaison Committee. This 
paper, given at the Pembroke Hotel, Blackpool, outlines the background to the OILC and is a 
prime original source for this chapter. Appendix CC. 
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This campaign had run aground by 1986 when the dramatic drop in the price of 
oil was accompanied by thousands of job losses but it was a goal of which the 
1UOOC never lost sight. Tommy Lafferty warned the employers of pending 
industrial action in 1986 or 1987' but the oil industry knew that his threat could 
never be translated into action on account of the powerlessness of the trade 
unions offshore. Official trade union records as compared with publicly claimed 
membership demonstrate the paltry numbers of trade unionists employed 
offshore in production. TGWU, for example, had 915 members in April 1987 but 
of these 570 were in catering and 270 on rescue ships. " Moreover, membership 
was not being maintained and inter-union bickering, endemic among IUOOC 
members, flared up again when Campbell Reid was virtually accused of using 
his position as secretary of IUOOC to recruit offshore employees to his union 
and to impede recruitment by officials of other IUOOC unions! In October 1987 
ASTMS achieved a slight measure of success when it secured a representational 
agreement on five Shell' platforms but this was for grievance and disciplinary 
hearings only and specifically excluded any rights to negotiation. Shell 
dismissed the result of the ACAS-conducted ballot as a near irrelevance since it 
affected fewer than 10 % of the company's offshore workforce. ' 
That the oil operators' opinion of their trade union relations was just one step 
short of derision is indicated by the UKOOA statement that Numbers and 
members and latent support was (sic) not relevant in many cases as the 
operators had their own ways offinding the opinion of their employees" and by 
Britoil's assertion that it had no intention of granting recognition to any trade 
union although it conceded that over 50% of its employees were trade union 
members. " There was some justice in the claim made by IUOOC that the oil 
companies were not acting within the terms of the agreement of June 1977 on 
how recognition could be achieved" and it is not surprising that some IUOOC 
representatives suggested that their meetings with UKOOA were becoming 
pointless. 
However, IUOOC members decided to continue with the quarterly meetings on 
the ground that some contact with the employers' organization was better than 
none. There had been mergers among unions, notably that between ASTMS and 
TASS" to form the new Manufacturing Science and Finance Union (MSF) and a 
new IUOOC constitution"' was agreed by May 1988 with Ian Macfarlane of 
5 Minute of quarterly meeting of IUOOC and UKOOA, 5th March, 1986. 
6 j. Melvin Keenan, District Officer, TGWU to C. Reid, 5th May, 1987. 
7 R. W. Eadie, Area Official, EETPU to C. Reid, 23rd February, 1987. Appendix DD. 
8 Auk, Fulmar Alpha, Brent Bravo, Brent Delta and Cormorant Alpha. 
9 Scotsman, p. 11,1 Oth October, 1987. 
10 Notes made by C. Reid on quarterly meeting of IUOOC and UKOOA, 2nd September, 1987. 
" Minute of IUOOC, 2nd December, 1987. It is unclear whether IUOOC was including onshore 
as well as offshore employees in this total. 
12 v. Appendix K. 
" Technical Administrative and Supervisory Section of the Amalgamated Union of Engineering 
Workers. (AUEW resumed its traditional title of AEU for a brief period before uniting in 1992 
with EET? U to form today's Amalgamated Engineering and Electrical Union. ) 
14 Appendix EE I 
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AEU as chairman. Tommy Lafferty considered that lUOOC was forgetting that 
its principal purpose was to seek recognition from all offshore employers and to 
check that employers were adhering to their agreements. At the 
UKOOA/IUOOC meeting on Ist June, 1988 he took up again the question of 
post construction agreements. He also claimed that not one contractor had 
submitted bids based on the existing OCA" and consequently a new OCA should 
be negotiated. UKOOA did accept that, if contractors were acting contrary to the 
terms of the OCA, the oil companies, when informed, would investigate, yet 
another example of their over-riding control of the industry because none of 
them was a party to the OCA. 
Piper Alpha was soon to divert attention to other matters but at their next 
meeting with UKOOA (24th August, 1988) IUOOC members resumed their 
request for a new OCA to be discussed. There was, however, an new item on the 
trade union agenda. Whereas in June 1988 they had been asking for the 
negotiation of a new OCA, which brought improved pay and conditions but did 
not differ in essentials from previous Offshore Construction Agreements, they 
now sought to add a further dimension to the offshore employment scene: 
namely, that employees on long term contracts should enjoy the same salaries 
and conditions of employment as direct workers of oil companies. The trade 
unions argued that there was no justification for two classes of employee with 
significant differentials in pay and conditions of work. This shows for the first 
time the move towards common conditions of employment among all offshore 
workers as distinct from a post- construction agreement where some differentials 
between direct and contractors' employees may well have been acceptable in the 
interests of winning an agreement. 
It is important to point to a connection between the demand for common 
conditions of service made at this meeting and a discussion which had taken 
place at the meeting of the ITJOOC five weeks earlier. Here Tommy Lafferty 
reported that many shop stewards responsible for the collection of contributions 
to assist the families of Piper Alpha victims were unhappy that the money was 
going towards the Lord Provost's Disaster Fund. " He said that they were asking 
for the formation of a separate fund to be administered by the trade unions, 
because of the difference in benefits received by oil company personnel and 
contractors' employees, and many of the workers believed that there should be 
additional funds made available for those not entitled to death in service 
ben eft ts. " 
it is thus legitimate to argue that Piper Alpha drew attention in a particularly 
poignant way to the difference in conditions of employment between direct and 
contractors' employees and thus prompted the lUOOC to ask for a post- 
construction agreement where this anomaly would be expunged. True to form, 
UKOOA refused to discuss the matter but within a year the oil operators were to 
Offshore Construction Agreement: v. Chapter Twelve, pp. 197-199. 
This was the official fund which would be used to help the families of victims of the Piper 
Alpha disaster. 
17 Minute of Extraordinary Meeting of IUOOC, 22nd July, 1988. Appendix FF. 
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become involved in an industrial dispute where a single agreement for all 
offshore employees would be a principal objective. It was a dispute which the 
trade unions were to carry out by proxy through an organization which was 
totally unknown in 1988: the Offshore Industry Liaison Committee. 
Wisely, the IUOOC rejected Lafferty's suggestion that the trade unions should 
set up their own disaster fund for victims of Piper Alpha. There would be too 
many problems with a separate trade union fund and members resolved that 
money collected by shop stewards should continue to go towards the Lord 
Provost's Fund. To what extent Tommy Lafferty accepted this decision is 
unclear but he did become involved with the management of a separate AEU 
fund which would be a factor in his tragic death five years later. 
(b) "Bear Facts" 
By 1983 some trade union officers took the realistic view that traditional 
methods of securing negotiating rights with offshore employers had failed and 
that consequently other tactics should be used. Four full-time officers - Lafferty 
and Gray (AUEW), McCartney (Boilermakers), Carrigan(EETPU) - encouraged 
a few activists, including Ronnie McDonald, to form local groups in Aberdeen 
and Glasgow, which, it was hoped, would make a start to mobilising the offshore 
employees by propagating the advantages of trade union membership. There 
were never more than ten of these men who published and distributed at 
heliports a lively broadsheet called "Bear"' Facts" directed mainly at construction 
workers. "Bear Facts" sought to draw attention to grievances and other aspects of 
employment offshore. 
Although this rank and file movement existed for only eighteen months, ceasing 
activities in 1985, OILC has always claimed some descent from it. McDonald 
stated that immediately after the trade unions signed the OCA for 1989 an 
attempt at the creation of rank andfile involvement was made again9 in order to 
maintain pressure for an agreement in 1990 which included union recognition for 
post-construction employment. This must refer to the establishment of OILC 
early in 1989 and McDonald has never claimed that the "Bear Facts" group was 
still active after three and a half years. As he himself has stated, prior to Piper 
Alpha our activists offshore did not even number ten ." Woolfson, Foster and 
Beck" refer to reactivating the unofficial committee, after it had been dormant 
for two and a hatf years but considerable doubt must be cast on how far there 
was still in existence after over two years a tiny group capable of being 
reactivated. A safer conclusion is that while OILC inherited the aspirations of the 
"Bear Facts" activists its descent from them is, at best, indirect. 
's The term "Bear" had now become the colloquial term for tradesmen on the construction and 
maintenance aspects of offshore employment. 
19 Appendix CC 
20 ibid. 
21 Woolfson, Foster and Beck, op cit p. 113. 
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(c) The Demand for an Offshore Construction Agreement with a Post- 
Construction Element 
Unrest on a major hook-up project in the latter half of 1988 and subsequent 
unofficial industrial action offshore in 1989 play a central r6le in the foundation 
of the Offshore Industry Liaison Committee and also influenced negotiations for 
the Offshore Construction Agreement to apply in 1990. During the two years 
following the collapse of the oil price in 1986 there had been almost no hook-up 
work and consequently no employment offshore where conditions of service 
were regulated according to a collective bargain negotiated between trade unions 
and management. By 1988 the economic future for the industry had brightened 
and some hook-up work was re-started. The biggest project was Shell and Esso's 
development of the Tern oilfield which was scheduled to begin production in 
mid-1989. " Work began on lst July, 1988, just a few days before Piper Alpha 
was engulfed in flames. The first and principal reaction of all trade unions was 
sheer horror and sympathy for the victims and their families, but, in addition, 
they genuinely felt that, had there been official trade union presence aboard with 
influence to affect accident prevention measures, the disaster might have been 
avoided. 
The men on Tern were engaged under hook-up agreement conditions and had 
elected shop stewards who held mass meetings on safety and other issues related 
to their employment. The most prominent of them was an electrician, Bobby 
Buirds, who had been rather surprised to have had his application for 
employment on Tern accepted on account of some earlier disagreements with 
contractors over trade unionism and he believes it was accounted for by the fact 23 
that his interview took place in Glasgow where his activism was unknown. The 
main theme of the mass meetings was the lack of trade union protection from the 
moment of "first oil". Buirds and other activists wrote pamphlets and news- 
letters, 24 which they distributed among Tern employees and, through fellow 
activists met during shore leave, among men on other installations. The shop 
stewards and their members were well aware that after they had completed work 
on Tern most of them were to be transferred to a gas lift project, a major 
engineering work in the Forties field. This would not be hook-up work and so 
the employers would not be obliged to accept any trade union representation on 
conditions of employment. Nor were the employers likely to recognize shop 
stewards or permit them to call and address mass meetings. The trade unions saw 
that they had only a short time available to mount agitation for post-construction 
recognition. 
Resuscitating their policy with the "Bear Facts" committee of 1983-85, Lafferty, 
Gray, Carrigan and Eddie Bree" encouraged activists both onshore and offshore 
to stir up support for action in support of a post-construction agreement for the 
22 This target was met. 
23 Information supplied to the author by Mr Buirds. 
24 Their local trade union offices were happy to print them; e. g. by word processor. 
25 Bree 
' 
had succeeded McCartney when the Boilermakers; had merged with other unions to form 
the General Municipal Bqilermakers and Allied Trades Union, usually referred to as GMD. 
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industry. Among the shop stewards on Tem was Ronnie McDonald, a rigger 
employed by Press Offshore and he and his colleagues took the view that the 
hook-up agreement should be ripped up unless the operators finally conceded 
post hook-up recognition. " Contrary to general belief McDonald did not play a 
leading r8le on Tem and it was Buirds who addressed a mass meeting on the BP 
flotel "Safe Felicia" in December 1988 saying We must tell the national officers 
that the OCA should not be signed. All it has ever done is give the oil companies 
protection when they most need it, for nothing in return. " 
The Tem workforce gave almost unanimous support to a motion that their 
national trade union officials should not accept another Offshore Construction 
Agreement unless it included some post-construction concessions on trade union 
representation for their members. Refusing to be hustled into an industrial 
dispute which a demand of this nature would inevitably have occasioned, the 
trade unions signed an agreement similar to its predecessors but issued a warning 
to the Offshore Contractors' Council. This stated that unless the contractors 
persuaded the operators to concede a post-construction agreement within twelve 
months the trade unions would not sign an OCA for 1990. 
One must deduce from the events which followed its foundation in February 
1989 that the OILC was part oý the unions' strategy for obtaining a 
comprehensive post- construction agreement. Nothing has, until this thesis, been 
published about how the name OILC was chosen or what discussions took place 
between Tern and other activists and local union officers such as Lafferty and 
Bree. McDonald, who was appointed its spokesman, is totally silent on the 
matter and in his paper of 5th September, 1989"' moves straight from 
commenting on the background to the 1989 OCA to the industrial action of 
summer 1989. Even Woolfson, Foster and Beck whose lengthy volume is packed 
with detail on many less important matters merely state that OILC was 
established with the encouragement of local union officers. " 
The facts are, however, perfectly straightforward. " Lafferty in particular among 
trade union officials wanted to keep the spirit of Tern alive and conceived the 
idea of OILC as the type of organization which could achieve this. The name 
Offshore Industry Liaison Committee was suggested by Eddie Bree. McDonald 
who was well known to Lafferty" was available' to head up OILC and was 
appointed. While he may have been Lafferty's preferred choice as someone 
whom he could control, subsequent events were to demonstrate that he was 
particularly well equipped intellectually and administratively for the job. 
26 McDonald, R. (1992) Novice's Guide to the Hook-Up Agreement. Blowout, 29, p. 11. 
27 ibid. 
28 Appendix CC. 
29 Woolfson, Foster and Beck, op cit p. 113. 
30 information supplied to the author by Mr Buirds. 
31 He was a member of the Construction Engineering Section of the former AUEW, which 
Lafferty had led in North East Scotland since the early 1980s. 
32 He had been dismissed by Press Offshore. 
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It is now generally accepted that the trade union officials at local level believed 
that since OILC was to a large extent their own creation they would always be 
able to control it. The very title made clear that its purpose was to act as a point 
of convergence for the views of offshore employees in a way which would assist 
the trade unions to formulate a common policy towards the industry. Its value to 
the trade unions was that it was an unofficial body. Notice of strikes and 
balloting of members' willingness to take part in them were now part of 
employment law and registered trade unions which flouted the law could be 
heavily fined. OILC, however, could exercise sanctions against employers 
without trade unions having to bear any responsibility for what occurred. 
McDonald himself is reported as having stated at a meeting of OILC on 7th 
March, 1990 that OILC wasformed as an illegal enabling and mediating body. " 
Woolfson, Foster and Beck use the word "catspaw"" to define this relationship 
of OILC to the trade unions and for about eighteen months this was to be an 
accurate description of its r6le. However, a glance at the Concise Oxford 
Dictionary shows that, after giving the better known explanation of the term as a 
person used as a tool by another, there is added the second meaning of a "slight 
breeze rippling the waters in places". OILC may have begun as a slight breeze 
rippling the waters of offshore industrial relations but gradually the trade unions 
were to find that they had unleashed a storm which blew in directions which they 
had not expected. 
Throughout the summer of 1989 there were a number of "sit-ins" on platforms 
and, while OILC encouraged and supported them, it cannot be said to have co- 
ordinated these actions, since that would suggest a degree of control which was 
not possible. McDonald was to refer later to the inadequacy of their 
communications and the absence of detailed logistical planning. " In military 
terms it would be described as guerrilla warfare. The "sit ins", some as short as 
twelve hours, were instigated by union activists and had as a common theme 
some fonn of recognition of trade unions once a platform was in production. 
McDonald arranged over seventy mass meetings onshore and he claimed, with 
justification, that the agitation that led to the summer of discontent was wholly 
from these meetings. 16 There was action on 37 installations, almost all production 
platforms, and McDonald noted the value of non-participation by the catering 
workers as the best way to sustain the action would be to feed the bears" 
although he recognised that their unions, TGWU and NUS, had dissuaded them 
from giving any support to the action since negotiations for the next COTA 
agreement were imminent. The main grievance among contractors' employees 
was the considerable difference in pay and conditions of work (not least security 
of employment) between them and the direct workers of the operating companies 
and McDonald perceived that this universal sense of injustice fell by the 
indirectly employed workforce is a unifying force. " It was as if the employees 
33 See Appendix GG. 
34 Woolfson, Foster and Beck, op cit p. 113. 
35 Appendix CC. 
36 ibid. 
37 ibidL 
38 ibid. 
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were flexing their industrial muscles to see how far they could push their 
employers and reminding them that the OCA for 1990 was conditional upon a 
post-construction agreement. 
The response from some of the major contractors was surprisingly conciliatory. 
Some promised to raise the question of recognition with their client companies, 
the operators, and some went even further with promises to arrange ballots on 
platforms to find out the wishes of their employees concerning representation by 
trade unions. There were two positive results for the contractors' employees. The 
first was a significant increase in hourly rates of pay and the second a unified pay 
and conditions structure for persons employed by members of the Offshore 
Contractors' Council to which the description "Model Terms and Conditions" 
came to be applied. This was not negotiated with the trade unions which referred 
to it, quite correctly, as "imposed" but it was eventually accepted by trade unions 
and employees as the template for terms and conditions of employment in 
offshore contracting. 
The operators saw things in a totally different light. Marathon Oil UK had two 
installations on Brae field which had been subject to a series of "sit-ins" from 
20th May to 21st July and the company went so far as to have counsel prepare a 
petition" to the Court of Session seeking an interdict prohibiting (the 
Respondents) from wrongrul actings (sic) on the said installations. In explaining 
the background to the request for the interdict the Petitioners state that the 
industrial action appears to be co-ordinated by ojficials of the Amalgamated 
Union of Engineering Workers through a body termed "The Offshore Industry 
Liaison Committee" This assessment of OILC's relationship to the AUEW (and 
also one which Lafferty would not, privately, have disputed) was unlikely to be 
that of just one company and there is thus as early as July 1989 a document 
which demonstrates that OILC had become known to the oil operators as a body 
through which a major trade union was carrying out industrial action against 
them by proxy. 
For the trade unions there was encouragement that offshore employees were 
prepared to take industrial action in support of trade union recognition. 
McDonald, from his narrower perspective within OILC, had seen how offshore 
workers could act in concert when sufficiently motivated in contrast with the 
trade unions which had shown little cohesion in their efforts to develop a 
presence in the offshore oil and gas industry. In May 1989 he and some other 
activists had published the "One Union Discussion Documenf', which, despite 
'its name, did not propose a trade union of offshore workers to replace the 
existing unions. Some OILC members undoubtedly already had aspirations in 
that direction but the document's purpose was to stress the importance of all 
employee organizations combining in a common strategy to secure the basic 
right of all offshore workers to be represented by a trade union. The influence of 
OILC had grown since its foundation and McDonald now felt confident enough 
39 A copy of this document was given to the author on the understanding that it would not be 
published in full and it therefore does not appear as an appendix. In the event the petition was 
never served. 
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to propose that the trade unions should use OILC as a mediator through which 
their differences could be reconciled. He said that a suitableforum must befound 
to enable these, at times, conflicting interests to be reconciled in the cause of 
organising the N. Sea effectively. This document would also like to suggest that 
the authentic voice and active participation of the N. Sea workforce can be 
brought to bear through the OILC"' Now with the title of Chairman of OILC he 
was beginning to carve for himself the r6le of a principal player in offshore 
industrial relations. 
Discussions had begun in July 1989 between the Offshore Contractors' Council 
and the trade unions wherein the question of a post-construction agreement was 
raised as well as other less contentious issues. The operators were aware of this 
and in the Autumn of 1989 they told the contracting companies that no work 
would be offered to any organization which included a post-construction 
agreement in its tender. This put paid to any thoughts of ballots of contractors' 
employees on the subject of trade union recognition offshore. At a meeting on 
18th December, 1989 the trade unions stated that they would not negotiate 
further on an Offshore Construction Agreement for 1990 unless OCC agreed to 
include post-construction work within it together with a merger with the 
Southern Waters Agreement4l and a commitment to training on an NAECI 
baSiS. 42 The Offshore Contractors' Council met the Employment Practices 
Committee of UKOOA on 12th January, 1990 and were told that while the oil 
companies were prepared to see harmonization of OCA and SWA they would 
not, countenance an OCA/SWA which encompassed post-construction work. 
OCC, realising that an impasse had been reached, cancelled the meeting arranged 
with the trade unions for 24th January, 1990. 
This did not mean immediate disruption offshore because the unions, not being 
recognized by the employers, were in no position to carry out the legal 
preliminaries that now had to precede industrial action. On the other hand the 
summer of 1989 had shown that there was sufficient militancy offshore for 
another bout of disaffection to find expression. The trade unions began to plan an 
offensive for the sunimer of 1990 with OILC playing a central part in the 
strategy. 
(d) The OILC becomes established 
Industrial action offshore petered out during September 198943 but OILC had no 
intention of maintaining a low profile until called into action again by trade 
" Appendix CC. 
41 v. ChapterTwelve, p. 202. 
42 The National Agreement for the Engineering Construction Industry had been reached in the 
n-M-1980s and brought to an end separate negotiations between the employers and three unions- 
AUEW(Construction Section). EETPU and GMB. The unions now negotiated as one body and 
there was thus what is now known as a single table agreement. In return, the employers offered 
training in order that members could keep up-to-date with modem technology affecting the 
industry. 
43 There was some small degree of unrest among catering staff later in the year but that was 
related solely to new COTA rates and had nothing to do with the OILC, although McDonald 
pledged support. 
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union officials. Nor was this the wish of Lafferty who was thoroughly supportive 
of OILC at all times and Marathon Oil's perception of his union's r6le was very 
near the truth. " The influence of OILC had now spread beyond Aberdeen to oil 
ports in the north of England and McDonald had addressed a meeting during the 
Trades Union Congress. OILC had a small, inchoate, but fast developing 
administration of its own. From donations from oil workers it generated a small 
income sufficient to pay its chairman a modest salary and, from August, to rent 
accommodation above the Criterion Bar, a public house in Guild Street near the 
railway station. In this it was repeating the history of many of the older trade 
unions, which held their earliest meetings in public houses. "' This somewhat 
cramped accommodation was given the title of the Oil Information Centre and 
registered itself as a charity the purpose of which is the provision of information, 
advice, assistance and educational facilities for offshore workers in matters 
relating to their terms and conditions of employment in sojar as they affect their 
health and Safety. 46 McDonald now also had the title of manager of the Oil 
information Centre. 
OILC also had its own publication -"Blowout" -which began in mid-1989 as 
little more than a duplicated news-sheet giving information about OILC matters. 
It has gradually emerged to become a triumph of trade union journalism 
considering the narrow financial base upon which it has always rested. 
McDonald had known from the outset that there was no future for an 
organization, which was concerned solely with fighting a general grievance 
without an underlying philosophy around which the industrial action could 
focus. It was for this reason that he and his colleagues had given priority to 
preparing the "One Union Discussion Document" which stressed the importance 
of unified action by all oil workers. " He knew that little could be achieved 
without a great deal of preparation and consequently saw the "sit-ins" almost as a 
practice run for a more serious confrontation at a time and in a manner which 
OILC would choose. 
Meanwhile he consolidated his position as a growing force in trade union life. 
Following a proposal of Lafferty he was invited to attend meetings of ITJOOC 
which still regarded OILC as an organization which it had nurtured and which it 
could rein back when circumstances required. Although not a full member he 
was allowed to speak on matters concerning OILC. At a meeting on 4th July, 
1989 attended by representatives of all seven trade unions with membership 
offshore, except BALPA, together with Frank Doran, MP for Aberdeen South 
and Lewis Macdonald" his research assistant, Lafferty reported on the industrial 
44 
v. p. 223 supra. 
"5 This was because before trade unions achieved legal status under the Trade Union Act 1871, 
they could not sue or be sued: owners of property were therefore reluctant to lease premises in 
case they were not paid for them. 
46 As stated on p. v of "Striking Out". a 1991 Oil Information Centre publication. 
47 v. p. 223 supra. 
48 Dr Macdonald is not related to Ronnie McDonald. He advised Tom Clark MP (1993-97) and 
is now assisting Mr Doran again on the latter's return to Parliament after a gap of five years 
(1992-1997). 
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action offshore, to which the lUOOC gave total support. Members then criticised 
the EETPU for concluding another SJIB agreemene' but Bob Eadie defended his 
national officers on the ground that this mutual understanding with the offshore 
employers would not be allowed to wither in javour of any one industry 
agreement. " Ronnie McDonald argued that by signing this new SJIB agreement 
the EETPU had lost credibility within their own membership. Despite this 
criticism Eadie and the other EETPU delegate supported the IUOOC resolution 
which was released later that day to the press. 
We state our intention to pursue with vigour the establishment of a single 
offshore agreement with the representatives of all offshore employers covering 
all the contract workers in the offshore oil industry. 
By the time of the next meeting of the IUOOC on 9th August, 1989 the contract 
workers' dispute was still in progress. Possibly feeling that OILC was beginning 
to exercise power without responsibility, the IUOOC resolved that there was 
now a need for closer relationship between IUOOC and OILC and it was agreed 
that this should be done by the Committee being represented at all meetings of 
the OILC in the coming months. Since Campbell Reid and Tommy Lafferty were 
appointed to be the IUOOC representatives at OILC meetings, the relationship 
between Lafferty and McDonald was now official as well as personal and 
became even closer by the end of 
1989 when Lafferty succeeded Reid, who had taken early retirement, as 
Secretary of IUOOC. 
The first meeting of OILC to have its minute recorded in typescripts' took place 
the following day. Before this there had been little more than rough manuscript 
notes without dates and although there does appear to have been some discussion 
about whether OILC should be a separate union nothing is clear. From this date, 
however, the minutes of OILC meetings provide a wealth of information on the 
industrial relations of the oil industry from the trade union point of view and 
must be read in conjunction with those of IUOOC to obtain a full understanding 
of what was happening. 
That this meeting was held in Glasgow demonstrates that OILC was not just a 
small pressure group based in Aberdeen. Lafferty and Reid were present and 
McDonald produced a draft constitution for discussion. This minute offers 
undisputed evidence that OILC saw its purpose to be dedicated to industrial 
relations activity in a manner which circumvented the law as it now applied to 
registered trade unions. The draft constitution stated that the organization 
intended to operate outside the restraints of current and future anti-trade union 
legislation and that to do so successfully it must maintain the loose ad hoc 
association that it is. It had no intention of becoming a trade union because The 
OILC does not have memhers-only participants. 
49 v. Chapter Twelve, p. 201 supra. 
50 Minute of meeting of IUOOC of 4th July, 1989. 
51 OILC had obtained office accommodation in August 1989. v. p. 225 supra. 
226 
At another committee meeting in Glasgow on 12th October, 1989 McDonald 
reported that he had met Campbell Christie, General Secretary of the Scottish 
Trades Union Congress, on the 14th September, 1989 and that he had spoken at a 
meeting during the Trades Union Congress with Jimmy Airlie of the AUEW in 
the chair and thirteen national officers of trade unions Present. " At the meeting 
on 2nd November it was minuted that Campbell Christie was very supportive of 
the OILCs aims in assisting the Trade Unions' drive to organise the offshore 
industry. This was the r6le which OILC saw for itself at this time but it is of 
equal relevance that McDonald was now accepted by the Scottish trade union 
hierarchy as someone worthy of notice and encouragement. 
By December 1989 the OILC had widened its influence to the extent that it was 
rivalling IUOOC as the representative body for offshore employees. The IUOOC 
was essentially Aberdeen-based while OILC now had branches in Newcastle, 
Middlesbrough, Great Yarmouth and Liverpool as well as Aberdeen and 
Glasgow. On 6th December McDonald was in Great Yarmouth speaking to 
supporters at a meeting covered by television and in the presence of Frank 
Doran, the Opposition spokesman on energy. Lafferty revelled in his r6le as 
IUOOC representative on the OILC committee and at its meeting on 5th 
December, 1989 had proposed that it (IUOOQ should reconstitute itseýr to 
include a lay delegate from each of the constituent unions. It was felt that this 
would make the IUOOC more relevant to the men and more effective in itsfuture 
dealings in the industry. It is unusual for a motion on the constitution of one 
body to be proposed and accepted at a meeting of another, but IUOOC agreed to 
amend its constitution to include lay representation, although insisting that 
individual trade unions would decide the basis upon which any lay nomination 
would be made. " At the final 1989 meeting of IUOOC a revised constitution 
incorporating the right of lay members of trade unions to become representatives 
was presented and accepted. In addition, McDonald's somewhat anomalous 
position on the ITJOOC was regularised when the 1UOOC decided that the 
manager of the Offshore Information Committee be co-opted onto the X00C. "' 
The IUOOC probably still considered the OILC as a subordinate body but, 
somewhat pusillanimously, had accepted the OILC proposal for a radical 
alteration to its constitution and had elevated its chairman to the same status as 
the representatives of the eight unions which constituted the ITJOOC. 
Thus OILC, founded early in 1989 as a small group of activists prepared to work 
within the trade union framework to co-ordinate action for a post-construction 
agreement, had, by the end of the year, developed into an organization which 
enjoyed full membership of IUOOC almost as if it was a trade union in its own 
right. It had its own accommodation and income and its chairman, Ronnie 
McDonald, virtually unknown at the start of the year, had become accepted by 
national officers of trade unions as a valuable auxiliary in their fight to win full 
negotiating rights offshore. 
" It is reasonable to assume that this is the meeting of 5th September, 1989. Appendix CC. 
53 JUOOC minute of 6th December, 1989. 
54, IUOOC minute of 14th December, 1989. 
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2 The Action Offshore in 1990 
(a) OILC: its Leadership, its Relationship with Trade Unions and the 
Reaction of the Oil Operators 
1990 has been the only year when the oil companies operating on the UK 
continental shelf have faced concerted industrial action from the trade unions. 
Since the Offshore Industry Liaison Committee was the principal instrument of 
this action it is necessary to look at its leadership, its connection with other 
employee organizations and the reaction of the oil operators to its emergence 
upon the industrial relations scene. This must, however, be preceded by a short 
commentary on industrial relations within the oil industry at the beginning of 
1990. 
The new decade began with relationships between trade union and industry 
organizations very different from their form twelve months earlier. 1988 had 
seen Piper Alpha and some activism from employees engaged on hook-ups but 
by January 1989 the public inquiry headed by Lord Cullen had begun its 
proceedings and the trade unions had negotiated an Offshore Construction 
Agreement for 1989. There seemed little to disrupt the quiet waters of North Sea 
offshore employment in the coming months. By January 1990, however, the 
placid industrial relations which the employers had enjoyed throughout the 
1980s no longer existed. During the summer there had been unofficial industrial 
action offshore centred upon a demand for a post-construction agreement and, 
although work had resumed, the trade unions had refused to negotiate an OCA 
for 1990 and it was not difficult to foresee that before long the unions would 
bring up the issue again. Moreover, the agitation offshore had been associated 
with a new employee body, the Offshore Industry Liaison Committee, which 
might be, technically, no more than an ad hoc body acting with the tacit consent 
of the official trade unions, but which had now achieved considerable 
prominence, even to the extent of being regarded by the press as the voice of the 
offshore worker. 
It is very difficult to separate OILC from its leader, Ronnie McDonald. It has 
been suggested that he may have been a "plarif 'by Lafferty, who felt that he was 
being outmanoeuvred by TGWU and MSF in the quest for offshore members 
and that, once established, McDonald would recruit for the AEU but instead 
McDonald saw an opportunity to create a new trade union for offshore workers. " 
Whatever the reasons for the appointment of McDonald to his special task he 
soon demonstrated that he had all the qualities of effective leadership required to 
develop a small group of dedicated trade unionists into a coherent and active 
force. He displayed a natural talent for public relations, which was of inestimable 
value to OILC since it attracted the attention of press, radio and television 
journalists. This accomplishment was part of his superb command and 
35 This theory appears in the thesis because it was suggested to the author by a highly respected 
former director of a prominent oil operating company. McDonald has told the author it is not the 
case. 
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understanding of the power of communication in general, whether addressing 
fellow trade unionists or contributing to Blowout, the bi-monthly organ of OILC. 
As already stated he was also the manager of the Oil Information Centre, which 
was in effect the OILC in legal guise. It published OILC information and 
discussion pamphlets and here McDonald received great assistance from Dr 
Charles Woolfson of Glasgow University, an academic who shared his general 
political philosophy and since that time has appeared on many academic and 
trade union platforms as a spokesman on the industrial relations of the North Sea 
oil and gas industry. Some of the lengthier and more academic publications of 
the Oil Information Centre bear the mark of Dr Woolfson's exemplary literary 
style and particular philosophical outlook. 
IUOOC began 1990 with a new constitution, a new chairman, Warren Duncan of 
i,; us, 56 and a new secretary, Tommy Lafferty. Its decision to appoint Lafferty 
was not in its best interests because it had replaced a highly competent 
administrative officer, Campbell Reid, by someone who, whatever his other 
merits as a union official, lacked the expertise appropriate for the secretaryship 
of a trade union joint committee. Moreover it had been Lafferty's idea to 
introduce onto IUOOC the lay membership which was likely to be supportive of 
OILC. Lafferty's main objective was to extract from the oil industry the post- 
construction agreement that he so desperately wanted not least because his union 
was the natural home for most offshore construction workers. Indeed, he saw 
OILC as a tool which he could use to deliver this prize to his union. 
Senior officials of the trade unions at Scottish level were aware of the nature and 
intent of OILC and regarded it as an autonomous pressure group which they 
could support and, when judged appropriate, use as an adjunct in any sanctions 
which they might take in pursuing their offshore objectives. In particular, OILC 
received encouragement from Jimmy Airlie, " who had himself risen to 
prominence through extra-trade union agitation on Clydeside and was now on 
the executive of the AEU. Even Campbell Christie, General Secretary of the 
Scottish TUC, had met McDonald who described his attitude as supportive. " 
The oil operators quickly understood that OILC constituted a threat to the 
industrial relations system which they had established with the trade unions.. For 
about fifteen years representative bodies of the trade unions and the operators, 
IUOOC and the Liaison Panel of the Employee Practices Committee of 
UKOOA, had been meeting at regular intervals to discuss matters of mutual 
interest. Concerning negotiating rights in the context of post-construction work 
on which the vast majority of employees were engaged, the operators maintained 
an adamantine opposition and any prospect of such rights remained a distant 
prospect for the unions although some companies had conceded representational 
56 Soon to merge with rail and other transport workers and become the National Union of Rail. 
Maritime and Transport Workers (usually abbreviated to RMT). 
57 Airlie's personal assistant was Charles Whelan, now an advisor to the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer. 
58 v. p. 227 supra. 
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rights at disciplinary and grievance hearings. The current system satisfied the oil 
companies because it did not interfere with their philosophy of management- 
controlled joint consultation and kept the trade unions quiescent. When it 
became known that the IUOOC had amended its constitution to include lay 
representatives, UKOOA immediately cancelled the quarterly meetings between 
the Liaison Panel of its Employee Practices Committee and IUOOC until further 
notice. This was not a display of petty malice but a shrewd tactic which denied to 
the trade unions the only official contact they had with the operators. " The 
employers could not abolish OILC but they could seek to prevent the spread of 
its influence through the official trade unions with which they wanted to retain 
the form of contact they had so far enjoyed. 
General information about OILC was available in the newspapers because 
McDonald used the press as an ally in his campaign for the rights of offshore 
workers. It was another matter when it came to details of the campaign which 
OILC was planning with the trade unions and so UKOOA simply infiltrated the 
organization. How this was done is, at present, unknown but the documentary 
evidence exists. There is a report described as a note which came into my hands 
from a source Iprefer not to disclose sent to all oil operating companies by Dr 
Harold Hughes, Director-General of UKOOA. This concerns the OILC meeting 
held in the Aberdeen Trades Council offices on 7th March, 1990 with an 
audience of about 160 offshore workers. ' On 30th March, 1990, UKOOA was 
able to send out to all the major oil operators a six page report on meetings, 
which McDonald had addressed in Newcastle and Middlesbrough only two days 
earlier where the OILC chairman had outlined the nature and details of the 
61 industrial action that his organization intended to pursue. 
There are also notes made at an OILC meeting of 29th May, 1990, revealing that 
the writer cannot have known much about the local trade union personalities 
involved" because he refers to a "Tom McLaffery" (obviously Tommy Lafferty) 
but which provided for UKOOA a most useftil account of how the action 
offshore was progressing from the point of view of OILC. This is, however, to 
anticipate events. Once they became aware of the existence and purpose of the 
Offshore Industry Liaison Committee, the oil companies, powerful and wealthy 
organizations with their well-resourced and at times ruthless employers' 
organization, were soon in possession of all they needed to know about the 
upstart body which was seeking to upset the industrial relations status quo 
offshore. 
(b) Armed Neutrality 
UKOOA knew that OILC was gaining influence among oil workers and as early 
as January 1990 companies were preparing for the conflict that they were certain 
59 The trade unions did meet the operators as members of OPITO (Offshore Petroleum Industry 
Training Organization) but these meetings had a different agenda and purpose. v. Chapter 
Eleven, p. 192 supra.. 
60 v. p. 222 supra and Appendix GG. 
61 See Appendix HH. 
62 He also refers to oil contractors "Salonus" and "Masalle", presumably Salamis and Lasalle. 
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would erupt within a few months. At a meeting of senior managers of oil 
operating companies in Aberdeen on 22nd January, 1990 there was general 
agreement that none of the operators had been preparedfor the emergence of the 
OILC as a power group in 1989" and that Ourjob for this year is to become 
more pro-active and head off some of the difficulty. They felt that their position 
was stronger in 1990 because of the more uniform and acceptable level ofpay 
for contractors' employees. " Certainly Shell and BP exercised pro-activity by 
calling their major contractors to a meeting on 27th February, 1990. The 
contractors were advised that Shell intend to award an across the board 
increase of 11.7% to all categories of contractor personnel including catering 
crews, effective I ApH4 1990. Shell also advised their contractors that all 
contractor employees will be guaranteed similar privileges offshore as Shell 
employees, e. g. no "apartheid" in the canteen, no accommodation differentials 
etc. The operators also insisted that their contractors would be expected to have 
pension schemes, improved travel and subsistence allowances and to raise death 
benefit from E25,000 to E50,000 and sickness benefit from E30 to flOO per 
week. " Thus, without consulting other oil operators, Shell and BP raised 
substantially the pay of construction workers on their installations and ceased the 
practice whereby contractors' employees were disadvantaged in terms of 
accommodation, travel allowances and other benefits in comparison with directly 
employed staff 
This was an attempt by the two largest oil companies to buy themselves out of 
any future trouble because they had a considerable amount of work projected for 
the next few months. Other operators were less than thrilled with this unilateral 
decision. " Nevertheless they had to follow suit in case they suffered shortages of 
exnerienced offshore workers because men would naturally seek employment 
where the wage rates were highest. 
McDonald could see that the considerable concessions made by the operators 
were intended to deflect employee support from what he and the trade unions 
regarded as the more substantial goal of a post-construction agreement. 
inevitably the markedly improved pay and conditions of work offshore were 
bound to reduce the appeal of OILC for industrial action in the coming months. 
McDonald himself had earlier referred to the differences in pay and conditions of 
work between contractors' employees and direct workers of the operators as an 
injustice which acted as a unifying force. " The employers had trumped his ace 
and it was now going to be more difficult to engender common cause offshore 
for a post- construction agreement. Accordingly he branded the non-negotiated 
award as a bribe. " 
63 The quotations in this paragraph are from a confidential memorandum sent on 26di January, 
1990 to a senior manager of a major oil operating company by his subordinate responsible for 
industrial relations. 
64 
v. p. 223 supra. 
65 Report on the Shell decision to senior management of another operator from its company 
human resources manager, 28th February, 1990. 
66 One operator, Marathon, complained of "being led by the nose by Shell 
67 v. p. 222 supra. 
68 Scotsman, 3rd March, 1990. 
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Meanwhile there had been some unease offshore among OILC activists at the 
lack of response ftorn national officers of trade unions whom McDonald had 
addressed on OILC and its objectives"' during the Trades Union Congress in 
September 1989. They had promised to meet in order to consider ways in which 
they could assist offshore workers and advised that a single table approach 
should be discussed. Single table bargaining had become an important issue at 
the national level of British industrial relations. ' It was a method of negotiation 
whereby an employer or employers' association did not negotiate separately with 
each recognised union but with a representative body of all the unions which had 
already agreed their common objectives. By March 1990 the national officers 
had still not met but OILC and IUOOC had already drafted a single table 
agreement, which came to be known as the Continental Shelf Agreement. It 
demanded from offshore employers recognition of trade unions for negotiating 
purposes, the right to elect shop stewards and certain other concessions, all of 
which were standard practice onshore, not least in the establishments of those oil 
companies which were so opposed to granting similar rights to their offshore 
workers. 
Eventually a meeting between national officers of trade unions which were 
involved in hook-up agreements took place on 18th April, 1990 during the 
Scottish Trades Union Congress. They constituted themselves the National 
Offshore Committee (NOC) with Tom MacLean, national secretary of the 
AEU's construction section, as its secretary and charged OILC to Deliver action 
offshore. A national paper reported This is the first time all the unions in the 
North Sea have gone forward with a unified strategy. It was probably the best, 
most constructive and united meeting of its kind about the North Sea. " NOC met 
local and OILC officials on 8th May, 1990 in London and endorsed the draft 
Continental Shelf Agreement. The NOC press release stated: The National 
officers reajji'rm support for an objective of a Continental Shetr, 4greement to 
cover terms and conditions of all employees engaged in offshore work To this 
end we will not conclude any agreement that does not encompass these 
p Ci 1 72 rin P es . By this time the 
OILC was in the early stages of delivering action 
offshore and it was agreed that NOC would meet on a regular basis with 
MacLean keeping in daily communication with OILC and local officials. Events 
were to show that the National Offshore Committee's enthusiastic endorsement 
of the Continental Shelf Agreement was near the limit of the support it gave to 
OILC. 
(c) Confrontation in the North Sea Oil and Gas Industry during 1990 
The confrontation offshore in the summer of 1990 was sought, organized and led 
by OILC with the objective of winning employer recognition of the Continental 
Shelf Agreement. Its leadership operated within the framework of the trade 
unions, which supported the OILC initiative but did not themselves become 
69 Appendix CC. 
70 It had been the subject of a TUC Special Review Body during 1989. 
71 Scotsman, 19th April, 1990. 
72 Minute of OILC comraittee 8th May, 1990. 
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officially involved. The dispute centred on the single principle of full trade union 
recognition by the employers. As McDonald had always made clear, money was 
not an issue and so this dispute was never to become clouded by secondary 
issues. For their part, the operators were determined not to concede full 
recognition to the trade unions. 
Since OILC had made no secret of its intention to take industrial action the 
employers were prepared when it came. As stated above, the two main operators, 
Shell and BP, had arranged for a large increase in wage rates, additional to the 
annual award made only a few months previously, to begin in April 1990. 
UKOOA also opened an office in Aberdeen so that it now had direct local 
communication with its member companies and, when required, with the trade 
unions. This was to be a considerable factor during the confrontation because 
LJKOOA maintained a much higher public relations image which did much to 
minimise the OILCs media campaign" 
The OILC strategy was to initiate the confrontation with an overtime ban and 
then to escalate the activity to withdrawal of labour when that would be most 
likely to inconvenience the employers. This would be the late summer when, in 
addition to the normal repair and maintenance programmes, operators would 
have to meet the Department of Energy requirement to fit emergency shut-down 
valves (ESVs) on their installations by the end of the year. OILC targeted late 
summer for its major trial of strength with the industry because it knew that at 
the height of the shut-down programme there would be many workers with trade 
union allegiances employed offshore. The timing of the industrial action would 
be crucial to the success of the campaign. 
There was also a further point. The government had introduced the Employment 
Bill 1990 which, when enacted, would require trade unions to repudiate any 
unofficial industrial action by any of its officials, including shop stewards. It 
must be remembered that at this time OILC was acting with the approval of the 
major LJK manual worker unions, which had formed a special committee, the 
NOC, to support its struggle against the oil operators. However, once the bill 
received royal assent, support from a trade union for any industrial action such as 
that carried out by OILC would have to be repudiated or the trade union(s) 
concerned would be held responsible at law for any claim for damages from the 
employers affected by the unofficial action. 
By April, 1990 McDonald was in a dilemma. There was a real danger that 
enthusiasm for industrial action would wane once the enhanced wage rates were 
experienced by offshore workers. Moreover he was finding it difficult to restrain 
OILC activists, especially those who had always favoured a separate offshore 
workers' union, from initiating sanctions. Yet he knew it was too early to begin 
the action. Since delay might make matters worse circumstances forced him to 
open the campaign. 
" From a paper (13th March, 199 1) reviewing industrial relations in the offshore oil industry 
during 1989 and 1990 prepared for the senior management of Marathon Oil UK. 
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The overtime ban got off to a rather stuttering start on account of uncertainty by 
the OILC leadership of the extent to which this form of sanction would be 
successfid. The ban was referred to as "working to contract" because, very 
conveniently for OILC, the Department of Energy had issued a safety notice" 
advising that the "normal" working day should not exceed twelve hours and that 
"only in very special circumstances" should a maximum of sixteen hours per day 
be exceeded. Since 1986 fifteen hours had become normal on many installations 
and the three hours of overtime pay had acted as a sufficient palliative for any 
physical or other inconvenience it caused. By mid-May the overtime ban was 
being implemented with some success and at the end of June about 27 
installations were involved. In retrospect it has become clear that very little was 
achieved and that the employers were irritated rather than injured. Many workers 
were not dedicated trade unionists and disliked the ban since it reduced their 
earnings. Also from the aspect of the OILC strategy it had come too early 
because the employers decided to delay their installation shut-downs, partially 
for technical reasons but also to allow support for the ban to decline. Worst of all 
there was dissension within ITJOOC, where support should have been at its 
strongest, because both MSF and EETPU wanted to reverse the decision to 
accept lay delegates and so resume their meetings with UKOOA. McDonald 
realised that his presence on IUOOC was the principal reason for UKOOA 
breaking off relationships with that body and at a meeting of IUOOC held in 
London on 17th July, 1990 (when NOC also met IUOOC representatives) he 
said that he did not wish to attend any future UKOOA / IUOOC meetings. " He 
thus made a personal contribution to healing the dissension within 1UOOC. 
Almost immediately UKOOA was informed it agreed that the meetings between 
it and IUOOC would be resumed on 5th September, 1990. " 
By July the offshore activists were demanding that complete stoppages of work 
were necessary if any momentum was to be retained. Lafferty was showing 
impatience and looking for more effective action offshore. In addition some 
unrelated events fuelled the demand for the promised escalation of the dispute. 
On 25th May, 1990 the Fatal Accident Inquiry was opened in Aberdeen into the 
death of Timothy Williams. He had been a wireless operator on the drilling 
vessel Ocean Odyssey, which experienced a high pressure blow-out on 22nd 
September, 1988 and after everyone had been safely evacuated he had been 
ordered back onto the burning vessel where he had succumbed to the flames. 
Then on 25th July, 1990 the rotor blade of a helicopter collided with the jib of 
the crane on Brent Spar, the aircraft collapsed into the sea and six men lost their 
lives. These fatal accidents highlighted one of the principal complaints of the 
offshore activists continually voiced by OILC, namely, that accident prevention, 
despite Piper Alpha, still had insufficient priority in the minds of management 
and that this defect could be remedied solely by the fullest involvement of trade 
union representatives on all installation safety committees. 
74 Department of Energy, Petroleum Engineering Division Safety Notice S 1/90,1 Oth January, 
1990. 
75 Minute of IUOOC, 17th July, 1990. 
76 Minute of lUOOC' 16th August, 1990. 
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In early June there occurred an incident which seemed indicative of the type of 
employer under whom persons were required to work without the type of 
protection enshrined in the Continental Shelf Agreement. Some workers on 
Beryl Alpha protested about the disciplining of a colleague and immediately 
their employer, Press Offshore, dismissed not only them but all those on leave as 
well. 
There was also some pressure from the NOC which met for only the second time 
on 17th July, 1990 and decided to demonstrate its commitment to the offshore 
workers by attempting to carry out a registration campaign. Official backing for 
industrial action could be provided only when there was sufficient support from 
registered union members as indicated through a ballot. Although the unions 
tried to carry this through over the following months, two factors were to render 
the attempt fruitless: the implacable employer opposition to any co-operation, 
such as releasing the names of their employees and the movement of employees 
from one contract to another. 
McDonald knew that it was too early to escalate the action but he was under 
pressure from the men who were carrying the burden of the industrial action on 
the installations. Accordingly OILC called the first 24 hour strike on 2nd 
August, 1990 and about 35 installations in the northern sector of the North Sea 
were affected. There was some action during August on installations in the 
southern sector but it was poorly co-ordinated and soon ineffectual. The major 
action revolved around Shell installations in the northern sector with workers 
"sitting -in" and refusing to go onshore. Shell sought an interdict against OILC 
in the Court of Session, where the case came before Lord Caineron. OILC, at 
considerable expense, defended the occupation on the grounds that trespass was 
a concept foreign to Scots law and that the occupiers were engaged in an 
industrial dispute. Shell did not obtain an order for eviction but since Lord 
Cameron advised that the dispute should now be conducted onshore the men 
decided that they had won a moral victory and ended their occupation. The 
action then dribbled to a halt and McDonald called off any finther sit-ins at the 
end of August. 
In their book "Paying for the Pipee' to which reference has already been made, 
the authors provide, in exhaustive detail, a well-documented account of the 
industrial action of summer 1990. The book is written very much from the OILC 
perspective and the authors would be the first to concede this as a statement of 
fact and not as a criticism. It would be appropriate, therefore, to look briefly at 
how the action was interpreted by the senior management of a prominent oil 
company, Marathon Oil, LJK. 
On 2nd August, 1990, R. J. Carter, the company's External and Corporate 
Affairs Manager supplied a paper on industrial relations offshore for J. V. 
Parziale, the company's London President. " He reported that Oil (sic) Industry 
77 Appendix II. 
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Liaison Committee has sought to put pressure on the operating companies to 
obtain a National Offshore Agreement. They have pressed their claim under the 
guise of seeking better representation on safety committees, but this is really a 
coverfor the bigger issue. (Recognition of trade union demands as outlined in 
the CSA). He further stated that in the absence of any national agreement the 
industry collectively has been compelled to follow the negotiated settlements of 
BP and Shell who broke ranks and conceded to the demands" being made. The 
result has been that the remaining companies have had no influence over events, 
whereas if a national agreement were in place we would naturally have an input 
into any negotiations. Carter then went on to argue the case for a national 
offshore agreement. This conciliatory approach - possibly reflecting the personal 
view of a furmer Labour MP - was unusual among oil operating company 
managers. His comments also indicated the dominance of Shell and BP within 
the industry. 
Four days later the company's General Manager in Aberdeen, D. E. Smith, 
reported to Parziale that contract workers on the company's Brae A and Brae B 
installations had struck. " He had immediately sent back onshore 154 men who 
had refused to return to work to sort out their difficulty with their respective 
employers. These men were mainly welders, fitters and riggers and Smith stated 
Production operations continue in a normal manner on both plaýfbrms and 
drilling has not been affected. After commenting that only OILC, not the unions, 
was presenting the case for the strikers via the media, he tells Parziale that across 
the North Sea it is unlikely that much, ifany, production is currently affected. 
A fortnight later, when the industrial action was beginning to decline, Smith 
wrote again to Parzialefrom the operations end of the business, regarding R. J 
Carter's letter of 2nd August, 1990. " His use of this terminology indicates a 
degree of impatience with someone far away from the practical problems of 
dealing with a strike offshore and a determination to give his superior a more 
realistic account of what was going on. He stated that UKOOA have done a 
creditablejob ofpresenting the industry view that safety is not the issue, only the 
lever being used by the organizers. Despite three weeks of industrial action 
production in the North Sea has been affected very little at all. Planned 
construction and maintenance programs have been deferred, but with little pain 
to the industry. The resolve of the major operators (Shell and BP) has been 
demonstrated by their willingness to demobilize the striking members of their 
workforce. In summary, the workers being led by OILC have not succeeded in 
causing major problems for the industry. They have begun to lose substantial 
work time and consequently wages. With the only objective being representation, 
the strikers' resolve is beginning to weaken. What is noticeable here is how 
Smith's perspective of the r6le of Shell and BP is very different from that of 
Carter. Again, while Carter saw value in a national offshore agreement, Smith 
79 It is not clear to what Carter is referring unless it is to the decision by Shell and BP on 27th 
February, 1990 that contractors must award offshore workers a pay increase and other improved 
conditions of employment as stated at p. 229 supra. 
79 Appendix JJ. 
80 Appendix KK. 
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took a totally different view on the grounds that the union would have leverage 
to severely impact production by calling out a wider scope of workers than they 
can now accomplish and we should direct our efforts to continue frustrating the 
efforts to organize. 
In his next paragraph Smith provides an admirable summary of the problems that 
face trade unions, which seek to organize membership among offshore workers 
and how the unions are unwilling to surrender power to OILC although OILC 
has presented a focal point. His conclusion is that unionization does not appear 
to be inevitable (as argued by Carter) and we can play an important r6le in 
preventing it. 
In March 1991 a paper" was prepared for senior Marathon Oil managers as a 
basis for discussion on its industrial relations in the coming year. It contained 
summaries of the disputes in 1989 and 1990 and that for 1990 claimed, quite 
correctly as we now know, that Yhe strikes were not as widespread or as 
successful as reported and that firm action by the Operators and OCC in 
isolating disputes, cancelling work programmes and dismissing personnel who 
had failed to follow formal disputes/grievance procedures minimised their 
effectiveness. 
OILC had failed to obtain a single concession from management and Smith's 
comment on how Marathon Oil could assist in preventing the unionization of its 
offshore employees would have been echoed by Shell and BP and other major 
UKOOA members. 
3 The Offshore Industry Liaison Committee becomes an Independent Trade 
Union 
(a) The Marginalization of the OILC by the National Unions 
Once industrial action ceased, the OILC became an embarrassment to the trade 
unions. Having refused to re-negotiate an Offshore Construction Agreement for 
1990" the unions had deprived themselves of the one important collective 
bargain they had ever held in the industry and with the employers. The 
Employment Act 1990" was about to come into force and they did not want 
semi-autonomous bodies such as OILC taking any action which would 
compromise their relations with the employers with whom they were now 
anxious to re-establish their lines of communication. The trade unions realised 
that they had promised their offshore members far more than they could deliver 
and that there had never been the slightest likelihood that the employers would 
have accepted the Continental Shelf Agreement as a basis for discussion. They 
saw that any accommodation with the employers implied the abandomnent of the 
81 The name of the person who wrote this discussion report is not mentioned. The paper was 
faxed to Aberdeen and the date at the foot of each page is 13th March, 1990. 
82 v. p. 224 supra. 
83 v. p. 233 supra. 
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Continental Shelf Agreement, which they had endorsed a few months earlier and 
distancing themselves from the OILC. 
This may have been a shabby display of ingratitude towards the OILC which had 
fought for the basic principles of trade unionism but realism dictated trade union 
policy. As early as 31 st August, 1990 Jimmy Airlie was claiming that the trade 
unions had not overtly supported the action offshore -a blatant untruth - 
although they would not repudiate them. "' EETPU made overtures to the 
employers to resurrect the SJIB agreement and RMT, the new union into which 
NUS had been absorbed, believed that this OILC12Vational Offshore Committee 
is tying up too much of our timefor negligible return. "' Only four members of 
IUOOC turned up for a special meeting to discuss future offshore policy with 
OILC. By early 1991 the Offshore Contractors' Council entered into discussions 
at national level with AEU, EETPU and GMB on a new Offshore Construction 
Agreement, excluding from the process MSF, which had been a previous 
signatory, another example of the divide and rule policy through which 
employers weakened the unity of the trade unions. Tommy Lafferty, still 
committed to the principle of a negotiated agreement involving post-construction 
as well as hook-up, believed this was letting down his members who had 
involved themselves in the industrial action of the previous summer, many of 
whom were still unemployed as a result. He continued to work in association 
with OILC, many of whose supporters, it must be recalled, were members of 
AEU, until June 1991 when he informed OILC that he bad been instructed to 
discontinue contact with it. "' Earlier in the year Jimmy Airlie is reported by 
McDonald as having said at a meeting of national officers that the OILC had not 
produced any results in the last 2 years, " a clear indication that he saw no 
further r6le for it. By mid-summer 1991 the details of a new OCA had been 
agreed and were signed amid a glare of publicity in August. Ever the realist, 
Airlie said "at's the alternative to an agreement? It's no agreement, " although 
McDonald despised it as a squalid little sectional deal signed on the backs of the 
sacked workers. " He also claimed that by signing the agreement the trade unions 
had endorsed their own marginalization but, in truth, it was OILC which had 
been marginalized. 
(b) The Publication of "Striking Out" 
The question which McDonald and his colleagues had to face on the cessation of 
industrial action was whether there was a future for the Offshore Industry 
Liaison Committee. They had been encouraged to "deliver action offshore" by 
national officers who, for their part, had promised not to reach any settlements 
with employers which breached the principles of the Continental Shelf 
Agreement. OILC had kept its side of the bargain but the trade unions had 
reneged on theirs. Although there is no minute of any decision to continue its 
84 Financial Times, 31 st August 1990. 
85 Report of Aberdeen branch, RMT, for July - September, 1990. 86 Minute of OILC Standing Committee, 20th June, 1991. 
87 Minute of OILC Standing Committee, 28th March, 1991. 
88 AEU press conference, 28th August, 1991. 
89 Scottish Daily Express, 29th August, 199 1. 
238 
activities, OILC was determined to retain its organization as far as possible and 
to continue to press, within the trade union movement, for an offshore post- 
construction agreement. Pay was not an issue and the differences in conditions of 
service between operators' and contractors' men were now significantly reduced 
but trade union representation on accident prevention committees was denied to 
them. It was on this aspect that OILC sought to focus attention and thus justify 
their raison d'6tre. 
It must be remembered that OILC was still little more than a pressure group 
working within the trade union movement. Its officers and supporters were 
members of established trade unions and OILC remained, as described in its 
constitution, a loose ad hoc association without members of its own. * 
Unsurprisingly it lost support after September 1990, not least because many who 
had been its strongest adherents were now unemployed. The Hull office was 
closed in December 1990 with debts of E4,00O. ". 
. ; Attendance at what were still referred to as 
"mass meetings" had 
fallen below 30 by March 1991. "' McDonald and his colleagues, however, were 
determined to show that OILC, far from being a guttering candle flickering 
towards extinction, was still a vibrant association of committed trade unionists. 
They published "Striking Out: New Directions for Offshore Workers and their 
Unions" in time for the Scottish Trade Union Congress in April 1991,91 
presenting it as a discussion document on how effective trade union organization 
might be achieved on the UK Continental Shelf The introduction drew attention 
to the OILC policy of trade union recognition as a necessary factor in improved 
accident prevention. It is the position of the OILC that we owe it to those who 
have already died and who have been injured and to the thousands who remain 
at risk today to ensure that effective safety provision is established. We believe: 
that this cannot be done withoutfull trade union recognition--. 9' It criticised the 
IUOOC as not currently a vehicle capable of organising t. he UK Continental 
ShetC 9' but avoided any suggestion that the OILC might set itself up as an 
independent trade union for all offshore workers. Nevertheless, there were 
members of the Standing Committee of OILC who were beginning to have 
thoughts in this direction and the editor of "Blowout" had to be restrained from 
including a ballot paper on precisely this matter. 
"Striking Out" served two purposes. It was a public relations coup for the OILC, 
demonstrating that it was still very much to the fore in offshore industrial 
relations. It attracted a lot of media attention and brought OILC back into the 
public eye after a period when it seemed to be a declining force. It was also the 
first analytical account of the offshore disturbances during 1989 and 1990 and 
one which posed questions that trade unions in the offshore oil and gas industry 
90 v. p. 226 supra. 
91 Minute of OILC 2nd December, 1990. 
92 Minute of OILC 28th March, 199 1. 
93 It was almost certainly written by Dr Charles Woolfson of Glasgow University. 
94 1991 Striking Out, p. 1. Offshore Information Centre. 
95 ibid p. 82. 
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would have to address. In particular, it argued for the trade union movement as a 
whole to take the lead on the offshore representation issue. 
Although it was not intended to be so, "Striking Ouf' can now be seen as the 
point where OILC crossed the Rubicon. It had published "Striking Out" to 
stimulate debate at the Scottish TUC on the question of offshore representation 
and had included a suggestion for a Federation formed from offshore sections 
which trade unions could set up within their own organizations. Such an 
Offshore Federation could seek a Certificate of Independence from the Registrar 
of Trade Unions and Employers' Associations and there was no reason why 
employees could not enjoy dual membership of both the Federation and their 
own trade union. ' Although this proposal was put forward with the best of 
intentions and, indeed, was to be taken up by the trade unions at national level 
later in the year, it received short shrift at the Scottish TUC. This was principally 
because "Striking Out" was published when the negotiations which Airlie, 
MacLean and other national officers were having with the Offshore Contracting 
Council had reached a crucial stage and they regarded any suggestions from 
OILC as an unwelcome intrusion. McDonald himself had logically, but perhaps 
unwisely, stated to the press that if the idea of an Offshore Federation was 
rejected it might lead to the foundation of a separate trade union for offshore 
workers. 97 This gave Airlie an opportunity to lambast the OILC at the Scottish 
TUC warning it that history is littered with the corpses of men who thought that 
they could take a different linefrom the official movement. " As "The Herald" 
reported, relations between the unions and the OILC had reached breaking 
point. 99 
(c) The Offshore Industry Liaison Committee and the IUOOC 
Lafferty was still secretary of the IUOOC during 1990 and did not demit office 
until July 1991, when his union ordered him to distance himself from OILC. " 
The minutes, where they survive, are few and uninformative during his period of 
office and consequently there is a paucity of original records at a time when it 
would have been interesting to read of the relationships between OILC (which, 
in effect, meant McDonald) and 1U00C. Campbell Reid was re- appointed in his 
place and the minutes immediately become full of relevant detail. We learn from 
a minute of a IUOOC/UKOOA meeting that IUOOC was concerned from 
September 1990 about the number of offshore workers who were unemployed as 
a result of the industrial action and IUOOC told UKOOA that all sacked men 
should be re-instated before any settled work could be achieved. "' This was to 
be a constant theme at all meetings until well into 1991 and UKOOA always 
gave the same answer: the dispute had been between contractors and their 
employees and since UKOOA did not negotiate with OCC the issue could be 
raised only on a client-contractor basis. This reply contrasts with the UKOOA 
" ibid p. 99. 
97 OILC Press Conference, 16th April, 199 1. 
98 Scottish TUC Conference, l7th April, 199 1. 
" Herald, 18th April, 199 1. 
100 v. p. 238 supra. 
101 Minute of meeting of UKOOA and lUOOC, 5th September, 1990. 
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statement of lst June, 1988 that it would investigate the IUOOC claim that 
contractors were not submitting bids based on the existing OCA. For McDonald 
it was a matter of moral integrity that he should fight for the rights of these men 
and his bitter condemnation of the August 1991 Offshore Construction 
Agreement reflected his disgust at their virtual abandonment by their unions. "' 
McDonald's position on the IUOOC must have been becoming tenuous by mid- 
summer 1991. Whatever may have been the relationships which he had with 
local officials in the North East of Scotland - and there is no evidence of 
acrimony- it must have been known that at national level he and his organization 
were not regarded with any favour. Nevertheless, when he reported at the 
IUOOC meeting of 26th July, 1991 that two trade unions had sought to prevent 
his attendance at an international offshore unions conference in Norway his 
IUOOC confr6res supported his application to attend as a full member. 
Moreover, he must still have had some influence since at this meeting the 
IUOOC agreed unanimously that it would wish to investigate further a 
proposition to re-organise the IUOOC on similar lines to the Confederation of 
Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions. It was felt that this could possibly assist 
the Unions in their long running battle to achieve recognition in the offshore 
industry. "' This was exactly what had been proposed in "Striking Out" but the 
decision of IUOOC to ask their national officers to give it serious consideration 
did not indicate an entirely new policy. IUOOC had already (in July 1989) 
assured OILC that it was the intention of IUOOC to work towards a single 
offshore agreement for all contract workers in the industry. "' The IUOOC 
probably had in mind then something like the Continental Shelf Agreement"' but 
this new IUOOC proposal did not differ in essentials from the policy agreed 
back in 1989. It also demonstrates that despite the unfavourable comment about 
IUOOC in "Striking Out" its member organizations believed the proposal had 
merit despite its provenance. Accordingly Campbell Reid invited the general 
secretaries of all the trade unions with an interest in the North Sea oil and gas 
industry to instruct their senior official with responsibility in this area to attend a 
meeting in Glasgow on 5th September, 1991 during the Trades Union 
Congress. '" 
There is a paper in the IUOOC files (infuriatingly undated) which outlines the 
problems of recruitment offshore and how this might be improved if The 
Offshore Sections (of the trade unions with interests offshore) are brought 
together in a "Confederation" based loosely on the CSEU It is reasonable to 
assume that this paper'o' was the working document to which Reid refers in his 
letter. 
102 
v. p. 238 supra. 
103 This quotation is taken not from the actual minute but from a letter dated 12th August, 1991 
sent by Campbell Reid to the general secretaries of all the trade unions with an interest in the 
North Sea oil and gas industry. This letter is reproduced in full as Appendix LL. 
04 v. p. 226 supra and Appendix MM. 
105 v. p. 232 supra. 
106 C. Reid to general secretaries of all unions with members employed in the oil and gas 
industry, 12th August, 199 1. 
107 v. Appendix NN. 
241 
Researchers are indebted to Campbell Reid for a manuscript note, which he 
inserted among the IUOOC minutes, of this meeting in Glasgow on 5th 
September, 1991. During what appears to have been a discussion on SI 971 
(Offshore Installations (Safety Representatives and Safety Committees) 
Regulations 1989"' McDonald said that Certification was the only way in which 
trade unions could exercise influence offshore. It is almost certain that he was 
referring to the solution already suggested in "Striking Out" and repeated in its 
sequel, "The Crisis in Offshore Trade Unionism", " that an offshore federation 
could seek a Certificate of Independence from the Registrar of Trade Unions and 
Employers' Associations and thus meet Lord Cullen's stipulation that the only 
arrangements that were relevant in matters of safety were those which involved 
the "total workforce". The value of Reid's note is that it reveals the presence of 
Alex Ferry, General Secretary of the Confederation of Shipbuilding and 
Engineering Unions. Reid reports Ferry as saying that CSEU could accept an 
invitation from national officers to assist in theformation of a confederation for 
offshore either through the present CSEU or independently. 
Ferry was one of the ablest trade union leaders of the period. "' Had Ferry been 
given the support of the AEU and the EETPU there was every chance that even 
at this late date the OILC could have been retained within the trade union 
movement as a whole. It would have been able to contribute its enthusiasm and 
dedication towards obtaining some concessions for organized labour from the 
employers. Both Ronnie McDonald and David Robertson have told the author 
that Ferry was sympathetic to OILC and probably would have been able to 
fashion a r6le for it within whatever joint union body he was able to construct 
out of the unions with membership of the IUOOC. It is difficult to disagree with 
the authors of "Paying for the Pipee' that the two major unions offshore, the 
AEU and the EETPU, amalgamated as AEEU by 1992, had no intention of ever 
allowing the formation of an offshore federation and that their disruptive tactics 
at meetings brought to naught the efforts of Alex Ferry. "' As the authors of "The 
Crisis in Offshore Trade Unionism" foresaw, the national officers of these two 
unions had negotiated a new OCA in 1991 because they were attempting to 
create a new craft super union which will dominate the areas of manufacturing 
and engineering onshore. The signing of the Hook-up 4greement only begins to 
make sense when analysed as part of this game plan. "' 
OILC was, however, unable to make any further contribution towards the 
formation of an offshore federation after the meeting in Glasgow of 5th 
September, 1991. The OCA, ratified a few days earlier, was anathema to OILC 
and McDonald's strong condemnation"' could not go unnoticed by the signatory 
108 v. Chapter Eleven, p. 186 supra. 
'09 1991 The Crisis in Offshore Trade Unionism. Oil Information Centre, Aberdeem 
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unions. This was probably why the trade union national officers made it clear 
that OILC was to have no part in the discussions about a possible offshore 
confederation. It was a parting of the ways when OILC sought independent trade 
union status. McDonald applied to IUOOC for OILC to be accepted as a trade 
union member but this was turned down and simultaneously IUOOC withdrew 
its invitation to him as a delegate of the Offshore Information Centre, the status 
under which he had been attending since December, 1989. "' 
Campbell Reid's meticulous minutes provide brief glimpses of subsequent OILC 
and IUOOC relationships. At its meeting in December 1991, IUOOC agreed to 
oppose the OILC campaign for recognition by the Scottish TUC and the Labour 
Party. The Edinburgh Trades Council had withdrawn moral and financial 
assistance from OILC but it still had support from the Aberdeen Trades Council 
which was to host a debate between Ronnie McDonald and Harry Bygate (of 
RMT) on 19th February, 1992. "' The lay membership introduced through 
Lafferty's agency in December, 1989' 16 continued and David Robertson attended 
as GMB representative on 26th July, 1991 and 20th October, 1991. He attended 
again on 12th November, 1992 (and to judge from a letter sent to Fraser Adam, 
the recently appointed GMB Regional Organiser, also on an earlier occasion that 
year) but was seen as an OILC spokesman rather than as a GMB lay 
representative and was asked to leave. 
Two letters from Campbell Reid strike an almost poignant note about the 
lUOOC. The first is that referred to immediately above when he asks the new 
GBM Regional Organiser to specify which lay delegate is to represent the union 
when you are unable to attend meetings. Meetings were often poorly attended by 
officers, almost as if they were implying that IUOOC had now little purpose to 
serve. The GMB Regional Organisers had been particularly remiss in this way 
because Eddie Bree, who had been elected chairman in July 1991, attended no 
meetings at all before he resigned his post in June 1992. In view of the time and 
effort Reid devoted to his work as secretary of the organization, one can 
understand his disappointment, to put it no stronger, at the lack of reciprocal 
effort by other local union officials. 
The other letter is to Campbell Christie, General Secretary of the Scottish TUC. 
Here we find Reid writing almost in sadness to ask Christie to try to ensure that 
STUC affiliates do not give support to the OILC, now that it has set itself up as 
an independent trade union. He recognises that OILC has made a significant 
contribution to trade unionism in the North Sea and that the IUOOC accepted 
that there was a genuine attempt being made (i. e. by the OILQ to organise the 
offshore workforce and to represent their aspirations both in Health and Safety 
terms and in the area of terms and conditions of employment. He continues a few 
lines later with charge that Many of us have felt for years that the unions at 
national level have been less than whole-hearted in their approach to the 
114 Minute of meeting of IUOOC, 30th October, 199 1. Also Appendices 00(i), 00(ii) & 
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115 Minute of meeting of IUOOC, 29th January, 1992. 
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organisation of the offshore workforce. He goes on to say that The OILC has in 
the past gone on record urging the Trades Unions to organise themselves along 
the lines described in the previous paragraph (the efforts of Alex Ferry to 
establish an Offshore Federation) and that although it is no longer a member of 
IUOOC, OILC has been made aware ofprogress on an informal basis. Clearly 
Campbell Reid regretted the way events had turned out and felt it was necessary 
to make the most senior trade union official in Scotland aware that there were 
many who did not go down the OILC road but were appreciative of what it had 
contributed to offshore industrial relations. ' 17 
By October 1992 Tommy Lafferty, one of the more colourful figures in offshore 
industrial relations, had ceased to play any official part in trade union life. An 
active player from the earliest days of the Scottish based oil industry, "" he failed 
to retain his post as his union's divisional organizer in a bitterly contested 
election ` where his close association with OILC was a factor in his defeat. The 
following year the AEEU investigated the special hardship fund which Lafferty, 
despite IUOOC advice, had set up for families of Piper Alpha victims. "' 
Unfortunately, Lafferty had arranged for himself to be the sole signatory for 
withdrawal of funds and had not surrendered control of it to his successor; 
worse, he had allowed his own personal accounts to be become inextricably 
mixed up with it. This was sheer administrative incompetence and not peculation 
but inevitably questions were asked and rumour abounded. Overwhelmed by the 
loss of his prestigious post, the suicide of his son and his union's investigation 
into the accounts of the fund, he took his own life in October 1993. "' 
(d) The Metamorphosis of an Association into an Independent Trade Union 
The nature of the OILC's public criticism of the new Offshore Construction 
Agreement finally broke the link between it and the trade unions. It was the 
culmination of a series of disagreements on policy between the OILC and the 
trade unions which had begun when the national officers, abandoning the 
Continental Shelf Agreement, had opened discussions with the Offshore 
Contractors' Council on a new OCA. McDonald had described the new 
settlement as a squalid deal". scarcely the language to rehabilitate his already 
deteriorating relationship with the national officers - and the Offshore 
Information Centre had just published "The Crisis in Offshore Trade Unionism". 
While "Striking Out" had displeased Airlie and the other national officers, this 
second emanation from the OILC publishing house went beyond their frontier of 
tolerance. It referred to the new hook-up agreement as a backward step and, as 
already stated, asserted that it only begins to make sense when analysed as part 
of a game plan, an attempt by the AEU and the EETPU to create a new craft 
117 These letters, 30th November, 1991 and 8th January, 1992 ( the date 1991 which appears on 
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super union which will dominate the areas of manufacturing and engineering 
offshore. 123 Although this was a valid interpretation of the new agreement, 
especially since MSF had been excluded from the discussions, '2" it was 
unacceptable to the national leaders that a group of members as critical of them 
as OILC could continue as a legitimate organization within their unions. "The 
Crisis in Offshore Trade Unionism" included the sentence In some respects the 
OILC seems to be on a collision course with national union officials` and this 
point had now been reached. Thus when the national officers denied OILC a seat 
at the discussions with Alex Ferry on the formation of an Offshore Federation 
and permission to use AEU premises for its meetings was withdrawn, OILC had 
to contemplate its future. 
It could either dissolve the organization or continue to fight for its objectives 
outside the main trade union movement. Neither was an attractive option. 
Dissolution was the easier decision but would be seen as a betrayal of what 
OILC had fought for and an abandonment of the 500 or so offshore workers who 
had supported industrial action and were still unemployed. To continue as an 
independent body required a tremendous act of faith in the organization's ability 
to survive as a viable entity. It was all very well for a member to rejoice that the 
unions have unshackled US126 but it had been the trade unions which had been the 
principal source of funding and that was now removed. Officially OILC had 
never had members, only participants, and independence would mean that they 
would have to give up their current union membership and lose all the privileges 
and protection that went with it. 
During September 1991 McDonald held meetings in Glasgow and in Aberdeen. 
There was no way back into the trade union fold and the alternatives of 
dissolution and independence were discussed by OILC associates. There was a 
large majority in favour of independence and on 3rd October, 1991 during the 
Labour Party conference at Brighton, McDonald announced the arrival of a new 
and independent employee organization prepared to represent the interests of all 
offshore workers and, in particular, dedicated to the improvement of safety in all 
aspects of offshore employment. 
The die had been cast and the OILC began to recruit members. Its target of 3,000 
by 1993 was to prove optimistic, particularly as the CRINE initiative was having 
its effect, "' but McDonald was a master organizer and by mid-summer of 1992 
OILC had around 1,500 members, enough for financial stability. Area 
committees were formed at Glasgow, Aberdeen, Liverpool, Hull but the latter 
two were short-lived and the new union has never been able to establish a branch 
structure similar to other unions. Together with a close-knit group of hard- 
working enthusiasts he drew up a constitution with the necessary items relating 
123 All three quotations are from The Crisis in Offshore Trade Unionism p. 14. 124 
v. p. 238 supra. 125 The Crisis in Offshore Trade Unionism p. 12. 126 Comment attributed to G. Douglas, member of the OILC Standing Committee at meeting of 
19th September, 199 1. 
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to the objectives of the union, the rules, the number of officials, their method of 
election and terms of office, the benefits accruing to membership and the 
subscription levels. By February 1992 it had won listing as an independent union 
from the Registrar of Trade Unions and Employers' Associations and entered 
upon the regulatory two year probationary period, which had to precede the grant 
of a full Certificate of Independence. 
These twenty-four months did not pass easily for McDonald because there was a 
real possibility that internal dissension would cause the nascent trade union to 
founder. To a large extent this arose out of the nature of the membership of the 
Organising Committee set up to carry out the executive functions of OILC. The 
majority of its officers were Glasgow-based and no longer employed offshore 
while the Aberdeen-based officers were more closely in touch with OILC 
members out in the North Sea. The dispute had all the characteristics of the petty 
quarrels and irrational suspicions of the motives of others which, historically, 
plague small organizations poised between survival and irremediable decline. It 
was 1995 before OILC was free of this financially damaging civil war but by 
then it had won full legal status as a trade union and the members had elected 
Ronnie McDonald as its General Secretary with Jake Molloy (who succeeded 
him in 1997) and David Robertson as his deputies. 
(e) The Offshore Industry Liaison Committee and OFS 
Although OILC had sought affiliation to the Scottish TUC and the Labour Party 
and had been rebuffed by both, it was welcomed as a friend and ally by the 
Norwegian trade union OFS, "' itself outside LO, the recognized trade union 
organization of its own country. The OFS regarded NOPEF, a trade union within 
LO, in much the same light as OILC regarded the AEEU, that is, a large union 
too ready to be conciliatory to employers and antagonistic to any employee 
organization which challenged its supremacy as representative of all offshore 
workers. It was considerably larger than OILC and had been founded several 
years earlier but the similarities of their foundation and relationship with the 
official trade unions made the two organizations natural allies. An OFS 
delegation attended the first OILC national conference in 1992 and an alliance 
was forged there which has continued to the present day. As early as January 
1993 the two unions had formed a joint committee to bring about a meaningful 
level of co-operation between the two organisations to benefit both sides"' and 
by May of that year OFS had intervened on the OILC's behalf in the Borgny 
Dolphin incident referred to in the Foreword to this thesis. OFS and OILC have 
also organized international conferences on the oil industry at Stavanger, at 
which prominent figures in the industry and in the regulatory bodies of both 
countries have presented papers. For example, the conference held in November 
1994 included addresses from the managing director of Statoil and the operations 
director of the Offshore Safety Division of the Health and Safety Executive. 
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On account of its small membership OILC remains very much the junior partner 
in this alliance. OFS, on the other hand, is large enough to feel that it has a 
secure future and in 1995 was seeking to recruit employees in the onshore oil 
industry. Elections to its executive, which are held every two years, are fiercely 
contended. Some shop stewards on the Ekofisk field in 1995 were fornier OFS 
executive members and as part of their campaign to regain office objected to 
their union's close links with OILC. "O In 1996 there was what '13lowout" 
referred to as a major'shake-up in the leadership of OFS ... but the OILC/OFS 
alliance appears to remain unaffected since they formed a joint working party in 
1997 to monitor plans of Shell and Statoil concerning helicopter facilities. "' 
(f) The Future of the Offshore Industry Liaison Committee 
Since OILC was mandated by its participants to sever the link with the trade 
unions affiliated to the Scottish Trades Union Council and establish itself as an 
independent trade union for all offshore workers, its membership has remained 
just large enough to provide sufficient income for survival. It maintains excellent 
public relations with the press, radio and television and consequently its opinion 
is regularly sought and therefore reported on all matters concerning offshore 
employment. This is particularly the case when a serious accident occurs 
offshore because it is almost an article of faith among OILC members that the 
absence of trade union representation from offshore safety committees is 
inimical to the interests of workers. Members feel a strong personal identity with 
their union and so a higher proportion of them are active within the OILC than is 
the case of trade unions with larger memberships. The union's bi-monthly 
publication -'Tlowout"- is attractively produced with well-informed and analytic 
contributions which, since they are written in good prose, retain the readers' 
attention. 
The size of the union, nevertheless, will be an ever present problem because its 
membership has now fallen to around 1,500-1,600. At present there seems little 
chance of significant higher recruitment unless some event occurs offshore 
which convinces workers that it is worth their while to join OILC. Preliminary 
discussions were opened in 1997 with the National Union of Miners about the 
possibility of a merger to form a new union of energy workers but the industries 
are too disparate in their technology and location for a merger to advantage 
either of them. OILC proposed affiliation with MSF at its AGM in May 1998 
and discussions are currently taking place. The decline in membership of the 
trade union is almost certainly the reason why amalgamation is being sought 
with a larger union. That the Offshore Industry Liaison Committee has survived 
at all is a success in itself. 
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4 Summary 
The creation and survival of the Offshore Industry Liaison Committee is the 
story of how one man built a new trade union for offshore workers and how 
another, through his close association with it, met his Nemesis. Despite the 
uncompromising opposition of the oil operators to the principle of collective 
bargaining and the equally intransigent attitude of national officers to minority 
groups within their own trade unions, Ronnie McDonald forged a trade union 
which is now a full player in North Sea industrial relations. By contrast, Tommy 
Lafferty, who had been enjoying a successful career as a union officer was to 
experience personal disaster when his close association with OILC became 
inconvenient for his trade union. 
Although OILC has now adopted improved safety offshore as its primary 
objective, its origins lie in the demand for post-construction agreements freely 
negotiated between employers and trade unions. Operators had always refused to 
concede this and by 1988 it seemed as unattainable as it had been a decade 
earlier. Consequently union membership offshore was poor and the operators 
were able to claim that this reflected satisfaction with their conduct of employee 
relations. Piper Alpha stimulated trade unions into reactivating their demands for 
fuller recognition but, totally independent of Piper Alpha, agitation had already 
begun on the Tern oilfield for a post-construction agreement. 
There had been little hook-up work since 1986 and the men on Tern knew that 
they were soon to be transferred to non-hook-up work on Forties field. They 
used their right under the Offshore Construction Agreement to hold meetings on 
their installations where they demanded a post-construction element be included 
in the next OCA. Their unions, already negotiating the 1989 OCA, promised that 
unless the contractors conceded a post construction agreement during the next 
twelve months they would not sign an OCA for 1990. 
OILC was founded in February 1989 as part of the local trade union strategy to 
win a post-construction agreement and McDonald was appointed to lead it. Its 
purpose was to instigate unofficial action offshore in pursuit of trade union 
objectives as a substitute for official action which trade unions could now 
undertake only after a ballot. A number of "sit-ins" took place which OILC 
claimed to result from the difference in pay and conditions between contractors' 
employees and direct workers but their purpose was probably to test the 
readiness of offshore workers for a sterner test the following year. 
This low-key action offshore produced a surprisingly conciliatory response from 
the Offshore Contractors' Council in the form of a big increase in hourly rates 
and unified conditions of service for employees of OCC members - the "Model 
Terms and Conditions". The oil operators, however, immediately identified 
OILC as a threat and informed OCC that tenders for work which included a post- 
construction agreement would not be acceptable. Since the unions refused to 
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negotiate an OCA for 1990, without such an agreement a serious confrontation 
offshore became imminent. 
McDonald and Lafferty used the autumn and winter of 1989/90 to put OILC on 
firmer foundations. OILC rented an office, registered itself as a charity (Oil 
Information Centre) and a drew up a constitution stating that it had no members, 
only participants, and would thus be able to operate outside the restrictions of 
trade union legislation. McDonald addressed a meeting of national officers of 
trade unions at the 1989 TUC and claimed that OILC articulated the authentic 
voice"' of the North Sea workers. Lafferty consolidated OILC's position as a 
growing force in offshore industrial relations by persuading IUOOC (of which he 
became secretary in December 1989) to invite McDonald to attend its meetings, 
to allow itself to be represented at OILC meetings (by himself) and to accept lay 
members. 
C)TLC and IUOOC souaht to ensure continued trade union sutmort for a nost- 
construction agreement by drafting tl 
committed signatories to that principle. 
trade unions constituted themselves i 
e Continental Shelf Agreement which 
The national officers of the oil industry 
ito the National Offshore Committee- 
endorsed the CSA, announced that they would enter no agreement outwith its 
principles and invited OILC to deliver action offshore. "' Meanwhile the oil 
companies had tried to weaken support for OILC by increasing even higher the 
hourly rates of pay, offering to contractors' men conditions of work similar to 
those enjoyed by their own direct employees and breaking off the regular 
meetings between UKOOA and IUOOC. 
OILC had planned a strategy whereby a series of overtime bans would be 
followed by withdrawal of labour in the late summer of 1990 when the oil 
companies would be most vulnerable on account of a requirement to fit 
emergency shut-down valves. In the event the timing went awry because 
McDonald could not withhold the enthusiasm of his activists and Lafferty lacked 
the patience to await the most propitious time to escalate the action. Although 
the overtime ban protests had some success, withdrawal of labour, where it did 
take place, came too early and OILC had to call off action at the end of August 
with little accomplished. A 1991 Oil Information Centre publication, "Striking 
out", analyses the background to the action, its conduct and its consequences 
from the OILC perspective while contemporary oil company papers throw a very 
different light on the events. 
With almost indecent haste the trade unions began to repair their bridges with the 
operating and contracting employers. Their commitment earlier in the year to the 
CSA was jettisoned and negotiations on a new OCA opened. For the national 
officers OILC had now become a hindrance to smooth progress towards an OCA 
and they hoped that it would wither and die but OILC remained a cohesive, 
albeit smaller, group which continued to receive support from the IUOOC. It had 
33 Appendix CC. 
34 v. p. 232 supra. 
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a public relations coup with the publication of "Striking Out", which proposed, 
inter alia, the formation of an Offshore Federation similar to the Confederation 
of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions (CSEU) and this was interpreted by the 
national officers, currently involved at a crucial stage in negotiations with the 
employers, as unhelpful in the extreme. When it was followed immediately after 
the signing of a new OCA by "The Crisis in Offshore Trade Unionism" wherein 
the AEU and EETPU were accused of manipulating the discussions in their own 
and not the offshore workers' interests, OILC could no longer remain within the 
main body of British trade unionism. 
Lafferty had continued his close connections with OILC and McDonald until 
June 1991, when, having been instructed by his union to break off relationships 
with OILC, he resigned his secretaryship of IUOOC. That body continued to 
accept McDonald as a full member and as late as August 1991 proposed to their 
national secretaries that a meeting be convened to discuss a re-organization of 
IUOOC along the lines of CSEU, an OILC suggestion first put forward in 
"Striking Out". The meeting took place but the AEU and EETPU made it clear 
that no OILC representative was to be present at any subsequent discussions. In 
October. 1991 McDonald was expelled from the IUOOC because by then OILC 
was seeking independent status, while Lafferty failed to win re-election to office 
in 1992 and died, a broken man, the following year. 
The decision to operate as an independent trade union outside the Scottish TUC 
implied the retention and recruitment of sufficient members to sustain an 
organization, which had previously operated with subventions from other, 
mainly trade union, sources. Although never quite reaching its target of 3000 
members, OILC achieved financial stability during 1992 and continued on its 
course as a union serving the needs of all offshore workers, irrespective of their 
occupation. It found an ally in the Norwegian union OFS, like OILC a union 
outside the main stream of trade unionism, and both unions have subsequently 
co-operated closely on all matters concerning the North Sea oil and gas industry. 
It is always unwise to predict the future of small trade unions living precariously 
in the shadow of larger unions from which they have broken away. The most that 
can be said of OILC is that its members appear to be confident of their future and 
that it remains the first workers' organization to which the media refer, when 
they require an authoritative comment on an issue that affects offshore 
employees. 
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CHAPTER FOURTEEN 
CONCLUSIONS 
The nature of industrial relations within the United Kingdom has undergone 
radical change within the last quarter of a century. During the 1970s and early 
1980s almost every issue of the 'Tinancial Times" required a complete page to 
cover current or threatened industrial disputes but today their infrequency no 
longer warrants such coverage. Trade unions and collective bargaining remain 
features of the employment scene but the influence of the trade unions has 
declined significantly and, outside the public sector, direct communication 
between employers and employees is becoming increasingly prevalent at the 
expense of collective bargaining. It is even suggested by some authorities that 
organizations may move completely away from trade union recognition and 
collective bargaining and lean towards a unitary perspective of industrial 
relations which emphasises the individual and either marginalises or eliminates 
the rile of trade unions. ' Yet back in the mid-1970s there was already emerging 
from the offshore oil and gas industry an industrial relations structure which 
exhibited many of the features that have become more common today. 
I The Industrial Relations Policy of the Oil Operators 
The dominant theme of industrial relations in the North Sea oil and gas industry 
has been the unrelenting opposition of the oil operators to any recognition of 
trade unions for the purposes of collective bargaining. They are so thirled to this 
policy that they have extended it to oil service companies by making it known 
that no contract will be offered to any organization which has agreed its terms 
and conditions of employment with a trade union. Somc operators are prepared 
to grant representational rights to union members involved in grievance or 
disciplinary matters but this is the limit of the trade unions' success in their long 
and, so far, hopeless quest to secure any rights to negotiate. The one exception is 
Phillips Petroleum which has granted full negotiatini rights to MSF for that 
union's members on the Hewett and Maureen fields. The uniqueness of this 
union-management agreement was brought home to a colleague of the author 
when he attended a recent conference of oil related personnel and witnessed the 
Phillips Petroleum representative being ribbed about his company's trade union 
connection. 
There has never been any public declaration of this policy although it is 
recognized as an article of faith among oil operating companies. The oil industry 
is happy to be associated with trade unions through official bodies such as the 
Offshore Petroleum Industry Training Organization (OPITO) and at the quarterly 
meetings between the Inter Union Offshore Oil Committee (IUOOC) and the 
Liaison Panel of the UKOOA Employment Practices Committee but the trade 
unions have never been accorded any legitimacy when it comes to the industry's 
1 Billot, H. (1996) Business Alloys. People Management, 2 No 20, p. 39. 
2 v. Chapter Nine, p. 141 supra and Appendix S. 
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management of human resources. As this thesis has shown, there have been 
several factors which explain why the industry has kept, and continues to keep, 
the trade unions away from its bargaining tables. 
What may be described as a general negative factor embracing many sub-factors 
was the state of industrial relations in Great Britain from approximately 1965 to 
1980. Exploration for oil began in 1965 and by the early 1970s it was known that 
under the UK continental shelf there were huge reserves of oil and gas capable of 
commercial exploitation. There followed the construction and commissioning of 
production platforms to extract this mineral wealth from the sea-bed and 
transport it onshore. These activities took place at a time when the industrial 
relations scene in the United Kingdom as a whole was not attractive to inward 
investors. Indeed, when Robert Taylor, then Labour Correspondent of "The 
Observer", wrote "The Fifth Estate", a book about trade unions during this 
period, the title was generally accepted as a fair indication of the power which 
trade unionism then exercised in the United Kingdom. 
The policy and practice of British trade unions at this time would have caused 
any incoming organization to think carefully before committing itself to heavy 
capital investment within the country. When American manufacturing firms 
established factories in Britain during the 1960s, organized labour seemed more 
concerned that anti-trade union practices were being imported than that there 
would be any widening of opportunities for employment. Between 1963 and 
1969 the TUC accepted four motions which were hostile to the perception of 
anti-trade union behaviour by American management. There followed in 1970 
the specially convened TUC Conference on International Companies which 
concluded, inter alia, that trade unions would continue to act to compel 
subsidiaries to conform to British industrial relations practice. 
3 The oil 
operators would also have noted that the study on labour relations in multi- 
national companies commissioned by the British North American Committee in 
1971 came to remarkably similar conclusions 
4 
including criticism of certain 
companies for reftising to recognize trade unions. 
The Labour Government's proposal to introduce greater control of industrial 
relations, as outlined in the white paper "In Place of Strife", merely aroused the 
wrath of the unions while the Industrial Relations Act 1971 was rendered a dead 
letter by the refusal of the trade unions to allow it to operate as intended. Its 
repeal in 1974 and replacement by the Trade Union and Labour Relations Acts 
of 1974,1976 and 1978 suggested to many both within and without the United 
Kingdom that trade unions could dictate to the government the national 
industrial relations system. The Social Contract was interpreted as an example of 
this with the government virtually seeking approval of its economic policy from 
a non-statutory body. As late as 1983, Dorfman 
3 Item ii of Appendix Two: TUC Conference on International Companies. v Appendix F (of 
thesis). 
4 v. Chapter Seven, p. 11,4 supra. 
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was writing that the disruptive power of unions in Britain has been painfully 
obvious in recent years and the union movement has seemed at times an 
impregnablefortress ofpressure group power. ' 
Moreover, although trade union leaders were accepted as national figures whom 
government ministers consulted, it was patently obvious that in some industries 
their members could ignore with impunity the very procedures agreed between 
managements and unions for the resolution of disputes. Before even a drop of oil 
had been recovered from the North Sea the oil industry itself suffered this 
experience indirectly when Highland Fabricators, continually embroiled with 
labour disputes, delivered the first jacket for the Forties field one year later than 
originally targeted. 6 
The nearest trade unions ever came to recognition from the industry was in the 
summer of 1989. Some of the major contractors, aware that the trade unions 
were unwilling to discuss another hook-up agreement unless there was an 
accompanying post-construction agreement, agreed to discuss recognition with 
the operators and a few even went the length of promising to hold ballots among 
their employees on platforms in order to find out their wishes concerning trade 
union representation. 7 Trade union agreements with contractors would not 
necessarily have impinged upon the policy of the operators but no such 
agreements were ever reached since the operators made it clear that any 
contractor who had entered into one would not have its tender accepted. During 
the industrial action of the following year R. J Carter, External and Corporate 
Affairs Manager of Marathon, saw advantages for the smaller operators of a 
national offshore agreement since this would mean that Shell and BP could not 
dictate policy to the industry but he was a lone voice within his company as well 
as the operating companies as a whole. 
8 
There were positive reasons too for the decision to avoid involvement with 
British trade unions. Principally they were seen simply as a problem which, if it 
arose, could be dealt with at operating level. The industry was a world-wide 
structure, which had been accustomed so long to having its managerial decisions 
unquestioned by its employees that it was unlikely to amend its preferred 
"modus operandi" to fit into the British industrial relations system. In any case 
extracting oil and gas from the North Sea meant that the operators had 
installations in northerly latitudes involving far greater expenditure on safe 
working environments and transporting employees and supplies than in Saudi 
Arabia, Venezuela or in the shallow waters off the coast of Texas. Once hook-up 
had been successfully completed on a platform, full priority was given to 
production so that a return could be generated on the enormous initial 
investment. As regards human resource management the operators applied a 
policy of sophisticated paternalism which may be described as an 
5 v. Chapter Four, p. 60 supra. 
6 v. Chapter Six, p. 96 supra. 
7 v. Chapter Thirteen, p. 223 supra. 
8 v. Chapter Thirteen, p. 236 supra. 
253 
authoritarianism sufficiently benevolent to make superfluous any need for 
collective bargaining through the agency of a third party. 
There are two other positive factors in the absence of trade unions as negotiating 
bodies from the North Sea oil and gas industry. First, the industry did not 
consider that it was its responsibility to impose trade unionism on employees 
who were perfectly happy without union membership. As a former director of 
operations commented to the author: there was never any pressure from 
employeesfor trade unions except in the case of OccidentaL'If the oil companies 
had introduced them they would have been imposed upon their men by the 
employers. Although trade union officials would seek to counter this argument 
by claiming that the employers always made it very difficult for them to 
communicate the benefits of trade union membership to offshore workers, this 
does not invalidate the employers' view of the matter. Recruitment of members 
in sufficient numbers to make claims for representation credible must always 
remain the responsibility of the unions. 
The second factor is the skill of the operating management staff responsible for 
conceiving and implementing the oil companies' industrial relations policies. 
Here a distinction must be made between drilling and production. Drilling is 
usually carried out by companies on contract to a major operator and their 
vessels move around the oceans wherever their services are needed. There is 
tremendous pressure to obtain positive results and consequently little time for the 
niceties of employment law or building a rapport between different levels of 
authority. The conduct of the senior tool pusher of the Venture Onelo and the 
crudity of the language of another, which was quoted earlier in the thesis, I I 
justify the description sometimes given to industrial relations in the drilling 
industry as overt and brutal anti-trade unionism. 
By contrast employee relations on production platforms have been described as 
being covert and quiet anti-trade unionism. 2 Indeed, very little is ever written or 
said about industrial relations on production platforms on the LJK continental 
shelf and to a large extent this seems to have been deliberate policy by the oil 
companies. The author has attended over the years many conferences where 
personnel directors of well-known companies have accepted invitations to speak 
about their organizations' approaches to industrial relations but he has never 
heard any contribution in this area from an offshore oil operator's representative. 
In their monumental book "Paying for the Pipef", Woolfson, Foster and Beck 
make little or no concession to the professional skill of the managers charged 
with the development and implementation of industrial relations policies. John 
Kelly, an editor of the "British Joumal of Industrial Relations", comments in the 
course of his review of the book that it is a highly readable, often fascinating 
9 Presumably a reaction to the Piper Alpha disaster. 
10 v. Chapter Eight. 
IIv. Chapter Two, p. 29 supra. 
12 These descriptions were given by David Macaulay in his unpublished thesis to which 
reference has already been made in Chapter Four. 
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account of a grim and depressing saga. " Kelly's view accords well with his 
known philosophy on industrial relations which he shares with the writers of 
"Paying for the Piper". This, however, is not the picture of the industry which 
the author has drawn from his research. 
The oil operators have determined upon an industrial relations policy wherein 
trade union recognition for negotiating purposes has no place but this does not 
imply a callous or even uncaring attitude towards their employees. All major oil 
companies entrust their industrial relations to well trained and experienced 
personnel managers, 14 who have been responsible for introducing policies and 
procedures which compare favourably with those of onshore companies 
considered to be the most progressive in this field. Reference has already been 
made to one company which went to great lengths to ensure that its employees 
knew their rights when the company was about to sell its interest in an oilfield. 
15 
In common with all organizations there will be employees on production 
platforms who are the subject of disciplinary action and there the procedures are 
clearly laid down and designed to allow the employee a full and fair hearing with 
access to an appeals procedure when necessary. Equally professional are the 
grievance procedures which give the employee access to a route along which he 
can pursue a complaint against some action by the company. There are also in 
place procedures for the resolution of disputes and, although they must be used 
infrequently, they are again drawn up in a professional manner worthy of any 
other major employer. In general, there are channels of communication between 
employees and management which operate satisfactorily to mutual advantage. 
A recent example of this is the experience of the small Canadian oil company, 
Talisman Energy(UK), when it took over the Beatrice, Buchan and Clyde fields 
in 1997. It asked the employees their particular dislikes of their work and were 
told that the three week on/three week off shifts were not conducive to a stable 
home and family life. Accordingly the company altered its system of shifts to 
two weeks for the winter period but retained the longer shifts for most of the 
16 year. 
This is not a plea in justification of the industrial relations policies of the oil 
operators and in particular of their refusal to concede negotiating rights to trade 
unions for negotiating purposes. It is merely a statement of fact and a judgment 
that employees do not appear to be disadvantaged by their lack of trade union 
representation. Some people regard membership of a trade union as a social duty 
and indeed there was a period in the late 1970s when industrial tribunals were 
not allowed to hear a claim for unfair dismissal if the loss of employment arose 
13 This quotation does not come ftom a volume of BJIR but is an excerpt from a review of 
"Paying for the Piper" which Kelly gave before publication at the request of the publishers. In 
conversation with the author of this thesis, he described this practice as "advanced praise". 
14 Titles vary between companies, some using the terms such as human resource manager, 
industrial relations manager, employee relations manager etc. 
IS v. Chapter Twelve, p. 2 10 supra. 
16 Helicopter flights are expensive and it is a saving of costs if employees need to be flown 
offshore once in three weeks instead of in two. 
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out of an appellant's non-membership of a trade union. The reasons why 
employees in the offshore oil industry have shown little inclination to combine 
in traditional trade union fashion have been explained in Chapter Ten. The 
unitary perspective of industrial relations which a writer 
17 in 1996 foresaw as a 
direction in which employment was moving had already emerged offshore 
almost twenty years earlier. 
2 The Marginalisation of the British Trade Unions 
The industrial relations policy of the oil operators has succeeded because the 
trade unions have never been able to confront the industry as a united and 
cohesive organization. Even if they had enjoyed total unity of purpose at national 
and regional levels this would have been to little purpose on account of their 
failure to recruit sufficient members to support their demands. Jobs offshore 
were certainly more highly remunerated than equivalent work onshore but there 
are other industries such as vehicle manufacture, chemical engineering and, 
especially, printing where payment is well above the national average and trade 
union membership is almost "de rigueur. " 
The prime reason for the failure of the trade unions to gain a substantial presence 
on the UK continental shelf was a combination of their arrogance, assumptions 
about their inevitable acceptance at the collective bargaining table and undue 
reliance on government support. The arrogance was displayed in the early days 
of the industry when Bill Reid, secretary of the newly formed IUOOC, sent a 
letter to the oil companies based in Aberdeen demanding their attendance at a 
meeting to discuss recognition of the trade unions and in the same 
communication threatening them with industrial action ii they refused to accept 
the invitation. The employers ignored the invitation and, since the response of 
the onshore trade unionists to the IU0OC`s call for industrial action was utterly 
ineffectual, the oil operators never thereafter saw the IUOOC as a threat. 18 
Despite this total rebuff the IUOOC continued to assume that collective 
bargaining was bound to become the norm offshore as it was onshore and that it 
would be only a matter of time before the oil operators could be persuaded to 
this way of thinking. It must be remembered that the mid 1970s were years when 
British trade unionism was at its apogee and that its leaders were national figures 
whose organizations had been referred to as the robber barons of the system. 
19 
With a Labour government in power and a Secretary of State for Energy 
20 who 
was a strong supporter of trade union aspirations, the unions thought that they 
had achieved their goal when the oil operators, following considerable 
government pressure, agreed to the "Memorandum of Understanding on Trade 
Union Access to Offshore Installations" and, a few months later, to the 
"Guidelines through which Recognition may be achieved. " The trade unions had, 
17 v. p. 251 supra. 
18 v. Chapter Six, pp. 101 & 103 supra and Appendix C. 
19 v. Chapter Four, p. 61 supra. 
20 Appendix FFF lists the government ministers responsible for the UK offshore industry 1963 - 
1996. 
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however, been outmanoeuvred by the oil companies and were to find that the 
agreements were very much to the companies' advantage rather than to their 
own. 21 Moreover, they never seemed to realise that even the Labour government 
of 1974-1979 had limits to the time and effort it was prepared to expend on 
persuading the oil companies to undertake industrial relations policies to which 
they were opposed. 
There are a number of other factors which have gnawed continually at the unity 
of purpose to which the trade unions have aspired and thereby have contributed 
to their failure offshore. One of these was the indeterminate status of the IUOOC 
which was established to fight for a fully representative r6le for trade unions in 
the oil and gas industry. It is difficult to dispute the conclusion of the author of 
"Striking Out" that this has been the root cause of the IUOOC weakness. 22 It has 
always been a committee of local trade union officers based in Aberdeen without 
delegated powers from either the TUC or the STUC. Given its title the former 
Fuel and Power Industries Committee of the TUC was the obvious body to carry 
out TUC resolutions on the newly arrived offshore oil industry but the FPIC 
seemed more interested in ensuring that no rival or newly formed committee 
would assume that function. 
This, however, does not excuse the constant petty bickering between members of 
the IUOOC about the categories of offshore employment from which the 
different unions could recruit members. Very early in the life of the IUOOC, 
when it had become obvious that unions were going to have a struggle to recruit 
any worthwhile membership at all, the NUS squabbled with the TGWU over 
recruitment on semi-submersibles and the arrival of Campbell Reid, the first full- 
time ASTMS official to be appointed to North East Scotland, was regarded as a 
challenge rather than an additional resource in the struggle to win access 
offshore. These are just two illustrations of this unfortunate propensity to 
intemecine squabbles which, although not a regular feature of trade union 
relationships, were never to disappear from the agenda. 
The accusation could also be levelled at the 1TJOOC that its members were slow 
learners. The UKOOA always made it clear that it was an association of oil 
companies which had no mandate to negotiate with any trade union or trade 
union body such as 1UOOC. The conduct of industrial relations within individual 
oil companies remained the responsibility of each company and this was 
stipulated in the UKOOA Liaison Panel's terms of reference which all trade 
union officers must have seen. Yet time and time again IUOOC brought issues to 
its quarterly meetings with UKOOA which the latter was unable to entertain 
without breaching its terms of reference. The 1UOOC never even attempted to 
develop an alternative strategy to counter UKOOA policy. Yet the successful 
fight to win reinstatement of the men dismissed for industrial action on the 
drilling rig Venture One 23 occurred early in the history of offshore oil on the UK 
continental shelf It was the result of well co-ordinated action by trade unions 
2tv. Chapter Seven, p. 124-128 supra. 
22 Striking Out p. 77. 
23 v. Chapter Eight. 
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including vital support from onshore employees. Although the employers learned 
from their mistakes in that conkontation, the IUOOC never again achieved any 
comparable victory because co-ordination, which had served them so well in the 
Venture One case and was vital to the attainment of their overall objectives, gave 
way to narrow individual and sectional interests. 
Finally, if, at times, the trade union officials living and working in Aberdeen felt 
that they were not receiving as much support from their national officials as they 
deserved, they should have considered the wider picture faced by the trade union 
movement as a whole from 1979.24 Every year since then the number of trade 
unionists has been fewer than in the previous year and this was associated with 
high unemployment in the mid-1980s. At national level, therefore, trade union 
leaders had more urgent affairs to address than the difficulties faced by their 
branches in NE Scotland, where employment was still buoyant and where their 
officers were seeking to recruit in a fairly shallow pool. A target of 30,000 
employees aimed at by eight different unions offered slim pickings from the 
point of view of accretion of numbers to a particular trade union. They won 
attention from their national leaders from time to time, particularly in the 
immediate aftermath of Piper Alpha, but this interest was always spasmodic and 
when trade union membership fell into sharp decline from the early 1980s 
recruitment of offshore workers was among their minor concerns. It was this real 
rather than apparent lack of interest which was one reason for the birth of the 
Offshore Industry Liaison Committee. 
3 The Norwegian Comparison 
Had the international oil companies not ignored history their experience of 
working in Norwegian waters would have been different from what it is to-day. 
They committed a serious error of judgment in believing that they could 
disregard the national identity of a people whose nation had been reborn as 
recently as 1905, a mere sixty years before drilling began in the North Sea. Apart 
from that general misunderstanding they failed to appreciate that all five 
Scandinavian countries have a tripartite system of industrial relations where 
trade unions are as important participants as governments and employer 
associations. That the oil companies confronted this system instead of integrating 
with it had two major consequences. 
The first is that the initial intransigence of the oil companies has forced them to 
recognize two trade unions, often bitterly at odds as each claims its superiority in 
the representation of offshore workers. This arose out of the recognition by one 
company not of an established LO-affiliated trade union but of an in-house 
association of employees, which soon expanded to involve employees of other 
major oil companies. Thus was bom OFS, a militant offshore trade union outside 
the LO framework. Simultaneously LO had come to realise that existing trade 
unions were making no impact upon the oil companies and, prompted by the 
24 v. Appendix III 
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arrival of OFS, instituted a new trade union, NOPEF, specifically for petroleum 
workers, which soon attracted a larger (but not overwhelmingly so) membership 
than OFS. 
The second consequence is that the Norwegian government has required the oil 
companies to adopt employment practices which conform to the general pattern 
of the nation as a whole. Despite the great difference in the operational nature of 
their industry compared with onshore industries, offshore oil and gas companies 
must adhere to Norwegian law in the same way as onshore employers. 
The comparison with events in the UK is stark. Most significant is the 
uniformity of all employment legislation across Norwegian industry which 
contrasts with the semi-autonomous position of the oil and gas industry on the 
UK continental shelf. The UK government, even when it was Labour controlled, 
has never contemplated legislation which would put pressure on offshore 
companies to negotiate with trade unions or to accept them (as distinct from 
employee representatives) as equal partners on installation accident prevention 
committees. The British trade unions are in regular contact with their Norwegian 
brethren and envy their state-supported relationship with the employers but have 
never analysed why there is in Norway such a different state of affairs; or, if they 
have done so, they have not reached the obvious conclusion. The Norwegian 
trade union movement quickly saw that it was failing to make an impact on the 
multinational companies associated with oil and gas and that unity of purpose 
was the key. Instead of immersing themselves in petty, often fratricidal, 
squabbles about rights to recruit in particular aspects of offshore work - as the 
British trade unions did to their disadvantage - the Norwegians established a new 
trade union designed to represent all offshore workers. NOPEF does have a rival 
in OFS but this is almost a matter of indifference compared with the position of 
the British trade unions which continue to vie with each other for membership 
among a workforce which exhibits apathy towards their efforts. 
4 The Offshore Industry Liaison Committee 
Despite the success of LO in forming an entirely new trade union to serve 
employees in an industry which had not previously existed in north west Europe, 
the TUC never saw this as a solution to their offshore recruitment difficulties. 
Incredibly, since the British trade unions must have been 4ware of the industry's 
attitude to organized labour, they believed that all that was needed for 
recognition to be inevitable was access to installations for recruitment. Having 
won support for this through government intervention, they then left the matter 
to the local officials in north east Scotland whose loose ad hoc Inter Union 
Offshore Oil Committee was accorded no delegated powers. Visits of 
representatives of different trade unions to offshore installations became 
common but the vast mass of the employees remained indifferent to their 
presence. 
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Eventually there was founded an independent trade union specifically for 
offshore employees but, unlike NOPEF and OFS, it was too late to make any 
significant impact on what had become the established system of industrial 
relations on the UK continental shelf. Although now unrecognized by the TUC, 
the OILC was originally established with local trade union encouragement as a 
group of offshore activists who had every intention of remaining within their 
trade unions. It was, nevertheless, a combination of workers which inevitably 
began to behave like a trade union when it recruited "participants" and 
established branches. As its leader Ronnie McDonald stated, it wasformed as an 
illegal enabling and mediating body which could impose industrial sanctions 
with impunity in ways that were not now open to official trade unions on account 
of the Employment Act 1990. Its original purpose was to agitate for a post- 
construction agreement, which would concede to trade unions rights similar to 
those enjoyed under hook-up agreements and in this cause it imposed sanctions 
against the offshore employers in 1989 and 1990. This caused annoyance rather 
than real concern to the operators and achieved nothing. "Paying for the Pipee' 
stated that there had been a breakdown in managerial authority culminating in 
the rig occupations of 1989 and, more especially of 1990 and that the collective 
action of the workforce in the years after Piper Alpha" had a significant effect 
on the subsequent character of the industry, but these claims lack evidence. 
The national officers of the trade unions, who had constituted themselves into a 
National Offshore Committee in order to support OILC action offshore, did not 
enhance their reputation in this whole affair. Having first encouraged OILC in its 
industrial action the national officers very quickly sought first to distance 
themselves from it when the action had to called off and then actively sought its 
demise. For a brief moment it seemed that something positive might have 
emerged from the d6bAcle when Alex Ferry supported the IUOOC proposition 
that it reconstitute itself on lines similar to the Confederation of Shipbuilding 
and Engineering Unions but that, too, ran aground. Had this strategy been 
implemented twenty years earlier it might have achieved that unity of purpose 
and action which the trade unions needed to confront the operators but, since a 
federation could never have enjoyed the autonomy exercised by the two 
Norwegian offshore unions, it is unlikely that relationships between offshore 
employers and trade unions would have been very different from what they are 
today. 
On the other hand, had the TUC sought to establish in the early days of oil and 
gas production an industrially based trade union similar to NOPEF or OFS, the 
history of industrial relations in the North Sea would certainly have been 
different. If such a trade union had attracted even 8,000 members it would 
certainly have made an impact upon the oil operators. The OILC "participants" 
refused to disband after their industrial action and have survived as an 
independent trade union specifically for offshore employees. The union's 
influence with the local and national media is surprisingly strong given its 
membership of just over 1,500, although it reached a total of over 2,000 at one 
25 Woolfson, Foster and Beck, op cit p. 545. 
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time. At present, OILC is maintaining its link with OFS and there is always a 
possibility of a closer alliance with its stronger Norwegian ally. 
Accident prevention is now the foremost theme in OILC policy and the union 
publicises accidents or dangerous occurrences whenever it believes they merit 
attention. In common with all trade unions which have an interest in offshore 
employment it continues to assert, despite evidence to the contrary, that manual 
worker representatives on platform safety committees cannot make their fullest 
contribution without trade union protection against victimisation. 
5 Accident Prevention. 
As stated in the methodolog/6 there is a myth in the making concerning 
employment in the offshore oil and gas industry. This is that accident prevention 
is accorded a low priority and that the managers are vested with Draconian 
powers which they wield with scant regard to the canons of acceptable man 
management. Spaven and Wright, who carried out research for the Health and 
Safety Executive on the effectiveness of the new offshore safety procedures, 27 
wrote that It is a commonplace among many commentators on the offshore 
industry that Safety Representatives spend their time coweringfrom management 
in fear and trepidation . 
2' This statement is included in an article where they take 
'issue with one such commentator who had written a paperý9 full of 
unsubstantiated assertions of oil company malpractice such as manipulation of 
elections to safety committees by OIMs to secure pliant representatives. 
The authors of "Paying for the Pipee' argue their case with sharper instruments 
and sounder. academic bases but their research is eclectic and seldom strays far 
from the theory that there can be no satisfactory safety culture offshore until the 
oil operators accept organized labour as a legitimate player in their industry. 
Their single-minded approach evokes echoes of an earlier age when the 
translators of the authorised version of the bible warned of brethren who run 
their own ways, and give liking unto nothing but what is framed by themselves, 
and hammered on their anvil. " 
26 
v. Chapter One, p. 5 supra. 
27 Spaven, M., Ras, H., Morrison, A. and Wrightý C. (1993). op cit. 
29 Spaven, M. and Wright, C., (1993) The Effectiveness of Offshore Safety Representatives and 
Safety Committees: a Response to Vulliamy. Proceedings of an international conference entitled 
"Workforce Involvement and Health and Safety Offshore" p. 93 sponsored by STUC and others 
at Glasgow in March 1993 and published by STUC et at in November 1993. 
29 Vulliamy, D., (1993) Review of the SI 971 Report on the Effectiveness of Offshore Safety 
Representatives. Proceedings of an international conference entitled "Workforce Involvement in 
Health and Safety Offshore" pp. 87-9 1. op cit. Ibis paper borders on the unpleasant in its 
attitude to managers in the offshore oil and gas industry and even, as Spaven and Wright 
demonstrate, misquotes the Cullen Report at one point in order to support an argument. 
30 Dedication to King James VI and I by the translators of the authorised version of the bible. 
1611. 
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The logic of the oil companies concerning membership of installation safety 
committees outweighs the trade union demand for representation as a right. The 
person who does a job is far more likely to make a valid contribution in a safety 
committee than someone who is representing the employees as a whole. Further, 
as one director explained to the author, there is the necessity for each 
representative on an installation safety committee to understand the production 
process and, in particular, how his particular job both contributes to that process 
and is itself affected by that process. 
Moreover, some recent research has shown that workers on platforms located 
above the UK continental shelf are as satisfied with the accident prevention 
procedures on their installations as are the unionised workers in Norwegian 
waters. 31 Associated with accident prevention is the concept of stress and, 
although their managerial cultures differ, there is no evidence of greater stress on 
British platforms than there is on their Norwegian counterparts. 32 During 1998 
the Health and Safety Executive will publish a further report (which the author 
has been shown prior to release) confirming these findings and stating that a 
majority of both the onshore and offshore samples (722 employees who had 
answered questionnaires)felt safe with regard to a range ofpotential hazards on 
oil and gas installations andfelt satisfied with safety measures designedfor the 
detection, prevention and control of incidents. 33 
Had there been dissatisfaction about the safety of their environment it is likely 
that the agitation for SI: 500 of 1977 34 to replace SI: 971 of 1989 35 (dear to the 
hearts of the authors of "Paying for the Pipee) would have found some response. 
The review of the effectiveness of SI: 971 of 1989, specially commissioned for 
the Health and Safety Executive, 36 found no evidence to support any change and 
in 1995 the HSE, following European Union legislation which required 
consultation on accident prevention issues to involve all employees and not 
solely trade unionists, recommended that SI: 971 remain unaltered. In doing so 
the EU was merely recognising the ILO convention that "independent worker 
representatives" should not be interpreted as "trade union representatives". 
37 
A. C. Barrell, formerly head of the Offshore Safety Division of HSE, when asked 
if there was likely to be another disaster of the magnitude of Piper Alpha, replied 
that there is reasonable expectation that there will not be. " Barrell's opinion is 
well gounded because he was responsible for monitoring the oil companies' 
response to the legislation following the Cullen Report. Oil companies are no 
31 Fleming, M., Flin, R., Meams, K., Gordon, R. and Rundmo, T. (1997). op cit. 
32 Rundmo, T. v. note 69 of Chapter Eleven, p. 193. 
33 Fleming, M., Flin, R., Gordon, R., and Meams, K. (1998) Human and Organisational Factors 
in Offshore Safety, Summary p. IV. HSE Report 97543. Appendix GGG reproduces the 
Sununary. 
34 'Me Safety Representatives and Safety Committees Regulations. 
35 The Offshore Installations(Safety Representatives and Safety Committees) Regulations. 36 Spaven, M., Ras, H., Morrison, A. and Wright C. (1993) op cit. 37 v. Chapter Eleven, p. 193 supra. 
38 Speaking on BBC 2 during a programme (7: 30 to 8: 00 p. m. ) on 7th January, 1997. 
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different from any other employers of labour in that they are responsible at law 
for the maintenance of a safe working environment in the establishments which 
they control and Piper Alpha, Ocean Odyssey (both 1988) and Cormorant Alpha 
(1992) 39 are ever present reminders of the tragedies that have happened in their 
industry. They have, therefore, interpreted their r6le as one where they must 
exercise total control over accident prevention policy and they have no intention 
of sharing this responsibility with any trade unions. Thus safety and its attendant 
legislation have not provided the bridge which trade unions once believed would 
give them access to offshore installations. One obvious way for trade unions to 
play a useful part on safety committees would be for a member employed 
offshore to stand for election to his installation's safety committee with union 
support but this policy has never been adopted. For the trade unions, and 
especially the OILC, formal involvement in the operation of offshore safety 
committees remains an objective but one which is becoming ever more unlikely. 
The reality of safety offshore conflicts with the trade unions' aspirations. In 1996 
serious allegations were made about safety on the Piper Alpha's sister ship, Elf 
Claymore, and were accepted by the BBC for inclusion in its documentary 
"Frontline, Scotland'9.40 The programme asserted that faulty work carried out 
during refurbishment had been covered up by a cosmetic finish. HSE officials 
were to spend 45 days investigating the matter and they reported that they found 
absolutely no substantive evidence to support the complaints. Elf welcomed the 
HSE report, which, rather unusually, was made public and described the 
allegations as nonsense while OILC refused to accept the report'sfindings. 41 
At a personal survival level managers are no less interested in safety than trade 
unions. As a senior manager responsible for overseeing accident prevention on a 
large platform said to the author, I have to sleep and work there like everyone 
else. The important question, however, which must be posed is whether the 
accident prevention policy of the industry is successful. The answer must be in 
the affirmative as shown by the following statistics issued by the Offshore Safety 
Division of the Health and Safety Executive. 
ý 
1989/90 1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 
Fatal ities 
- ý 
3 13* 13# 5 1 1 
ri ou s 
Injuries 
-76 84 73 79 52 41 
-L mb agure includes the 6 men who were drowned in the Brent Spar helicopter 
accident. 
# This figure includes the 11 men who were drowned in the Cormorant Alpha 
helicopter accident. 
39 Eleven oil workers died when a helicopter transporting workers from Cormorant Alpha to the 
nearby accommodation barge fell into the sea. The fatal accident inquiry found the pilot to have 
made a gross error ofjudgment and, although the casualties did not therefore arise from a defect in the oil operator's safety procedures, their extent has made the incident highly memorable. 40 May 1996. 
4' Scotsman, 18th July, 1996. 
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6 Into the Millennium 
Employee relations exhibit every symptom of continuing in their current and 
placid form well beyond 2000 in an industry where technological advances will 
ensure that existing reserves of oil and gas together with what are termed 
"potential additional reserves" and "undiscovered recoverable reserves" will 
extend the life of the industry in the North Sea for at least another quarter of a 
century. To those who warn that few authorities foresaw the sudden and steep 
decline of trade union fortunes after 1980 and that consequently there may soon 
be a resurgence of organized labour in the United Kingdom, the answer is that 
the circumstances of today are different. Then the industrial relations policy of 
the offshore employers did not conform with the British system but that policy 
becarne less divergent as the years passed when other employers began to adopt 
similar direct forms of communication with their workforce in place of the 
traditional trade union channels. This particular process has yet to run its full 
course, British trade union membership is still in numerical decline and 
collective bargaining continues to atrophy, even in many organisations where 
the procedures are still followed. "' North Sea oil and gas employers did not set 
out to change the British system of industrial relations but their model is now 
much closer to the national system, if one can be said still to exist. 
Ten years ago the extension of the offshore construction agreements beyond 
hook-up to form a national offshore agreement was the goal of the trade unions. 
Now, however, the technology of commissioning offshore installations is very 
Id offer some sort of different from the days when hook-up agreements cc-A 
template for agreements applicable for employment once oil or gas was in 
production. Modem technology has allowed new installations to be constructed 
on site in such a way that hook-up offshore is less complicated and much shorter 
in time than it once was. Consequently any chance of full recognition of trade 
unions after installations have been commissioned is as far away as it ever was. 
As the years extend into the next century the Atlantic will become the focus of 
attention. In what is referred to as the West of Shetland basins oil is already being extracted from the Foinavon and Schiehallion fields where the most 
advanced technology available to the industry has conquered the triple problem 
of depth, strong currents and inclement weather. No change in industrial 
relations Policy or practice is likely to happen on these two fields or any others 
which are yet to be developed over the next decade; what can be called the 
established North Sea format will remain, largely because operations will 
continue to be controlled from Aberdeen. The Irish continental shelf, however, 
presents a different picture. Oil operators are certain that drilling off the west 
coast of Ireland will soon reveal a wealth of recoverable oil and they have 
42 Employment Relations into the 21st Century. Institute of Personnel and Development. 
December 1997. 
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already had serious disputes with SIPTU (Services, Industrial, Professional and 
Technical Union). Whether SIPTU will be more successful in its relationships 
with the oil and gas industry than British trade unions must be left to conjecture. 
One hundred and fifty years ago the British machine tool industry began to 
expand and to en oy considerable prosperity. Enlightened inventor/employers 
such as Sir William Armstrong and Sir Joseph Whitworth had little time for 
trade unions but shared the prosperity with their workforce by paying above 
union rates. There are therefore similarities with the employers in this, for the 
United Kingdom, relatively new and prosperous industry of oil and gas 
production. A refusal to recognize a trade union for negotiation purposes may 
still be seen in some quarters as antediluvian but it is not a sign of a bad or 
inconsiderate employer. As far as the offshore oil and gas industry is concerned 
their industrial relations are rooted in a policy based on a principle which 
combines total managerial control and encouragement of the fullest personal 
commitment to the task. As one prominent spokesman for the industry has said 
The expectation by the workforce is now such that genuine involvement of the 
workforce by and with the management has become the norm and can be said to 
be part of the developing culture of the industry. 43 This is how the industry 
depicts its relationships although its employees may see things in less favourable 
light. Conflicts of interest will never disappear but they will be resolved through 
mechanisms established after that degree of joint consultation which the 
employers judge appropriate but, thereafter, controlled by them. 
7 Summary 
This thesis set out to examine three interconnected themes associated with 
industrial relations in the North Sea oil and gas industry. The first was the failure 
of the British trade movement, in contrast with the Norwegian trade union 
movement, to secure a presence in the North Sea oil and gas industry and how 
this has led to a unitary culture of human resource management above the UK 
continental shelf The second was the emergence of the Offshore Industry Liaison Committee. The third theme was accident prevention, its role in trade 
union-management relationships and the fairness of the allegations that the industry accords a higher priority to profitability than to the safety of its 
employees. 
This thesis has shown that British trade unions failed to win recognition offshore 
because their lack of cohesion, internecine squabbling, inability to recruit 
significant membership and refusal to adopt new strategies meant that they 
offered far too weak a challenge to the operators who were well organized and 
united in their determination to refuse negotiating rights. The Norwegian trade 
43 Royle, D. J. C., (1995) Workforce Involvement in the UK Offshore Oil and Gas Industries. 
Paper read at the Society of Petroleum Engineers Offshore Europe 1995 Conference and 
Exhibition, Aberdeen. 
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unions, less disputatious, more adept in their choice of strategies and more 
strongly supported by their government obtained full negotiating power within 
the industry. The OILC, originally formed as a group of activists within the trade 
union movement, carried out an unequal struggle against the employers in 1989 
and 1990. When it was jettisoned by the trade unions it managed to establish 
itself as an independent union outside the STUC and, despite its falling 
membership, retains the attention of the media as the representative body of 
offshore workers. As regards accident prevention offshore the statistical evidence 
of the Offshore Safety Division of the Health and Safety Executive and research 
carried out among oil workers argues strongly against the commonly expressed 
belief that the employers pay insufficient attention to the provision of safe 
working environments. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Human Resource Management in the North Sea 
It would be impossible in a chapter as short as this to include information on 
industrial relations as they affect offshore workforces; as diverse in location and 
culture as the Far East, the Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of Mexico and the North Sea. 
This chapter will therefore focus upon human factors and human resource 
management in the North Sea oil and gas industry. Human resource management in 
that industry has inevitably been influenced by the prevailing management culture 
of the multi - national oil companies although with surprisingly different outcomes 
for Norway and the United Kingdom despite their sharing the same continental 
shelf. Anyone who seeks to understand the human factors of employment in the oil 
industry of the North Sea must appreciate from the outset that while both Norway 
and the United Kingdom had the industry brought to them by multi - national 
companies all sharing a common philosophy concerning the management of "their" 
industry, the pattern of industrial relations is vastly different in each. Oil managers 
transferring from a British installation to one based in Norwegian waters will have 
to adopt a very different approach to their understanding of human factors on a 
Norwegian installation. 
In the absence of indigenous expertise, multi-national companies were responsible 
for most of the initial exploration and drilling in the North Sea and once fields were 
designated as commercially viable for exploitation, they had the technical 
knowledge and venture capital to build and operate many of the platforms. As 
employers, they brought with them the same approach to the human factors of their 
operations that had served them well in other parts of the world. Their philosophy 
of management reflected their need to contend with a physical environment more 
hostile than they had ever had to face and consequently human factors received 
significantly less attention than technological concerns. The style of management 
was paternal at best but over the first decade of the industry in, the North Sea it 
2 
would be more accurately described as uncompromising. Once the frenetic activity 
of the early years had given way to the more predictable but still economically 
challenging business of producing oil, time was found to look in greater detail at 
human factors. 
By this time, however, Norway and the United Kingdom had sharply contrasting 
systems of human resource management within their offshore oil industries, the 
reasons for which will be explained later in this chapter. In Norwegian waters 
human resource management does not now differ in essentials from the prevailing 
pattern on mainland Norway. All the major oil companies, for instance, have found 
it politically convenient to join the Norwegian Employers Federation (Nmringslivets 
Hovedororganisasjon) and the Norwegian Oil Industry Association (01jeindustriens 
Landsforening) and to work in concert with them. By contrast, human resource 
management on the British continental shelf exhibits features more -akin to 
American than to British establishments and is thus atypical of the national system, 
where, for example, trade unions still play a significant r6le. 
Industrial Relations 
Industrial relations may be described as the rules which govern employment. (')- 
These rules are of two kinds. Substantive rules are such matters as the length of the 
working week, pay and holiday entitlement while procedural rules are concerned 
with the manner in which the substantive rules are drawn up and how they can be 
interpreted and amended. These rules are arrived at and administered in four ways. 
First there is statutory regulation where the government intervenes in the 
relationship between employer and employee, almost always in order to protect the 
individual from injury or from causing injury to someone else. Government bodies 
are established to ensure compliance with the regulations and, where appropriate, to 
prosecute offenders; examples of this are the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate in 
Norway and the Health and Safety Executive in the United Kingdom. Then there is 
3 
employer regulation when organizations determine both the substantive' and the 
procedural rules with little or no consultation with their employees. In its extreme 
form this is autocracy which is unlikely to be found outside small firms'. The third 
way is a mild form of employer regulation known as sophisticated paternalism 
which is common offshore on the UK continental shelf. Here organizations seek to 
provide conditions of employment which satisfy their employees to the extent that 
they are not interested in joining trade unions and asking them to negotiate on their 
behalf. Finally there is collective bargaining, the process whereby trade unions 
negotiate with the employers terms and conditions on behalf of their members. It is 
by far the commonest form of reaching agreement between employer and 
employees. It is sometimes referred to as joint regulation in contrast to the 
unilateral regulation where managers make decisions on their own terms. It should 
be mentioned here that collective bargains, contrary to the practice in the USA and 
other industrialised nations, are not normally enforceable in British law. I 
Collective bargaining may be described loosely as the standard pattern of job 
regulation within the British and Norwegian systems of industrial relations. 
Industrial Relations'on the UK Continental Shelf 
However, collective bargaining as understood in the United Kingdom does not take 
place offshore. Collective bargaining is possible only if management accepts trade 
unions as legitimate representatives of employees, usually on the basis that the 
majority of the employees are members of the trade union(s) concerned. From the 
earliest days of the industry on the UK continental shelf, the oil companies have 
resisted all demands by the trade unions to be accorded the negotiating rights which 
are necessary for collective bargaining to be carried out and they have defended this 
I It will be appropriate to point out here that almost all oil installations in the North Sea are in the 
Scottish part of the United Kingdom continental shelf and consequently the law of Scotland and not of 
England applies. Legislation affecting employment offshore is, however, common to both legal 
systems. Where prosecutions occur, the case for the Crown is led by the Procurator Fiscal, whose 
r6le is similar to that of the District Attorney in the USA, except that he is appointed and not 
elected. 
4 
stance on the grounds that the unions have never secured sufficient membership 
among offshore employees to justify a right to represent them. In 1976 the trade 
unions, with government assistance, did enter into an agreement with the employers 
to assist with recruitment offshore but this "Memorandum of Understanding on 
Trade Union Access to Offshore Installations"2 has been of little assistance to them. 
Even when trade union officers do go offshore the whole ambience of an 
installation isolated perhaps one hundred miles out at sea militates against an 
atmosphere which is conducive to the recruitment of members. ()- The position 
today is that the major trade unions now accept, though they do not admit it 
publicly, that, offshore oil industry employees do not, on the whole, want to be 
represented by them. It is possible that this may change but currently the employers 
continue to reject trade union demands to negotiate on behalf of offshore employees 
on the sound argument that union membership is paltry. 
It is not correct to infer from the foregoing comment that industrial relations 
offshore lack structure and stability. If it were so it is unlikely that the fairly placid 
state of industrial relations on both the UK and the Norwegian sectors of the 
continental shelf would have continued for two decades apart from occasional 
flurries such as the strike of UK catering workers in 1979, some slight turmoil 
caused by the Norwegian union OFS in the early 1980s and the industrial action 
taken in 1989 and 1990 in British waters, none of which had any lasting effect. 
THE STRUCTURE OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS OFFSHORE 
As stated immediately above, industrial relations on the North Sea on and gas 
industry are stable and this is accounted for by the relationships between the 
different organizations, both management and trade union. Since differing 
2 On 21st July, 1976 the UK governtnent extended the Employmcnt Protection Act 1975 to include 
offshore employment and simultaneously the UKOOA agreed that oil producers 'would ensure that 
trade union officials, on request, are granted reasonable access for recruitment purposes to all their 
offshore installations". 
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philosophical approaches to human factors of employment characterise the conduct 
of UK and Norwegian industrial relations, separate sections are needed to describe 
i 
their structure in each nation. This section, accordingly, is concerned solely with 
orgarazations within the British structure, some of which are discussed below. 
The Individual Employers 
In common with large organizations in North America, the oil companies in the 
North Sea have approached trade unions as a constraint to be dealt with at the level 
of operating decisions. c) As a former, chief executive of a multi-national oil 
company commented "the oil companies took a collective decision, not in any way 
formalised, not to encourage trade unions ý3 Far from ignoring industrial relations 
on that account or leaving them to be conducted on an ad hoc basis by operational 
managers, the companies have recruited well - qualified and experienced staff to 
devise and implement policies which are in line with company objectives. It would 
be too crude to say that the employers are simply anti-trade union because, as will 
be shown later in this chapter, there is a forum in the UK where trade unions and 
management meet regularly while in Norwegian waters it is impossible to operate 
without involvement of trade union representatives. On the other hand, it is 
impossible to come to any conclusion other than that the oil companies have sought 
to be in the forefront of enlightened employee-management relations to the extent 
that employment with them offers attractive conditions which few other 
organizations can match. It would be nonsense to criticise any firm which offered 
the best conditions of employment that were possible in the circumstances but it 
must be accepted that in doing so the oil companies see as a bonus the consequent 
difficulty posed to any trade union which wants to recruit members. If membership 
of a trade union is believed to bring no advantage, ý what point, apart from the 
3 Private comment to the author. 
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ideological one that a worker ought to belong to a trade union, is there in taking out 
membership? 
The relationships between employers and their employees offshore are summed up 
in the term joint consultation. While four different models of consultation have 
been identified, "' its commonest form (and that adopted by the oil companies) is 
when it is used "as an alternative to collective bargaining and to prevent its 
establishment. Here management is essentially unitarist, but much more 
sophisticated than the traditional anti-union owner-manager. Yhus it seeks to 
promote harmony and the willing acceptance of management decisions". () This is 
the sophisticated ý paternalist approach to industrial relations which was mentioned 
earlier and since it must be making a major contribution to the placidity of 
industrial relations, its virtual adoption as standard practice is understandable. 
Joint consultation implies direct communication between managers and employees. 
There are obvious mutual advantages in this and in a variety of industries and 
establishments onshore there has been a resurgence of joint consultation. This has 
upset some trade unions where collective bargaining has been long established since 
they feel that they are being marginalised; instead of issues being taken up by the 
shop steward to the union for comment or for managers to communicate with their 
employees through the trade union, managers are speaking directly to their 
employees. Offshore, where collective bargaining scarcely exists, the -oil 
companies encourage such direct communication. Oil producing companies 
promote this form of employee relationship in order that they may hear points of 
view on a whole range of topics relevant to employment on their installations and 
such exchanges of opinion develop trust and understanding between people at all 
levels who, it must always be recalled, are living and working on a metal 
construction in the hostile environment of the sea. (-) They know, moreover, that 
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each -one of them may at any time be dependent on the other in an emergency from 
which there are far fewer avenues of escape than onshore. 
Following the tragedy of the Piper-Alpha platform in 1988, accident prevention was 
given an even higher profile than before on offshore installations. The regulations 
introduced on the UK continental shelf in the immediate aftermath of the tragedy 
and following the Cullen Reportm drew particular attention to the importance of 
employee representation on the safety committees. It was now a requirement that 
each installation have a safety committee, which met at regular and not too 
infrequent intervals and which included employee representation at all levelS. 4 To 
the chagrin of the trade unions the government did not make it mandatory for them 
to appoint representatives on these safety committees. In this the government was 
only being consistent with the philosophy which underpinned the Health and Safety 
at Work Act of 1974. This is that persuasion of employers to act responsibly and 
reasonably on accident prevention is preferable to compulsion. This reliance on 
self-regulation coincides with the managerial approach of the oil companies who 
have adhered to their joint consultation policy and have not invited trade union 
representation onto these committees although Lord Cullen did say "that the 
appointment of offshore safety representatives by trade unions could be of some 
benefit in making the work of safety representatives and safety committees 
effective". Having avoided a legal requirement to accept trade union representation 
after the greatest offshore disaster in the history of their industry, it is unlikely that 
the UK- based oil companies are any closer to accepting collective bargaining than 
they ever were. 
Offihorc Installations (Safety Representatives and Safety Committees) Regulations 1989. 
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The United Kingdom OMhore Operators' Association 
In stark contrast to the trade unions, the offshore employers had a representative 
body in place within a year of the granting of the United Kingdom's first round of 
licences in 1964. The UK North Sea Operators' Committee was an informal 
association of licence holders which provided for its members a forum for 
discussion on any matter affecting their industry offshore. It is highly unlikely that 
the members did not discuss frPM time to time what would be their policy on 
employment were reserves of oil to be discovered in commercially acceptable 
quantities offshore. When this happened it was not difficult to convert the existing 
Committee into a larger and more formal body by incorporating it as the United 
Kingdom Offshore Operators' Association (UKOOA) with a constitution and a 
permanent staff. Currently there are more than thirty companies in membership 
and the Association is administered by a Council of 34 (who meet monthly) with 
fifteen permanent and five ad-hoc committees. 
Fundamental to any analysis of industrial relations in the North Sea oil industry is 
an understanding of the inter-relationship of UKOOA and IUOOC (Inter-Union 
Offshore Oil Committee). The relationship is purely consultative, almost an 
extension of the industry's joint consultative approach. - IUOOC has consistently 
misunderstood UKOOA's modus operandii, probably because it would prefer 
UKOOA to have precisely those powers which are denied to it by its constitution. 
One of the more important permanent committees of UKOOA is the Employment 
Practices Committee with seven terms of reference of which only the first has 
relevance here: 
"To provide a forum where member companies can exchange opinions and, where 
necessary, formulate an industry viewpoint in the field of employment practices 
including training, employee and industrial relations ". 
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It is a body purely for internal discussion on employment issues upon which it 
might form a viewpoint but not a policy. This is spelled out with greater clarity in 
the terms of reference of one of its five sub-committees, 5 the Liaison Panel, the 
function of which is; 
"To act as a channel of communications for UKOOA on matters concerning 
employee relations which can be discussed in general ternts on an ixchange of 
views basis with Government, the Inter-Union Offshore Oil Committee and any 
other appropriate body approved by the Council". , 
The status of the Liaison Panel has been one of continual frustration for the unions. 
Whereas the IUOOC has some authority to commit its members to particular 
policies, the Liaison panel does not, and to any IUOOC request it can only reply 
that the request will be communicated to the companies or company concerned. 
The Liaison Panel is best defined as a body which acts as the collective voice of the 
oil companies on industrial relations but has neither executive control over, nor 
responsibility for, any member company's own industrial relations decisions. In 
short, no UKOOA member is inhibited by any agreement or recommendation 
reached between UKOOA and IUOOC from making whatsoever arrangements it 
likes concerning the management of its employees. The consequence of this has 
been that the quarterly meetings of the IUOOC and the Liaison Panel are little more 
than opportunities to exchange opinions on matters of mutual interest. 
Nevertheless, this somewhat limited outcome is, not without its advantages. 
Individual trade union officers and managers often establish some rapport which 
allows useful exchange of opinion and information. An issue which may be 
affecting employees on one installation can be drawn to the attention of the manager 
by a trade union officer on a personal basis that has been built up through their 
regular attendance at meetings of the IUOOC and the Liaison Panel of UKOOA. 
5 The other four sub-committees are Training, Contractors' Liaison (Aberdeen), Contractors, Liaison 
(London) and Pay and Benefits. 
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The inter-Union Offshore Off Committee 
During 1973 it had become obvious to the trade unions in North East Scotland that 
the oil companies were not interested in establishing the sort of contact with them 
that would lead to recognition for bargaining purposes on behalf of their employees. 
The trade unions with an interest in recruiting and representing offshore workers 
accordingly decided to form an organization which would seek to persuade the oil 
companies to recognise them for bargaining purposes and consequently to negotiate 
with them appropriate terms and conditions of employment. Originally comprising 
ten unions, there are now eight with the Transport and General Workers Union, the 
Amalgamated Engineering and Electrical Union and the Manufacturing, Science and 
Finance Union among the more prominent members. IU06C set off on'the wrong 
foot by demanding rather than requesting a meeting with representatives of the oil 
companies and threatening industrial action if they did not comply. The companies 
ignored the invitation and the attempt to carry out industrial action failed dismally. 
The trade unions on the IUOOC have never lost sight of the principal objective 
enshrined in the first paragraph of the "Charter for the Unionisation of Employees 
engaged in the Offshore Oil Industry" which they drew up in 1975. This is that 
"all companies engaged in the Offshore Oil Industry-recognise the fight of- 
unions to recruit, represent and negotiate terms and conditions of employment for 
all employees falling within their spheres of membership'. While some companies 
have conceded representational rights, for example the right of union officers to 
attend disciplinary hearings involving their members, negotiating rights remain at 
best a distant prospect. 
Despite the unforturiate early efforts of the IUOOC at communication with the 
employers, both lUOOC and UKOOA realised that more was to be gained in 
discussion than by confrontation. By 1976 the Liaison Panel of UKOOA had begun 
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to meet the IUOOC on a regular three monthly basis and these meetings have 
continued until today. As stated above these meetings are not without their value 
but they are far from the negotiating sessions which IUOOC would like them to be. 
Officers of IUOOC unions do visit offshore installations escorted by a member of 
the company's industrial relations staff and do interview prospective members but 
the results, from the IUOOC point of view, have been disappointing in the extreme. 
The Offshore Industry Liaison Committee 
Any publication about industrial relations in the UK oil industry must include a 
brief comment on the Offshore Industry Liaison Committee (011, C). It originated 
in 1989 in the aftermath of the Piper Alpha disaster when a group of members of 
various IUOOC unions set up an Oil Information Centre in Aberdeen with the 
intention of assisting their unions in the pursuit of recognition for collective 
bargaining. The following year the OILC became heavily involved in industrial 
action offshore and eventually found that it was viewed with hostility by the 
employers and with some suspicion by the trade unions. OILC accordingly 
established itself as a separate organization but was refused membership of the 
Scottish Trades Union Congress (and therefore of the TUC). It is now a registered 
trade union unaffiliated to the TUC. Although membership oscillates around the 
3,000, this small trade union is recognised as a full player on the industrial relations 
scene of North East Scotland and has developed a very strong alliance with the 
Norwegian union OFS. This is another union not affiliated to its country's main 
trade union confederation (LO) but it was established almost twenty years ago and 
has a membership of about 6,000 offshore workers. 
The Offshore Contractors' Association 
Known until 1995 as the Offshore contractors, Council (founded 1984), the 
Offshore Contractors' Association (OCA) is the principal organization for 
employers in the offshore contracting business and has over 50 member companies, 
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all of whom are involved in mechanical, electrical, construction and maintenance 
work in the UK oil and gas industry. Since OCA has a combined UK offshore and 
onshore workforce of over 30,000 employees with a presence on virtually all 
platforms operating in the UK continental shelf, it is obvious that this presence has 
an effect upon industrial relations. - 
It is estimated that today on the UK continental shelf only about 20% of offshore 
workers are directly employed by the operators, i. e. the oil companies such as 
Shell, BP, Enterprise Oil. The rest are employees of contractors who provide the 
operators with construction and maintenance personnel. The direct employees of 
the operators enjoy, on the whole, better, pay and conditions of service am 
contractors' employees. With the growing interest over the last few years in 
"partnering" these discrepancies are being removed, not least in the interests of 
harmony on the installations where the two different classes of cmployee have to 
work and live together. () A distinction is currently being made between "core" 
employees of contractors, who may have virtually permanent jobs on particular 
installations (e. g. maintenance electricians) and "peripheral" or "short term" 
employees who are aboard the installation for periods that can be as short as one 
week (e. g. welders sent offshore to carry out a repair). In some cases the 
proportion of contracted personnel on an installation is so high that Mr Sandy 
Clark, Chairman of OCA commented "How far are we ftom the day our member 
companies become responsible for operating the platform on behatf of the oil 
company? '16 lain Bell, Secretary of OCA, said that it was good news for his 
organization that the multi-nationals were concentrating more and more on 
producing and selling oil and gas and leaving the rest to contractors. "It means 
more work for his members, who will in future be responsible for designing, 
building, operating and eventually disposing of rigs for the multi-nationals 11.7 
6 Offshore Contractors' Council Annual Review 1994. 
7 Fraser, S. (22nd October, 1995) Safety Hopes Buried at Sea. (Scotland on Sunday), p. 8. 
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Within months of Clark's comment, Sun Oil had contracted out its Balmoral field to 
Brown and Root and almost all the operations on the Hutton, Lyell and Murchison 
fields had been handed over toAtlantic Power and Gas by Oryx UK Energy, only a 
year after it took over these three fields from Conoco. In almost all fields, the oil 
producing companies traditionally used contractors to look after specific parts of the 
operation such as production chemicals and working the downhole pumps. Thus 
over a period of about fifteen years, the offshore contractors have expanded their 
contribution to the industry from the original one of building rigs and platforms, 
commissioning them at sea and carrying out maintenance and repair to the point 
where they can operate the entire offshore operation on behalf of the oil companies. 
The Offshore Construction Agreement 
It is necessary to tum now to the question of collective bargaining because it is only 
from the contractors that the trade unions have secured any significant recognition 
in the offshore oil and gas industry. The construction industry has always been 
heavily unionised. The move to the fabrication of drilling rigs and platforms for 
new clients in the offshore industry did not alter this in any way and conditions of 
employment continued to be regulated through collective bargaining. The immense 
capital outlay which precedes the extraction of oil made it important for the 
operators to have the work carried out as quickly as possible. Since the manual 
workers engaged in this task were still employees of the construction firms and, in 
addition, were often the same individuals, it would have been foolish even to 
contemplate the abandonment of collective bargaining. Accordingly, the operating 
companies realised that it was in their interests to permit some form of trade union 
involvement on their offshore establishments and with their tacit consent the Oil and 
Chemical Plant Constructors' Association (later merged into the Offshore 
Contractors' Council) negotiated the Offshore Construction Agreement (or "Hook- 
Up" Agreement as it became more commonly known). The first "Hook-Up" 
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agreement was signed in 1976 by five trade unions and the Association but not by 
any operator. It covered the entire range of conditions of employment normally 
associated with collective bargaining for onshore workers e. g. pay, holidays, hours 
of work, disciplinary procedures. The operators, who had, officially at least, no 
part in the agreement were nevertheless insistent that it would cease to apply in toto 
as soon as "first oil" was produced or at some date which they would stipulate. All 
subsequent work on installations was to be classified as maintenance for which there 
was no trade union agreement with the employersg. The Offshore Construction 
Agreement was re-negotiated at regular intervals until 1990 when the signatory 
unions withdrew from the agreement. 
This was part of combined union policy to extract a Post Construction Agreement 
from the operators which would include recognition of the trade unions for 
bargaining purposes. Fewer and fewer employees were now engaged on "hook- 
ups" because, quite apart from the fact that the many fields in the North Sea were 
now on stream, the nature of the work was changing. Technological advance now 
allowed the fabrication onshore of integrated modules. Most "hook-ups" and 
testing are now done on land and the modules are taken by barge out to their 
locations "with their lights on" in the jargon of the industry. Their positioning has 
been made possible by the huge floating cranes which have become available over 
the last decade. To this must be added the increasing emphasis on sub-sea 
completions tied back to existing installations or a floating production system, both 
of which require far fewer people in the offshore construction phase. In sum, the 
majority of contractor personnel aboard installations were, by 1990, t carrying out 
what in general terms might be called maintenance and were employed by 
companies who had to bid for work in competition with rival firms. The trade 
unions were persuaded that by reftising to sign a re-negotiated Offshore 
Apart from an agreement affecting electricians who were few in number, 
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Construction Agreement pressure could be brought on the operators through the 
contractors to negotiate a comprehensive Post Construction Agreement, which 
would cover all employees and include recognition of trade unions as the bargaining 
agents of these employees. This would meet a long term objective of the trade 
unions for, as they pointed out, it was not unusual for workers originally engaged 
on "hook-up" terms to stay on the job after "first oil" and to suffer a considerable 
reduction in pay, together with the loss of the protection previously conferred by 
the union/company agreement. The policy did not, succeed and within eighteen 
months a new Offshore Construction Agreement was reached under the previous 
terms. As one senior trade union officer acknowledged, the last agreement has 
been generous as far as pay is concerned taking into account the small amount of 
"hook-up" work and the price of oil9. 
At present the trade unions are as far from obtaining a Post Construction 
Agreement as they ever were and in any case modem technology may mean that the 
very term is running out of date. The bulk of the employees offshore, as stated 
earlier, are employed by contractors and apart from the fast diminishing number 
who still enjoy Offshore Construction Agreement terms and the catering workers 
who are a special case, very few of them have their terms and conditions regulated 
through the process of collective bargaining. 
The Catering Offshore Traders' Association 
Almost from the beginning of the North Sea oil and gas industry, catering has been 
contracted out by the operators to specialists in this field. Members of the 
Association, usually referred to as COTA, obtain contracts through competitive 
tendering. Following some unrest among employees in 1979 over conditions of pay 
and service, the oil operators actively encouraged an agreement on minimum rates 
9 Private comment to the author in late 1995. 
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of pay between the main union involved, the Transport and General Workers' 
Union, and the caterers. There has been little industrial strife since that time in the 
offshore catering industry although the work is characterised by low pay and high 
labour turnover in comparison with other offshore employment. 
Summary 
This diffusion of the offshore workforce among oil companies and contractors 
(some of whom are very small outfits) makes it even more difficult for trade unions 
to play the r6le to which they aspire. Furthermore, offshore workers are not only 
composed of different categories of employee; they are themselves very different in 
occupation and the OILC concluded as late as 1991 that there are as many as ten 
trade unions seeking to represent them. The OILC claim that this allows the 
operators and contractors to assert that union recognition implies multi-union 
recognition and so justifies their resistance to attempts to obtain collective 
bargaining rights. OILC interprets the employer view as follows: "It is argued that 
multi-unionism will produce industrial anarchy in the industry which because of its 
hazardous nature, cannot afford to have any challenge to managerial authority from 
trade unions". () In addition, the question arises about responsibility for industrial 
relations offshore: is the policy of the operator paramount or can the contractor 
devise and carry out a policy that may be different from that of the operator? The 
operators are perfectly clear where they see responsibility to lie because the 
UKOOA Council recommended to its members in 1978 that "Ae right of an - 
OIM / manager to order anyone off company premises remains paramount"10. It is 
a further indication of the virtual total absence offshore of any trade union presence 
that appeals against removal of a contractor's employee from an installation are the 
responsibility of the contractorl I and not of a trade union. 
10 Appealsfrom Disciplinary Action exercised by OIM or other Company Manager against 
Contractors I Personnel by their Employers. Recommendations to Members by UKOOA Council 
1978. 
11 ibid. 
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ACCIDENT PREVENTION 
Interest in accident prevention has been a natural concern of all trade unions since 
their inception and the origins of many trade unions lay in the determination of 
groups of workers to seek safer conditions of work. Associated with this has been 
reliance upon trade unions to obtain financial compensation for their members when 
there seems a possibility that injury was consequent upon a failure of the employers 
to observe required safety standards and practice. When one considers accident 
prevention in the North Sea oil and gas industry, the topic must be approached from 
two very different perspectives. The first is that employers have had ever 
increasing legal requirements to observe in the provision of safe working 
environments, especially following accidents when there have been many casualties 
with attendant loss of life such as the Alexander Kielland and Piper Alpha tragedies. 
The other perspective is the successful efforts of the Norwegian unions to become 
involved in ý the mechanisms established to provide safe working environments on 
Norwegian installations and, in contrast, the total failure of British trade unions to 
be accorded any formal r6le at all on installations on the UK continental shelf. ' 
Accident Prevention on the UK Continental Shelf : Trade Union Exclusion 
The question of safety is paramount in the offshore industry and has already been 
discussed in Chapters 9 and 10. Some of the most spectacular and horrific 
accidents in any industry have been the three offshore disasters which occurred in 
the 1980s : Alexander Kielland (1980, Norwegian waters, 123 fatalities), Ocean 
Ranger ( 1982, Canadian waters, 84 fatalities) and Piper Alpha ( 1988, British 
waters, 167 fatalities). The consequences of these and other accidents (such as the 
Chinook accident off Shetland in 1986, when the rotor blade of a helicopter sheared 
and 45 men plunged to their death) are reflected in the measures which have been 
taken at the highest level to reduce the risk of working in a hostile environment. In 
addition, it must be recalled that the offshore oil industry is the only industry where 
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almost all the employees must be transported to their place of work either by air or 
by boat. Other chapters in this book will concern themselves with the perceptions 
of risk seen from the perspectives of employer and employee and the legislative 
requirements pertaining to the employment of persons offshore. - This chapter is 
concerned with industrial relations and will therefore consider accident prevention 
(a much more positive term than safety) solely in the manner in which it impinges 
upon industrial relations. 
Accident prevention in the offshore oil and gas industry has been approached in a 
different way from accident prevention onshore. There are obvious differences in 
the working environments but these alone do not account for the pattern that has 
developed over the thirty year history of the industry in the North Sea. In 1965 the 
decapodal platform, Sea Gem, collapsed off the Humber estuary with the loss of 13 
lives and a public inquiry followed. Among the recommendations contained in the 
subsequent report there were two which have had a direct bearing upon industrial 
relations. The first was "the fact that the Sea Gem was lost in the character of a 
sinking ship suggests strongly that there ought to be a Master or unquestioned 
authority on these figs"; '" thus the nature of the power that came to be vested in oil 
installation managers has its origins in what some writers see as a mistaken 
similarity between a fixed installation offshore and a vessel, whereas the analogy 
with an isolated land-based construction might have been more appropriate. The 
other recommendation which concerns industrial relations is that the report advised 
that consideration should be given to the kind of legislation that was needed for 
offshore installations. 
Several working parties were set up to advise on this and the result was the Mineral 
Workings (Offshore Installations) Act 1971 which empowered the Minister of State 
for Energy to make such regulations as considered appropriate to secure a Safe 
working environment on installations exploiting mineral deposits. Strangely, those 
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persons who advised the government appear to have worked in isolation from 
discussions which were simultaneously in progress on other employment safety 
matters. The Holland-Martin Report in 1969" dealt with safety in fishing, - another 
industry where the sea poses particular hazards and it specifically recommended 
joint union - management safety committees on vessels. The Robens Report 1972(11) 
was the basis for a major amendment in LJK safety legislation which reached the 
statute book as the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974. 
The philosophy underlying the Robens Report and the subsequent legislation was 
that persuasion was preferable to compulsion and that consequently the principle of 
voluntarism in the achievement of safe working conditions was to apply. This 
philosophy was, nevertheless, tempered by the principle that no government 
department was to be responsible for accident prevention within the industry for 
which it had to account to Parliament. Consequently there was established a unified 
supervising authority, the Health and Safety Commission (HSC), with an executive 
arm, the Health and Safety Executive (HSE). The HSC is tripartite in nature with 
its membership composed of representatives from industry, trade unions and the 
government. 
In most onshore industries there were already accident prevention committees with 
representation from employees, who were usually union members. Trade unions 
also negotiated with employers when they believed that their members needed 
protection from any hazards specific to the industry or to any particular forms of 
employment within an otherwise "safe" industry. In 1977, the Safety 
Representatives and Safety Committee Regulations gave to trade unions recognised 
by employers the right to appoint representatives empowered to demand the creation 
of safety committees where none existed but by this time it was too late for the 
trade unions to apply these regulations to the oil and gas industry. As stated 
earlier, the oil employers had no intention of negotiating with the trade unions and 
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since the Regulations specifically referred to trade unions recognised by employers, 
the Regulations could not be used by the unions. Moreover, the Department of 
Energy, in contradiction to the philosophy of the Robens Report, continued to use 
the powers given to it under the Mineral Workings (Offshore Installations) Act of 
1971 to control accident prevention on oil installations. "Offshore safety was thus 
insulated ftom the Robens reconstruction. "(") As trade unions complained over 
these years, the responsibility for ensuring a safe working environment aboard 
offshore installations was delegated to the government department which had as one 
of its principal objectives the uninterrupted flow of oil (and therefore of tax 
revenue) from the mineral deposits of the UK continental shelf. 
As the oil and gas industry expanded offshore there was a corresponding and 
unacceptable growth in fatalities, especially among divers. ""' In contrast to the Gulf 
of Mexico, where divers had simply followed the reservoirs offshore into shallow 
water and the climate was benign, the North Sea was deep and the weather often 
hostile. This led the government to appoint in 1978 a Committee of Enquiry under 
Dr J. H. Burgoyne, which reported two years later. The Burgoyne Report'", 
concluded that "the government shall discharge its responsibility for offshore safety 
as a single agency" and recommended that the Department of Energy should 
'continue its policy to. employ an Inspectorate consisting of well-qualffied and 
industrially experienced individuals". This was a bitter disappointment for the trade 
unions which had hoped that Burgoyne would recommend that offshore safety be 
transferred to the HSE and the two trade union representatives on the Committee of 
Inquiry issued a six page note of dissent stating their preference for the HSE to be 
the responsible agency. The single agency therefore remained the Petroleum 
Engineering Division (PED) of the Department of Energy which had entered into an 
agreement with the HSE in 1978 to act in a proxy ro* le for the HSE offshore. 
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The British trade unions had realised by 1980 that despite the "Memorandum of 
Understanding on Trade Union Access to Offshore Installations" their efforts at 
recruiting offshore oil workers had been almost a complete failure. An alternative 
strategy was therefore needed and they decided that their strongest argument for 
obtaining recognition from the employers was their interest in safe working 
environments. Each trade union has built up a considerable body of expertise on 
the particular hazards common to the industries wherein their members are 
employed. Moreover, this wealth of knowledge has been recognised by trade union 
participation, as of right, on public institutions concerned with accident prevention, 
not least the HSC. 
Their case for recognition by the oil employers on the grounds that they could make 
a positive contribution to the industry through their wide knowledge of safety was 
pursued throughout the 1980s. In the opinion of many within and without the 
industry, this objective appeared to have been reached when Lord Cullen carried 
out his inquiry into the Piper Alpha disaster and made his report. Trade union 
officers had given evidence at the inquiry and Lord Cullen stated that union 
representatives could be of benefit in making the work of safety committees 
effective. The subsequent legislation saw the removal of the PED as the 
responsible agency for accident prevention and its replacement by the new Offshore 
Safety Division (OSD) of the HSE in 1991, but there was no requirement for 
companies to appoint union representatives on safety committees. 
The huge sum of E2.6 bn has been spent by the oil and gas industry on accident 
prevention since 1990. Companies have made every effort to provide for their 
employees a working environment that is as free as possible from all hazards known 
in their operation. In conversation with the author, the head of industrial relations 
in one of the largest oil companies, commented "Whereas previously the company 
sought, in general terms, to meet the minimum requirements of the law as it then 
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stood, it now regards the legal obligations on the employer merely as the minimum 
acceptable base upon which the company will always attempt to improve". For the 
trade unions this is small comfort. The Offshore Installations (Safety 
Representatives and Safety Committees) Regulations 1989 require employee 
representatives, as distinct from trade union representatives, on platform safety 
committees and although many of these representatives may well be members of a 
trade union it is their immediate colleagues for whom they speak and not their trade 
union. The trade unions have still no direct voice on the accident prevention 
measures which an employer wishes to discuss and/or implement. 
Two pieces of research call into question the whole rationale of the trade union 
point of view. Peter Kidger argues that since statutory participation by trade unions 
on safety committees has been restricted to workplaces onshore, there has been no 
opportunity to study the experience of committees where the employee 
representation is not union influenced other than on platforms offshore since 1989. 
He even goes so far as to suggest that "the system operating on North Sea oil 
installations provides a useful model which could be drawn upon for application 
onshore". ") Kidger's argument is based on the Robens principle that collective 
bargaining has no place in discussions on accident prevention and that in their joint 
consultative approach the oil companies are interpreting correctly the philosophy of 
the Health and Safety at Work Act. A study carried out by Malcolm Spaven and 
others for the HSE(6) concluded that "Support for increýsed involvement of trade 
unions in the work of Safety Representatives is considerable among offshore 
workers. However there is no clear majority for a system of Safety Representatives, 
and such a system, if widely applied, would present difficulties for the 
representational rights of non-members of trade unions". 
Currently the trade unions continue to assert their moral right to represent offshore 
employees and claim that since employee representatives on safety committees are 
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unprotected by trade unions, they can be intimidated from expression of opinion, 
despite the provisions of the Offshore Safety Representatives Act 1992. Legal 
redress for dismissal can be sought through the Industrial Tribunal but this is only 
after dismissal and even if the applicant is successful re-instatement does not 
necessarily follow. (") Safety representatives offshore have the right to telephone 
the OSD direct if there is a safety matter which is exercising their concern but, 
again, unions believe that fear of losing one's job makes this an unrealistic 
privilege. The oil companies have over the past two years been following a policy 
to which the acronym CRINE has been given; it stands for Cost Reduction In (the) 
New Era and is an attempt to reduce unnecessary expenditure at a time when there 
I L-11 
is plenty of oil available world-widelý The trade unions consider that it is unlikely 
that accident prevention measures can escape some trimming of the expenditure 
which companies are hoping to reduce and that this can result in accident rates 
beginning to rise. (17) The oil companies remain, as they always have been, 
interested in what the unions may say but unwilling to accept them as equal partners 
in the formation of policy on accident prevention. 
INDUSTIU[AL RELATIONS IN NORWEGIAN WATERS 
Norway enjoys immense reserves of oil and gas under her continental shelf. The 
revenues which have accrued to this small nation of under four million people from 
the exploitation of these resources have resulted in her citizens having among the 
highest per capita incomes in the world. Her current and assured future prosperity 
aiises not simply from having a lengthy coastline along the North Sea but from the 
manner in which she has managed this fortunate inheritance. 
In 1935 the Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions (Landsorganisasjonen i Norge, 
usually referred to as LO) and the Norwegian Employers Association 
12 Over 10 years ago oil was priced at just above $30 per barrel. It is currently just under $17. 
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(Nmringslivets Hovedorganisasjon, usually referred to as NHO) signed the Basic 
Agreement (Hovedavtalen) whereby freedom of association was guaranteed to trade 
unions who in turn contracted to settle all industrial disputes through national 
institutions established for that purpose. At regular intervals since 1935 the Basic 
Agreement has been revised and updated with the full support of the government. 
Thus during any contract period there is an obligation upon employers as well as 
employees to resolve disputes through negotiation or by referral to the Labour 
Court. By 1960, Norway had become a societal-corporatist state with co-operation 
between government, national organizations such as trade union federations and 
employer associations widely accepted as the appropriate method whereby the 
kingdom's interest was best served. It was this sense of the conduct of business 
operations in Norway which the oil majors initially failed to recognise when oil was 
discovered under Norway's continental shelf. 
Exploration drilling had begun in 1966 and the companies were almost all American 
since Norway had no indigenous expertise in the industry. Norwegians were 
employed at the lower skill levels and were subject to "hire and fire", as labour 
requirements dictated. Any suggestion, of a collective agreement between a 
company and a representative body of employees was brushed aside. Eventually 
Norwegians as a whole came to understand that this new industry was operating an 
industrial relations policy utterly alien to the accepted practice of their nation and 
they demanded action from their government. (") 
On account of both trade union and government decisions, 1977 is the watershed 
year of Norway's oil and gas industry as far as industrial relations are concerned. 
The Storthing13 passed the Working Environment Act and LO formed a new trade 
union for oil workers, the Norwegian Oil and Petrochemical Workers' Union 
13 The Norwegian parliament. 
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(Norsk O1je-og Petrochemisk Fagforbund, usually referred to as NOPEF). Another 
union, the Federation of Oil Workers (01jearbeidernes Fellessamengslutning, 
usually referred to as OFS), had already grown out of an association of employees 
on the Phillips Petroleum Company Norway (or PPCoN) installations. The 
company first recognised the association in 1973, no doubt expecting that it would 
be what in America is called a "sweetheart" union, an innocuous staff association 
which an employer can manipulate with ease. It has remained outside LO, is more 
militant than NOPEF and claims a membership of about 6,000. Originally it 
attracted only workers directly employed by the operators but it now consists of 
four divisions: operators, drillers, caterers and employees on mobile units. It has 
developed in the last few years very strong links with OILC in Aberdeen. NOPEF 
and OFS are rival unions and managements must work with both. 
The Working Environment Act 1977 was the government's response to national 
feeling, almost outrage, that foreign companies were denying to Norwegian workers 
those rights to representation and conditions of employment that were common 
across the rest of the nation. The following two quotations outline the main 
provisions of the law with which all employers, offshore as well as onshore, must 
comply. 
"Solution of an enterprise's working environment problems shall be reached 
through close co-operation between management and employees. A number of the 
act's provisions expressly stipulate co-operation in questions, concerning, for 
example, the organization of work, planning systems, building work etc. By virtue 
of the Working Environment Act formal institutions / bodies shall be stablished to 
ensure that the employees can exercise influence in working issues" 
"In every enterprise one or more protection officers shall be elected (whose duty 
will be) to take care of the employees' interests concerning the working environment 
and to see that the work can be carried out in a thoroughly safe and sound 
manner-. (") 
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The reaction of the oil companies was expressed as follows: "Aere is nothing we 
can do, we just accept what we are being told to do by the government and unions - 
it is very qpensive, - but if that is the way they want it, they can get it ff. (20) This 
remains the case today. Whatever an organization's or an individual manager's 
opinion may be on the place of trade unions in the operation of a commercial 
undertaking, if that undertaking is based within Norwegian territory it must allow 
the trade unions to carry out the functions which the law has guaranteed to them. 
There was not immediate harmonisation of conditions of employment onshore and 
offshore, partially on account of the conflict between OFS and NOPEF over the 
right to organize employees and partially on account of the good sense of the 
Norwegians in -allowing the oil companies time to adjust to a method of labour 
control which was new to them. The Working Environment Act also empowered 
the government to introduce additional regulations as were deemed relevant. For 
example, the act stated that all enterprises which regularly employed at least fifty 
persons had to set up working environment committees with equal - membership 
between employers and employees. In addition, safety delegates (a better 
translation that "protection officers" as given in the quotation above) had ý to be 
elected and they were empowered to require operations to cease if they considered 
them to be dangerous., Then a few years later it was made compulsory for 
employers to permit trade unions with 50% membership on, an installation to 
appoint worker representatives onto the working environment committees. By the 
mid - 1980s there had been further changes favouring trade unions when, following 
another Basic Agreement, all enterprises with over one hundred employees had to 
have a works committee with equal representation from management and 
employees. oil companies had joined NHO in 1981 and were bound to comply but 
with the usual Norwegian sense of balance it was agreed that on offshore 
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installations works' committees and working environment committees could be 
amalgamated as single bodies. 
Thus in Norway the oil companies have been driven to recognise trade unions for 
collective bargaining and other representational purposes and where membership of 
working environment committees are involved they have often to accept the 
nominees of the trade unions. On the other hand they are now operating within and 
not without the national industrial relations systemand consequently their human 
resource management is accepted in a far more positive light than it once was. 
Readers who seek more detailed accounts of industrial relations on the Norwegian 
continental shelf should consult Andersen, 1984 and 1988. ("-) 
CONCLUSION 
Fundamentally the labour process in the Norwegian oil industry is typical of the 
national pattern while in the identical British industry the process is atypical; but the 
different labour processes seem to have no economic consequences. (') Norwegian 
and British, workers appear to be equally satisfied with safety on their 
installations. (24) Trade union appointed safety delegates did not prevent the 
Alexander Kielland tragedy and it seems unlikely that British trade union appointees 
to a safety committee could have prevented Piper Alpha. Managerial cultures differ 
but there is no conclusive evidence of greater levels of stress among one or the 
other workforce who share the common problems of employment- on isolated 
installations in the North Sea. (25) 
The British trade unions envy the success of their Norwegian counterparts and see it 
as almost "politically correct" that traditional collective bargaining should be the 
method of establishing pay and conditions of work offshore as it is onshore. It can 
be argued equally well that in the United Kingdom a new labour process is being 
developed offshore where direct communications between - managers and workers 
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eliminate the need for unions in the achievement and control of safe working 
environments. The success of voluntarism offshore with elected representatives as 
distinct from union appointees suggests that it could be just as successful onshore 
but has never been fully implemented on account of the trade unions' statutory right 
to participation. 
Industrial relations on the UK continental shelf exhibits a special form of 
voluntarism in that it emerges outside the collective bargaining which is common 
onshore in Great Britain and is almost the standard practice across all Norwegian 
industry. Moreover, the labour process offshore is becoming more complex on 
both the Norwegian and the British continental shelves as operators reduce the 
number of their own direct employees in favour of increased proportions of contract 
employees. Separation of the bulk of the necessary human resource from direct 
employment is now standard practice offshore in both Britain and Norway with 
consequences which are more predictable for Norway than for Britain. There is no 
indication that there will be any change in terms and conditions of employment on 
Norway's continental shelf and so the industrial relations scene will remain much as 
it has been over the last five years. 
As regards the United Kingdom prediction and conclusions are more difficult. The 
OILC is currently pursuing a merger with the National Union of Mineworkers to 
form a union of workers in energy but this is unlikely to come to fruition. There is 
also the possibility that trade unions may seek to advance their claims for 
recognition offshore through their existing bases among the contractors onshore. 
There is no evidence that will persuade one to believe that this strategy will be any 
more successftil than previous trade union attempts to attract membership that will 
be in any way significant. Indeed, quite the contrary view has greater support and 
some recent research has shown that involvement of offshore workers by and with 
their managements has become part of the culture of the industry. (6) If there is any 
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retreat among the oil producers on the UK continental shelf from their present 
policy towards recognition of trade unions it will be a small one and based upon 
their own terms. 
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LABOUR PROCESSES IN THE N0RWEGL4N AND BRITISH SECTORS 
OF THE NORTH SEA OIL AND GASINDUSTRY 
The waters above the European continental shelf are shared by several nations with a 
North Sea coast but only three are major players in the oil and gas industry. One is 
The Netherlands where reserves of natural gas were first discovered offshore in the 
1960s and the other two are Norway and the United Kingdom which have both 
exploited large oil and gas fields under the North Sea since the early 1970s. This 
paper compares the labour processes on the UK and Norwegian continental shelves. 
Brief Background to Norwegian Industrial Relations 
The nascent trade unions, which in 1899 had formed themselves into a national 
federation, Landsorganisasjonen i Norge (LO), negotiated as early as 1907 their first 
nation-wide contract with the Norwegian Employers' Association, N-mringslivets 
Hovedorganisasjon (NHO). LO, almost from its foundation, has had a very close 
relationship with the Norwegian Labour Party, Den Norske Arbeiderpartei (DNA), 
which was founded in 1887. This "integration has been so close at all levels of the 
organization that the two systems have been fittingly described as Siamese twins"I. 
While the constitution of the kingdom has from the outset implicitly granted 
freedom of association to workers, this relationship of the LO with DNA is the 
principal reason why, alone of all industrialised democracies, Norway has never 
experienced any legal harassment of trade unions. 
During the 1920s the trade unions were in sharp conflict with the employers but 
from 1930 LO "appeared to change from an agent in class conj7ict to a 
domesticated collaborator in macro- economic planning. "2 Despite a DNA 
resolution in 1930 that it was "opposed to all class co-operation"3, LO began quietly 
to have discussions with the employers. These culminated in 1935 with the first 
Basic Agreement (Hovedavtalen) which covered all the earlier disputed issues, both 
wage and non-wage, and was to be valid for five years. Unofficial strikes and other 
industrial disputes did not vanish immediately but Basic Agreements soon came to 
be accepted nationally as a social contract parallel with the Constitution. Basic 
Agreements have been negotiated at regular intervals with the current one running 
from I st January, 1994 to 31st December, 1997. As the State Mediator remarked in 
1939: " whereas organizations met earlier as enemies at the bargaining table, the 
situation has changed They do not meet as enemies but as opponents with a will to 
peace. "4 Freedom of association both in practice and in theory was now established 
on a firm and permanent footing. 
Norwegian Institutions 
It is appropriate at this point to look at the nature of the institutions within which 
Norwegian industrial relations operate. This is done most easily by discussing 
Fivelsdal, E., (1965) White Collar Unions and the Norwegian Labour Movement. (Industrial 
Relations), Vol 5 Part 1, p. 8 1. 
2 Schwerin, D. S., (198 1) Corporatism and Protest: Organizational Politics in the Norwegian Trade 
Unions, p. 17. Kent Popular Press, Kent, Ohio. 
3 Schwerin, op cit p. 17. 
4 Galenson, W., (1949) Labor in Norway, p. 176. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts. 
briefly the ethos of the nation and then explaining how the industrial relations 
system fimctions as part of the apparatus of state. 
(a) The Ethos of the Nation 
Professor Geir Lundestad, Director of the Nobel Institute in Oslo, believes that 
Norway is '! probably more unified than any country in Europe and certainly equality 
is a belief stronger here than anywhere else ". 5 While patriotism has always been 
and remains strong as indicated by the unofficial national motto "Alle for Norge" 
(all for Norway), the ethos of the nation is equality because it reflects more 
accurately the outlook of Norwegian society, which the previous Prime Minister, 
Gro Harlem Brundtland, 6 has described as a "compassionate form of 
capitalisinwhich returns comprehensive weýlare benefits in exchange for brutal 
taxation". 7A synthesis of national norms of social responsibility and conceptions of 
equality has attained for Norway its objective of aclassless society and this is the 
foundation of the political consensus so vital for the way in which the nation 
conducts its affairs. 
Almost from the formation of the state Norway sought to work towards equality 
through the establishment of institutions appropriate for a country of her size. 
Norway has achieved her goal earlier than she could ever have expected through the 
tremendous wealth generated by the oil industry. She is second only to Saudi- 
Arabia8 in the export of crude oil and has natural gas in superabundance as well; the 
Troll platform, for example, has recently come on stream and is expected to produce 
84 million cubic metres of natural gas each day over the next seventy years. The 
institutions preceded the discovery of oil and were therefore in place when the oil 
majors arrived. All trade unions of any size were already affiliated to LO or to other 
smaller confederations. Employing organizations were members of NHO and they 
had surrendered full negotiating powers to it. By the 1960s Norway had become a 
socio-corporate state. 
(b) The Industrial Relations System 
The industrial relations system of Norway conforms to the Nordic Model which 
operates through a strong trade union movement co-operating with a centralised 
employers' association within a tradition of political consensus. This definition may 
be broadened by identifying four principal features which are central to its 
continuing success: a unified trade union movement with a much higher degree of 
organization than in most industrialised nations, a long tradition of collective 
bargaining, tripartite regulation of disputes through co-operatio-a of state, trade 
unions and employers and consultation by the government of trade unions and 
employers on economic policy. 
5 Ledgard, J. (7di July, 1995) Booming Norway basks in its go-it-alone golden age., (Scotsman). 
6 She resigned in 1996, not because she lost an election but simply because she wanted another 
challenge. Many thought that she should have become Secretary-General of UNO instead of the 
present incumbent. 
7 Ledgard, J. op cit. 
8 Lynghaug, E. (1995) Positive Power by Team Management. Fourth Offshore Installation 
Management Conference, Tlie Robert Gordon University, Aberdeen. 
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In comparison with many nations such as Germany, Italy and France, where 
legislation provides basic rights in labour relations, Norway, like Great Britain, gives 
less legal protection to individual and collective rights. The current British 
government, for example, does not wish to implement the European Social Chapter 
of the Maastricht Treaty which her European Union partners have accepted. Norway, 
not a member of the European Union, sees no need for further legislation on 
individual rights, partially since trade unions have such a high membership of the 
working population (at the start of 1992 there were 1,299,955 members of 
associations of wage earners out of a working population of about 1,700,000) but 
mainly because the system works to the satisfaction of the nation as a whole. 
Both NHO and LO have highly centralised mechanisms and together "constitute a 
bi-polar power system without rival in the Norwegian economy'. 9 Thus the 
industrial relations system is intertwined with decision-making on national economic 
policy to a degree unknown outside other Nordic nations. LO with around 800,000 
members is consulted along with NHO by the government on all issues affecting the 
national economy. 
Institutions for dispute resolution are supported in equal degree by managements and 
trade unions and third party resolutions are accepted almost without question; the 
second clause of the 1994 Basic Agreement states that "no stoppage or other 
industrial action must (sic) take place where a collective agreement is in force". 
Compulsory mediation, which was first agreed as far back as 1915, is accepted as 
desirable because disputes introduce disorder into the system which they have 
negotiated with the government over the years. It would, nevertheless, be incorrect 
to state that there is no industrial conflict at all; for example, between 1981 and 1991 
there were 143 strikes involving 315,978 workers leading to 1,772,007 working days 
lost. 10 
Norway's industrial relations system has, however, been constructed in such a way 
that organizations outside the official trade union and employer associations can feel 
disadvantaged. This was certainly the case when an oil trade union outside LO, 
Oljearbeidemesfellessammenslutning (OFS), found its strategy of selective strikes 
negated by immediate employer lockouts and government interpretation of this as a 
reason for using its power to intervene and to impose a settlement. 
The Coming of Oil 
The oil majors had been less than enthusiastic about the Arab nations taking control 
of their own economic destiny through OPEC in 1974 and when the Norwegians 
sought to do the same after a considerably shorter gestation period, the operating 
companies reacted with the same initial resentment. Had they troubled to study the 
history of Norway in the twentieth century they would have made fewer assumptions 
about the host nation's willingness to adopt a disinterested approach to events off its 
shores. 
In 1993 the Vice-President of the Norwegian Oil and Petrochemical Workers Union, 
Ketil Karlsen said - "unions are a bit slow to react to changes. It is in their nature to 
9 Fivelsdal op cit p. 81- 
10 Statistisk Sentralbyri. Oslo 1994. 
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hold back and the nature of this new industry took the unions by surprise". 11 Perhaps 
the Norwegians themselves had been somewhat lax in their historical research for it 
would not have been difficult to make realistic assumptions about the nature of the 
oil industry's operational methods. The industry treated its locally recruited labour as 
it had its employees of less developed nations, paying insufficient attention to the 
working environment and operating a "hire and fire" policy as labour requirements 
dictated. There was no redress for an employee who felt that he had been unfairly 
dismissed and any suggestion of a collective agreement between a drilling company 
and a representative body of the employees was brushed aside because the idea of a 
trade union presence anywhere in the industry was abhorrent. In short, the local 
people were not accorded the respect to which they believed that they were entitled, 
both as employees and as Norwegians. Odan Bergflodt, Deputy Leader of OFS adds 
the interesting comment that the industry's culture was based on values completely 
different from what Norwegians had been taught at school. 12 
Some Norwegians have labelled these early years of oil and gas exploration "The 
Wild West Period"13 although even at this early stage some political regulatory 
machinery had been introduced through the establishment of an oil sector in the 
Department of Industry. LO soon realised that it had a battle on its hands and that it 
was dealing with a less scrupulous and tougher opponent than it had previously 
confronted. LO first designated four existing trade unions to represent oil company 
employees and when this did not succeed due to a combination of factors such as 
difficulty of access to offshore installations, employer hostility and apathy by the 
unions, it founded in 1977 Norske O1je og Petrokjemiforbund (NOPEF) - the 
Norwegian Oil and Petrochemical Workers' Union. 
There was another very different cause behind the birth of a new trade union within 
LO. This was the emergence of another union, OFS, which was not a member of LO 
and has remained independent since its foundation. It is of particular interest in any 
study of industrial relations in the North Sea oil industry on account of its curious 
origin, its militancy and its later influence within the British sector, when the 
Offshore Industry Liaison Committee (OILC) made its appearance. 
In 1973 employees of the Phillips Petroleum Company (PPCoN) formed an in-house 
union, which the company recognised, probably because it thought that a 
"sweetheart" union had been born, an innocuous staff association which it could 
manipulate with ease and use to ward off legitimate trade unions. However, the 
company soon found that it had a wildcat by the tail for the union immediately 
adopted safety measures as its the top priority. Soon after this Mobil and Elf began 
to explore in Norwegian waters and the Phillips workers assisted in the formation of 
in-house unions on their installations. Amalgamation of these and similar 
associations on other installations followed and thus was OFS founded, a union 
specifically for workers in the oil industry and a rival for NOPEF. 
11 Karlsen, K., (1993) The Norwegian Experience, p. 53. Proceedings of an international conference 
entitled "Workforce Involvement and Health and Safety Offshore" sponsored by STUC and others at 
Glasgow in March 1993 and published by STUC et al in November 1993. 
12 Bcrgflod4 0., (1993) A Story ofNeglect. Occasional paper published by Hylo House, Wigan. 
13 Bergflodt, 0. op cit 
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Social Continuity Restored 
The fifteen years from 1966, when drilling began, constitute a period of 
discontinuity in the tripartite relationship of the government, employers and trade 
unions. Although it was 1981 before the oil companies joined NHO and traditional 
institutions were re-established in a form recognisable and acceptable to 
Norwegians, the principal step had been taken in 1977 with the passing of the 
Working Environrnent Act. In its 1992 Annual Report the Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate made this comment: 
"The introduction of the Working Environment Act in 1977 is a crucial element in 
the process towards the institutionalization of the Norwegian oil industry. Yhe act 
not only protected the workers' rights, but also forced a general process of co- 
operation between the supervising authorities, the oil companies and the unions". , 
As the above statement implies the 1977 act began the process by which the oil 
companies were driven to accept Norwegian institutions and customs in the 
employment of labour. The act, for example, required all enterprises employing over 
50 persons to establish environment committees with equal membership between 
employers and employees and in practice "employees" have been almost exclusively 
trade unionists. There was also an obligation upon employers to accept accident 
prevention representatives who had the authority to close down an operation they 
considered unsafe pending a visit from the Safety Inspectorate. The oil companies 
having joined NHO, the Basic Agreement of 1985 applied to them and from that 
date all organizations with over 100 employees had to have a works committee with 
equal representation from management and employees. Oil companies had now 
bowed to the inevitable and in the words of one of their oil installation managers 
"There is nothing we can do, we just accept what we are being told to do by the 
government and unions; it is very expensive - but if this is the way they want it, they 
can get it ". 14 
Industrial Relations on the UK Continental Shelf 
Collective bargaining, in as far as the term is generally understood, does not take 
place on the UK continental shelf. Collective bargaining is possible only if 
employers accept trade unions as legitimate representatives of employees but from 
the earliest days of the industry on the UK continental shelf, the oil companies have 
resisted all demands by the trade unions to be accorded the negotiating rights which 
are necessary for collective bargaining and they have defended this stance on the 
grounds that the unions have never secured sufficient membership among offshore 
employees to justify a right to represent them. A former chief executive of a multi- 
national oil company commented "the oil companies took a collective decision, not 
14 Quale, T. V., (1986) Safety and Offshore Working Conditions: the Quality of Work Life in the 
North Sea p. 33. Norwegian University Press (distributed outside Norway by Oxford University 
Press). 
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in any wayformalised, not to encourage trade unions". 1-5 In 1976 the trade unions, 
with considerable government assistance, did extract from the oil companies an 
agreement that permitted access to offshore installations for recruitment purposes 
but this "Memorandum of Understanding on Trade Union Access to Offshore 
Installations" has been of little assistance to them. Even when trade union officers do 
go offshore the whole ambience of an installation isolated perhaps one hundred 
miles out at sea militates against an atmosphere which is conducive to the 
recruitment of members16. The position today is that the major trade unions accept, 
though they do not admit publicly, that offshore oil employees do not want their 
services. It would be too crude to say that the employers are simply anti-trade union 
because there is a forum where trade unions and management meet regularly, but 
compared with Norway where it is impossible to operate without involvement of 
trade union representatives, trade unions have a severely restricted role. Oil 
companies have also aimed to be in the forefront of enlightened employee relations 
to the extent that employment with them offers attractive conditions which few other 
organizations can match. This is covert anti-trade unionism because if workers 
believe that membership of a trade union brings no advantage, what point, apart 
from the ideological one that a worker ought to belong to a trade union, is there in 
taking out membership?. 
The Inter Union Offshore Oil Committee and the United Kingdom Offshore 
Operators' Association 
During 1973 it had become obvious to the trade unions in North East Scotland that 
the oil companies were not interested in establishing the sort of contact with them 
that would lead to recognition for bargaining purposes on behalf of their employees. 
The trade unions with an interest in recruiting and representing offshore workers 
accordingly decided to form an organization, the Inter Union Offshore Oil 
Committee (TUOOC) and immediately set off on the wrong foot by demanding a 
meeting with representatives of the oil companies and threatening industrial action if 
they did not comply. The companies ignored the invitation and the subsequent 
attempt to carry out industrial action failed dismally. In stark contrast to the trade 
unions, the offshore employers had a representative body in place within a year of 
the granting of the United Kingdom's first round of licences in 1964. This was the 
United Kingdom Offshore Operators' Association17 (UKOOA) and fundamental to 
any analysis of labour processes in the UK North Sea oil industry is an 
understanding of the inter-relationship of UKOOA and IU00C. UKOOA is a 
closely-knit organization of companies with several permanent committees including 
an Employment Practices Committee which is a body purely for internal discussion 
on employment issues whereon it might form a viewpoint but not a policy. The 
Employment Practices Committee has a Liaison Panel whose fiinction is to "To act 
as a channel of communications for UKOOA on matters concerning employee 
relations which can be discussed in general terms on an exchange of views basis 
15 Private comment to the author. 
16 Foster, J. and Woolfson, C., (1992) Trade Unionism and Health and Safety Rights in Britain's 
Offshore Oil Indust7y. International Centre for Trade Union Rights, London. 
17 originally entitled the UK North Sea Operators' Committee. 
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with Government, the Inter-Union Offshore Oil Committee and any other 
appropriate body approved by the Council'ý 18 
The status of the Liaison Panel has been one of continual frustration for the unions. 
Whereas the IUOOC has some authority to commit its members to particular 
policies, the Liaison Panel does not, and to any 1UOOC request it can only reply that 
the request will be communicated to the companies or company concerned. The 
Liaison Panel is best defmed as a body which acts as the collective voice of the oil 
companies on industrial relations but has neither executive control over, nor 
responsibility, for any member company's own industrial relations decisions. In 
short, no UKOOA member is inhibited by any agreement or recommendation 
reached between UKOOA and IUOOC from making whatsoever arrangements it 
likes concerning the management of its employees. The consequence of this has 
been that the quarterly meetings of the IUOOC and the Liaison Panel are little more 
than opportunities to exchange opinions on matters of mutual interest. 
The trade unions on the IUOOC have never lost sight of their principal objective 
enshrined in the first paragraph of the "Charter for the Unionisation of Employees 
engaged in the Offshore Oil Industry" which they drew up in 1975. This is that "all 
companies engaged in the Offshore Oil Industry--recognise the right of---unions 
to recruit, represent and negotiate terms and conditions of employment for all 
employeesfalling within their spheres of membership". While some companies have 
conceded representational rights, for eiample the right of union officers to attend 
disciplinary 
hearings involving their members, negotiating rights remain at best a distant 
prospect. 
This lack of success has led to the formation of a small independent trade union, the 
Offshore Industry Liaison Committee (OILC). Originally a group of activists from a 
number of the large unions who, they believed, were insufficiently committed to 
their offshore membership, they eventually emerged as a trade union outside the 
Scottish TUC. They led (in 1989 and 1990) the only major offshore industrial 
disputes on the UK continental shelf and arc very closely linked to the larger and 
more firmly established Norwegian union OFS. 
Accident Prevention 
When one considers accident prevention in the North Sea oil and gas industry, the 
topic must be approached from two very different perspectives. The first is that 
employers have had ever increasing legal requirements to observe in the provision of 
safe working environments, especially following accidents when there has been 
considerable loss of life such as the Alexander Kielland'9 and Piper Alpha2O 
tragedies. The other perspective is the successful efforts of the Norwegian unions to 
become involved in the mechanisms established to provide safe working 
environments on Norwegian installations and, in contrast, the total failure of British 
18 UKOOA Employment Practices Committee Information Booklet p. 4. 
19 1980: 123 lives lost: Norwegian waters. 
20 1988: 228 lives lost: British waters. 
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trade unions to be accorded any formal r6le at all on installations on the LJK 
continental shelL 
The UK offshore oil and gas industry was excluded from the Health and Safety at 
Work Act 1974 and from 1971 to 1990 the responsibility for ensuring a safe working 
environment was allocated to the Department of Energy. The Department's 
Petroleum Engineering Division (PED) acted as the single agency responsible from 
1978. The Burgoyne Report2l two years later rejected trade union advice to bring 
offshore safety under the Health and Safety Executive. As trade unions complained 
over these years, the responsibility for ensuring a safe working environment aboard 
offshore installations was delegated to the government department which had as one 
of its principal objectives the uninterrupted flow of oil (and therefore of tax revenue) 
from the mineral deposits of the UK continental shelf 
The British trade unions had realised by 1980 that despite the "Memorandum of 
Understanding on Trade Union Access to Offshore Installations" their efforts at 
recruiting offshore oil workers had been almost a complete failure. An alternative 
strategy was therefore needed and they decided that their strongest argument for 
obtaining recognition from the employers was their interest in safe working 
environments, where they had a great deal of experience and technical expertise. 
Their case for recognition by the oil employers on the grounds that they could make 
a positive contribution to the industry through their wide knowledge of safety was 
pursued throughout the 1980s. This objective appeared to have been reached when 
Lord Cullen carried out his inquiry into the Piper Alpha disaster and made his 
report22. Lord Cullen stated that union representatives could be of benefit in making 
the work of safety committees effective but immediately qualified this by saying that 
there would have to be "substantial membership on the installation in question". 23 
This w::: never likely to be the case on any major installation and so, although the 
subsequent legislation saw the removal of the PED as the responsible agency for 
accident prevention and its replacement by the new Offshore Safety Division (OSD) 
of the HSE in 1991, there was no requirement for companies to appoint union 
representatives on safety committees. 
Two pieces of research call into question the whole rationale of the trade union point 
of view. Peter Kidger argues that since there is statutory participation by trade 
unions on safety committees in to workplaces onshore, there has been no 
opportunity to study the experience of committees where the employee 
representation is not union influenced other than on platforms offshore since 1989. 
He even goes so far as to suggest that "the system operating on North Sea oil 
installations provides a useful model which could be drawn upon for application 
onshore". 24 Kidger's argument is based on the Robens principle that "there is no 
legitimate scopefor collective bargaining"25 on accident prevention and that in their 
21 EMSO, 1980, Command Paper 7866. (Burgoyne Report). 
22 HMSO, 1990, Command Paper 13 10. (Cullen Report). 
23 Cullen, op cit para. 21-85. 
24 Kidger, P., (1993) Should Union Appointed or Elected Safety Representatives be the modelfor the 
UK? University of Salford Working Paper No 9003. 
25 HMSO, 1972, Command Paper 5034. (Robens Report). 
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joint consultative approach the oil companies are interpreting correctly the 
philosophy of the Health and Safety at Work Act. A study carried out by Malcolm 
Spaven and others for the HSE26 concluded that "Supportfor increased involvement 
of trade unions in the work of Safety Representatives is considerable among offshore 
workers. However, there is no clear majorityfor a system of Safety Representatives, 
and such a system, if widely applied, would present difficulties for the 
representational rights of non-members oftrade unions 1127 
Currently, the British trade unions continue to assert their moral right to represent 
offshore employees and claim that since employee representatives on safety 
committees are unprotected by trade unions, they can be intimidated from expression 
of opinion, despite the provisions of the Offsbore Safety (Protection Against 
Victimisation) Act 1992. The employers take a very different view and one senior 
manager has stated that "thefear that the system wouldprove to be a toothless tiger 
has been largely dispelled. "28 
The oil companies remain, as they have always been, interested in what the unions 
may say but unwilling to accept them as equal partners in the formation of policy on 
accident prevention. 
Conclusion 
From the discovery of oil and gas in the North Sea the international companies have 
approached the trade unions as a constraint to be dealt with at the level of operating 
decisions. Initially, the oil operators could ignore the Norwegian trade unions but the 
established role of unions within the institutional frarnework of Norway soon made 
it necessary for the operators to conform to the national system of industrial 
relations. The British trade unions, however, have had to accept defeat essentially 
because their relationship to government is very different from that of their 
Norwegian colleagues. Fundamentally the labour process in the Norwegian oil 
industry remains typical of the national pattern while in the identical British industry 
the process is atypical. Nevertheless, the different labour processes have no apparent 
economic consequences and Norwegian and British workers appear to be equally 
satisfied with safety on their installations. 29 Trade union appointed safety delegates 
did not prevent the Alexander Kielland tragedy and it seems unlikely that British 
trade union appointees to a safety committee could have prevented Piper Alpha. 
Managerial 
26 Spaven et al, (1993) The Effectiveness of Offshore Safety Representatives and Safety Committees. 
University of Aberdeen OTO Series No 93 012, Health and Safety Executive Information Services, 
Sheffield. 
26 Spaven et al, op cit para 6.4.1. 
28 Royle, D. J. C., (1995) Workforce Involvement in the UK Offshore Oil and Gas Indust? y. Paper 
presented at the Society of Petroleum Engineers Offshore Europe 1995 Conference and Exhibition, 
Aberdeen. 
2-0 Fleming, M. J. et al, (1995) A Comparative Study ofRisk Perception on the UK and Norwegian 
Continental Shelves. Paper presented at "Work and Well-being in Europe" Conference, Nottingham 
University, England. - 
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cultures differ but there is no conclusive evidence of greater levels of stress among 
one or the other workforce who share the common problems of employment on 
isolated installations in the North Sea. 30 
The British trade unions envy the success of their Norwegian counterparts and see it 
as almost "politically correct" that traditional collective bargaining should be the 
method of establishing pay and conditions of work offshore as it is onshore. It can be 
argued equally well that in the United Kingdom a new labour process is being 
developed offshore where direct communications between managers and workers 
eliminate the need for unions in the achievement and control of safe working 
environments. The success of voluntarism offshore with elected representatives as 
distinct from union appointees suggests that it could be just as successful onshore 
but has never been fully implemented on account of the trade unions' statutory right 
to participation on accident prevention committees. 
Industrial relations on the UK continental shelf exhibits a special form of 
voluntarism in that it emerges outside the collective bargaining which is common 
onshore in Great Britain and is almost the standard practice across all Norwegian 
industry. Moreover, the labour process offshore is becoming more complex on both 
the Norwegian and the British continental shelves as operators reduce the number of 
their own direct employees in favour of increased proportions of contract employees. 
Separation of the bulk of the necessary human resource from direct employment is 
now standard practice offshore in both Britain and Norway with consequences which 
are more predictable for Norway than for Britain. There is no indication that there 
will be any change in terms and conditions of employment on Norway's continental 
shelf although the question has been asked whether a system devised in the first half 
of the twentieth century can meet the challenge of change in working practices and 
organization? In a recent publicationY Hans-Gordn Myrdal of the Swedish 
Employers Confederation raises some questions about the future of the Nordic and 
therefore of the Norwegian Model. He challenges as arrogant the claim by his 
compatriot Bernt Schiller that "the Nordic experiences of labour relations are 
morally superior to other less democratic forms of labour organization and 
therefore represent the most attractive means of handling future challenges. "32 
Myrdal asserts that the future almost certainly involves an increasing use of 
information technology and thus an associated decentralisation of organizations. 
This in its turn will pose a conflict between the traditional centralist institutions and 
small groups with their own particular objectives. Schiller, on the other hand, 
believes that the model is strong enough to retain its characteristic features through 
the self reliance which the system has developed among its participants. This will 
allow amendments to be grafted upon the model and thus meet the problems which 
Myrdal foresees. 
30 Meams, K. et al. 1996. A Comparative Study of Organizational Factors and Safety in the UK and 
Norwegian Offshore Oil Industries. Journal of Safety Research. 
31 Myrdal, H. G. (1995) Labour Relations: the Nordic Experience. European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, Dublin. Vol 10, pp. 12 - 14.. 
32 Schiller, B., (1994) The Future ofthe Nordic Model ofLabour Relations, pp. 73-74. The Nordic 
Council of Ministers, Copenhagen. 
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As regards the United Kingdom prediction and conclusions are more difficult. The 
OILC is a tough little union determined to survive and become an industrial union 
exclusively for oil employees. During 1995 it discussed a merger with the National 
Union of Mineworkers to form a union of workers in energy but while this is 
unlikely to come to fruition it may stimulate the traditional unions to make greater 
efforts to assert their position. There is also the possibility that trade unions may 
seek to advance their claims for recognition offshore through their existing bases 
among the contractors onshore. There is no evidence that will persuade one to 
believe that this strategy will be any more successful than previous trade union 
attempts to attract membership which will be in any way significant. Indeed, quite 
the contrary view has greater support and contemporary research has shown that 
involvement of offshore workers by and with their managements is becoming part of 
the culture of the industry. "The expectation by the worký`brce is now such that 
genuine involvement of the workforce by and with the management has become the 
norm and can be said to be part of the developing culture of the industry ". 33 If the, 
oil producers on the UK continental shelf arc ever to retreat from their present policy 
towards recognition of trade unions that retreat will be a small one based upon their 
own terms. 
33 Royle, op cit. 
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Book Review 
Paying for the Piper 
By Charles Woolfson, 
John Foster and 
Mafthias Beck 
Published by Mansell Publishing 
Limited. 603 pages. ISBN 0 720 123488 
(hardback), price: f65. ISBN 0 720 
12350X (paperback), price: f25. 
The editors of the 'Employment and 
Work Relations in Context' series to 
which this book is a contribution state 
that 'a particular feature is the consid- 
eration of forms of worker and citizen 
organisation and mobil isation. ' The last 
paragraph of the book contains the fol- 
lowing two sentences: 'Those who con- 
trol the UK oil and gas industry remain 
convinced that their interests are 
incompatible with the presence of 
organised labour and the right to col- 
lective bargaining. This conviction is the 
story of our book. ' It also sets the tenor 
of the book. 
From the outset the oil and gas indus- 
try on the UK Continental Shelf has 
opposed the introduction of collective 
bargaining with its associated recogni- 
tion of trade unions and has sought to 
develop relationships with its employ- 
ees through the alternative process of 
joint consultation. The authors claim 
that this policy has allowed the employ- 
ers to pay insufficient attention to the 
maintenance of safe working environ- 
ira 
e'unions"to secure collective ba'r- 
gaining rights. 
Oil is a commodity vital to industri- 
alised economics and inevitably the 
industry wields power on a worldwide 
scale. The book provides a useful com- 
mentary on the economics of the indus- 
try in general but when it comes to the 
North Sea it suggests that there is an on- 
going conspiracy between UK govern- 
ments and the oil companies, particular- 
ly Shell and BR whereby safety is sacri- 
ficed in the pursuit of revenues. CRINE 
(Cost Reduction Initiative in the New 
Era) is subjected to particular criticism 
on the grounds that expenditure neces- 
sary to maintain and to improve safe 
working practices has inevitably been 
curtailed in the interests of cost saving. 
This is a bit hard on employers who have 
spent f5 billion on accident prevention 
since Piper Alpha in 1988 and to call in 
aid the fatality figures of 1995-96 (five 
compared with one the previous year) 
smacks of special pleading. Great play is 
made of the relationship between the 
safety regulators before and after the 
Cullen Report. Few would deny that the 
Petroleum Engineering Division of the 
Department of Energy had too close a 
relationship with the employers to be as 
effective a regulator as it should have 
been but the authors assert, with little 
real evidence, that the employers have 
now captured and contained its succes- 
sor, the HSE Offshore Safety Division. 
There is reference here to some socio- 
logical research of over 20 years ago but 
no mention anywhere in the book of 
Aberdeen's own Professor Alex Kemp 
who has shown that if costs can be 
reduced the industry will grow in size 
because the lives of the existing fields 
will be extended and new, previously 
uneconomic fields will be developed. 
could'have prevented that disaster. The 
Norwegian trade unions have the right in 
law to be represented on safety commit- 
tees but that did not prevent the loss of 
123 lives in the Alexander Kielland disas- 
ter in 1980. British trade unions have 
much expertise in safety matters which is 
brought into play through their member- 
ship of the Offshore Petroleum Industry 
Training Organisation but until they 
secure significant and permanent mem- 
bership on installations the current prac- 
tice of employee as distinct from trade 
union appointees to mandatory safety 
committees must be made to work. 
The most persuasive sections of the 
book explain how organised labour, 
debilitated by inter-union disputes, 
achieved no more that a few toeholds 
offshore. That the majority of offshore 
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employees simply did not want to join 
trade unions is, however, given insuffi- 
cient credence; some recruits in the late 
1970s saw employment offshore as a 
refuge from trade union harassment, 
while a significant proportion of 
employees were ex-servicemen unac- 
customed to querying orders. Also by 
the 1980s many oil workers had values 
more asscKiated with the middle classes 
through investment in houses and small 
businesses. ' 
of particular interest is the account 
of the generation of the Offshore 
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Industry Liaison Committee (OILC), the 
small but tough trade union, which, 
despite problems and setbacks, retains 
its independence and has forged close 
links with another 'rebel' union, the 
larger Norwegian OFS. OILC played a 
leading role in the industrial disputes 
offshore in 1989 and 1990 but the 
authors have invested these strikes with 
greater significance than they deserve. 
Many will disagree with the conclu- 
sions which the authors have drawn from 
what has happened on the UK 
Continental Shelf over the last 2S years. 
They have, nevertheless, produced a 
monumental work replete with facts and 
figures which will remain a standard 
work of reference for many years. qp 
DHF Gourlay, Research Fellow, 
The Robert Gordon University, 
Aberdeen 
1H Bygate (1976) Oil over Trouble 
Waters, Aberdeen's People's Press; M 
Jones and F Godwin (1976) The Oil 
Rush, Quartet Books, London; A 
Alvarez (1987) Offshore -A North Sea 
Journey Sceptre Press, New York. 
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SECTION B 
0 11- ave- 
I 
A PPEW. ý (, x A G. B. GIlliat. 
30, Lauds Foad., 
Crick, 
KGRTH. 11, T-I ONT, 
N1146 7TJ- 
8th November, 10,174. 
YIr. W. Price, 
Member of Parliament for Rugby, 
House of Commonp, 
L OND ON. 
Dear Yx. Price, 
As an A. S. T. M. S. rppresentative working for GFC Electrical- 
Project--, Rugby, I recently neGotiated an aggreement for COmmission- .L ing Engineers carryinC out work on the BF Forties Field Oil Rigs. 
The electrical equipment for the rigs was mainly manufactured at 
Ru gby. 
At the time of the aj; reement (copy dated 17th September attached) 
it was envisaged that, approx-, mately 'ýO engineers ýiou'ld be irriolved .&I over a period. of up to two years carryin6 out the 'Wrork of commissicn- 
ing the four fixed platform oil rigs. 
BP have not Yet placed the contracts for commissioning work, but 
it is nom-nal practice to delay such contracts until the woe-, is 
actually required. 
On the 5th November I was called to a meeting with -. )y manacament, 
and without explanationg wan told that BP had now chenced 
prograrme and requirements and working on the ---I rilp would now 
be based on the letter dated 5th November which was handed to me, 
In a nutshell the changes are: - 
1) The Salary offered in -every case Is reduced by E136 -per month. 
2) The pattern of working is changed from two weeks on/two weeks 
off to three weeks on/one week off. . 
3) The staffins requirdd is reduced from 30 to approximately S. 
Unofficiallyp the reason given was that'BP had seer. a copy of our 
Septer, ber 17th ag-reement and were very annoyed with GEC due to the 
fact that it would undermine their own salary structure. 
I myself cannot accept this explanation and feel that 'if the boot 
had been on the other foot' GEC would not have been allowed to 
complain. 
i 
continued ............. 
v 
en 
Scme of ml, r, 3mber3 are al. pre-cent work. 1r. - alonj; zicla B'P ezrlgineer3 .13L0 
L 61 at Du. mbarton erecting and pre-normussicn-i. -Z7 electrical equipment 
i. -I the module3 for the nexi to be s--tuatad in -thp. Sea. 
Ke BP enginecrs 00 will be operatiro the rigs have said that Sen 
they cc=enced emplonont a few months agc they were told that A 
did not reconise Trade Union membership =d frowncd upon Trade "ion 
members. 
These people have recently rpcaived a substantial salary increa-se 
ouvio, isly to retain the non-Union attitude. They have also stated 
that they would become Trade Union members but at presert are 
afraid of the consequences. 
Thus information cannot be substantiated in u-ritinr_ but is derived 
fr---i an abs-olutely rellab. J-e sc-urco. 
It aDrears that BP arc makine a deliberate attempt, to keep T=ado ci 
- the oill rigs. Unlonism oAf L 
You will understand that my members are utzat at the whole business 
although I personally do no t t1himIc GEC are in any way responsible. 
As BP is partly owed by the nation is it possible to obtain a 
statement of policy towaKs Traie Unionism wd in particular to our 
own case? 
Natural! Yv I an pressing this matter througgh the no=a. '6 A. S. T. M. S. 
channels and a copy of this letter is beinc sent to IMr. J. S. Davi. Son, 
Assistant General Secreta=y, A. S. T. M. S. Lcn, ýon, but as an individual 
Trade Unionist I think the political aspect of 3PIs attitude to Trade 
Unionism and its potentially serious effect on industrial relations 
should be brought into the open. 
T, %e reason for writing instead of visiting your surgery is that a 
letter will givc You tL. 10 to considqr the problem. If you do wish 
to discuss the matter or any points require clarification, I will 
only be too pleased to call and see you anywhere at any tine. 
yours sincerely, 
-e " S. 
e, I 
Geoff E. Gilliat. 
Tel. Crick 822e45. 
bz, 2 
minlitcr orstau 
PO 3318/1974 
WG Price Esq MP 
House of Cununons 
LONDON SW1 
lpp, Fb", )t, K -P> 
You wrote to IMIchael Foot on 15 
from Mr GE Gilliat of 30 Launds 
recognition by BP on oil rigs. 
lacnev- Scuare London S %T, * 
/f Deceryi! )er i')7'r 
November, enclosing ti-le al: tacheL. 
Road, Crick, aboul: : ride union 
There is at present no legal requirement for firmý to recognise I: r-ide 
unions; whether or not they do so is a matter for be-, e-:?!! 
the employer and the union concerned. However, the Government _J_n:: end: s 
to include provisions in the Employment Protection BiIi. whi ch 11 
enable unions denied recognition to refer their case to ": he Concý14,1': 2..; ' 
and Arbitration Service. If the Service is unable to promote n 
voluntary -settlement it will be required to invescigli:, - =krld ma'-ze 
recommendations. If the employer falls to folyot, ' up : he-se 
recommendations, the union will have the right to seek Lnilateral 
arbitration by the CAS' Central Arbitration Commirt-cee on nhe terms 
and conditions of employment of the employees concerned, and anv 
made by the, Committee will become an implied term o! ' tjj, ý 
-es, e inp Io ve 
contracts of employment. 
We are also proposing to include in the Employment Proteccion B111 
provisions which will give employees a right 
'to Join a trade unzorif 
and the right not to be prevented from taking part in il: s activities 
or to be penalised for doing so. Any employee who thinks thal: his 
rights regarding trade union membership or activities have been 
infringed will be able to complain to an industrial tribunal. 
Naturally we are as anxious to see the development of trade unioni: ým 
on oil rigs as anywhere else, and I understand that the Companies 'lave 
agreed to recognise trade unions when they have sufficienz membersilin 
amongst those working on oil rigs to warrant this. 
ALBERT -9c)o-, r! -! 
-1111PD-eK41fK 
TITTER UNION OFFSHORE OIL COMITTEE 
Secretary V. P. Reid, J. P., 
44, Yjmg Street, 
Aberdeen. 
Dear Sir, 
This Committee has been formed for the express purpose of establishing 
in the Offshore Oil Industry the right of the workcýýs in that Industry 
to belong to a Trade Union and as a consequence of that membership., the 
right to enter into negotiations uith the employing Company to establish 
agreed wages and conditions. 
At our meeting on Monday, 16th April, it i-ras resolved that in order 
to progress the claim for recogniticn je invite the repro-sentatives of 
all the drilling Companies in the North Sea to a meeting to be held at an 
appropriate venue on Tuesday, 141-h May, 1974. It is appreciated that a 
fixed date for a meeting may be inconvenient, but it is an indication of 
our concern at the present position that t: 2e subject matter be dealt with 
as a matter of extreme urgency. Obviouslyp it is not our wish to communicate 
through the media, press or television and we are quite sure that a meeting 
would lead to a better understanding of our respective attitudes. 
We would at this stage, indicate that a rejection of the proposed 
meeting would indicate that the ck-illing Companies have zeJected a settlement 
based on conciliation and in that situation the Uxior- who are constituent 
members of the Joint Committee would immediately resort to using their 
industrial power to establish recognition a condition subscribed to, and 
operated by all Industries operating in the United Kingdoz. 
would appreciate = early reply to this communi cation. 
Yours faitbfully, 
Ajot, p .. e, 
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IITTER UNION OFFSHORE OIL COMME. 
Charter for the Unionisation of employec-s engaGed in the Offshore Oil 
Z.,, ii; itry within U. X. jurisdiction. 
That all Companies engaged in the Offshore Oil Industry in exploration, 
e-. traction and production(andLthai,. ae=viazng-, of,, aane)recognise the riGht 
. 
UIVIA V%0 
zf the Inter-Union Offshore Oil Committeeto recruit, represent and 
hagntiate terms and conditions of emPlo3ment for all employeesfall-inC 
their spheres of membership. 
The right of access for Trade Union Officials to visit installations 
for discussion irith their uembers and elected representatives. 
aj; plication of a, sinale code of hoalth and safety which will cover 
,. -! I --. spects of 
the Offshore operation i. e. the incorporation of the 
kicalt,, and Safety at Work Act 1974. 
The setting up of a National B oard (Offshore Development) which would 
, le-11 -., ---4th wages and conditions and regulations of all persoanal working 
i-n tl'L-. e Offshore Industry. The D oard would be representative of the 
and management of the various enterprises. 
inherent to the establishment of the Doard would be that all personnel 
would become members of their appropriate Trade Union. 
6. The Board would work in close relationship with the responsible Government 
Departments to ensure that the Industry was answerable to Parliament. 
7. The establishment of an agreed conciliation procedure which would 
resolve speedily issues of dispute. 
. 9. The acceptance by all 
Employers of the Check-off systen, of dealing 
with trade union subscriptions. 
9. That all future licences be issued conditional on the rights of the 
o=ployees being represented by the Inter-Union Offshore Oil Committee Usý-akA 
That it ahcuU be a funther condition of licence that st, -mdby vessels, 
supply ships, survey chips and barges irrespective of fla , should confo= 
to Britoish Manning and Safety Standards. 
Unions in membership of the Inter-Union Offshore Oil Committee with 
recruitin4; rig'-'Its - 
A, au 
J; A. S. T. M. S. 
Doiler-nakers Society, T. A. S. S 
T. & G. U. U. N. U. S. 
P--,. E. P. T. U. Radi. Ado tju, ý,. 
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APPENDIX G 
This appendix gives in some detail the discussions which took place at the meeting 
of 17th November, 1975. It is taken from the Department of Energy's Minute of 
Meeting to Discuss Offshore Unionisation, a copy of which is available in the OILC 
files. 
There were present 3 officials from the Department of Energy, I from the 
Department of Employment, 1 from the Department of Trade, 2 representatives of 
ACAS (including Mr Bob Waddell, a senior member of the Scottish division of 
ACAS), Messrs Lea and Hanna from the TUC and Mr Bill Reid of IUOOC. 
One of the Department of Energy officials was Mr J. S. Liverman, a Deputy 
Secretary who had been specifically assigned to investigate the possibility of an 
agreement between the oil producers and the trade unions on the unionisation of 
employees offshore. "He explained that the Government could not be pany to the 
Inter- Union Committee's Charter, but on the other hand welcomed the evolution of 
a single body which could seek to represent the interests of the Offshore wonLforce, 
provided that this was the agreed objective of the Trade Union movement ff. 
Mr Lea, who was Head of the TUC Economic Department, "said that there was a 
needfor moreformal recognition by the Trade Union movement of the status and 
standing of the Committee ". 
Mr Reid "said that consultation with, and agreement by, the eMPIOYerS should be 
extended to drilling and other contractors. He envisaged that the operating 
Companies would be responsible for imposing the terms of their agreement with the 
unions on their sub-contractors". Mr Lea inteýected to say that this would be a 
complicating factor, especially where ships were concerned. 
The discussion continued on the matter of union recognition. Mr Liverman pointed 
out a difficulty on the employers' side "because UKOOA as an organization was 
not empowered to act as a negotiating agentfor the operators". Moreover, 
continued Mr Liverman, sub- contractors were not represented on UKOOA and had 
no trade organization of their own. (Note: the Offshore Contractors' Council, 
renamed the Offshore Contractors' Association in 1995, was not founded until 
1984. ) 
Mr Lea yeared there would be no unifled approach without a Board or something 
like it. (Clause 4 of the Charter for Unionisation drawn up by IUOOC see 
Appendix E and p. 59 of text. ). nere would be dissenters on both sides who would 
pursue their own agreements (as Dundee Kingsnorth and NUS had -done) " 
Mr Reid "said those he represented were verv anxious thatfull Union Protection 
should be extended very quickly to the whole offshore workforce. He believed the 
advent of the BNOC should persuade the Government to give theirfull Support to 
the idea of a Board". 
Mr Liverman stated that BNOC would take some years to build up and "would be 
unlikely to play a leading r0le as an employer over the period which was crucial to 
the setting up of a unionlemployerjoint arrangement. Hefelt that the Committee 
might well find that they could make progress with individual companies faster than 
with a unified employers' organization, because of the time and compleTity of 
forming such an organization. He was not convinced that the Government should 
depart from its normal neutral rile over the point, but was ready to consider and 
discuss further'. 
Mr Lambert of the Department of Employment believed that the problem was in 
two halves; "recognition and access. Recognition and tight of union membership 
would befully covered by legislation when the ternu of the Emplcyment Protection 
Act were extended by Order (as it was intended that th9Y should be at an early date) 
to cover offshore installations. Access could itse4f be divided into accessfor 
recruitment and access after recognition. Me latter was a matterfor negotiation 
between those concemed". 
H 
ellý NOTE FOR THE RECORD 
IIIOS/R N031 
Note o' a meet-: nýý be-cweer, Hirdst; crs the TUG and ITIC to discuss 
ofi: si: io--e un3. o., nsar:. orl ha-rcý. Pýl /. 
.. Mri S --: 4 tu. ti - mi n -4 ste .--L, Jf' S -V ate Mr H Irwbv. '-. TG/! UC .,,. * 
-y for Energ Mr 
kl;: A Booth - of 
tfiai6 rlinisteý Mr W 112UC , o7. 
for Employment Mr W 'UUC Reid 
Mr j Liverman kir J McCon4i e,.! - AB 
IIr A BurridSe Dept of Emp ment Kr-H 
"US Iuc 
Bygete-. 
Mr P Grattan 
Mr K Bvr eld 
Mr k1olyneux 
Dr Palmer 
Opening the meeting Mr Smith said the Government wanted to e-asure 
that unionisation offshore w9s implemented as stoothly as possibic 
and this could best be done through sensible co-ordination of, I!:. 
the parties involved. It would be helpful to hear the TUC's v. -*. -,.,... s 
on how they saw the next stages develcping and wh3t role wou2d be 
given to the ! UC.. This must be a matter for the separate uniona 
involved; for effective co-ordination between a lar,,: - Of 
unions operating within a relatively SM311 workforce it could 
seem sensible for the IUC to have the widest role Which t1ae Iu_, J0=L 
were willing to grant. With the aim cf achieving criod 
relations the Government could best act as a bridge batf een uZ. 1cns 
and operators by encouxaging the tao sidaz to tai., toZe her. This 
-): frict- on w would avoid a fragmented approach wih the scope fo 
this would create. in addition to reviewinE proR. -ass cn 
the meeting should also consider what discuosions wers necdc. d 
-*ic., cculd the operators and how, a code. of industrial relatAoa pra %. t 
best be implementoed. A meeting with Ithe operators should be held 
as soon as possible when Ithe advantages of a co-ordinated approncl-, 
could be-discussed. 
A, 
Mr Booth Said the Government was committed to the earliest poss. 
4 
introduction of "Legislation to cover unionisation offshc C-UZ 
delays had been caused by a variety of technical and draftinS 
problems. A -Commencement Order was now'being prepared 
for brin-J-. 7 
into efiCect Section 12? of the Employment -Protection Act which Wcu-a 
allow other Sections of the Act to be brought- into effect-by Orýe=. 
TIUS was the =ost suitable procedure given the co=leyities of the 
subject. A further Order bringing offshore work i'nto the same amb-11-t It was. hoped to keep implemental" c. as onshore work would be needed. 
of off shore and, onshore legislation in parallel from June. Some 
oeev Government Depart=enzs remained to be rasolved, for proble=s bet, 
example the apDlication of this legislatier, to foreign -registerea 
rigv, -might be-'held to clash with scme of our interiýational trad-. Lng: 
obligations. One possibility which did-arise from the extensicn, 
the EPA offshore was a poss:. bility of us. AnE; ACAS, approprialte are-Ii. 
would have to be' 
ýefined. The Governmaent would certainly hý: Ip tc; 
ey. -, ent it able with the s, ýatutory ý, cwazs avaiillabl. -. in 
any industrial r2lation proble, _-s in -.. he JLnd, %,. sz; rj-. 
Mr said -che 1UC h3d I-een i. --. existar-ce 
fo. - twc years a-'-d I-C- - -4 7 
de fac-r, 0 reco-ca-4--on 0.7 Z:, e AL -c 4": %- . 16. ---W 
dy ------ the ar-d .ýý _-. ) 1L. Z, ------ 
industrial relations 
*. 
Ir discussions btf-%-wee! i th, ý. - ard 
imions -ould 'be held on ci 
bene. fits would Ue cunside-ablL -.:. t; would nelnfu' heve 4-. Gove zmu: -. E t; u v. cn sz: 1,0 r 1,11 iz, IT ?) -L 
c, S 
the e. -irloyors. The -TUý; re-, -; z-; -Ced 
t, jj,. ý -_TL; 
C -i::! 
these puzýposes and coutact with th-u- trade unions could be Tl. dUS*tl, i ýS , iLLC th--ouE; h the Fue-1 & lIx.! er le I 24 L TjC; Charte. - could be a suita"bit basis -fur discussiu. n., -, asit refleczed practical experience of the of. f. s. ihore industry. D- Scussiors Witi-, 
employers s"., Ao'LU szar-'ý, as soon as. possible. 
L. 
t. 1- 
My Smith said the Government would endorse Sis line and hoped zhaz 
the u. nions would demonstrate their full backQ6 for the WC cy 
fieldirS national level officials inlupport, though this was . rjaliy 
a matter for the uniens themselves to. decide. 
Mr McConachie said the hisuory of the earlier Vorth Sea Acý; ior. To=ittee had shown some of the DroUlems Of iliter UA-Lion *rivalry but 
the IUC enjoyed support fi. o;. a izz, constituent unions ac 1.0cal and 
national level. In particular the Cormiitteý -. r-'&. ed to avoid 
demarcation disputes as these couid ue exploited by eaiployers -cc 
unnionisation. The pace of progress or. unionisa--on had bee!., U-L. 
disappointing especiaily where me.,, uershID , %ras whituied away beca-Lýse 
of dilficulties in access Co places of w-or-',,. -. He endorsed the T)ro-. osa-' 
for a hiE; h level meeting between the IUC and operators with tLe 
union represented at a seri-Jor national official level. Mr Reid 
and Mr Eycare indicated their with this proloosa-1. 
Mr Irwin said that b. 7 contrast he personally felt'. that the ITU V 
7C a ýs 
the respons'Ji-ole committee in Scotland shou-d 'cake rhe lead in 'Chese 
discuss-Lons on behalf of the unions. Uhions support should be 
tailored to avoid giving the immprpssion that V A. f Z: the IUG liad 'no sLz! 1-* 
role to play. The TUC _-Fuel & izidus-zriies would 
consider the questio-n. of represeitation agair., Jue.,,., ore the mmeetin7 wis. the operators. T, -, l further discussion Mr Irwin said there would ce 
ad-vanicage in focussin8; neSottiatioxis initially ua e ru- p 10 VMaZz OLL 
. rigs operako. Lng off 
the NorUh East Coast of Scotland and the ShetLeand.? 
Vocussing negotiations in this way would allow agreezaenlk. - to be reacha. - 
more ealsily, and would help to reduce the risk of. a fragmented apprcac,. 
which Would be to no-one's advantage. 
cors DiscusasiOlls with Operat 
Mr Smith, asked IlIr Liverman to rep, ort on his discussion3 with the 
operazors. 
Mr Liverman said that after two or three Feevings with UX-00A thkl:, - 
main poin-: s srill at issue were: - 
The authority of the IUC was not accepted operators were 
nervous of negotiating wizh tba COmmitltee ; heY felt its 
constit'uent unions =itjrl4k-. breali ranks and seek sej: arate 
settlements. Individual cases of this had already 
L7XCOA -4 
ko 
1 
A.. was and by T; Iie terms ol. i-C3 C', IF 
unable to negot-istei oil 'N: half Of d _ivi,, U,.,! eisploj-ers. Associv-U-Jun. C-'-,.. 'Ld ard 
did ua I. e 
1 
SUPPLEMENT TO APPENDIX H 
The first eleven lines of page 3 were indistinct when received by the author who has 
decided to provide a clearer text. 
However the UKOOA Council was recommending to its members that 
they should agree to the unions' requests for reasonable access, 
provided this could be fitted in with normal operation requirements. 
In addition some individual employers were ready to enter discussions 
with the IUC. It was therefore unlikely that a representative 
selection of oil companies would be present at the proposed meeting 
with the unions. To assist discussion the Department had prepared 
a Memorandum of Understanding which could fonn the basis for 
agreement between operators and unions. Mr Liverman read out the 
text of the draft Memorandum and said it would be supplied to both 
sides in advance of the forthcoming meeting. 
e 
they ., sho,.. i-'Id ai: rce -1.0 "Che ?, Cc,; ss, 
provided this could be fiýte-d in reqý44: 'e-uiiz; s- 
1n addition so: ae individual emp-LoYl--rs were ruady ýa enUr 
with the ! UC;. it was tktht: reforo like1y e4 
of O. L es w. uI, z be p-osont ett: tý, p;, -upozed . 1-F-e can %A 
the unions. To &z-,,; ist di-scLs D,?,, *--, jrr&,, eý, d 
Rad :,:: *e:,, a:, ---d 
a Hemoranduza of Unders"ta, nding which could Lo= tbe bosis for 
agreer-en'v between operators and imions. Mr read o,,. -. 
text of t-he draftto Me.,. orandmn. und sa-Ld it wouirl ',. * nnpr, "erd r-c 6c--*- . 6- 
sides in advance of the forthcomine. meeting. 
Aftfýr further discussion I-A. - Smith -ir, numminx V. was P-E; reed 
tha ;: a. 
11 iv 
There wereclear advantages to ar. - order-j of 
uniouisation offshore. 
ii. The initial area of work tj be covered in discussions 
between operators and unions c-hould be rig:; operatinE ('., -'f the North East of Scotland and Shetlands. 
The IUC hadl* a signifiezint role to ard a mee-k; in- Q betweezi the unions; represented by the Gom., -it; tee wirh other 
representatives as agreed by discussion a., 
I.. j. -I the TLiC, 
": 
-., n, --; 
a selection of oil companies shouild be heic, .! r, soon as 
possible. The Department would make -ýhe iiecf7s! ý, qry arra=E-men-cs. 
iv. At that meeting Ministers would exp. Lain the importance 
in the national interes+. - of acbieviing and 
on of offshore unionisaL. ior.,. aSreed im-plementati 
U 
LM Palmer 
PS/Minister of State 
M April 19"to 0, 
CODýes to: 
Those present 
PS/Secretary of State 
.? SIF, 
js 
Mr Kear 
Mr Gibson 
IfIr Blackshaw 
mr Tuc 
Mr De-mviess 
Mr Wcods 
PS/Ilinister oi: Stýte for Em loymezt .&3uD1., L Mr A BurridKe - Fic. pt; of Z', 7-ploymc-nZ 
Aap- cl; -k 
t. Mr 'rony Ben, Secretary of State Energy, ac-cot-. 1pan-nied 
by- Dr Dickson Maborrij Minist. e. of State and Mr Harold Walker, 
Minister of State at the Department of Employment, met 
representatives of union or: ranisat. -Jons and oil corzipazrules today %. ý a 
'to 
discuss industrial relations in the offshore Oil and gas 
industry. Thq purpose of the meeting was to'consider ways of 
promoting cont. -Muing gooa indusicrial relations in this new 
c; ffshore industry, and to provide an Opportunity for the first 
time for all these parties to. exchange views on the various 
subjects of interest. to It-hem. 
2 In this connection the meeting examined the role of the 
Inter Union Conunitýtlee in Aberdeen whose formation the Government. 
welcomed as a means qf harmonising the interests of the several 
unions concerned. 
The meeting agreed that oft-shore opera-1C. -Lons posed a specia-11. 
Problem in regard to the provision of access for union Officials 
to meet the offshore workfo37c. e. It was agreed that there would 
be further discussions to define more precisely an under- 
standing on fLture arrangements, 
4H Walker, Minister of Stat. - at the Departme. rit of 
Employm, ent took the opportunity to explain to those pretent the 
steps being taken by the Goverment to e; ý', end the Employment 
Protection Act 1975 to offshore areas, including the provizions 
of the Act relating to procedure for unj. on recognition and the 
ways byw1hich the services of the Advisory Conciliation and 
Arbitration Service could be made availMe. 
I L 
. /ý IT 
JOHN LANGAN9 N. 0. 
Glm-XSGO*. *l OFFICE 
U, '1-70, ', l ORGAINISAT "ION - 
NORTH SEA OIL 
'4 May' '976 
This memo. is Simply to report on a meeting -., fhich I attended 
to discuss the facilities which the oil companies would pro- 
vide to the Tr3de Unions in order that we may try and recruit 
in the North Sea oil industry. ý The meetina, which was chaired 
by Tony Benn was held in the House of Commons on tý May. The 
employers were represented by the Director-General of the 
Unýted Kingdom Offshore Operators Association (UKOOA) and he 
was acc--mpanied by very senior Management from seven of the 
major oil companies. 
A. --4e was led by Frank Chapple and Harry Irwin, ihe Trade Union si 
representing the T. U. C. F. & P. Committee and present were -, nem- 
bars of the In-Iter-Union Offshore Oil Committee (MOCC). 
ng into creat edetail I think it can be f said . jithout goi. 
that the meeting was of considerable assistance and the-oper- 
ators have agreed in principle to provide facilities for rep- 
-esentatives from the Unions in membership of Al-he 1UCOC to 
visit the rics and platform. s. They will provide the trans- 
oort and jay on facilities as long as plenty of advance notice 
can be giveý- and that production demands do not prevent it 4P 
The for-nal wording of the Agreement has still to be up, 
but I do not aniticipate any great trouble over this. 14 Lnk 
that at the end of the day this matter will be referred back 
to the IUCOC for us , 
to decide exactly what we would wish, then 
it should be all stations go. 
The operators claimed not to be in a position to discuss the 
Charter which the IUCOC drew up as they had not had time to 
discuss it fullY- I rather feel that what they meant was 
that the; ewere too many grounds for disagreement contained 
within that document and 
it would simply be better to agree in 
principle on the 
broader issue of access to the of: 6shore instal- 
lations. 
We'w: Lll keep you inibrmed of furmher developments. 
CAMpB9; LL REID, D. O. 
Abe: dlem- 
c. c. AGS S. Davidson, 
No R. Lyons. 
-. 0 
GUIDELINES THROUGH WHICH 
RECOGNITION MAY BE AC141EVED 
Agreed Between UKOOA Liaison Panel and IUOOC on 13th June 1977 
1. Unions seeking recognition must be in membership of the IUOOC at the time of 
application. It is expected that the IUOOC will inform the Liaison Panel. and any 
individual company affected, of a current union in membership of the IUOOC that 
subsequently leaves the IUOOC. 
2. Unions seeking recognition should do so by advising the IUOOC of their intention 
and by requesting the IUOOC to make such application for recognition 
on their behalf. 
3. An application for recognition would be made by the IUOOC on behalf of one or 
more member unions on the basis of applying to a common interest group. 
4. On receipt of such an application. the company concerned would then write to the 
IUOOC to discuss and mutually agree the common interest group under consideration. 
5. After a common interest group is determined. significant membership should be 
demonstrated through the agency of a mutually acceptable third party. 
6. Thereafter, the development of discussions. including consultations with employees 
which could lead to representational agreement between member unions of the 
IUOOC and employers, should proceed along lines that reflect the situation that 
prevails at the particluar point in time and takes into account the needs and wishes of 
all the parties involved. 
7. It being accepted that a balloting of employees would constitute part of the 
procedure before a negotiating agreement would be entered into. 
Note If. during the course of the above discussion, the lUOOC wish to make an offshore 
visit, the procedure to be followed would be that outlined in the minutes of the 
meeting between IUOOC and the Liaison Panel, dated 18 January 1977. 'It was 
agreed that. prior to any visit, there would be a discussion between IUOOC and the 
company concerned to work out and agree together what arrangements should be 
made and what facilities could be offered. 
It is understood that the above is the recommendation of the Panel on behalf of UKOOA 
members with the understanding that any member company is free to modify or amend any 
of the steps in discussion between themselves and the IUOOC. 
mo 
Pt 
ITAN DAVISON, A. G. S., I NT61-UN 101.1 OFFSHORE 01L COMM I TTEE 
ýEAD OFFICE. 3 March 1977 
urther to a request from Margaret for copies of any material relevant ýO the original terms of reference for the se'sting up of the Offshore 
the enclosed document Is ths only one I can fird with any relevance. The Co-imittee has traditionally been very informal and, in fact# very few ! Iinutes have been Issued, a matter which I have 
eon trying to pursue f, -. r some considerable time. 
rou wil II notice on the letter dated 5 Apri 1 1974 that at the very bot- om I'I'Om (c) states that spheres of Influence ought to be decided. 
, 
'his has been done as far as -Yorkers on the rigs are concerned, but so 'ar we have Deen unable to come to any agreement on f Ixed production latforms. You wl II have In your possession a copy of a memo. to ýatlcnal Officer. John Langan, dated 25 August 1975 which was'the tirst 
nstance of a spheres of influence agreement being seriously consicered. ince then, In line with the tactics agreed with John at the time, I 
OVO very tleilt-"tely kept thiz Item away fron the attention of the 
Or-*nlttee and it is only now, within the last two mantlis that flhe other 
embers of Tne Committee are insisting on Some form of agrsernanl-. 
[' '4culd stress that before ccrimll"ting "iyself furth3r to a policy of 
41 nnnr tal!. e all, I would like týat a r-e-eting with yourspl, ý and the 
3ther offic3rs Involved should take plac3 as' soon as possible. I 
Qnderstand 'here Is to be a meeting with all Unionz Involved at the rOU-Ce 
on 23 March and certainly our me. eting should be befor-9 this if t all possible. 
1929: EID, 0000, 
-A Ap 
le. *I C( 11"K 
N. 
ASSOCIATION OF SCIENTIFIC, TECHNICAL AND MANAGERIAL STAFFS 
Internal-Memorandum 
erce -: 'ýri II inq 1--ligs i. son,... AGS ................................. Re .... 
M20C. - 3. c., U, - ......... ...... ..... .... ....................................... 
L. ý 
.................... Date..... ................................. N: e- pi 1 ler, CO 
You tray reca II some cons i derab Ie-, : rre ago that the un 1 cns in membersh 1'0 
of the lUOOC raised at a fuel and ' power sub-cor-mi-167as of the 
TUC their idea 
that they were the only body which should be reccgnised by the TUC as beinq 
appropriate to those people working in the exploration side cr the offshcre 
indusý, -ry. This was largely based on -11-heir contention -, hat the rigs used 
were semi -submers ib le and Ihe-. they were, acc-crding. tc -. ha 2card cf Trade, 
registered as 'Ships'. 
I recall at this meeting that, you on behalf of ASTISS indicaTed that lt-hare 
should not, be any hard and fast rule governino this araa, but that ". -le should 
encourage any union which felt they c; uld recruit. in this area to go ahead 
and do ý0- The meeting did not, ! -ake any firm decision as I recall, but 
you wl II note from the recent minu-as of the lUCCC that th is matier has once 
ýaqain been raised. 7he reason f=r -. his ;s tnat, -he T& G have recrui-! -ed 
quite extensively arx)ngst crews working offshore `cr SEDCO (a di-1: 11ing and 
exploration company which is -. vcrk:, -_- in the 14ortli Sea both `-i British aaters 
and Norwegian waters). SECDCO is Cui ta na , 
DDY 70 talk to +he T&G acout 
recognition under the oanner of ILICOC and ! ave -naaea had one rree--Ino 
*W i th them. accompan i ed by E-2,1 1 Pe i -1. At the tir-e tre RSJC unicns regis-II-ered 
a ver, strc-ng protes-, bc-i! i wilf-h as Secrnt; _ýr,, of -. he 1'ý_'CCC and 
SECCO. As a result there has been one soecia! reeting t-- tr-, / ana resolve the 
issue between the T&G and the --'-c. C uniens and thers wi*l; be a final follow-u! ) 
r, esting early in December. 
Up t6 now I have been taKing a fairly neutral 
invclver. ent in the drilling side Oz. North Sea 
this area was noT -., itnin ::,. jr interes-Is. rh atI& 
=ncerned thaT this squabbia ccul: r=sjji7 fn 
Sn; DS witn.: n 7he : 
UCCC ard jniýss 4 
, ratý-=. - wi ce ri-17arr-ac 
-i -2 sncu 
id accp -a 7h. 
is 
., C Ii Cy on 7n 
15 
line as AST. -IS have no direct 
opsraticns and have indicated 
WS : wever, I err extrar-nely 
a de7arlwaVar in +he refation- 
: -7craw, , swscew that -hp, 
r:: r. 
::: 3--e tc 2cv; sia re c- a 7. 
AS-i*! S 
Z-- 
"147 , Ike, 
-. Private and Conf identiAl 
/V WAONUW,. I-, 
qeetinq Reýort 
June 4 198- 
TRADE S' uNroNC0NGRES 
NORTH SEA' OT-L- ISSUES 
Summary Report of an Informal Meeting 
with the Inter-Union Offshore Oil Com- 
mittee held at Congress House, Great 
Russell -Street, London, WC-1 on 
Thursday June 4,19,81 -at 10 30 am 
PRESENT 
TUC IU00C 
Mr DE Lea (In the chair) Mr W Reid Chairman ('1"GWU, 1 
Mr B Callaghan 
Mr D Themas 
Mr A Halmos 
Mr C Reid 
Mr W Duncan 
Mr I McFarlane 
Mr W Parker 
Mr R A White 
Secretary(ASTMS) 
(NUS) 
(AUEW-F-) 
(? 4NAOA) 
(REOU) 
Introduction 
mr Lea welcomed the IUOOC members to Congress House; 
recallýýthi long involvement which the TUC, principally through 
the Fuel and Power Industries Committee, had had with North 
Sea matters, 'including extending employment legislation in the 
difficult conditions of North Sea operations, given the TUC's 
interest in extending trade-union mem ershipjand noted that 
the TUC had always recognised., the IUOOC as the body with which 
to deal concern . ing North a _erýating issues. He asked for -Se' "op 
a -description of recent progress' in organising activity offshore. 
offshore Organising Activity 
1 2 The IUOOC reported. that progress in-off. shore organising 
activities was slow. -' There were - scme-recognition agreements 
Ld with Occidental "ýLnd 8hiL -'an , a"full 
`, hegotiatiýi4* 
withPhillijýs. ' -, in"-geperýl;, -, 6il, cýcmp, ýnies "were as 
1-ý. c( .. ýii -ý .. -, in' - re"zlsitýý4. -Ii ""There was of ten uni ad ant as '04er on organisat on.., b divergence', etween thpý, propaganda by'ý; enior ., c . ,, `- ",, "t, -, sed to' biil dI thatýý'theiywere, no oppo 0 Organisation, and 
ua -p ictýice of oper S. ý: ting manager' " 'BP had recently 
conf irmed _: 
Ln 
_a 
letter, that 
- 
their_ policy remained t. 11at oý! q; L-antý, TYY ion only -if 
membeiship 
- was * 
-sp . read-across all installaticns, 
--ý--'ýnot'on 'an JnStýilation,. by installation basis. 
II "ý14-tz 2 
3 The IUOOC estimated that about 30 per cent of workers 
offshore excluding vessels (where there was a closed shop) werE 
organised, and the distribution of membership varied from 
about 100 per cent among catering staff on mairy rigs to 
a very low f igure among oil company personnel. 
Semi-Submersibles 
4 The meeting turned its attention to the problem can- 
cernIng semi-submersibles, which was the reason why the IUOOC 
had asked for the meeting. 
5 Mexabers of the IUOOC made a number of different points 
as background to the present difficulty, including: 
only one semi-submersible was at present producing oil, 
as opposed to prospecting, though more semi-submersibles 
might do so, as production spreads to marginal fields; 
TGIs'U membership had spread in the North Sea, because 
there had been a dispute on one production platform 
(SEDCO 701) and the company had dispersed those involved 
in that dispute; and 
despite the fact that the British Seafarers' Joint 
Council (BSJC) had closed shop agreements in maritime 
activities, s oil companies had said they preferred 
to deal with I. -be IUOOC on certain matters. 
6 Mr Lea recalled the agreement dated February 17,1978, 
and signed, by. the I 
theii Secretary of th-a IU00c, which was: 
.. ': "TIiit 
'the_IUOOC 
recognise'the-sphere of influence of 
-ind ': BSJC in the'. of. fshore. oil ustrY '(Semi-Submersibles, 
DrIllships and Pipelaying Barges). 
Other than those being used_as permanent production 
platforms and Semi-Submersible Rig-'Stadrillf where 
a recognition agreement already exists with IU00c". 
Mr Lea asked whether this agreement had broken down. 
7 Mr W Reid said that the BSJC unions had been'slow to 
semi-subaii and were relying on, agreements --organise on ersibles., , W of organising,, i th'companies as a ay o ýhich_-ýias -an' inef f ective 
ap&oach. - Thý-' TGWU 'had members... On semi-submersibl6s who had 41ý-. 
moved theid'f rýmý proýducilon-' andjdtfiýe` ce of any othe 
effective -union organisat ion, - they -natural 
1'' týart 4d recruiting. yA 
i 'd ab tit half of. Sedco* -The TGWU now organ se 0 
'Tjýj oVe eS 
D1r. -%8 Duncafi disputed this'. He said-that's faring unions "; ,.. -_:, L -had members on, exploration rigs, though their'pýbsition was 
hampered by the"refusal of the oil compan ies to talk to them. 
In the present situation, Sedco management were refusing to 
talk to the NUS while they were talking to the TGWU. Semi- 
submersibles, drillships, and pipelaying barges had been 
clearly defined as part of the BSJC unions' sphere of, 
.. influence 
by the February 1978 agreement. Seafaring unions 
---did not know whether the TGWU were claiming a right t 
r 
3 
organise just on the semi-submersibles presently at issue, 
or elsewhere as well. 
9 Mr C Reid pointed out that there was a difficulty under 
the terms oF -the 1978 agreement about what happened if TGWU 
membership spread from production platfo=ns to other install- 
ations. Ee also pointed out that with other companies in 
the North Sea Ceg Occidental) there was a clear understanding 
that all unions with membership had a right to be represented 
in dealings with management, but the union with the most 
membership predominated. It was important to get a clear 
understanding of unions' respective rights and responsibilities 
Su=nary 
10 Mr Lea summarised points which had emerged in the dis- 
cussion and the IUCOC agreed this summary: 
the TUC recognised the IUOOC as the proper body with 
which to work concerning North Sea operational matters. 
The credibility of the IVOOC was vital; 
there was mutual recognition of the roles in the North 
Sea of the IUOOC, the BSJC and all unions represented 
on these two bodies; 
the present difficulties were being used by the oil 
companies to divide the unions and therefore to hamper 
organisational efforts in the North Sea; 
Uv) all parties preferred to find a solution without 
invoking the. fozmal TUC dispiites procedures; 
(v) if the paxtiea agreed,, one way to make progress could 
be to consider the scope for an elucidation of the 
February 1978 agreement to cover subsequent develop- 
ments; 
(vi) it was recognised that the different constitutions of 
unions belonging to the rUOOC meant that there would be 
dif, ferent& arrangements for TUOCC memberq gonqnýtjng 
their unions; and 
(vii) the TUC would use its good offices to facilitate the 
achievement of this elucidation and to promote it with 
any relevant party (such as the employers) if requested. 
Conclusion 
IT WAS AGREED 
(a) that the TUC would circulate a Summary report 
of the meeting; 
(b) that a further meeting would be -,: %Id on July 33 
11 am at Congress House; and 
4 
(c) that those present would try and be in a 
position by then to give specific consideration 
to suggestions for elucidating the 1978 agreement. 
----a--a---- 
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I Aliens Farm Fto3d. 
Aberdeen A39 2HY 
T se*, ephona. 
diract line Ab: v-dtten jG2241 332 
vmt-viboard At-3rdeen 1022-') 832000 
H. Byga-.. e, E-l; q. p 
-I 
sec. of t! -te 11"00C, 
3 Con-jerce Street, 
ABERDE-17.71- 
II 
Dear 4r. BYgaý; ý, 
C) 
I e! e. ( 
, -ýberdeen 73391 -' 73-L34 
i e! igaph: c addres3 
'7-1! axpro Abn S. . 
v2w . It 
Gýt pet UZFA, *. r: -:. ". 7 : "EA 
. A^ ... ý--j 
-70 
C3re 
n-g was held Reid :n -ch-2 -t"e you are no do-, bt waare a meeti, 
3. s-, z Dfavember to discuss with 
hlm the ACTSS claim, on behalf off, tn:! 
for a representational agreement 
to cover certain categories of employees 
on our plat-Lcrn Brent 
Delta. 
During t, -Iis discussiOr. we outlined to 
*4r. Raid t. ha circumnstances that *. -iou---' 
need to prevall 
before Ive were able ro nrcaress his claim for racogniti-,. 1 
O., j Brent D. 
as ccn:: -2z-ns --'--fforms and an.. - st-'ner .e circu. -; istances are 'ýiat sc 
f 
Thos 
- ---h: ` -. I- o0era- 
-z-; on an icarar. - 
operated bY Shall 
Explora or, 
all of ti*ja const-4-tuted 
unions of tha : UCCC accept that any claim for a 
r'egc-ý-ý; at-ing agreerient- 
could not In re-pect of a 
am 
or combination of platforms ). r units, 
but --. vo, -, 
Id have brace li-- 
such P" at--orr,. s and 
operational and pro-duction un-its 
(inc-ludi. -g, Spar E-usy- . 
The only ex-cap ii: ý: ' 
to t-le -fc: 'O BIn 
rig Stadrill 
would continue tz be ra. varded as an entity in its Own 
right for 
both representational and, should it be appropr4ata later, 
negotlating pur-P053s. 
If the acce. --,; that arran-gement, the Cz;. npan-, - 
is prepared -w progress 
claims for representational a----raennents b7 
fc -- - :; na 1 
:, ambers :, r each 
separate z; "a. - r-. and czx-ra7: ý - un. 
-z 
ýJortharn Operations area, 
if sc requir-21;. 
A. ddiý, j-onalljr 
job positions that *eau! -4 co-npr; _stý 
t"a COMMon 7nteres-z 
Grouo would need 
to be agreed batlai2-en us rc--v and -., vuld a'ý', Jy -'r, res-sý-- 
- -ezr-sentational or n-ago'; 1aring aaraemer. 
=s 4for t1nose uni7s 
all clail--Is 
irlel,. iding 
Soar Buo-wr which are the responsibil-ity of and are operated 
by 
Shell Exploration and 
Production, Northern Operations Division. !. -I 
regard, 
--he Compaily has proposed 
thai: the Common : nterest ra"roup should 
= 
rise of tl.,. e ., 
-ol lowinla positions: - 
col-14P - 
Techni-Cian 
Senior Technicia, " 5", ý%t-: anda 
prar -, er 
Supol,, - #')Fficer 
we/ ..... 
ý, -1; eve he'regairg ap pro ac h -... cu 2. . -; assist : ý- :ýd -a -: -ý, - -- ... . 1.0 1ý L. _: ýpmen; of order-1,; 
and stable industrial relazions _Jr our snerattions in the N': )rth Sea and 
i'l par4---lar would ensure lor zha turture a co. mmona L., -carms and Lt-,, c- 
conditicns of employment f'or lilka categý, ries of employees slýoulj thev 
h to be representad by -a s. me. mber of the _J a 
negotiating agreement. 
your -wr_; tten acceptance of t-he fore,; oing on behalf of the 
enable us 4-o move forward on the baslis of mutual understandin'a and in, 
part4CUlar zo, progress Xr. Re-4d; s claim. in accordance wit. a the guidelines 
agreed bet-w-eer, the IUCOC and UKOCA. 
-yo-,; _"s 
sincerely, 
-%-or Shell U. K. Exploration and Pzr: ýductffon 
"1 
- 
', 
/ 
<i " 
. ------ 
-- 
'77, 
C. C. ., ]. Reid - 
Chairman 
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ASSOCIATION OF SCIENTIFIC., TECHNICAL AND MANAGERIAL STAFFS 
Internal Menwrandiun 
R... Lycns, NO, I-Ilead Of 
............................................................ 
:ýP. F'c r7 ." -mS Re .......... * .............................................................. 
2,9-, h Se: -. arroar, ;? 71, - Date ...................................................................... 
tirther to your memo of 2411-h Seoterroer, 1979,1 am afr3i ý -. ha7 ! Coul -. no- - av 
nands on the edition of the 'Oilman' to whicn you ra. Far anc arn, 'ýIera-, ra, 
of the detai Is. Hiowever, in response to your encui r"I recardi-IC 
%'ý-ganisaf ion and recrui tment in For-. Ies, the undermen-, -cned is the 
-uation. 
-a 
lowing tne ini tial ac-, ivi-ý-/, -3 Dast three ý; r I am afraid that over th- 
,:, j 
*-_ks we have not rece i ved any further app Ii cations. _ýjrren-. ty, -_3 -, Ctal 
. 
r, ý4nber of applicants stands at 77. The distribution of these var: =_s =U! 79 
ýý! Zýkriarkab I%/. Forties 'C' must now be approaching the 40 - 50", rark, bu- 
171 the other hand, we have received absolutely no app!, c3t, cns to our knc-n; e. jge rlý '-he contaCtS Thall- a f, er "". ein; a tm Forties I was warned by one of -11 i- 
jk4Zh, it was quite possible that ac-,, vity woula subsi 
*a 
probabiy jn1-. -, he c 
Xt annual settlement date of Ist January, 19EO , vher it cculd be ant: c. `Paýad 
iý! -, un I es s E3. P. core up wI th ve ry s ub s tan tiaIi mp rover7en ,s in aI: offshore 
I arles and condi 'Ions' payments, this mi q IZ4 
nt be the final caraiys. -. 9 u -. Bz 
give us sufficien-, membership ro achieve recognition. 
tj is extremely difficult, as you realise, to get any real or-ian! sa-,? ---r. zc: MC 
'ýn it is impossible to get the people together to elect officials a-. c. ar. 
11 using contacts on For-11-les 161 and tC? who made 11he initial moves anC 3S 
Ive, as yet, been unsuccessful in arranging a visit of fisnore : ntC 7r. e F-_r7i-as 
to make contacZs on other plat$rorms. '%Id, I have been unable ', 
Nave had a meeting wi th one of the Personnel Managers in Aberdeen regarding 14 
t% 
, 1., membership and as usual with 
this company, itt was really ver/ much of a 
J `ýIcklng exercise as far as they were concerned. Ile did discuss membersh; p 
I-s anc 14ýtjres and also the company's requi-aments 
for rep resanitall*i ona 1. r, gn-. 
t*I negotiating 
rights. They indica-red that as far as represen-7a-7:. cnai rign-s 
,, -z concerned, 
the company would excec-i; - us to have 5-0- --n anv P 12Tform or a! 
for negotiating r: Qh, , ;, s, we would r-3cuire to have a ! -aj*cri-. y metroershi. -p ro UCr. - 
their North Sea Oi I ooerations. Th is co uIa comD Ii ca -. a ma tt, e rs reat! as 
have a nurver of fields which are currently on th e wav and this would make 
GO, lzý extremely difficul- recarding neG, tiating rights. It is also coiroie-seiy "tý`! 
-rar/ To The understanding between UKCCA and the IUCCC in which negc'7iaTjnq 
would be on a 
field basis and no-. on a company's t -Ial --peraTIons basis. 
regara to addi -.; --nal ma-erial, this jvculd be axtrerrelv welco-re and cD. /icus;, / 
a nernbershio appi*catio -rhouch 1 would k-ld, if PCs -IIn sect-on. A 11 - %a0py to aSSiST in -. he pre-oaraTion : )4 sucn materfal, ý `-ank: v ýc IcT =nsider 
a very coca adver-isement CCOý., --gr: -er and WOL!, J I-CCe -ýa7 5 CreCne v: 
-n-: -. is area =u! d draf. - scr-6--ing : 3u;, ---ar I. ave 3 1-, CK 37 
re 0; jca-,: --n, ýu-7 cer--aim--, -nis : )e ver, ý qe'ccre i-,: 
For-: -* -3s perSCrn-a, -i arcou- ear -2r, -. 4as us 
nas: :: -Iac-s --U7 :r --, "-ce s-a- ý: r-3-v ar, - was -ic- a -Ina. 
'RFRAD. "E, -S-- UNION CONGRESS 9% 
CONGRESS HOUSE - GREAT RUSSE-LL STREFT - LONDON WCIB 31.5 
Rt Hon Nigel 
Se'cretary of 
Department 0: 
Thames House 
MIllbank 
London SWIP 
Tclcphonc 01-636 4030 Tciegrams TRADUNIC LONDUN WCI 
Lawson MP 
State for Energy 
E Energy 
4DJ 
YOUR Rh!: r-. RENCE 
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DEPARTIMENT 
L, 'I/BC/DT/C-cC/z. 
Economic 
November 11 1982 
Dear Mr Lawson 
Access to North Sea Installations 
The TUC Fuel and Power ZndustiFigs COmMI titee have asked me 
to convey to YOU their sericus 
*disquiet abcut obst =u a ti-c 
to trade union of f icials requesting access to certain 
North Sea installations. 
Over the last 12 months; trade union officials de s ign a 
by the Inter-union Offshore Oil Committee have &d been 
confronted with delays and obstructions whi6h are undoubtedly 
Ln breach of the Memorandum of Understanding Signed : Ln. 1976 
by the UK offshore Operators' Association, the ZU0CC and 
the Gover. nment. IU`OOC representatives have raised the 
matter repeatedly with the UKOOA liaison panel, but to 
no avail. The UKOOA apparently deny-that they have any 
jurisdiction, ' over the actions of affiliated companies. 
Yet the 1976 Memorandum clearly states that "tlie operators 
have .... indiV4dually agreed 
that they and, as rar as Ithey 
are able to influence them, the contractors working for 
them will take appropriate action.... ". 
juooc unions are particularly concerned about the recent 
attitudes of two companies, 
Mobil and Chevron, botn' of 
ý 
whicth now appear to be directly flouting the Under s tand -4. n. g. 
It has come to our notice that Mobil are hiring so-called 
#union a-. roidance' consultants in an attempt to keep trade 
dnions away f-rom their opera-ticns, especial1v in -k; --, -, e Beryj 
Field. We are also aware that Mobii, s Policies are caus4,..,,. g 
concern to Norweqian trade unions in 
f ields. 
ea 
EL 'AURR. kY -, BE O-EPUTY GENERAL SEC. IF7. kR, "T' '4c, -4 Lln-"4 
-: )BE ', ý: D 
2 
In some cases, union officials are being denied access k-0 
platforms whe. 6e over 80% of the employees are already members 
of 1UOOC unions. This is not in line with the Memorandum 
of Understanding which guarantees designated trade unions 
the, right to recruit members on North 
ýea rigs. 
''-The 
Committee wish to know what the Go. vernment's Position 
Is on, this matter. The Committee are anxious to learn 
whether the Memorandum of Understanding has been unilaterally 
abrogated by the UKOOA or the Government or both. If not, 
I hope that the Government will use its influence to persuade 
the relevant companies to continue to abide by this important 
procedure. 
Z am sending a copy of this letter to the IUOOC and the 
UKOOA. 
yours sincerely 
General Secreta-ry 
A 
1 
k 
19 ýo ae ix R 
IHE MrNsrMR OF STATE 
ME RT EON HA-MIZH GRAY MP 
A Campbell Reid Lsq 
Secret=7 
Inter, Union, Offshore 
2, ýa Carden Place 
ABI lUQ. 
4lxj 
oii Co=, 1i 4. - kltcý 
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 
THAMES HOUSE SOUTH 
MILLBANK 
LONDON SWIP 4QJ 
Oirect Line 01-21,3290 
Switchboard 01-211 3000 
, Z1 June 1982 
TRAZE UN: ECM ACCESS TO CET'SHCRE INSTALLA=ONS 
Tbank you for your letter of 26 May, in which you draw my attention on "behal... 411 Of 
the IUCOC to delays you are experiencing in arranging visits for trade union 
officials to offshore installations. 
M7 impression hitherto has been that the Memorandum of Understanding an access to 
installations was in general worlcýng satisfactorily. Indeed, at our meeting on 
27 xanuary to discuss the North Sea Oil Charter, you raised with me the particular 
case, of access to the Brent Delta and Treasure Finder installations. You did not 
C=707 at that meeting any wider concern about the working of the Memorandum on, 
access. & 
I; owever, I would Ah2 e your concern. 
if arrangements are now going wrong. Tjx00A, I 
know, are equally concernedo I understand they are bringing your complaints 
specifically to the notice of 
the co=anies involved and generallY to their other 
members. I hope'that this wi! 
2 lead to a speedy resolution of the dionculties, 
to the satisfaction Of al-1 concernedo 
In my view, the UKOCA Liaison 
Panel has done a very useful job over the. past six 
years and ilt provides a valuable 
forum at which unions and employers are able to 
meet regularly and consider 
both =tual interests and any problems encountered 
offshore. I am sure 
that you are fuI17 aware of the great i=ortance which I 
attac! I to the maintenance of good 
industrial relations offahoýe. This was 
reflected during Our constructive 
discussions and subsequent correspandencL. on the 
Wor. kers Cbarter- it is in this spirit that I would regard your withdrawal : from 
participation in 
the Liaison Panel as a most retrograde step, 
letter to Lionel Murray and George 'Wil-21-4 ams. a= copyimg t=s 
-f 
. -'. 
STATEMENT OF MR JIM CHEETHAM: 15TH NOVEMBER, 1996 
Mr Jim Cheetham. was Administration Manager of Phillips Petroleum Company in 
Aberdeen during the mid 1980s. He visited me on 15th November, 1996 and kindly 
,: Yave me his account of the relationships between ASTINIS (later MSF) and his Cý 
company during the period 1984 to 1989. 
The Maureen Field was discovered in 197-3) but production did not start until 
September 1984 with Phillips Petroleum Company as the main licensee. Phillips 
started up its operations differently from previous practice cQmmon in the industry. 
The jacket was made at Hanterston and the accommodation module at Loch Kishom. 
It was a steel gravity structure and being an oil storage facility which floated it was 
not bolted to the sea floor. Since the platform was complete when it reached its site 
hook-up consequently took a matter of days instead of the usual few months and with 
the wells having, been drilled already Maureen was in production within a fortnii n ght. 
This was possible because from the outset the platform was staffed with trained and 
capable people who had already been in the employment of the company at Bacton in 
Norfolk, on the Hewett gas field and at the Ekofisk terminal on Teesside. These 
company facilities already had trade union agreements' and so when Maureen came 
on stream it was being operated by a variety of existing union members, whose unions 
had enjoyed full negotiating rights at their previous places of work. 
2 Despite this the 
company decided that there was to be no recognition of trade unions on Maureen and 
it was Jim Cheetham's brief to ensure that attempts to secure recognition by Aberdeen 
based trade union officers were thwarted. 
For some months there was no interest in trade unionism on Maureen but few. if anY. 
employees dropped their membership. The only union which sought an agreement 
was ASTMS and this was at first done centrally with Roger Spiller, the union's 
Divisional Officer in East Anglia (who had fought for and won recognition on Hewett 
Field and at Bacton 3) holding discussions in London with J. Pierson, the company's 
Employee Relations Director. 
The first contacts from Aberdeen were made by Campbell Reid of ASTMS who 
approached Pierson on the matter. Pierson told him to see the 
local personnel 
management people and this meant Jim Cheetham. 
There then began what Cheetham 
described as a "cat and mouse game-. Through the Memorandum of UnderstandinQ on 
Trade Union Access to Offshore Installations union officers could request visits 
offshore and when Reid suggested a visit to 
Maureen he was informed that the men 
were not interested. 
Campbell Reid should have responded immediately with another request quoting the 
Mernorandum on Understanding as his justification but did not and Jim Cheetham 
commented on the great gyaps in time ---vilich elapsed 
between ftirther correspondence. 
v, Chapter 7. 
TGWU at Teesside. \STNIS at Bacton ana -)n ije,. VeEt (-'F%k-'. C'r-*TPI-: and other craft unions -"or 
maintenance staff. 
v. Chapter-. 
It was a year before Reid managed to visit Maureen and the intervening, time had been 
well used by Phillips Petroleum to encourage their employees to channel their 
demands for improved conditions through the company's consultative committee 
system. 
The process operatives were more in favour of trade unions undertaking negotiations 
on their behalf than the maintenance and ancillary staff (radio operators, medics and 
other non-process workers). The company made it its business to find out which viexv 
was likely to prevail and it became clear that the process operatives were in the 
minority. Consequently Campbell Reid was sent the standard response of "no 
interest" when he pursued his attempts to obtain recognition for ASTMS and in this 
Phillips was given strong support by UKOOA. Reid, however, was receiving 
information from the process operatives and by dogged persistence did manage to 
make several visits offshore. At the same time Jim Cheetharn was being told by the 
maintenance and ancillary staff that they did not want ASTNIS. 
Phillips then pointed out that if the company were to enter upon any discussions about 
union recognition the definition of a common interest group would be significant. 4 
Maintenance and ancillary staff on Maureen were in the majority and if ASTMS were 
to be accepted it would mean that this union would be representing them as well as the 
process operatives, which was something they did not want. The arguments with 
Campbell Reid now centred round the question of a common interest group and again 
the time delays were interesting. Months would pass before Campbell Reid played his 
next card and so there was stalemate and consequently no agreement concerning a 
common interest group. Cheetham believes that Reid knew that if the questionwas 
put to a vote, the majority of Phillips Petroleum employees on Maureen would reject 
ASTINis. 'rhe company even considered the gamble of asking its employees to vote in 
order to strengthen its position in discussions but decided not to do so. 0 
By 1988 there was a rough consensus on what constituted a common interest group on 
Maureen but no formal company-union agreement had been reached. Desultory 
discussions continued as they had over the previous years until the Piper Alpha 
tragedy. The radio operators then reconsidered their attitude to ASTIMS (now renamed 
MSF) and since there was now a majority on Maureen in favour of that union the 
company awarded it full negotiating rights. 
Over the first four years of the platform's life Phillips Petroleum had recognised the 
reluctance of the majority of the employees to be represented by ASTMS and had 
therefore resisted the attempt of the union to secure any form of representative status 
on their behalf. However. when circumstances changed after Piper Alpha. the 
company accepted the wishes of the employees and entered into an agreement with 
the union. Phillips Petroleum was the only major oil company in the North Sea to 
concede negotiation rights to a trade union! 
'The agreement between UKOOA Liaison Panel and IUOOC --Guidelines throut! h which 
Recognition may be achieved" - stipulated (clause 3) that any application for recognition would have 
ýh lUOOC "on 
hehatf qj'one or more, member unions on : i? e iast. y oI appil-ijýg to,, to be made throug 
group " See comment on this in Chapter 4 ,: oInmon inlerest , . Sce also section on Phillips Petroleum in Chapter 
In any consideration of industrial relations in the North Sea during the 1980s it must 
be recalled that it is the government which allocates licences to the oil companies. 
ýEvery few years there are offshore licensing rounds when companies bid for blocks of 
the UK continental shelf where they believe that there is oil in commercial quantities. 
_While 
other companies such as Conoco and Shell have major interests in other 
petroleum provinces such as the Middle East, the North Sea is Phillips Petroleum's 
main strategic area. Rightly or wrongly it believed that an. v company which was 
weak" in its attitude to trade unions would attract the displeasure of the Conservative 
government of Margaret Thatcher, which was introducing legislation designed to 
reduce the influence of trade unionism in British industry. This was the prime reason 
for the company's decision in 1984 that there would be no trade union presence on its 
orm. -Maureen platf 
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THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE BURGOYNE COMMITTEE 
ýN RELATION 
TO SAFETY COMMITTEES AND SAFETY REPRESENTATIVES IN THE 
OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY. 
INTRODUCTICN 
1 The Report on Offshore Safety by the Burgoyne Committee made 
recommendations' at paragraphs 5.96,5 . 97 and 
6 
. 50 in respect Of the 
In essence the recommendation setting up of Safety Committees. was 
for the appointment of a safety committee on each offshore 
installation "the members of which are elected, appointed or 
co-opted to represent those employed 
for the time being on the 
installation including employees of contractors" (para 5.96-3). 
The Report also envisaged that "it did not consider it esseniial tb 
embody these principles in mandatory regulations". 
2 This Department is currently considering the 10zition in some- 
what wider terms than that relat'ing to installations by including 
offshore pipeline works Ln a review of how the recommendations 
might best be implemented. To this end it is appropriate to 
L 
consider how the requirementz for safel-y csmm_':; tees and represenza: _-; e: 
have been J. Tplemented onshore and wher. '.,: er tnosee requ-J. -emen: s C_=- 
used in the introductlon of appropr-4-aze- standards for the cf-'sncre 
oil and gas -industry. 
BACKGROUND - ONSHORE 
The Saf-ety Representat. 4ives and Safety Ccr., m-4ttees Regulaý: -4--ns 
1977 (t; ý-., e S115C regulaz; ions) made under z;!, -e H-eall-. ' anc -=-- 
Work et-- . Acs 
1974 per-nit recozn-4sed -. rad-- unlons :; c 
representat--ves frcm : he employees at a wo. -K place, and req----re 
employers to set up safety commlf: tees where safety re=re3en: a:: _-ve_t 
nz-s, these regu"a"ons enti4-je safe: 
-,, request this. 
Among other th-4 
-ake peerlodic I4nspec: _I: -, ns 0-f : 
he work p-a: e. representatives to under'. 
However, the regulations only apply -ýo t4`- 1-2-dwarýj areas of 
Britain as at', the time they were made the Heealth and Safety a: Wcr:. 1, 
etc Act 1974 did not apply olfstore. 
EXTEENSICN C, --. 7SHOR--- C. -F THLE SRSC -RE:: U" A-'CNS - THE ""S' EMS 
41t seeni approp. -late : -- Implement - tne recomm. endat--cors of 
Burgoyne by s-4mply applying the, SRSC regulations offs, ",, cre. Fcwe,. rer, 
t, his would not be a simple -natter, and a nuniber of practical 
wcu:: ' ar-45e. Spec-4-'-4ca:: y: 
The SR5C regulations place duties on EnLp-loyers. This 
reflects onshore conditi4ons where at a particular 
work place t' e employer is normally the individual 
primarily responsible for health and safety. This 
principle isnot in accord with tle offshore indus'.. -y I 
where, SenerallY, tMere will be several employers w1V 
many employees. Hence the concept Of the owner, both 
of an installation and of pipeline works, who is in 
the optimum position to monitor and control work 
activities. 
(ii) Because of the numbers of employers normally represen- 
ted at any one time on an installation, and because of 
their transient aature, the arrangements embodied in the 
SRSC regulations whereby each set of employees would be 
entitled to elect safety representatives would appear 
to be inappropriate, and possibly unmanageable. This 
difficulty is not so apparent when considering pipeline 
works. 
The SRSC regulations permit the appointment of sa. Lety 
representatives only by recognised trade unions. This 
requirement may well result in the proposed standards 
having only a limited impact offshore due to the 
organisation of labour in the industry at the present 
time. 
PROPOSALS FCF IMPLEMENTING THE BURGOYNE RECOMMENDATIONS AT OFFSHORE 
INSTALLATIONS AND PIPELINE WORKS 
In view of the noted difficulties associated with the 
application offshore of the SRSC regulations, 
it would appear to 
be necessary to proceed along 
different lines if the recommendations 
in paragraph 5.96 of the Burgoyne Report are to be implemented and 
also applied to pipeline works. 
3 
Firstly, in relation to the content of any proposals to 
1LA r-ee Implement the recommendations there appears to be-f-a4zr possible 
ýz 
'Options . 
The owner of an offshore installation or pipeline works 
is responsible for setting up a safety committee and 
appointing safety representatives from among all those 
persons working on the installation or pipeline works. 
(ii) The owner of an offshore installation or pipeline wo&-ks 
responsible for setting up a safety committee and 
appointing safety representatives from any persons 
working on the installation or pipeline works who are 
members of. a trade union, whether recognised or not. 
(iii) Each employer represented on the installation or 
involved in the pipeline works is responsible for the 
appointment of safety representatives from his' 
employees subject to the overriding control of the owner 
of the offAhore installation or pipeline works. This. 
option may be more appropriate to pipeline works as 
there is normally one main contractor involved in the 
operation who is not the owner. 
Secondly, in relation to the mechanism by which the proposals 
'kt-e implemented, there appear to be two options: 
- (i) The proposals are embodied in mandatory regulations, or 
(ii) The proposals are the subje2t Of Guidance from the 
Department of Energy. This was the option favoured by 
the Burgoyne Committee as in their opinion it will 
'Z 
permit offshore owners the flexibility to make arrange- 
ments which best suit their particular circumstances 
eg the numbers of persons at work, shift patterns, 
involvement of contractors, and other Prevailing 
circumstances. 
CONSULTATION 
would stress that this letter is only beJjng circulated on an 
informal basis for initial consultation. For your information, a ccpy 
of the exissing SRSC regulations is attached to be read in conjunctisr: v 
with this letter. 
91 should be very grateful il- " You would give this subject your 
early consideration. 
In particu! ar, your v-Jews on the matters 
covered in paragraphs 
4 to 7 would be most welcome, as would any 
other suggestions you have to make. 
10 If you have any response to make, please could you let me have 
it by 31 January 1985. In the meantime, if you have any queries 
please do not hesitate t6 contact me 
(01-211-4073) or Colin Thomas 
(01-211-3248). 
Yours faithfully 
BW Hindley 
Principal Inspector 
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4. Whilst there was a majority of ic_--, ý;: * (Internaltional 
Federation of Chem' a', Energy and Genera! Workers' 
Unions) affiliated unions present within the Trade 
Union Group, it was agreed that we would maintain 
maximum-unity, taking into account the contributions 
of the Soviet and other WFTU affiliates, as well 
as unaffiliated Third World unions. The result 
was a refreshing display of harmony within the 
Trade Union Grouo, in marked contrast to the 
experience at thý previous 9th Session of the 
Petroleum Committee. One C%,; th e UK Workers' 
Representatives, John Miller, was elected by the 
Workers' Group as the Workers' Vice-P-resident oA E 
the Committee, for the Plenary Sessions. The other 
UK Representative, Roger Lyons, was elected a leading 
spokesman on the Occupational Safety and Healt. h. 
tee., sub-Committ 
The Sub-Committee on Occupational Saffety and Health 
and the Working Environmený in the Pe. roleum Industry 
was chaired by one of the UK Government 
Representatives (Afrom the Department of Energy). 
In the final report of this Sub-Committee, which 
was adopted unanimously, it provides for an Act4on 
programme des`gned to support and extend existing 
occupational healt.. -i and safety wcrk curzren-ýly being' 
undertaken a-,; nazional levels. Arising from the 
work of this Sub-Committee, th, e report was made I 
available to the O. J. 11 _Industry Advisory Committee 
I 
of the UK Health and, Safety Executive after the 7: 11 
Petroleum Committee. The TUC RePresentatives on "I 
the OIAC have been able to - 
introduce 10 major items 
from the Geneva talks for the Work Programme for 
1987/88, which indicates the comprehensive and 
realistic discussions that took place at the 
Petroleum Committee, aýd which were the subject 
of agreement between the parties at international 
level. The issues included, Freedom of Association 
on Health and Safety iss-, es Offshore; Effects of 
Exoosures to Toxic and Harm-ful Substances; Psycho-: 
Social Stress Offshore; Helicopter Transport to 
Work Issues; Analysis of Accident St, _1 tatis-ics; and 
pollution Control Methcds. 
6. The other ma jor Sub-Commit. -tee, on which TUC 
Representative John Miller served, dealt with 
Manpower Planning and Development 4. r' the Pet. -cleum 
industry. The Sub-Committee examined in detail 
#-" implication5 of thA e ie-structuring being .. ne fthJn 4n4ng and d4s_ribut-io undertaken w the ref 
sectors, and the need to pro..., erly invol--re and cons-It 
the trade unicon representatives. was genera! 
agreement on _tne 
need for but scme 
S=. _e Of difference ove- 
ccnsu-7t-a:: -O, - -- n ma ýcr 4ecls-ý-n-- 7-- ý- "-Aý= 
--act ing -,. -i d ý-, s 
7. Other matters dealt with by the Petroleum Committee 
included consideration of implementation of 
conclusions and resolutions of previous Sessions 
09 A. the Petroleum Committtee; Labcur Migration 
in 
the Petroleum Industry; Freedom of Association; 
-erprises Multinational Ent in the Industry; the 
present crisis in the Petroleum Industry and its 
consequences on the workers; and the future Work 
Programme of the ILO in the Petro. 'Leum Sector. The 
content of the eventually unanimously-adopted 
resolutions on these issues are attached. 
Particular note should be taken of the agreed 
Resolution concerning Freedom of Association in 
the Petroleum Industry, which strongly endorsed 
the right of freely elected independent Workers' 
Representatives, as defined in Article 3 of 
Convention No. 135 to participate in representation 
and negotiation across the Petroleum Industry. 
,. he Trade Union 
Representatives present for the 
Petroleum Committee had considerable difficulty 
in obtaining the definition of Trade Union 
Representatives as "Trade Union Representatives". 
Both the multinational company Representatives 
and the ILO office staff emphasised that successive 
ILO Conferences and the Gove; n4ng Board, had accepted 
the definition as being "Workers' Representatives". 
did& "-ppez= fzom 
informal consuitation that the 
A, - 
phrase "Workers' Representatives" in many 
languages 
other than English, was widely ac---. -. --ed as meaning 
"Trade Union Representatives". However, the English- 
speaking Trade Union Representatives, particularly 
from the UK, the USA, Canada, and Australia, together 
w -h Norwegians, 
identified references to it the 
"Workers@ Representatives" as not being in the 
best interests of developing trade union rights 
in the Petroleum Industry, as supported by ILO 
Conventions and previous Resolutions of the Petroleum 
Ccmmittee. It was agreed at the Workers' Group, 
and notified to the 
full Petroleum Committee, thýt 
t.,, iS issue would be referred 
by Trade Union 
Representatives t0 he -J r national centres, for 
onýard transmission to their members on the 
IT .10 
Governing Board. 
9. In the meantime, it was agreed as an unsatisfactory 
but workable ccmarcm--se to continue using the 
definition of "Workers' Representatives" as in 
I- -ative, Article 3 in Convention No. 13 . UK ReDresent 
John Mi -3 1er in his caoac4-Y as Workers' 
Vic-e-President of the Petroleum CZrnittee registered 
Workers' Group concern in the ma-;. - Plenarv he 
Session. He referred to the 
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DRAF2 
NORTH SEA OIL CHARTER 
The Inter Union Offshore Committee and the Labour Parliamentary 
Offshore group ag-. ee to work for the implementation of the 
folloving Charter to improve the safety standards, rights and 
conditions of employment in the offshore oil induBtry. The 
fol: Lowing are identified as key areas for immediate action; 
consolidation ofý legislation, safety, employee rights and conditions, 
t. raining for offshore vork. 
CONSOLIDATION OP LEGTSLVION 
The ever increasing nimber of acts, codes and regulattions 
urgently requize consolidation into one body of legislation 
for the North Sea. 
SAFETY 
2. All responsibilities for the health and safety of offshore 
workers must be tranaferred from the respective departments 
-to the Health and Safety C-ission. 
A21 trade unions must have the statutory right to nomin t 
safety representatives to their appropriate safety committees. 
The number of safety inspectors must be increased and they 
sho=d have access to all offshore I=Btallat-4ons without 
prior notice. 
English language proficiency zust be required in all arsaa 
affecting safety in the UK sector offshore. 
There mint be adequate provision of immersion suits, at a,., 
timesp for offshore personael. 
Exiliting British marnin and safet7 standards must be a 
condition of all operations in the UK sector of the continental 
shelf. 
operating regulations -st be established as a matter of 
urgency for all submersibles. 
9. TranBfer of personnel by banket to be prohibited Unless, under 
emergency conditions, or VhSre AL specific examption has been 
sought. 
10. A review of the safe OPGration of craneol in sea conditions. 
between installati= and -ressels is urgent: 1,7 ----qui--ed. 
A review Of a-11 aspeCta Of h8_11copter safe-ty with spacjoac 
refere=e to B&f8 flight t!. Me limdtat-1=3 standa--dsp and safe 
helicopter perfo-Ance atand2-, ds is ux-gently --equi--ed. 
EMPLOM RIGHTS AND CONDITIONS 
12. An immilal census of all personnel and vessel s operat,!. ng j--, 
the UK sac-tor of the North Sea is essential. 
13- Trade ULons with an establish9d membership -----ust be 
recognised automatically. 
14. All offshore workers, regardless of nationality =us-,, have 
a proper contract of employment issued pr-4or to co=encenent 
of employment. 
15- industrial Tribunals must have the right to investigate unfai= 
dismissals which may involve secondary pressures -"--cm the 
client contractor. 
16. Calculation of wages must in no way take account o-P any fo= 
off state benefit. 
17. A. 11 offshore workers must receive adequate =emuneration durj=& 
&! located fieldbreaks. 
18. The Department of Employment must establish a cent--e for 
Offshore employment and manpower pl=nin 
19. --he work permit system must be extended and enforced throughout 
the trI sector of the continental shelf. 
TRAINING Zzmý-- 
20. The -rossly Inadequate resources committed by 4-over---en-. and 
Indui-16. ry to offshore training facilities is deplorable. An 
industrial levy must be brought in to finance and expand all 
fo_ý=s of offshore training facilities under the P. I. T. B. 
CONCLUSION 
This joint Com=ittee calls for an immediate increase in the number 
of safe-cy inspectors and 
the recognition of the T=ade Unions righ-4- 
of nomi=at-jon to safety Committees. 
We will work to ! =-lement these 
points I= forthcoming offshore 
legislation, this session, and ensu=9 
th'at -: his cha=ter will be incorporated try the incomIng Labour 
Gover--=ent as a condition of all atfshore. licences. 
copy to: A 'Mobil cont A- 
0. pe 
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LONOCN-VC2A 2EB 
TEELEPHC. NE 31-a3l ", 7. 
. ELEX as 1241 , 
K July 1932 
-, Nfr A Caapbell Reid 
Secretary 
Inter Union Offshore 04-1 Committea 
25a Carden Place 
Aberdeen 
Dear Hr Reid, 
::; OOC VISIT TO BERYL 'A# 
Your letter dated 19 July 1982 has been passed to me for ac: antian. 
you will recall our meeting of 12 Ma. y 1982 when we discussed Che g--neral 
subject of IUOOC visits to off-shore 
installations, and in particular your 
request for a further trip to 
Beryl 'A' - At that time we advised you we C. -)ulld 
not agree to your request 
for the following reasons: 
cae last IUOOC visits had taken place at the end of September 1981 and 
earlier in 1982. It was our belief that two visits per year to Ber7l 
was reasonable, and on that basis further access would not be due 
until the last quarter of 1982. 
sensitive discussions were taking place with our employees to resolve 
the difficulties ideatifiad earlier. As we informed you, a union 
visit during these discussions would endanger proper focus on the 
actual problems at hand, and jeopardize our immediate objective to 
resolve the issues through direct consult 0 -acion with our employees. 
In our discussions you agreed 
Mobil's policy on access visits for 1UOOC was 
reasonable and that our past record 
was "as good as that of any other 
. 
operator, and 
better than most"- 
Our approach to this 
issue is unchaaged. Since our meeCing we have made 
significant progress 
in resolving our earlier problems. It remains our aim to 0 
institute an employee relations enviro=ent offshore which is second to none. 
Our employees have been 
fully involved in the review of future needs, and in 
depth consultation with them will, continue. An 
increasing number has 
indicated trade union representation 
is not wanted and expressed the desire to 
see formal 
internal consultative machinery established. 
ihe feeling is that 
further union visits should be suspended until our discussions are completed. 
-2- 
In view of the above I must reject your request far a further visit at this 
time. We are certainly prepared to review the situation in the last quartar 
of-this year and if you would care to contact me a3lain at that time, we can 
, reconsider your request. 
I would like to take this opportunity to advise you that Neil Winter has 
been transferred to our Londoa employee relations Calroup. His replacement 
1. J. Morrice (Mike). 'is, ; 
Yours sincerely, 
Boscoa 
Manager, Employee Relations 
0 
13,8 
Ell' 
HenJ ey 
ýu Thc-A lanal'r(miept Col 
BRO 
Mr Clive Jenkins 
General Secretary 
Association of Scientific Technical 
0 Managerial Staffs' 
79 Camden Road 
LONDON %i-; l 9ES 
Dear Mr Jenkins 
ber 193" 
- Re: MOBIL 
I am now in a position to reply more fully to your letter of 26 August 
1982. 
I am appalled at the suggestion that a member of the College's staff 
may have been used, even unwitcingly, to advise a company on how to 
avoid trade unions or to subvert them. Under no circumstances would 
the College ever be party to such activities. Indeed CO ,I am sure you are 
aware of the Collegge's positive work with Trade Unions in recent years. 
I had not seen the letter of 20 May from de Board to Boston before. 
have seen it now and have spoken to de Board. I do not agree with 
Mr Lyons's interpretation of it as a report on 
*how to smash the unions 
on the Beryl Field. 
I should like to think that, on a second reading, 
both you and Mr Lyons would see it, as I do: a non-partisan initial 
attempt to analyse the causes of anxiety among the employees on the 
platform, and to 
help the company develop a management style which would 
attitudes and relationships he w. imp rove That is wort-, 3d 
to everyone's benefit. -c 
Early this kulg-st the College ran a 3-day work. shop fc-1 0 .7 Jj ;. 
,F rc Obviously, the course was an C. - je managers : 
fooil- gU= 
earlier work. 
I have also looked at the content of =h- couls, I., 
fully satisfied that 
it was a nor=al exercise Zn improve 
iVe you no concern. It need gl bmFe r-Jnci- 
letter =anticns a number of events a-.: 
_j, yons 
'at 
ween Y, 0'4, L'l and Chevron and t1a u-,, -* ions ber A. CIL 717 I. L A. relar , Lai C. 
of these matters, 
has played no part in them, -, -, d j-,. C't dc so under any 
ci-. rcumstances. 
answer to the cuestion you have zz' The me ' S: cc-!: * li -tiv nut. 
Than1c. you for bringing this matter to =v attention. Ihope I have now 
cleared up any misunderstanding. 
yours sincerel-f 
C- 
Discuss: = : ccument- 
Pembroke Hotel 5/9/89. 
!. NIc(: STAy LrAISCU 
-; r -Sc 
Cne - 
cricins of the ar. shore tndust: y 'wia-; scn cc-mmitttee. 
Achi, eving that missing element in organising the N'Sea, 
namely rank and file involve-ment, - ýas proved the achilles 
heel of the Trade-Unions. Certainly a degree oil success can 
be rec-. rded over =ar. f yýears"With the Cf. 11shore Construction 
I Agreement. Getting a foothOA-d Cutwith this Agreement has 
proved impossible. In 1984 the four full-time officials, 
brothers T. Lafferty, T-Gray, J-McCartney and D. Carrigan 
correctly saw a rank and file committee as the approgriate 
way forward. They, together with a group oil local commite, -,; 
activists, tried. Meetings were held in Aberdeen and 
Glasgow. A newsheet was handed out every morning at the 
heli-port. A copy of the first such "Bear Facts"' is 
attached. : "4 predates Piper by 3ý1years and the issues 
hi-lighted" are st-14111 reele-vant ncw, cver a year a-fte. -- 
,,. ctjv;. ty at t. -a- time under t:. -. a 
O. C. A. was at an 
jcw due in no part '. o Ithe 'investment strike' car. ried 
Cull. by the C-411 =ultinaticnals' in reta-Iiation at the 
c ni 7ax. -1 rn of the Sce* 'a! Petr. )Ieu. -'J's was fu: t; -. er 
compcunded ir. 1.9a5/6, Lj tile ail Zprice cýcllapse, which put 
paid to any recovery in investment i. n thý U. K. continental 
silej!. cur shcrt lived grass rocts mcvement vanished in a 
wave of S16, eik"faman-s hand. 
The indust:. y -4.1 Scotland wen t 
into severq : ecessicn. Cone 
t 
. -I 
i rj 0f t- 
he 
af-'s*hore cciltracting work! orce were made 
redur -ntext is a euphemism for dant. Redurdant in this c 
sacked. A-'. mcst a- cciltractars emp. 'Lcyees in the N'Sea, and 
.s SCI ox., 
i:,. the '. 6, t*-at 4 N'Sea, are empLayed 4nder short 
t. arz and ad-*,,. cc -, e: =s and c-criditi-chs and t. '6e: e! ore generate 
neithe: emFIcymer-t rights nor redundancy pay. Thcse who 
re-malned ; n_e=; jcy=ent ! or. the mcst Sa: t tcck substantial 
wage clits. Vie -rade Unions were uttariy lz5otent ii the 
! ace ol i.,. 1-s. assault. An undercurrent of bad will was 
genezated by the bahaviOur Of the oil companies durinq thIs 
periodo a sense of severe aggrievement that Vhe Unions 
should have' s.; een able to exploit. That they were unable to 
p 
Two. 
do sc was pr. ma: -. y th: --c-gh a 1-ac'< of 
g: ou. nd. In this period our activists offshore di4 
number ten- 
idy the time Piper came along the feeliig was already afoot 
that 1. something had to be done". Pipe: changed attitid, 3: j 
quite deeply. Aithcugh the ancoalcus situat ion* regard.. 1,3 
**S. *-. Cre sa'aty lei, -. s-'aticn, 'had been hii-11-1 7. - aJe ; nted by tne 
Un; cns for 12 years, it was only now that the public too, ý 
any notice. indeed for the most part it was the offsAore 
wcr. '<--'orce's first inclination that a serious void ex., sted in 
tne legislative set-up. 
-Tcwa. -d the end of ! 968 it was apparent that a -j-rea,. change- 
in attitude was underway. This -coupled with'an upsurge in 
activity brought about by a stable oil price and a 
rellaxation of the o! --'shore tax regime, pr--videA- an 
t:: redress cu: situatlon. At the annual : eview 
the O-C-Ao it waA cerzain-ly the view of t:,. e Tern 
-, cr; <fteorce that it'wýs time to confront the O. C. C. and 
1j.. K. O. O. A. on tl-e-issue of a trade unon Agree=ent f:,.. - 
ncr. -hook u: ) work. the O. C. A. was signed for 
iti-nall, ce. rzaaly as f-ar as the Li--r were 
ccncarna. -I, that an! partici:: ation by the unions in 
on progress tcwa: d an inddustr.! future, would be 
AS:, e eme 
T%. Ie attempt at Cie creation of rank and file involve' ment 
.h success. This is the , jas made asain. This t-me wit 
--ac*<. g-ound, in brie!, of the O. I. L. C. 
lr*- ol i .e-- Sn. L: te 
Tý: e campa'qn c! s. "-, ns ! as-. ad neariv three montas and 
n-., cl ved at one Iti me or another 37 ins, % allat ions - '. "-. e is s-,; es 
were wages and ccnd'. ticns, trade union recognition and 
safety. A fu-11 account of the dispute will be available in a 
se, -, 
ýýalte document. 
0. 
I 
I' 
S 
S 
Crganislng the *WSea na3 unltl. ue problems. Cvver twe, t. 1 
oVe: ators cn over one hur. d: ed installatlons, in tnzee 
sectors, and a mobile workslorce dist: ibQted azong over t-40 
hundred contracting ccmpanies. Within this equation there 
are divisions of function. Pr6duction, Maintenance, 
Construction, Catering, Drilling aný*Ddwn-hole servIces. 
Drilling is further sub-divided into fixed installat- ticns and 
"Icaters'. Ccnst:, ict_, _-n has "w &- ,a main sub-d-visicns, Ecck-u. - 
and non Hock -up/ma intenance 
Cne division of catý)qories would seem to indicate the 
possibility of a solution for the trade unions. It is that 
between the directly employed and the contractors employees. 
witnout a single-exceytion the differential in pay and 
conditions between these two groups is gross. NO space need 
be wasted here in re-itt. erating* the degree of difference, 
lice to say the universal sense' of injust-ce felt by the su. 4. 
,. d.: -ect_! -, e.. iployed wcr. 
k_-_-rce is a uni! ying . 4orce. 1-ence in 
tne recen: disr. ute a. all sectiors cz: the 
c-_nzractors e=plo-yees was seen. This must be quali! -ed on 
two ý: oints- Firstly, except by two drilling Crews, dril, lers 
did not participate. made sure o A-,. ' th at . 
-icr. 1by cat Seccnd! y, pa: ý. ic;.,. at. I-ezing workers was patchy. 11-4o 
reasons for this- In the early stages uf organising the 
sit-ins it was anticipated that the býest way to sustain the 
action would be to feed the 'bears*. As the dispute 
, progressed, 
the ncn-ppart. c*pation of the catenng wc. -ke: s 
4o w. 4th the Y. U. S. and the T. & G. dissuad. was =ore to n tj 
o _* ves; en t 
for "ear of jeapordising their approaching 
; aticns With C'TA. neSct 
ine zoint ze. ng made is simpLy that the divis-_ns o-- 
t*-e ý. id.; s'_: y a: e many. vnat =av 
-e -' - th e 
.3SWIt 
y may not sui cne secczar o! the industv 4,1: e: asts ý-. t 
nes *- s ! urtler c- by inter-unjon rivairy ano t: -, mpcunded '-. 
and some particular instances of, mutual distrust. ne 
P1_'Ccse 064 this dcciment is not to cast:. gate any Union or 
its otflicialls for de. 4--anding the legiltimate se-'! interest cc 
their resiective unions. It is merely to sugges'. that a 
sui. ab, .e for..; m must 
'ce ! o,; nd to enaz. e these at 
times, ccnflicting inte: ests to be reconciled ir. zhe cau, se -Df 
organising the N'Sea effectively. This dociment woulLl also 
like to suggest that the authentic voice and active 
participation of the R'Sea workforce can be brought to bear 
through the O. I. L. C. 
. 6. 
function af the C. I. L. C. 4s to pr. -v;. de a focia, -1-i e 
within which the offshore workforce, no matter which sector 
-er which of of the industry they earn their living, no mat'. 
the seven unions they are members, can meet in conmon 
)urpose - its success so 
far has been in providing such a 
service. Over seventy =, &-ss meetings have taken place. these 
have been educational on the broader issues, and the 
agitation that led to the summer of discontent was wholly 
from thes meetings. 
-,; a:: --s in : *-. a o-I. L. C. are a br--ad 1--ased 
.I CrCs-S sec:. Cn 0-- he 
N'Sea wc-k! or-. s, hcs-ý 
-votivat--cr js the achievement o! strong trade unionisz 
o! fshcre- -L-, e d. -anati. c ups-, rge in trade ur-*cn mencershi. ) 
cveý th* ;s directly aztributa'-le to o-r-L. c. -s e 
unizn 7. n--9: r=at4. cn Centre. 
the ofl! ice a: zove the e C. r. has --acentlY a7c. ui red 
ter 4 Mar, ac:: S5 !. -:: a the za. n i.. -. e station Ln 
e use as an .!. i!, -dr=aticn Centre. -niis is 
14 Z-e: ai 1,. r tne cr--ss: ca-, 's of t*ae 
indust--v. -n4ormaticn, 
kncwledge, t'he gathering of, azrid the 
distribut. cn of same, a. e the key to pr--4g: ess . -n cur bid to 
unicnise the N'Sea. 
-4 
Ar. in=ease a. nccnt of ii'iorma--.; cn ar. d expe:. ýence was -a4 2 red 
in the dis. pute- Mter all, the tact-ics involved were inlike 
any tried be! ore. Should another dispute prove necessary 
(and this appears likely) the success and shortcowngs o. 
this summers action will guide us. Lack of detailed 
logistical planning let us down. Only when things were up 
and running did the full extent of the task fully dawn on 
US. 
Communication was inadequate. In futur 
! e, 
24 hour phone 
coverage will be essential. Fax and Telex too. Most of all 
there will have to ce com. prehensive and -iconstantly uý, )cated 
data base on 4no is where, on what shift, on what rig. Tne 
O. I. L. C. must start collating this information immedietly. 
Awareness and knowledge of the 
' 
issues is still lamenýbly 
, eez! icient a. mong a large proportion of the offshore 
'. force. Distribution of literature at the heji, -, p t an a rk or 3 (1 
or. t: ie pl. -t-forms is essential. '1he col,. ect- fon &-id sz--dy o! 
nzorm A. Cri on t. he industry is ce. rit-ra! --- s a-111 reievant i. , at 
educat-'On grocess. 
Fut-ire d4. sputes aside therý'is a pressing need for acz-: -ve 
mcnit,:, rir-,, - Of, arje4 r-; s_aazc', in'. ) prcblems particuiar to 
0 *A 'o-activti L. S. A. szalle, ccntinuing use of 
it. the offshore environment, etc. particularly in 
vw of tle fact the the C10SH"d regulations are not to have 
the force cl. law oftisnore. 
-is C' - new Safety Rej and or4. ý the pnasing in of the 
is! actory-as they are, it is essential c-, m. rn: ttje Re-, s-, unsat, ' 
,. a- c-ritractors personnel get every og. oartunity to 
ar -- ;. c ze - 
' 4bs ! unct4cfi the C. I. L. C. wýuld nc. r., e t, -; :. -I t *- ese ascects C. 6- 
. : -*e of the Lct. hia. n. .. e e. xa -it, T. -lide Un. -cn 
Rescurce Canc: a. A short descri. ptive leaflet is 
hed. "Y in-ute c! informaticn frýam the men cass"a attac! 
through to and 44rcm the rigs will enable us to keep cur 
finger or. che pu1se, as well. as providing the 
ammunition we requi: e in t'he pr. -Vcganda war against the oil 
Imulti-naticnals. 
." 
.0S*. 
"'x 
- 
be zcs-. ., zportant '. -, inctjcn ca. -. -,. ad cut oy t-e 
the : ecent dispute, is a-so Jits mosz'vaiua. ýje asset ! or 
!, jcj: e. That is its abillity to 0j: era: e to a great extenc 
outside the constraints of the ant. 4-t: ade union legislaticn. 
Since the action was instigated and sustained on an 
unof--'ic.; al basis, it left the trade unions fa.,. rly 
comfortably distanced from that dangerous legislation. 
Finance - 
Contributions in excess of 
f9000 
have been made to the 
'Unds C4 the O. I. L. C. by the offshore workforce. Vhls has 
1a: =ejy : -. een s. pen: on . -unning the dispute. P: inting, 
adver: -; s-. -q, ex=enses 
involved in runn! ng the meetings 
, acc--L: n-- --nj for mcst o! the expenditure. By the wishes c4 t-e 
a wage has been pa" to the C. hairzan based on 40 
hours at N. A. E. C. I. rate. In addition, so--e of the *ccst of 
p:, C-zUC; -g tA. e tab! icd newspaper Blow Cut, has beea met by- h 
he pilot iss-le is attached. the fu. 1(3. A xeroxed copy of t 
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AS AMENDED 
Aims and Objectives 
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responsibility +on collective bargaining. 
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HIGHLY CONPIDENTIAL 
PERSONAL TO ADDRESSER CE 
13 March 1990 
TO: MEMBERS OF COUNCIL WITH OPERATORSHIPS OF PRODUCTION 
cc: C Ryan, UKOO 
XF Shearer, UKOOA 
From: DIRECTOR-GENERAL 
OFFSHORE INDUSTRY LIAISON COMMITTEE 
I enclose a. Note of one of Mr Ronnie McDonald's recent meetings, 
which came into my hands from a source I prefer not to disclose. 
It makes interesting reading. 
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NOTES OF 7 MARCH 1990 MEETING IN ABERDEEN 
The Meeting, chaired by Mr Ronald McDonald and representatives oj 
the NUSI GMBI and the TGWU, was attended by about 160 offshore 
workers and was held in the Trades Council Buildin-g. 
DEMAND FOR A CONTINENTAL SHELF AGREEMENT 
The meeting was told that the main argument was over the need for 
a Continental Shelf Agreement which would cover all types of work 
offshore; maintenance, construction, drilling, and catering. 
McDonald explained that 
traditionally reluctant 
because of the relative 
notices. "It's therefo: 
because the one vitally 
this togetherO. 
the latter two categories were 
to get involved in trade union activity 
ease with which they could be given NRB 
re great to see so many of you here today 
important message is that we're all in 
Shell and BP were accused of *buying off- their workers when 
safety was lax - athe men are effectively being offered money in 
compensation for a potential tragedyO. McDonald said that what 
had been given this year (financially) would be taken away next 
year, reminding the audience that in 1986 wages plummetted by 
30%. He also said that the pay discrimination between the North 
and South sectors had to stop, and hence the need for a 
comprehensive Continental Shelf Agreement. 
CALL FOR BETTER HOURS 
OILC also demands better "conditionse for workers in all sections 
of the industry. On averaget the offshore worker works a 21300 
hour year compared with an onshore average of 1,700 hours. In 
addition, the 2,300 hours is telescoped'into a 36-week cycle 
before holidays. 
-mcDonald produced a Department of Energy safety notice (No. 1/90) 
which stipulates that no worker should work more than 12 hours in 
a row. Workers from the audience produced a memo from Total 
confirming this, and saying that they were still being asked to 
do 16 hour shifts "back-to-back*. 
- -6 
- 
McDonald said that workers who agreed to do 16 hour shifts were 
Ocontemptuouso and should be treated like thieves who steal 
another man's work. orLC demands a uniform limit of twelve 
hours, although this would involveA 30% wage cut. 'We must 
accept this, because our argument for safety. A uniform 12 
hour limit will mean a fresher, sat"er workforce*. 
WHY THE NEED FOR OILC 
The Government was accused of running all the collective and 
national agreements covering all the trades and disciplines in 
the Industry. *That is why OILC was formed, as an illegal 
enabling and mediating bodyO. Many workers would not get 
involved in individual trade union activity, but in a short space 
of timer OILC has become the recognised *umbrellao for offshore 
workers. 
"Today's meetingg like the others we are holding regularly around 
the country - and south of the border too - is designed to inform 
you of what is happeninge so we can get your support for the sit- 
ins'. McDonald said that workers had been abused for too long, 
that oil companies were breaching the Mineral Working Act, and 
that workers' rights now had to be fought for. 
THE INDUSTRIAL ACTION 
The essence of the sit-ins would be on the first day. oILC 
believes it has secured sufficient SUPPort to shut down at least 
30 platforms as of day one. *Thus the companies will not be able 
to shut down the affected platforms - they might get away with 
losing the output of a few platforms, but not 300. 
The operators were already becoming aware of the activities of 
ojLC; the OBlowout" newspaper was now banned from all SEPCO 
installations. Disaffected workers on those platforms are 
particularly concerned that Filipino strike-breaker3 could be 
-used. "If the companies put just one foreign worker on a rig, 
weIll shut down the whole fucking lot". 
Money was being raised to help adminster the strike programme 
through a Ocard schemen which is being launched in Aberdeen soon. 
- 
AMOCO INCIDENT 
McDonald reported that the Inspectors had ruled that the 
platform, especially the accommodation block, was neither gas- 
proof# fire-proof, or blast-proof. Yet workers are still 
compelled to work on the platform because a "Certificate of 
Fitnesso was issued which doesn't expire until 1991. And yet 
peter Morrison said that *not one barrel of oil will leave until 
it can be done so safely". McDonald then said "little does he 
know how right his words are once OILC has had its say4. 
OTHER ISSUES DISCUSSED 
McDonald said that safety was increasingly becoming a problem on 
the Montrose platforms. *The reservoir is almost empty, and is 
just full of crapw. Workers were advised that the platforms 
could no longer be considered safe. 
OILC would be demanding that the 48 knot crossing limit on 
bridges should be adhered to everywhere. The bridges are 
failsafen and therefore have to be severefy mismanaged before 
activiating their "automatic lift facilitya and falling into the 
sea. A total of 14 bridges 
had fallen Lico the sea, and three 
men died on Piper Alpha when a 
bridge fell into the sea. The 
meeting was reminded of the 1981 incident when worXers were 
forced' to run over a bridge against their will. "This is stij-1 
happening, and it must stopm. 
I March 1990. 
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OFFSHORE INDUSTRY LIAISON CQWTITPF 
NOTES OF 28 MARCH 1990 MEETINGS 
IN NEWCASTLE AND MIDDLESBOROUGH 
The meetings in Middlesborough and Newcastle were held in 
the AEU offices and were attended by about thirty and forty 
offshore workers respectively. In both places, these were 
the fourth OILC meetings to be held, and Mr Ronald 
Macdonald - who chaired the meetings - commented that these 
attendences were lower than the previous two. They compare 
with figures of over a hundred at Aberdeen meetings and 
sixty to eighty in Glasgow. Both meetings lasted for about 
two hours twenty minutes. 
1. PURPOSE OF THE MEETINGS 
Macdonald said that the meetings, as most offshore workers 
would by now know, were being held to galvanise support for 
the oILC campaign to secure a "Continental Shelf Agreementm. 
OILC had brought the six offshore unions together, in order 
to devise an agreement that would ensure no offshore 
differentials in pay or conditions between the Northern 
southern sectors of the North Sea and in Morecambe Bay. 
currently, negotiations were far too "piecemeal*. For 
instance the recent caterers' deal, won by the TGWU and NUS, 
secured a wage increase but no official recognition by the 
companies. 
He reported that when union Officials met the occ (Offshore 
Contractors Council) in January, 
ýhey had agreed not to 
negotiate any "hook-up' agreements (9 of which are due in 
the next three years), as this covered barely ten percent of 
the workforce. 
The EETPU, however, had said that although they will abide 
by the inter-union agreement for now, (confirmed by their 
not renewing the SJIB agreement 
in February), they will 
negotiate separately 
in July if OILC are seen to be getting 
nowhere in their dispute. 
The Unions will be meeting In Glasgow on April 18th to 
spell-out their position. It is the first time all six 
unions, including the NUS and TG'dU, Will be allowed to take 
part in the OCA (Offshore ConstvictIcn Agreement). 
DEMANDS FOR A "CONTINENTAL SHELF AGREEMENT* 
Macdonald reported that the draft of a proposed "Continental 
Shelf Agreement' (CSA) would be distributed to members in 
the first week of April, and details would be published in 
the 'next edition of "Blowout", also available that week. 
The proposed CSA covers a number of areas, in particular it 
seeks a single agreement for all offshore workers 
irrespective of status or location. A key element is the 
right to full trade union recognition on all platforms, with 
annual negotiating rights on pay and conditions (especially 
those relating to safety). 
on the issue of hours of work and holiday entitlement, it 
was reported ' 
that BP had cut their 4-day bereavement 
allowance from 12 hours to 8 hours, and that Shell were only 
giving 3 days. Offshore workers worked, on average, a 2,180 
hour year compared with an onshore average of 1,840. The 
2,180 figure excludes travel time, so there will be a demand 
for an extra four weeks off during the year to bring the 
overall hours in line with onshore. This will mean that 
every quarter the cycle becomes two weeks on, three weeks 
off. 
In notivating the workers to support the action, it was 
essential to identify who would gain 
from a CSA. Caterers 
obviously would - because 
despite two wage rises in the last 
18 months, they still lagged behind in terms of status and 
recognition. Construction workers and 
drilling crew would 
gain, as a CSA would 
help protect them from the worst 
contractors such as APG and wood 
Group, who slashed their 
rates in 1986. Workers were reminded that at the start of 
last year, Wood Group were offering about ES/hour - "it 
could happen again". 
Members were reminded of the last year's united approach 
when UKOOA and the OCC told the contractors to give another 
E7.20. This year, there was "total disarray" amongst. the 
contractors and oil ccmpanies were doing *their own thing" 
especially Shell who are the most 
highly exposed. ' 
Asked what the attitude would be to the OILC's CSA demands 
from the contractors, Macdonald said that some would welcome 
it, some would be neutral, and the "worst* obviously 
wouldn't like it, such as contractors 
like Deetzmann who Zles-. Oý 
weren't in the OCC. A-Mod similarly - they 
don't even take 
part in the Crusader 
Insurance Scheme, which a CSA would 
make mandatory. 
A CSA would also get rid of the "NRB" threat, and would 
ensure proper grievance procedures. 
3. SHUTDOWN PROGRAMME 
The proposed industrial action will involve platform 
shutdowns on a rolling, "targeted" basis which will 
coincide - as far as possible - with the time at which 
individual platforms are at their most vulnerable during the 
refurbishment phase. The action will now be starting early 
than planned, probably in late May, and will progress into 
August /September. Macdonald said that the companies would 
not accept the demands for a continental shelf agreement, so 
the time was right to strike*. The industry was now seen 
as viable for at least another three decades, and over the 
next five years a E27 billion investment progranvne was at 
stake. 
onshore refinery workers, through the unions, will be 
involved this time around, and the aim will be to 'make the 
oil companies see sense* with regard to the demands for a 
cjA. Macdonald reported that last year's strikes clearly 
did not work, because they were not adequately co-ordinated 
and wthe oil wasn't stoppede. It was, in any case, more an 
expression of anger and frustration. This time, the aims 
were clear cut. 
"It's clear that, as the miners found out, you can't win a 
dispute until you hurt the middle classes in the Home 
Counties. well, this year we're going to stop the oil long 
enough to do just that. " He said that such a strategy was 
also the only way of ensur.: Ang that the UK press, not just 
the Scottish press, gave coverage to the issues at stake. 
It was clear that over forty platfor-ms would "definitely* be 
involved, and that while it was obvious to all that certain 
platforms would take part (for instance CORMORANT ALPHA), 
other platforms - crucial to the strategy - were currently 
,, lying low" and appearing to be non-problematic. However, 
"the key people have already been identified for most of the 
forty-odd platforms". 
It was reported that in anticipation of the summer troubles, BP 
and Shell (joined by Conoco in the Southern Sector and later in 
the Northern) had implemented an E8.03 pay rise as from April ist 
(notably, Marathon was waiting until the winter). This was seen 
as an attempt to placate workers, and Macdonald stressed that the 
dispute was not one about cash. It was about "basic rights, 
safety standards, and basically getting the same deal as the 
Norskies get*. 
4. PROBLEMS WITH FOREIGN LABOUR AND 1992 
It was reported that MacDermott's of Louisiana and a Dutch 
company Hermac had formed a joint venture company which has 
pooled together five barges, off the Dutch coast, manned by a 
multi-disciplined Filipino crew, trained at the US naval 
refurbishment base at Cebu, Phillipines. 
This was a "sign of things to come*, with three of the barges 
already operational. Some work had already been carried out of! 
Humberside and in Morecambe Bay, and this was a clear threat to 
the UK workforce, as labour costs are approximately E10 a day. 
After 1992, the company would be able to operate anywhere, and 
woul-d certainly be used in major construction aand abandonment 
projects. 
NEWS FROM OFFSHORE 
ARBROATH: A problem had developed with Press Offshore, who had 
delayed a wage review due in January until April. The workers 
involved were not satisfied about this, but had been unable to do 
anything about it. 
13RENT: Bravo and Delta were already virtually non-operational. 
With David Robertson working on Bravo [his wife is Macdonald's 
secretary), information was easy to get 
hol4l of regarding BP's 
activities. 
ComORANT ALPRA: With the companies apparently concentrating the 
shop stewards on this platform, earning it the nickname *the 
Gulag", there would be no problems "activating" the platform. 
Macdonald pointed out that if Cormorant Alpha goes down, so does 
the oil from seven other platforms. 
SHELL FIELD: This would be the hardest-hit field. "Everything 
will stop". It was reported that Shell were planning to compres 
a2 year work programme (as measured in manhours) into seven 
weeks. "They will lose the most, which in some ways is a shame, 
cos the management is better than many" said Macdonald. 
FORTIES: With the removal of so many stewards, there was "a 
problem here*. Workers were concentrating on triviality, and 
Macdonald said this exemplified "management's inability to 
manage". Good trade union representation would lead to better 
offshore harmony, whereas now "thing's have got to such a stage 
that the men just aren't willing to take any more shit. * 
with nine shop stewards already removed, an acting steward has 
also been thrown off Forties. Press Offshore admitted that the 
man was treated "unfairly" and offered him Montrose. Apparently 
when he said he -wanted to go back to Forties, Press Director 
Thain said "I, m afraid the client (BPI don't want you there". 
OILC are trying to get confirmation of this statement in writing 
CHEVRON: Members were asked whether they knew of the "Donut" 
escape system, already introduced by Chevron, which had receivec 
substantial publicity. it was "hype" of a huge magnitude, and 
the meetings were told that Piper survivor Bob Ballantyne, who 
had looked at the "Donut*, said it wouldn't be much use in a firs 
anyway. 
AMOCO/MONTROSE: The catalogue of events in mid-Febraury was 
related, and it was explained. that eventually the Department of 
Energy had had to give an exemption certificate for the platform. 
Workers were very concerned about staying on this platform *where 
even the helideck's made of wood". 
THISTLE: A worker from the platform reported that recently he hac 
argued with a safety officer about stopping drilling, because 10C 
mph winds were creating "very dangerous c. 6nditions, everyone on 
the floor half the time". Apparently, the safety officer repliec 
that he could stop anything on the platform except drilling - he 
could only make a recommendation to stop as regards drilling. 
MISCELLANEOUS 
It was reported that Press Offshore are currently in *the proceý. Zr 
of screening a PR video to all workers prior to their going 
offshore. The video, in which P-ress's IRO Bill Murray appears, 
supposedly has two offshore workers being told how saýe the Nor- 
Sea now is. In fact, the two are professional actors, and 
Macdonald advises all Press workers not to *waste a day watchinq 
twenty minutes of crapo. 
rt was also reported that an offshore worker had had a heart 
attack en route to the Norwegian sector, and that as his 
contractor did not have the right insurance, his widow would be 
getting nothing. Macdonald reiterated the need for a 
comprehensive shelf agreement, which he said would eliminate a 
disgraceful situation such as this one". He is planning to 
visit the Dutch union FWZ in April, when he will be going to 
Rotterdam for a fortnight's holidaý. 
29.. 3-1990. 
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UKCS INDUSTRIAL RELA TIONS DISPUTES CFr; CE External & Corp. Affairs 
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, 
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'the course of the past year or so an unofficial trade 
union body, the Oil Industry Liaison COMmit-ee (OILC) , has sought to put pressure on the operating companies to obtain 
a National offshore Agreement. They have pressed their 
claim under the guise of seeking better representation cn 
safety committees, but th4&. s is really a cove--- for the bigger 
objective. 
With no national agreement in alace, the industry 
collectively has been very fragmented in its response and 
aas been compelled to - I follow the negotiated settlements of BP and Shell who broke ranks and conceded to the demands 
being made. The result has been that the remaining 
companies have had no influence over events, whereas if a 
national agreement were 
in place we would naturally have an 4nput into any negotiations. 
Marathon has tended to support the concept of a national 
agreement because, 
I 
(a) it appears to be an inev--able 
cuý&co-"je, (b) there is scme suL-s--ance --a -he claim Of the 
workforce, but (c) and perhaps -nore iniportantly, the Ux 
Government is very keen to see Indust-_ Jal peace and stable 
production conditions on the UKCS. This has been 
particularly SO since the Piper Alpha disaster and has 
produced messages from the Minis-t-er which urge operators to 
avoid industrial relations disputes. 
So far Marathon has not been afA fecIted and at the present 
time remains outside the Current dis. pute. 
'lowever, today's unof. -Eicial act-, cn C, ccin 'des 
invasion of Kuwait, wh-, ch Is a-mcst Certai. n 
-, eriod of prolonged oil market -4nstab_j_1_, ty. 
-workforce is bound to real-ise t.,,. a-, these ev 
additional bargaining str-311, (gth and they may 
order to step up pressure. 
wittoh 
ptrhoedulcreaqa-4 
The of ý "shore ants give them 
iell use It in 
further industrial ac-=-4 on does take place, then the UK 
, 6overnment. 's concerns wi. 
11-1 be "MUl't-JIplied. They wj 11 want 
. he oil 
to flow with even greater ur gency and could, if t1he 
-worst happens, put more pressure on zhe Coerating companies. 
:::,. r- I -l .............. 
To: J. V. Parziale From: R. J. Carter 
My own view is that in a Situation where we have been led by 
the nose by BP and Shell, we have nothing to lose by 
supporting the concept of national agreements. What f or= 
these agreements should take and how far they should extend 
must remain open for discussion, but if the disputes 
continue, I think Government will seek to push us in the 
general direction of an accommodation with the Unions. 
R. C. Earlougher Ynr. 
D. E. Smith 
P. L. Wcod 
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Findlay rocm D. E. SMith 
Industrial Relations London 
The -, Industrial Relations situation in the North Sea 
continued to worsen over the weekend. At 19-00 hours 
Friday, August 3, the majority of Brae 'A' contract workers 
on , the gas disposition project began an unofficial wildcat 
strike. They made no demands stating only that they were 
striking "in sympathy with their brother workers on other 
installations". Marathon management offshore ( in 
concurrence with onshore management) advised the workers to 
return to their jobs by 24-00 hours or they would be 
downmanned and returned to shore to sort out their 
difficulty with their respective employers. At 24.00 
hours the workers advised they would not return and were in 
turn told they were to return to shore. A total of 79 men 
were transported to shore on Saturday, August 4, without 
incident. 
Subsequent to the Brae 'A' group being removed, an action 
began on Brae IBI on Saturday, August 4. A total of 57 men 
beg,,, i an unofficial strike and were transported to shore an 
Sunday, August 5, without incident. Additiciially, 17 more 
Brae 'A' contractors joined the strike and were also sent 
in. one further Brae 'A' employee went out on Monday. 
The 154 personnel who have been removed are mainly employed 
as welders, fitters, riggers and scaffolders. It is 
noteworthy that all of our contractors have -' not been 
affected. Contract operators, crane operators, deck 
crews, drillers and catering personnel have remained. 
These personnel, along with 21 personnel from the affected 
companies who did not go out, give an adequate workforce to 
continue virtually nor-mal production operations. 
Production operations continue in a normal manner on both 
platformls and dri. 11-ing has not been affected. Adequate 
crews also remain to continue with the critical generator 
repairs on Brae W. The repaired 
interturbine duct has 
been received and installed on ICI berth and the repaired 
jet engine is in route to the f ield by boat. A second 
generator should be running by the end of the week. The 
gas dispcSition project 
is shut down and we are evaluating 
how to progress it at this point. The impact on 
production is that the gas 
lift systems will not be operable 
until it is completed, costing approximate 1", r 2500 barre's 
joer da, -,, on 
Brae IAI. 
The issues in the dispute are centered on two areas as 
follows: 
1. North Sea-wide Union Recognition - The majority of 
workers are currently union members. However, they 
belong to a wide variety of organizations. There is no 
agreement encompassing the longterm construction and 
maintenance work on platforms. An agreement did exist 
for construction and hook-up on new structures. 
However, it lapsed early this year. The target appears 
to-be one agreement which would cover both areas. 
2. Safety At present the Department 0f Energy is 
responsible for offshore safety. The drive is to change 
that responsibility to the "Health and Safety Executive" 
who have a similar function onshore. (The current 
systern miMiCS the U-S where OSHA does not apply offshore, 
, MMS 
is responsible). The H&SE have provisions for 
, workforce safety 
representatives who are appointed by the 
governing union, i. e. defacto unionization of the 
workforce. 
These issues have been presented only via the media through 
an unofficial group called the oil Industry Liaison 
Committee (OILC) located in Aberdeen and headed by one 
Ronnie McDonald. As of Monday, August 6, it appears that 
Virtually every facility in the U. K. sector of the North Sea 
is*, involved to some extent. McDonald has publicly called 
for an all-out strike. A number of more militant strikers 
on other installations have opted to "sit-in" and are 
refusing transportation to shore. Numerous reports of 
strong-arm tactics are surfacing in which workers trying to 
stay on the job are being physically threatened by 
sympathizers. On the other hand, many contractors did not 
go out and it is unlikely that much, if any, production is 
currently affected. 
The situation is obviously very confused with the variety of 
companies and contractors involved and no "of 'Llicial" union 
or demand to deal with. our current plans are to deal 
with the situation as an -'-'-Ieqal strike and remove workers 
who walk off the job. At the same time we are working 
with our contractors who are affected to determine what, i,, 12 
any, demands are being made and what steps can be taken to 
return construction crews to work. We have suspended crew 
change of these workers the men going cou"t "%,.,. o "relieve" 
striking employees) for the time being. A meeting of 
contractors is schedu'Lead in Aberdeen today which also may 
shed some light on the situat--on. 
1 will keep you posted. ? lease advise : an answer any 
cruestions 
eii c-11. 
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UKCS Industrial Relations Disputes Aberdeen 
The sporadic work stoppages by offshore contractor personnel 
have continued for approximately three weeks under the 
orchestration of the unofficial oil Indust-ry Liaison 
committee (OILC) - At this point a comment from the 
operations end of the business, regarding R.. 7. Carter's 
letter of August 2, seems appropriate. . 
The mass media has finally begun to characterize the reasons 
for the action as first, recognition of a North Sea-wide 
labor agreement and second, improved safety conditions. 
UKOOA (United Kingdom Offshore Operators 
- Association) 
spokesmen have done a creditable 
job of presenting the 
industry view that safety is not the issue, only the lever 
being used by the organizers. All sides of the dispute 
acknowledge that increased pay 
is not at issue. 
ý, 'ver the course of three weeks of industrial action, 
production in the North Sea has been affected very little 
46.0 
-on and maintenance programs at-,: all. Planned constructl 
have been deferred, but with, little pain to the industry. 
The resolve of the major operators (Shell and BP) has been 
demonstrated by their willingness to demobilize the striking 
members of the workforce. In summary, the workers being 
led by the OILC have not succeeded in causing major problems 
for,,, the industry. They have begun to lose substantial work 
time and consequently wages. With the only objective 
being representation, the strikers' resolve is beginning to 
weaken. Marathon's Pcsition in all t'h_4s has been that 
our critical safety relazed work was done during 1989. 
Recognizing what was to =cme, we have prepared for and 
accomplished reducing :,, ur *wcr< force to a minimum level and fr= --he major 
., 
istancing ourselves industrial acticn. 4f 
',; e can certainly endure 'a 
protracted strike and expect that 
the event safety re azed wcrk is required, we can get 
staff to accomplish 
it. Ray Carter's comments on 
4ntervention may come true. However, 
, ossible government date government has been ramýrkabl. absent from any 
current questions are: *,; l-.. -=_-_- _Jc "we qc fn., -i here aln. d how 
see the we ria f resc'-.: -_4 zn 3f he t. d; saqreements? 
2-3t,, cnIs ncr-mal I-ass : han 511. of the 
-zsincre contract latccr fs-_-:: -ý :: cnpared zz: 3P and Shell whc , -5 C" : qether employ Over - These nunters w4 11 not change , T%r and 
. I, zstant: 
ial as a :: -Saquencs ',; e -"Cn't : -, ow have a 
-; ea- 
Agreement that situation would not be altered. We might 
have input but influence comes from the power of numbers. 
Two aspects of an all encompassing union agreement are very 
concerning. First, the union would have leverage to 
severely impact production by calling out a wider scope of 
workers than they can now accomplish. Secondly, if caught 
in that situation, virtually our only course of action would 
be to dismiss the contractors and take laborers onto the 
Marathon payroll in those slots. we would be seeking 
talent from a relatively small group of specialists and 
would in all liklihood hire unionists who could and would 
attempt to organize the entire workforce. The kind of 
projects we operate are so sensitive to early and continuous 
cash 
' 
flow that this position is virtually intolerable. 
As -a consequence, we should direct our efforts to continue 
frustrating the efforts to organize. 
The offshore industry in the U. K. has continued for 25 years 
without an all encompassing union agreement. The primary 
reason the unions have failed in their organizing efforts is 
the, 
, 
fragmentation of the workforce. The seven national 
unions trying to organize over 30 contractors working for 20 
operators on 50 sites has presented a logistical nightmare 
they have been unable to overcome. The OILC has presented 
a focal point. However, the unions are unwilling to 
surrender power to them. The OILCIs only lever to success 
has been their ability to play on the Piper Alpha disaster 
and-, that memory is slowly fading. I believe that by 
maintaining our stance 'tthat the unions must deal with the 
contractors and at the same time pressing the contractors we 
can forestall this effort and maintain the current 'Ifree 
market" contractor system. One objective of the workers 
equal is to obtain more treatment and we are working in that 
direction through better pay, comparable living and meal 
conditions and longer term contracts for key contract, - 
employees. These efforts must continue along with a 
strong reaction to any work stoppages. 
In summary, unionizat-on does not appear to be inevitable 
and we can play an important: role in prevent'ing it. In 
turn, we must ensure that there are no abuses of our 
contract workforce as they are an integral and i-niportant 
facet of our team. 
cc: R. J. Carter 
P. L. Wood 
J. R. McClellan. 
R. C. Earlougher 
I 
cumau PLACE 
zoz: A-B UQ 
12 August 1991 
Dear General Secretary 
L_ 
0 
0224 640-1,0t) 
At the last meeting of the Inter Union Offshore Oil Committee in 
Aberdeen, the Committee unanimously agreed that it would wish to 
investigate further a proposition to re-organise the IUOOC on 
similar lines to the Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineer- 
ing Unions. It was felt that this could possibly assist the 
Unions in their long running battle to achleve recognition j4. n the 
C)ffshore industry. 
In order * 
to continue the discussions on this proposition the 
Committee -wishes. to invite all unions in membership to nominate 
3- their sedior official with responsibility for offshore oil %. o 
attend a meeting during the Trades Union Congress in Glasgow. 
A room has been booked at the Scottish Exhibition and Conference 
Centre for this meeting at 12.30 pm on Thursday 5 September and Ir 
would be grateful if you would let me know the names of the 
senior officials (limited to 2) who will represent Your union. 
Local/Regional Officials who normally attend the ILUOOC will also 
be present. When I receive the names I will tend'them a copy of 
a working document which will be the basis for our discussions. 
yC)Urs sincerely 
lit 
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: S: E: 
2! 
1; 
jýýTARY7 k% 
INTER-UNION 
OFFSHORE OIL COMMITTEE 
-1 
mm 
1/ 
OFFSHORE OIL COMMIT7EE 
I; 
/ _"s 
/1 
A. CAP. IFSE: I F: =. D 
0224 640 -' 9 Gi 
NI ý". ABI 
1UQ 
XEIJ PLACE 
on Tuesday, 4th July, 1989 
Sec. -etzirv 
Minutes of the IUOOC Meeting held in the TGWU Offices, Aberdeen, 
PRESENT: E. Bree GMB 
W. Duncan - NUS 
R. Eadie - EETPU 
T. Lafferty - AEU 
J. Locke - TGWU 
1. McFarlane - AEU 
m- McVicar - NIUS 
A. Miller - EETPU 
B. Parker - NUMAST 
C. -Reid - MSF R. Spiller - MSF 
J. Taylor - TT4U 
F. Doran - MP 
L. McDonald - Researcher 
R. McDonald - OILC 
Miriutes of the IUOOC of 7th June, 1989 
Cn a proposal from E. Bree, seconded by N. MaVicar, 
the Minutes 
9 7th June, 1989, were accepted as a correct record. of 
matters Arising 
none 
Contract Workers' Dispute Offshore I 
:. raj--fe=-z: Y updated ý; --he meecing cn the current Situaticn wiý-. h 
"egard to the stri , 
ke ac-Jon taLng place offshcre. He also 
ýshcre --n referrea to the 
d-ccumented cffer made by Press Off 
Jay' 
INTER-UNION 
2. 
day, 30th June, 1989. A number of amendments were proposed to 
the draft document and Press intimated that they would probably 
consider these and respond at a meeting on the following Monday. 
-As a result of 
the discussions with Press, men working on the 
ýZafe Felicia indicated that they were prepared to return to 
'lormal working subject to certain conditions and a number agreed 
to leave the sit-in and return to shore as they had completed 
zheir,, normal turn of duty. It transpired, however, that the 
ýtmployer refused to allow a return to work and the men were 
that they were expected to leave the platform. At Lnformed or 
ýAxound the ý same time 
it was learned that BP had contracted a 
'I=ber of foreign nationals to undertake work which would allow tzhem to continue production. This led to a call for a total 
i 
ttoppage across the North Sea in support of the demand that the 
itcab labour be removed immediately. 
e TGWU and the NUS officials both expressed their' extreme 
oncern at having been excluded from meetings at which new terms 
: nd conditions were being discussed and felt that they had been 
zccluded deliberately by the construction Unions, despite the 
-act that the professed policy of the OILC was for a one industry 
-, 
Ireement, including catering and drilling. It was pointed out 
, lat the meetings held had been called at extremely short notice 
were addressed primarily to the construction indust-rv. The 
; Z1 
r 
'la 
'0 
;: ýnstruction unions had, however, intimated to the employers that 
'lless the catering and drilling sides of the contract business 
"! Ltre included in any new proposals there would be no deal struck. 
%ke EETpEj officials made it clear that the SJIB agreement which 
'ýU recently been concluded w, ould not be allowed to 'wither' in 
-kSvour of any one industry agreement. It was the EETPU's inten- 
on to continue to protect its members irrespec. tive of any one Rdtstry 
agreement. 
ý, 
h behalf of the OILC, R. McDonald intimated that 14--he Committee's 
Pýlicy was still for a one industry agreement. He also ex- [\*'essed the view that the EETPU had lost credibility with their 
membership by concluding a new agreement with the SJIB with- 
referring the offer to their members. He alsc intimated 
offshore rank and file workers could see divisions ýLt the 
t which was giving cause for concern. thin the IUCOC 
ý11! ý NUS. of, 94cials indicated that the NUS were qui: e =. repared to 
.L -ý ;: -;. -ý along with a one 
indusitry agreemen't, but on'_ -- --s was done 
r4er the banner of the IUCOC. 
3. 
It was pointed out by the AEU of f icials that currently there was 
a widespread dispute in the North Sea but no deal on the table 
and the IUOOC should be taking appropriate action to support the 
workforce. 
The MSF officials intimated that it was their view that there 
should and had to be a one industry agreement. Unless catering, 
drilling and service companies were involved and the agreement 
concluded formally, the workforce would be back at square one in 
twelve months time. 
It 
-was agreed 
that: the unions would make attempts to contact 
related onshore sites at Wytch Farm, Sullom Voe, Grangemouth, St. 
Fergus etc. asking for their support for the offshore membership. 
It was also agreed that contact should be made with the Norwegian 
Trades Unions and the International Trades Union Federations 
asking for their support. 
It was unanimously agreed that the following statement would be 
made available at the meeting of the OILC to be held later that 
day: - 
"This meeting of the IUOOC expresses its total suppor4t- 
for those workers who are currently engaged in indus- 
trial action offshore and expresses the hope that no 
services will be provided to 'scab' labour. 
0 
We state our intention 
io 
pursue with vigour the estab- 
lishment of a single offshore agreement with the repre- 
sentatives of all offshore employers covering all 
contract workers in the offshore oil industry. " 
This statement would also be released to the media. 
Meeting closed at 10.50 a. m. 
A. Campbell Reid 
Secretary 
/V /V 
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Differential resources appl'ied by different unions. 
Unions perceived to have a more effective policy on 
Health and Safety creating a recruiting atmosphere 
The initial absence of collective bargaining over terms 
and conditions reduced traditional loyalties. 'Anyone' 
can provide insurance. 
The industrial action of the recent past has been iess 
ýeffective than might have been the case because of the impact 
,0f the 
*1 aw and the -res tr i ct i ons that has pI aced an the ur i ons 
"-whi ! st urof 
f icia' bodies - ike tie CILC car organise, the 
abserce 0ff orma I -endcrsemer. t by the Na t ý' ona Uniors weakenec 
,, he overa'l effort. 
6)- The perception of a cr--up of offshore activ. ýsts was tz 
ov, come t-ese problems 'z-, :a irg fcr the estab : sh. rr. er-. t z- a 
. gie offshore Sir urion. 
ir terms perceived by those eitner 
unaware of the probiems -, r : e'iterately seekirg tc ; grcre t: -e 
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:,, The secretariat of the Confederation cou; c be either 
seconded officials or appointed. 
Representation an the Committee could be either by 
officials appointed by the union bureaucracy or from Area 
Committees or from the offshore membership or a 
combination of any of these 
Unions change their own rules to permit greater autoncmy 
if needed to perm it the Sect i ors tc fu rcfe ir 
the Confederation 
9),... - The f inal stage might not 
be necessary and may Sc 4urther 
tham some member unions would wish. 
the unanimous backirg -_f the *, oca, fu , 0) These 
ideas have 
time off icials frcm Aberdeen and East ArS, ;a who are 
resporls ibie for 
I ook ing af ter the UK f, 4 f st-cre membersh ip. We 
ccmmend it to the 
Nationa' Off I; cia, s as a S-: art Irc paint 4-: r 
debate. without some more 
forn-a- rrethoc :, s tr ngi - mc toget. -er 
the representat i ves of a: ' 
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The matter is however urgent. The . vcrl%f. zrce are rot 
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OFFSHORE INDUSTRY LIAISON COMMITTEE 
CRITERION BUILDINGS, 52 GUILD STREET, ABERDEEN ABI 2NB 
r Tel: (0224) 210118 
Fax: (0224) 210095 
TGold: 74: MIK2712 Geonet: OIL-COMMITTEE 
24 HOUR INFORMATION: (0224) 210119 
T: I Reldý 
ýýIlon offshore 01.1 Committee 
of Muchalls 
,: GEU 
Izzbell 
vour ýletter of the 
21st.. instant cutlininiz the preliminary aire-nda for the 
meeting of Wednesday 
30th. October, please include the f 0110 . wing, - 
IL-pa'ation for membership of the IX. O. O. C. from the cffshore union 
'-Industrv Liaison Committee. hore 
Ztanks for your assistance on this matter. 
Sincerely 
I McDona 'ýd 
a 
Secretary:. 
ý,. -, T"ERUNION Campbell Reid Mayfield' 
'RE OIL COMMITTEE Bridge Of Muchalls Aberdeen AB3 2RR. 
-PA- 
EEPTU-GM8-MSF-NUMAST- RMT-T&GWU 
Tel. 0569-30086 
November 1991 
: ýr Ronnie MacDonald 
keting Chairman 
! ýffshore Industry Liaison Committee 
lZriterion Buildings 
Z2 Guild Street 
ABERDEEN ABI 2NB 
tear Ronnie 
7, q e Application from OILC for membership of 
- -the IUOOC 
-------------------------------------------- 
Further to your letter of 25 October 1991, Your request for ; 
embership an behalf of the OILC was discussed by the Commist-tee 
at'their meeting on 30 October 1991. 
I am instructed by the Committee to inform you that the applica- 
tion from the OILC was rejected by an overwhelming majority. 
jours faithfullY 
,X CAMPBELL REID 
Secretary 
4 
-Maytieic 
OFFSHORE OIL COMMITTEE Bridge of Mucliads Aberdeen AB3 2RR 
AEU-BALPA- EEPTU-GMB-MSF- NUMAST- RMT-T&GWU 
Tel. 0569-30086 
21 November 1991 
Mr Ronnie MacDonald 
Manager 
Offshore Information Centre 
Criterion Buildings 
52 Guild Street 
ABERDEEN AB12NB 
[: ear Ronnie 
4e: OIC Attendance At IUOOC Meetings 
------------------------------------ 
At their 
' 
meeting on 30 October 1991, the IUOOC decided to with- 
draw their invitation to the Offshore Information Centre to send 
a delegate to IUOOC meetings. 
-This decisiPn , was 
taken in light of the changed circumstances 
zince, the OIC was first invited to attend the IUOOC meetings in 
'ýecember 1989. 
Zours sincerely 
A CAMPBELL REID 
ýZCRETARY 
i 
inr 
Aj e- 2e vt vý i- >c 
INTER-UNION Secretary:. _Campbell Reid 
LI 
'Mayfield' 
OFFSHORE OIL COMMITTEE Bridge of Muchalls Aberdeen AB3 213R. 
AEU-BALPA-EEPTU-GMB-MSF-NUMAST-RMT-T&GWU- EPlu 
Tel. 0569-30086 
30 November 1992 
Mr Fraser Adam 
GMB 
59 Dee Street 
ABERDEEN 
Dear Fraser 
REF: D ROBERTSON 
---------------- 
At the IUOOC meeting held on 12 November 1992 the abovenamed 
attended claiming to be the lay representative of the GMBATU. On 
a previous occasion he had attended a meeting of Ithe committee 
only to clearly articulate the policies of the OILC rather than 
those of 'the GMB, causing offence and was asked to withdraw. 
At the meeting on 12 November the Chair ruled that Robertson was 
not entitled to be present as he the Chair, had been informed 
verbally by yourself that Robertson 
had no autharitty to speak on 
behalf of the GMB. The Chair's comments on this Point were 
confirmed by another union representative. 
As a result the Chair's ruling excluding Robertson was not chal- 
lenged and he was asked to leave. This he did. 
The Committee have asked me to seek your 
avoid any possible unpleasantness in th 
possibles, when you are unable to attend 
mittee, that you informed the Secretary 
name(s) -of any lay delegate(s! authorised 
of the GMB. 
assistance to try and 
future. Wculd it - be 
meetings of the ccm- 
of the lUOOC, of the 
to speak, "vote c-n behalf 
T i. n vcur .: ---aperaticn a nd ihanking you 
understanding. 
yours sincerely 
CAMPBELL REID 
AO oq 0/ 1 rv 
x 
Secretary: - INTER-UNION Campbell Reid 
Mayfield' 
Bridge of Muchalls OFFSHORE- OIL COMMITTEE Aberdeen AS3 2RP 
AEU -BALPA- EEPTU- GMS-MSF- NUMAST- RMT-T&GWU 
Tel. 0569-30086 
a"January 1991 
! -Ir Campbell Christie 
%; eneral Secretary 
". T. U. C. 
Zliddleton House 
16 Woodlands Terrace 
'XASGOW G3 6DF 
bear Campbell 
'QIL, INDUSTRY LIAISON ". '%'; r4MI"-rTEE (OILC) 
-------------------------------------- 
Z7or the past few years the member unions of the inter Unic. - 
; Ufshore Oil committee (IUCCC) all of whom are affiliated I. c the 
, S; TUC, have given both financ-Lal and moral support to 'he 
tives of the OILC. Despite ccertain reservations about t-he at--i- 
t, ", de adopted 
by t-he leadersh. it, at times the I-UCCC acceptecd 
there was a genuine attempt being made to crgan-4se 4--.! -. e of-ch-cre 
qorkforce and to represent Itheir aspirations both i. n. Healtln. and- 
Wety terms and in the area of terms and ccnd-"---Jcns of empl: y- 
zent. 
During the pasIt year the IUCCC has bee -n very involved in : ryinc 
ý, O i. mprove the Trade Union organisation as it affects -he 
shore cil and gas indusltry. Many of us have felt for years t", a: 
-inions at national 
level have been less than whole hearted _n 
: heir approach to the organisation of the Offsh, cre 
Fericus attempts are now being made to set --, p a "Confederat4-- 
Cffshore Workers' which w-4.11.1 be modelled =n : he CSEU but wýi-:.: h 
be independent cf :: hat organisaticn. A r, iniC _4 al 
:: --nst-4tuticn has 
been fformula--ed by Alec Ferry 
be discussed at a mee: ina 4n Londcn 
? rogreSs has been made and the UCCC bel-'eves 
! ý-jst and w-4-1-1 
beccme a reaal--r--, I -n th-, s wa-, w 
ý zz.; iz., a" Tr ad es 
un -L=s ::. an --r. e : 
-: he : --f-f-sn-Cre 
; __ Z- and a second 
azer this mcnzn. 
::. 'i a z: t. - e 
e bell eve 7n- 
e -a n d. -- =- c Z' Lý 
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Bomb kilaed 
, 
ItAan ofl 
010 c1def A4aftei 
Autopsy sheds light on 35 -year mystery 
DAVID WILLEY 
In Rome 
THE DEATH in an air crash in 
October 1962 of Eanco Mattei, 
powerful president of Italy's 
state-owned oil company ENI, 
and sometime bane of the. 
seven sisters", the US oil cartel, 
has been one of postwar Italy's 
longest lasting political mystery 
stories. I Did his private plane crash 
accidentally as it was approach- 
ing Milan's linate airport, or 
was there a borub on board? 
According to the Turm daily 
La Stampa the mystery has now 
been definitively cieared up. Mr 
Mattei was murdered by the 
Sicilian Mafia, /who had been 
hired to kill him by his'lYansat- I, lantic business and political on- i 
anues. 
Analysis of minute Piecei A 
metal taken firom his corpse,, ' 
exhurned by )udicial order ij 
June 1995. has shown tha 
there was a bomb on board 
plane and that he died as tqh 
result of an explosion- 
Tile newspaper quoted 
sources close to the public pros- 
ecutor of Pavia, Vincenzo Calia, 
who appointed university re- 
searchers and aerodynamics 
experts to carry out a detailed 
examination of the kagments; 
embptdded in his hody. Although 
%Ir Call a is refu 
his fmal repoi 
case, due tro be issued in abqut 
one, rnonth's ti; -ne. he has bot 
denied La Slampa's story. 
Enrlci Mattei took off from 
atania in Sicily on 'he evening 
-; 1' 27 October 1962 to ny to 
Rome On board ýuis pnvate 
plane %%as in Arnericar IYme 
L ife 
' 
iournahst Williarr, ', Icliale. 
who also died, toggethe, , .,, h the, 
P60', 'I_IIe. rIO RertI17. - 1-irnp 
r1he iiiiiht the destina-a_: ! f! , 
Enrico Mattel: Refused 
follow US price setting 
flight plan was changed from M 
Rome to Milan. The plane wo 
crashed in trees not far short of wi 
the runway ad There have been several of- 
f1cial enquiries during the 35 th 
years which have elapsed since an 
the crash, none of which has tri 
been conclusive. Most were an 
shelved on the basis that the re! 
cause was most 11keiy pilot error wi 
or accidental. ml 
Mauro de Mauro, a Sicilian au 
journalist who began a private 
enquiry into the Maffbi mystery. 
disappeared in the early 1980g. 
His body was never found, but 
he is presumed to have been 
murdered hv the Mafta. 
In November 1994 the f6r- 
mer Mafia boss. Tommaso 
Huscetta, who turned state ev- 
idence and is row a protP. cW. d 
witness in Italy and the United 
States, wrote in his book Fare- 
well Cosa Nostra that -the si- 
cdidn Maria sentonced Enrivo 
klartei to die. He I-ad damaged 
certain important American 
business tnterests Ln LheMiddle I 
East" 
91 ! he o rit.. he died Mr Mattel 
had me of the most 
owerful managers uf state 
wried industry in Italy. He dis- 
ursed large sums of money to 
Wy's politicai parties. not omy 
the ruling Christian Demo- 
ts, but also to the opposition 
Ommumsts. 
ENI was set up by Benito 
fussobni before the Second 
Vorld War After the fall of Fas- 
ism, Enrico Mattet built it up 
ito a formidable international 
I company which refused to 
llow the price setting decreed 
y the LIS oil companies. 
Members of Mr Matte., 's farn- 
V welcomed the news given by 
2 Stampa with some scepti- 
sm. "No ont, has told us any- 
ing officially. " said Rosangela 
attei, his granddaughter -IN! 
e have ne%, er doubted that he, 
as killed by a bomb, " she id6d. 
In a land whero ronspirary 
eories flourish. it is rare foi 
y investigation into long ago) 
igedies to come up with new 
d hard evidence. The ftna! 
suit of Judge C. alia's findings 
II therefore be awaited with 
ore than usual interest this 
twnn. 
P. 132 
114ý6, 
,4 ml tx ý4 1ý I( 
Italy sheds light 9ý1, 
, 
Mattei death mystery 
By Paul Betts in Milan 
Italy has long had a 
penchant for sinister myster- 
ies. Few have been darker 
t4 the dqath 35 years ago 
dtri'nTo Mattei, founder of 
Eni, the oil company. 
On Thursday a magistrate 
from Pavia finally concluded 
that Mattei was assassinated 
when a bomb blew up his 
private jet on its approach to 
Milan on October 27 1962. 
The revelation that Mat- 
tei's jet was sabotaged, has 
confirmed what most Ital- 
ians had suspected from the 
beginning. After the crash, 
there was speculation that 
Mattei had been assassi- 
nated because he had 
become an uncomfortably 
powerful figure both in Italy 
and in the international oil 
industry. 
Despite the findings, the 
magistrate has completed 
only the first part of his 
investigation, which estab- 
lished the cause of Mattei's 
death. 
The next chapter of the 
roman noir will involve dis- 
covering who was responsi- 
ble for planting the bomb. 
This is likely to be an even 
more arduous task. So far, 
the magistrate has only 
charged a local farmer, now 
aged 76, for perjury. It 
appears the farmer was the 
only eyewitness of the crash, 
declaring at the time that he 
saw the jet turn into a "fire- 
ball" in the sky. Subse- 
quently he denied this and 
claimed he only saw a fire in 
the fields after the crash. 
The mystery surrounding 
what has become known as 
the "Mattei affair". the sLib- 
ject of films and books. 
includes speculation over 
whether Mattei was the vic 
tim of an international con- 
spiracy or of the local mafia. 
Mattei's rise to fame fol- 
lowed his discovery, shortiv 
after the war, of large gas 
resources in the Po vallev. 
which enabled him to build 
Eni and become one of the 
architects of Italy's post-war 
reconstruction. 
He then became a thorn in 
the side of large integrated 
international oil companies 
by attempting to break their 
cartel and negotiating con- 
tracts with third world oil 
producing countries. fie also 
became troublesome for the 
mafia because of his efforts 
to develop a petrochemical 
industrv in Siefiv. 
After his death and 12 
years of investigations, ju(Ii 
oial authorities decided t, 
,; h(, Iv(- the cast, on the 
grounds of insufficient evi 
dence. Then. three vv; irs 
ago. Tomina. so Busui, ml, ýj 
inafia mO)ster turned tatiý s 
evidence and declar(ýd thýti 
Nlattei had been killod I)%- 
the Sicilian Nlafia a, ;j 
fa vour to -A m eri va n 
friends". 
This prompted the Pnvia 
inagistrate to reopon the 
Two years a, _, o MatteF, 
corpse W; I sexhtiini- (I 
Experts exa in ine (I tIIo 
remains and discovored 
Inents of nietal. Indicatill'-, 
that an explosion had takon 
place on board Ow aircralt, 
1-t /--- -- - 61 Councillor Isobel Rhinct 
:5 r5, e-fAll-l 
Councillor Isobel 
Chrissie Rhind 
Born: 15 January, 1924, in 
Tollesbury, Essex 
Died: 18 May, 1996, aged 
72 
ISOBEL Rhind, one of the best 
known Highland councillors, 
collapsed on the Inverness-Lon- 
don sleeper train on Saturday 
Morning while travelling south 
to begin a holiday. 
She represented Invergordon 
for 32 years, beginning herlocal 
government service with Ross 
and Cromarty County Council in 
1964. From 1974 until this year 
she served continuously on both 
Ross and cromarty District 
council and Highland Regional 
Council. 
She had served as vice-con- 
vener of the district council and 
chairman of the regional coun- 
cil's social work committee. She 
also served as chairman of the 
northern joint police commit- 
tee. With the Highland Council, 
she was vice-chairman of the 
European select committee. 
She was educated at Tolles- 
bury Primary School and Mal- 
don Grammar School before 
gaining a teaching qualification 
at the University of London 
(Berridge House): 
Councillor Rhind, a widow, is 
survived by two sons and two 
daughters. 
Jamie Stone writes: The Young 
Isobel Drake -a direct descen- 
dant of the great Sir Francis - 
spent her early years in the Es- 
sex village of Tbflesburyý on the 
banks of the River Blackwater 
There, her father and uncle 
managed a highly successful 
family boat-building company 
Le Bourget airfield, Paris, in 33 
hours in a single-engined 
monoplane Spirit of St Louis, to 
win a prize of S25,000. Because 
of the weight of fuel he had no 
parachute, wireless, or window 
panes. 
1944: Allied forces broke 
through Hitler Line in Italy. 
1966: Cassius Clay (later known 
. 3s Muhammad 
Ali) beat Henry 
-lover to retain *he world 
, IPdvyweight boxing title. 
1982: British troops landed at 
, -ýr-, 'San Carlos on Argentine- 
..;, I ý7, jlklancl Islands. Dpstroyer 
%is Aroent sunK with loss Ot 
, :, veS. !n air battle is ! inpr 
incerra was straieci. 1- 
cer*ir, ý? cianes veri, , i* 
that employed many in the vil- 
lage. The Drake brothers 
counted Rab Butler the jockey 
Chris Collins and the miffionaire 
Courtauld family among their 
clients and friends. 
What was it that involved Iso- 
bel in public life in the first 
place? The answer goes back a 
long way. October 1950 saw the 
start of her supremely happy 
marriage to her late husband, 
Jack. After the wedding festiv- 
ities, Isobel set up home in 
Easter Ross. where she had first 
met Jack before the war (Iso- 
bel's mother came from Kildary, 
where many a Drake family hol- 
iday was spent). 
The first of the Rhinds' four 
children. also called Isobel, was 
born in 1951. Barbara followed 
in 1956 and the twins Alastair 
and Sutherland in 1958. 
Despite being a busy mother, 
Isobel played a major part in the 
growth and development of the 
Rhind family supermarket busi- 
ness. 
It was this experience, and 
her wish to bring prosperity to 
Easter Ross, that led her to calla 
fateful meeting in her home. A-s 
Isobel recalled: "In 1963 the late 
Dr Robertson had told me that 
the business people should do 
something to stop all the young 
going south for work. I thought 
about it over the weekend. And 
then I asked the county council's 
convener and county clerk. and 
the vanous provosts and town 
clerks, to come round to my 
home for a private meeting. 
"I said Invergordon has a fine 
harbour, good flat land, a rad- 
way and electricity - what were 
the problems and opportuni- 
ties? What was being done 
about them? I took them by 
surprise. ' 
From that meeting, emerged 
a small committee, including 
Isobel, which worked up the 
1989: Students occupying 
Tiananmen Square in Peking 
rejected government ultimatum 
to leave the square. 
1990: The Labour Party warned 
members not to support the All- 
Britain Anti-Poll Tax Federation, 
calling it a Militant front 
organisation. 
1991: Rajiv Gandhi, ieader ot 
Congress Party, assassinated cy 
suicide bomber as he arrived at 
a political meeting near Maciras 
Fourteen others died in blast 
1993: President Carlos Andres 
Perez of Venezuela Nas ordered 
*o stand trial on corruption 
Marges 
1994: Dundee United beat 
case for siting an aluminium 
smelter at Invergordon, a case 
which they eventually put be- 
fore the President of the Board 
ofT'rade. Therest, as theysay, is 
his-t6ry. ,ý-ý,, t, - 
In 1964 it seemed only right 
for Isobel to stand for Ross and 
Cromarty County Council, and 
fitting when she was swept into 
office - "None of this co-opting lark. In by the front door! " A 
political career was born. Since 
then. she never lost an elec- 
tion. 
Isobel Rhind made no apol- 
ogy for her name being so 
strongly identified with the eco- 
norrýc development of the High- 
1995: Iran indicated that the 
six-year "death sentence" on 
author Salman Rushdie could be 
ifted. 
Birthdays 
32ran L-lydesmuir, Lorcl 
Lieutenant for LanarKsnir,,, 
Malcolm Fraser, former 
Australian prime minister, 66, 
Terry Lightfoot, jazz nancileader, 
61, Andrew Neil, former eclitor 
Sundav Times, -47, Willis P, Ckarcl. 
editor, Tmes Educaricnal 
Suppiement Scotland, 55, 
Rosalind Plowright. soprano, ý7 
Harclo Robbins, author, 90, 
Marv Rooinson. president -, * 
Recuclic it relanc, S_-. Baron 
i7 
P, 1. v , 11 
lands. In the heyday offier pitrt 
nership with fellow couricillor. s 
, 
John Robertson and Cameron 
Ralph (the three Rs), she was 
part of an extraordinary dy- 
namo that strove to bringjobs to 
Easter Ross during the Svveri- 
ties (and early Eightieý, 
She persuaded Brown and 
Root to oppn in oil-rig fabri- 
cation yard at Nigg, in F. aster 
Ross over two decades ; Lgo. 'I 
read an article about Brown 
and Root planning to build oil- 
rigs in Spain. I phoned John 
Robertson. Why not Nigg? Then 
we flew down south to see Sir 
Phihp Southwell. heiLd of Brown 
and Root, in London" 
former principal an(I ýicc- 
chancellor, Edinburgh Univw,, 7, 
66, Desmond Wilcox. 7V 
producer, 65. 
Anniversaries 
Births: 1688. Alexander Pooe, 
DoeT known aSr, the wasp ot 
Twickenham-, 1780 Elizaoett- 
Pry, prison reformer, 1 8, w 
Henry Rousseau, pain: eýý '8 7ý--' 
Glenn Curtiss, aviation 
pioneer, 1964 Thomas 
'-Nailer, )azz pianist, singef am, 
-omposer 
Deaths: 7 ý42 Hernanco ,u 
ýuto, explorer ' 
1895 ýranz 
ýuooe. comooser, 1926 
rii-bank. novelist, 1929 
Roseoe, ý/, Lnerai Prirre 
plpe neCx- 6 C-c- 
1" 
c 
nter 
c 
ina 
firms: 
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British-North American Committee 38 
to accompany the Report 
42 
42 From its inception in 1969 the British-North American Committee has had under review the multinational companies, which are today under 
worldwide scrutiny. In view of the fact that the Committee includes in its 
44 membership senior executives of multinational companies and trade 
union leaders, it is inevitable that it should have found itself from an 46 early date involved in this topic. We have been anxious not to duplicate 
work already being done. As a first step, therefore, we commissioned a 
staff review of research completed or in progress on both sides of the Atlantic. This revealed the fact that there was a gap as regards the effects Y 12 
of the multinational on organised labour. 
50 The Committee next invited David Lea (Head of the Research and Economics Dept., British Trades Union Congress) and Nat Goldfinger (Research Director of the AFL-CIO) to address it at consecutive 
meetings on the attitude of their respective union organisations to the 
growth of multinationals. The Committee then decided to commission 
52 a specific study by John Gennard, Lecturer in Industrial Relations at the London School of Economics, of the attitudes and responses of British labour to the multinational corporations with special reference to American multinationals operating in Britain. This is his report. 
26 Without necessarily endorsing all its conclusions the British-North American Committee recommends publication of the study as the first 
of its contributions on this subject, with the hope that it will help 
towards understanding of the issues involved. 
30 
FOOTNOTE TO THE COMPLETE STATEMENT 
31 Mr. Gennard'spaper rests on certain assumptions which mav be peculiar to the author and. if not wholly wrong. are certainly of questionable validit ' v. One of the most basic of these is that in the relationships between multinational corporations and British tabour unions the 
32 
balance ofpower is tipped in favour of the multinational company and that this, therefore, 
creates a need which calls for the development of some countervailing power - to be 
exercised apparently by the tabour unions or government or both. 
37 The alleged imbalance of power is said to exist because the multinationals, having J operations in more Man the one country, are free and able to redeploy their resources 
internationally in whatever manner they might deem most effective to combat tabour unioll 
39 
his is what inost o( 
ern has committed 
ecrive work force. 
ix little or no flexible 
tical products in a 
e factorýr inaking 
xii B or an 4itterican 
0n even t an *v suc re e en were possible, 
it would 
generally be precluded by the time lag between scheduling additional products and their 
xv manufactured availability in theform of deliverablefinished goods. 
V 
Beyond that, labour-marragement disputes which culminate in and are settled through 
strikes are seldom of such a permanently harmful nature that they can providejustification NICHOLAS J. CAmpe: 
for a major redeployment ofproduction facilities. As a matter offact. it can be shown that Director and Senior Vice. PrW 
i some of the longest eras ofindustrialpeace havefrequentlyfollowedmajor confrontations as Standard Oil Company (N. J. ' 
a result of which both parties came to a clearer understanding of their respective purposes DR CHARLES CARTEF 
and philosophies. Accordingly. zy the power which Mr. Gennard deems to be vested in the . Vice-Chancellor University o! muliinationd corporation is attributable for the most part to its mobility. his case in the , 
opinion of this member is not proven. SIR FREDERICK CATH 
As may also be discernedfrom a careful reading of the paper. it deals more with "fears" Group Managing Director anc 
thcus realities. The fears are said to be directly related, in the main, to security - primarily Designate, John Laing & Son 
security of employment. But where cases are cited. the circumstances could in a number of FRANCOIS E CLEYN 
jinstances have been no less applicable to a wholly domestic corporation. and the evidence . Chairmanotthe Hoarcland C does not support any contention Mat multinationals offer lessjob security than others. . Officer, cleyn & Tinker Ltd 
FwAtermore, A' would make an uninformedguess that because of iheirpursuit ofgrowth 
the multinationals do on the whole offer greater security than that whicliprevails at i7naller. 
HON. J. V. CLYNE 
weaker national companies where the balance ofpower is more likely to be tipped infavour 
Chairman and Chief Executive 
of the union. If this be so. any code of good behaviour advocated for an incoming 
MacMillan Bloodell Ltd 
multinational could infact be andpresurnably shouldbe applicable to all corporations. In the LORD COLLISON 
ordinary course, this is embodied in local custom, tradition or the law of the land. 
. 
In the final section of Chapter II (pages 3 5-41 as summarised on page 9) Mr. Gennard JAMESCONWAY 
exan, tines -the quality of industrial relations In foreign-owned subsidiaries and British General Secretary, Amalgams 
, firm- and 
then chooses as one indicator of quality "the relative incidence ofstrike activity " 
Engineering and Foundry Wc- 
in the selected years 1963 and 1968 .1 challenge the selection of strikes as a criterion of LORD COOPER 
the qualiýy of industrial relations. and I ilisagree with the apparently related conclusion that General Secretary General ar high quality rests on peace andpoor quality on opposition. Strong companies tend to beget , Workers Union 
strong, unions. and ace isfrequently found only as a result of the price to be paidfor it. 
27M implication o Mr. Gennard's thinking would, however, seem to be that companies C. L S. COPE 
which acquiesce readily have good relations while those which resist demands which they Overseas Director, Confadera 
consider improper have bad relations. And yet IBM and Kodak are criticizedfor policies 
Industry 
which in effect strive to make employees so swisfied that they feel no needfor unions. DR. JOHN J. DEUTSC 
Mr. Gennard makes no claim that the charges alleged against resident multinationals Principal, Queen's Universav 
, are made by the Wour union rank andfile. Instead. he properly brings out that the charges Kingston, Ontario 
and. therefore, the attack are much more the initiative of the union secretariars. This is 
to be expected, but unfortunately it has the unwanted, undesirable effect of stirring up be. JOHN S. DICKEY 
tween the parties animosities or hostilities which are inimical to pursuit of the highest President Emeritus and Prof 9 
quality of industrial relations. Dartmouth College, Now He, WILLLAM BLACK[E RICHARD DOBSON 
Chairman. British -American 7 
Members of the Committee Signing the Statement WILLIAM DODGE Secretary-Treasurer, Canaciz 
Co-Chairmen SIR ERIC DRAKE AUGUSTIN S. HART LORD HOWICK Chairman. The British Petrou 
Chairman. commonwealth Development Executive vice-President. Quaker Oats Company 
corporation JOSEPH B. FLAVIN 
Chairman, Executive Committee 
Executive Vice- President. Xe 
R013ERT M. FOWLER DOUGLAS R. FULLER 
president, Canadian Pulp and Paper Association President, The Nonharn Truv 
Members GEORGE GOYDER 
A. E. BALLOCH PETER BESSELL Chairman, British Internatior 
V; c9_P, esidsnL Administration and Planning London 
eowater incorporated HENRY J. HEINZ 11 *WILLIAM BLACKIE 
SIR DAVID BARRAN Chairman of the Board, Caterpillar Tractor Co. 
Chairman of the Board, H. 
Chairman. Shell Transport and Trading JAMES H. INGERSOL 
company Ltd HARRY BRIDGES Vice- President. Internationa. Corporation 
RUSSELL BELL President and Chief Executive Officer. 
Director of Research, Canadian Labour Congress Shell Oil Co. HARRY G. JOHNSON 
Sai footnote to statement Professorof Economics. Lor. Economics and Political Scl, 
and University of Chicago 
A 
A -4 
N 0 CEA 
Shetland N0 RR W. A A' 
Wands 
Miles 410 
-, Otm "'160 150 Knm 0.60 
-, fW- C-f-d- 
Orkney 
Islands 
Vx 
11p, 
ThW", 
Krvrt. -. d.,, 
T L 
%-- 
,A 
Sky* Mom- 
Lo- d. 
NORTf SEA 
$. 
A "W1 N WT To, t 
D.: d- 11 Ift F 
=dl 
'0 
W Eko &*0 -S I To 
Ak Eldfýk 
v 
I It 
4- IM 
GLASGOW EDINBURGH 
-4 
N- 
jk* 
BELF 
9 (N- No 
York 
qh Mgt 
MANCHESTER T' 
w 
G 
LNEMPOOL Both-ý. 4 
Th. 
-C-n- mmgk- 41 
PtuN., 
% 'JUANDS 
Y. 
GREATMRIT. iIN AMSMIDAM HE AQUE 0 
MAP22.10 NorthSeaarea. 
A ýý-e 1, CA 7- eE 
CULLEN REPORT 
Documents for Appendix to Thesis 
preliminary : (a) Appointment of Lord Cullen to head the Public Inquiry. 
(b) Lord Cullen's letter to the Secretary of State for Energy enclosing 
his report. 
Volume 1 (a) Chapter 1. Executive Summary: pp. 
(b) Chapter 11. The Sutherland Fatality: pp. 197-199. 
(c) Chapter 14. General Observations: p. 238. 
Volume 2 (a) Chapter 2 1. Comments on safety representatives and trade union 
involvement on safety committees; the trade union evidence: pp. 374 - 
377. 
(b) Chapter 23. Recommendations: pp. 387-399. 
Appendix E. List of Witnesses: pp. 419-423. 
0. 
-THE, MINERAL 'WORKINGS (OFFSHORE INSTALLATIONS) ACT 1971 (c. 61) 
THEýOFFSHORE INSTALLATIONS (PUBLIC INQUIRIES) REGULATIONS 1974 
-I 
(SI 1974/338) 
WHEREAS on 6th July 1988 an acc ident involving loss o; Ii -rp 
occurred on and in connection with the ope: at ions of the 
offshore installation known as Piper Alpha situated in the 
United Kingdom sector of the continental shelf: 
Now THEREFQRE the Secretary of State, in exercise of the 
powers conferred on him by the above-mentioned Regulations, 
hereby- 
directs that a public inquiry be held to establish 
the circumstances of the accident and its cause; 
(2) appoints the Honourable Lord Cullen, a Senator of 
the College of Justice ir. Scotland, to hold the 
inquiry and to report to him on the circumstances 
of the accident and its cause together with any 
observations and recommerdations which he thinks 
fit tomakewith a view to thF pý reservaýion of 
life and the avoidance of similar accidpnts in 
the futurP. 
OL 
13th Ju'Av 1988 Secretary oý S*atPfor Energy 

SECTION ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Chapter I 
Executive Summary 
Through the Inquiry I sought the answers to 2 questions - 
What were the causes and circumstances of the disaster on the Piper Alpha 
platform on 6 July 1988? and 
What should be recommended with a view to the preservation of life and the 
avoidance of similar accidents in the future? 
1.2 In Chapters 4-10 1 review the events which occurred in the disaster and its 
aftermath. In Chapters 11-15 1 am concerned with the background to the disaster and 
deal with a number of further matters which were investigated in the light of what 
happened. In Chapters 16-22 1 consider what is required for the future: and in Chapter 
23 1 set out my recommendations. 
1.3 The present chapter should be understood as giving only a brief indication Of 
the content of what follows in later chapters. The latter contain my full conclusions 
and observations together with the supporting reasoning and such of the evidence as 
I have considered it necessary to set out. 
1.4 The first event in the disaster was an initial explosion at about 22.00 hours. In 
Chapter 51 conclude that it was in the south-east quadrant of C Module, the gas 
compression module, and was due to the ignition of a low-lying cloud of condensate. 
1.5 As most of the equipment on the platform was not recovered from the wreckage 
and as key witnesses did not survive the disaster a number of possible explanations 
for the leak of condensate are considered in Chapter 6. Particular attention was given 
in the Inquiry to events after 21.45 hours when one of the two condensate injection 
pumps tripped. I conclude that the leak resulted from steps taken by night-shift 
personnel with a view to restarting the othcr pump which had been shut down for 
maintenance. Unknown to them a pressure safety valve had been removed from the 
relief line of that pump. A blank flange assembly which had been fitted at the site of 
the valve was not leak-tight. The lack of awareness of the removal of the valve resulted 
from failures in the communication of information at shift handover earlier in the 
evening and failure in the operation of the permit to work system in connection with 
the work which had entailed its removal. 
1.6 Chapter 7 is concerned with the way in which the disaster developed. The 
initial explosion caused extensive damage. It led immediately to a large crude oil fire 
in B Module, the oil separation module, which engulfed the north end of the platform 
in dense black smoke. This fire, which extended into C Module and down to the 68 
ft level was fed by oil from the platform and by a leak from the main oil line to the 
shore, to which pipelines from the Claymore and Tartan platforms were connected. 
At about 22.20 hours there was a second major explosion which caused a massive 
intensification of the fire. This was due to the rupture of the riser on the gas pipeline 
from Tartan as a result of the concentration and high temperature of the crude oil 
fire. It is probable that this rupture would have been delayed if oil production on the 
other platforms had been shut down earlier than it was. The fire was further intensified 
by the ruptures of risers on the gas pipeline to the Frigg disposal system and the gas 
pipeline connecting Piper with Claymore at about 22.50 and 23.20 ýours respectively. 
The timing of the start of depressurisation of the gas pipelines could not have had 
any material effect on the fire at Piper. The OlMs on Claymore and Tartan were III- 
prepared for an emergency on another platform with which their own platform was 
connected. 
1.7 The initial explosion put the main power supplies and the Control Room at Piper 
out of action. It appears that the emergency shutdown system was activated and the 
emergency shutdown valves on the gas pipeline risers probably closed although 
extended haring pointed to a failure of the valve on the Claymore riser to close fully. 
The other emergency systems of the platform failed immýdiately or within a sho'rt 
period of the initial explosion. In particular the fire-water system was r,! ndered 
inoperative either due to physical damage or loss of power. However, at the time of 
the initial explosion the diesel fire pumps were on manual mode so that, even if thev 
had not been disabled, they would have required manual intervention in order to star't 
them. 
1.8 In Chapter SI describe the effects of events on the platform personnel. Of the 
226 men on the platform, 62 were on night-shift duty; the great majority of the 
remainder were in the accommodation. The system for control in the event of a major 
emergency was rendered almost entirely inoperative. Smoke and flames outside the 
accomrnoaation made evacuation by helicopter or lifeboat impossible. Diving person- 
nel, who were on duty, escaped to the sea along with other personnel on duty at the 
northern end and the lower levels of the platform. Other survivors who were on duty 
made their way to the accommodation; and a large number of men congregated near 
the galley on the top level of the accommodation. Conditions there were tolerable at 
first but deteriorated greatly owing to the entry of smoke. A number of personnel, 
including 28 survivors, decided on their own initiative to get out of the accommodation. 
The survivors reached the sea by the use of ropes and hoses or by jumping off the 
platform at various levels. 61 persons from Piper survived. 39 had b'een on night-shift 
and 22 had been off duty. At no stage was there a systematic attempt to lead men to 
escape from the accommodation. To remain in the accommodation meant certain 
death. 
1.9 Many organisations, vessels and aircraft were involved in the rescue and 
subsequent treatment of survivors, as I narrate in Chapter 9. There was some initial 
delay and confusion onshore due to the lack of accurate information. However, this 
did not affect the toll of death and injury. The events demonstrated the value of fast 
rescue craft and the bravery of their crews in getting close to the platform even where 
the fire was raging at its fiercest. They also demonstrated the shortcomings of the type 
of standby vessel which was in attendance at Piper. 
1.1o Chapter 10 shows that the bodies of 135 of the 165 personnel on Piper who 
died as a result of the disaster were later recovered. The principal cause of death in 
109 cases (including 79 recovered from the accommodation) was inhalation of smoke 
and fire. 14 apparently died during an attempt to escape ftom the platform. Few died 
of burns. 
1.11 Chapter II shows that the failure in the operation of the permit to work system 
was not an isolated mistake but that there were a number of respects in which 
& laid 
down procedure was not adhered to and unsafe practices were followed. One particular 
danger, which was relevant to the disaster, was the need to prevent the inadvertent or 
unauthorised recommissioning of equipment which was still under maintenance and 
not in a state in which it could safely be put into service. The evidence also indicated 
dissatisfaction with the standard oý information which was communicated at shift 
hanclover. This had been the subject of criticism in the light of a fatality in September 
1987. 
1.12 As regards the fire-water svstern I find in Chapter 12 that the practice of keeping 
the diesel fire pumps on manual mode during periods of diving was peculiar to Piper 
and in spite of an audit recommendation that it should be changed, It inhibited the 
1) 
operability of the system in an unnecessary and dangerous way. Further it is likely 
that if the fire-water system had been activated a substantial number of the deluge 
heads in C Module would have been blocked with scale. This was a problem of long 
standing but by the time of the disaster the necessary replacement of the distribution 
pipework had not been carried out. 
1.13 Evidence as to training for emergencies, to which I refer in Chapter 13 showed 
that the induction was cursory and, in regard to demonstrating lifeboats and life rafts, 
not consistently given. Muster drills and the training of persons with special duties in 
an emergency did not take place with the frequency laid down in Occidental's 
procedures. The OIIMs and platform management did not show the necessary 
determination to ensure that regularitý was achieved. 
1.14 1 point out in Chapter 14 that Occidental management should have been more 
aware of the need for a high standard of incident prevention and fire-fighting. They 
were too easily satisfied that the permit to work system was being operated correctlyl 
relying on the absence of any feedback of problems as indicating that all was well. 
They failed to provide the training required to ensure that an effective permit to work 
system was operated in practice. In the face of a known problem with the deluge 
svstem they did not become personally involved in probing the extent of the problem 
and what should be done to resolve it as soon as possible. They adopted a superficial 
attitude to the assessment of the risk of major hazard. They failed to ensure that 
emergency training was being provided as they intended. The platform personnel and 
management were not prepared for a major emergency as they should have been. The 
safety policies and procedures were in place: the practice was deficient. 
1.15 In Chapter 15 1 examine the involvement of the Department of Energy with 
safety on Piper in the year up to the disaster. Installations such as Piper were subject 
to regular inspections, the purpose of which was, by means of a sampling technique, 
to assess the adequacy of the safety of the installation as a whole. Piper was inspected 
in June 1987 and June 1988. The latter visit was also used to follow-up what Occidental 
had done in the light of the fatality, which was in part due to failures in the operation 
of the permit to work system and the communication of information at shift handover. 
The findings of those inspections were in striking contrast to what was revealed in 
evidence at the Inquiry. Even after making allowance for the fact that t' he inspections 
were based on sampling it was clear to me that they were superficial to the point of 
being of little use as a test of safety on the platform. They did not reveal a number of 
clear cut and readily ascertainable deficiencies. While the effectiveness of inspections 
has been affected by persistent under-manning and inadequate guidance, the evidence 
led me to question, in a fundamental sense, whether the type of inspection practised 
by the DEn could be an effective means of assessing or monitoring the-management 
of safety by operators. 
1.16 1 turn now to those chapters which are concerned with the future. By way of 
background to what follows, Chapter 16 provides a brief outline of the'existing 
United Kingdom offshore safety regime and, by way of comparison, the onshore safety 
regime and the Norwegian offshore safety regime. 
1.17 The disaster involved the realisation of a potential major hazard in that an 
explosion following a hydrocarbon leak led to the failure of gas risers which added 
vcry large amounts of fuel to the fire. Although such remote but potentially hazardous 
events had been envisaged Occidental did not require them to be assessed systematically; 
nor did the offshore safety regime require this. As I set out in Chapter 17,1 am 
satisfied that operators of installations, both fixed and mobile and both planned and 
existing, should be required by regulation to carry out a formal safety assessment of 
major hazards, the purpose of which would be to demonstrate that the potential major 
hazards of the installation and the risks to personnel thereon have been identified and 
appropriate controls provided. This is to assure the operators that their operations are 
safe. However it is also a legitimate expectation of the workforce and the public that 
operators should be required to demonstrate this to the regulatory body. The 
presentation of the formal safety assessment should take the form of a Safety Case, 
which would be updated at regýiar intervals and on the occurrence of a major'change 
of circumstances. 
1.18 Offshore installations have the unique requirement to b-! self-sufficient in 
providing immediate protection to personnel in the event of an emergency. I consider, 
as ,I set out 
in Chapter 19, that there should be a temporary safe refuge i6r personnel 
which should be a central feature of the Safety Case. Such a refuge should be able to 
provide temporary protection for personnel while the emergency is being assessed and 
preparations are made for evacuation should that be directed. The events which the 
refuge should be able to withstand and the acceptance standards for the endurance 
time and the risk of failure should be specified in the Safety Case. Likewise, the Safety 
Case should deal with the passability of escape routes and the integrity of embarkation 
points and lifeboats. Since the formal safety assessment should cover the safe 
evacuation, escape and rescue of personnel, the Safety Case should demonstrate that 
adequate provision is made for this also, as I set out in Chapter 20. 
1.19 The safety of personnel on an installation in re. , Yard to hazards at large is, as 1 
point out in Chapter 21, critically dependent on the systematic management of safetv 
by operators. The present offshore safety regime does not address this in any direct 
sense; and current measures are, in my view, ineffective for the purpose of ensuring 
that the management of safety by all operators is adequate. Each operator should 
therefore be required in the Safety Case to demonstrate that the safety management 
system of the company and that of the installation are adequate to ensure that the 
design and operation of the installation and its equipment are safe. The safety 
management system of the company should set out the safety objectives, the system 
by which those objectives are to be achieved, the performance standards which are to 
be met and the means by which adherence to those standards is to be monitored. 
1.20 it is essential, as I state in Chapter 21, that there should be assurance that 
each operator's safety management system is in fact adhered to. It is inappropriate 
and impracticable for the regulatory body to undertake the detailed auditing of 
operator's compliance with it. Operators should therefore be required to satisfy 
themselves by means of regular audits that the system is being adhered to. On the 
other hand 
& regulatory body should be required to review operator's audits on a 
selective basis and itself to carry out such further audits as it thinks fit and by regular 
inspection verify that the output of the system is satisfactory. This involves a completely 
new approach to regulation in the United Kingdom off&re safety regime. However 
it is totally consistent with the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 and the concept 
of self- regulation. It represents a logical development from the requirement of a Safety 
Case for each installation. 
1.21 In Chapter 21 1 set out mý general findings in regard to the existing safety 
regulations and guidance relating to them. Niany regulations are unduly restrictive in 
that they are of the type which impose 'solutions' rather than 'objective-s' and are out- 
of-date in relation to technological advances. Guidance notes are expressed, or at any 
rate lend themselves to interpretation, in such a way as to discourage alternatives, 
There is a danger that compliance takes precedence over wider safety considerations; 
and that sound innovations are discouraged. The principal regulation's should take the 
form of requiring stated objectives to be met. Guidance notes should give non- 
mandatory advice. On the other hand I accept that in regard to certain matters it will 
continue to be essential that detailed measures are prescribed. 
1.22 In Chapter 21 1 also reaffirm the need for a single regulatory body. This is of 
particular importance for the future in which a greater burden wilf be piaced on the 
expertise, judgement and resources of the regulator upon which his confidence and 
that of the industrv will rely. 
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1.23 As I set out in Chapter 22, developments in regulatory techniques, experience 
of the capabilities and approach of offshore and onshore regulators, the imminence of 
major changes in the offshore safety regime and the evidence which I heard in Part 1 
of the Inquiry caused me to entertain the question as to the body which should be the 
ce as a practical matter regulatory body for the future offshore safety regime. The choi 
lies between the DEn and the HSE, in either case being suitably strengthened. I come 
to the conclusion that the balance of advantage lies in favour of the transfer of 
responsibility to the HSE. The decisive considerations in my mind arise from 
considering the differences in approach between these 2 bodies to the development 
and enforcement of regulatory control. These differences are discussed in Chapter 
22.1 am confident that the major changes which I have recommended are ones which 
are in line with the philosophy which the HSE has followed. This alternative is clearly 
preferable to the DEn even if it was given a higher level of manning with greater in-- 
house expertise. I also attach importance to the benefits of integrating the work of the 
offshore safety regulator with the specialist functions of the HSE. 
1.24 The above summary has concentrated on the major elements in my recommenda- 
tions. However in Chapters 18,19 and 20 1 have discussed, in the light of the lessons 
of the disaster and the expert evidence given in Part 2 of the Inquiry what should be 
done with a view to the prevention of incidents causing fires and explosions (Chapter 
is); the mitigation of incidents (Chapter 19); and evacuation, escape and rescue 
(Chapter 20). In each of these chapters I have endeavoured to take account of the 
current state of the relevant technology and the extent to which further work is 
required; and to identify those matters which should, in my view, be the subject of 
regulations, either in the form of those which set objectives or those which prescribe 
fundamental essentials for safety. These include recommendations as to the operation 
of the permit to work procedures, the fire protection provided on platforms, the means 
of escape from platforms to the sea and improvements in the standby vessel fleet. 
11.14 However, this evidence should be taker. in conjunction with that of M. - Ciark. 
who had worked -on 
Piper since 1977 - On the one hand he agreed that the whole plant 
and platform was run in a professional manner. He felt that those who were employed 
on the platform did their utmost and took a pride in what they did. Safety was 
improving continually. There were quite a few meetings at whicii complaints' were 
put forward and, if i: t was practicable, the complaint was dealt with. On the other 
hand it was his view that there should be a written procedu! -e as to the amount of 
information which should be transmitted between personnel as to the work that was 
being done. "There were always times when it was a surprise when you found out 
some things that were going on. " At a seminar held at the head office of Occidental 
in Aberdeen in early 1988 he had criticised the way in which the permit to work 
system was applied. "I thought it was high time it was upgraded and more specific. " 
He had also criticised the lack of communication of information. "I just said that it 
was totally inadequate and it left a great need for rewriting. " He said that nothing 
had reallv come from this seminar by 6 July, ' Asked whether he had felt this in the 
years leading up to 1988 he said "We had made an issue of it and we had discussed 
what we felt we wanted between the people on the platform. We had approached the 
011M about getting something done with the permit system. We discussed it with him 
for quite some time and the permit system was altered but, again, when it came, it 
was not what we wanted. " Right from the beginning he had also been critical of the 
method of communication. He could nor see any reason why his suggestions could 
not have been carried out. As far as the permit to work system was concerned it was 
open to interpretation. "Everybody had their own idea of how the permit system 
should be applied and it sort of7chan-ged week to week and crew to crew. " He criticised 
the way in which a permit was extended. "At the end of the day-shift, when it was 
cancelled, the night-shift would take it back out and just put "extension" on the back 
of it, which was not the way it was supposed to work. " What annoved him more than 
anything was permits not being properly carried through. "With permits, there was 
such a great difference between them and that should never have been. " The majoritý 
of the maintenance department and also contractors were critical both of the 
communication methods and the permit to work system on Piper. These comments. 
which I have no reason to think were other than well-founded, underline the grave 
shortcomings in Occidental's approach to potentially dangerous jobs. 
The Sutherland fatality 
11.15 On 7 September 1987 , \4r F Sutherland, a rigger employed by an offshore 
contractor was killed in an accident in A Module. This accident and %ýhat arose out 
of it has a significant bearing on the discussion of the adequacy of Occidental's 
attention to the quality of its permit to work system and handover procedure. 
11.16 On the day of the accident a damaged bearing required to be replaced in a 
pump on the east side of A I'viodule. It was found that it was impossible to remove 
the bearing without lifting the motor. For that purpose Occidental's 
lead maintenance 
hand on the day-shift obtained the assistance of riggers before handing over to his 
night-shift counterpart. Occidental*s mechanical technicians on the night-shift 
decided 
to depart from the method of lifting which had been proposed by the day-shift and 
decided that clamps should be attached to overhead beams for the purpose of assisting 
in the lift. This was not discussed with the night-shift lead maintenance hand. In 
order to attach a shackle and sling to the beams Mr Sutherland climbed on to a panel 
which formed part of a canopy over the pump. The panel shifted from its support or, 
one side and Mr Sutherland fell off sustaining injuries from which he later died. A 
number of points should be noted for present purposes: - 
According to a note made by Mr RD Jenkins. a DEn Inspector, whose work- 
will be referred to in more detail in Chapter 15. the one and only permit which 
had been issued in respect of the work was to **check and repair the thrus- 
bearing". The lifting of the motor and the replacement of the bearing were 
not mentioned. One of the conclusions of the Occidental Board of Inquiry inw 
this accident was that "The expansion of the original scope of the work to 'hv 
I k. - 
extent that it required the raising of' the motor did not aiert the supervisor tit 
the additional measures that might havc been taken tit ensure the safe conduct 
of' the new workscope. - In those circumst-inces it might reasonably he said 
that if a further permit to work had been applied for this would have ensured 
that attention was given to the precautions to be stated on the fresh permit 
and taken at the time when the work was being carried out. Following the 
fatality Occidental were prosecuted under secs 3N. and 33(1)(a) of the HSXX'A 
for failing to conduct their undertaking in such a wa% as to ensure, so far as 
was reasonably practicable, that persons not in"their employment who might 
be affected thereby were not thereby exposed to risks to their health and safety. 
The complaint, to which they pleaded guilty. on 17 March 1987, set out a 
specification of the manner in which they ýad failed to supervise the iob 
including "No new permit was taken out to cover the instalktion of said lifting 
Lear and other necessary work". Air G Richards. the back-to-bac k OLM, 
agreed in evidence that the permit to work should have been extended but took 
the position that this did not contribute to the accident. This was not identified 
as a problem at the time. He agreed that if work had been restricted the crew 
would not have reached the stage where the accident happened. But, according 
to him. an additional permit would not have played a key part. A permit stated 
precautions. not the method of carrying out the work. NjVhile I appreciate that 
distinction it does not in my view follov. - that the absence of a further application 
for a permit to work had no bearing on this accident. Once again. it seems to 
m, - -hj! the Occidental approach left too much to, be settled as the work went 
jionc 
'["he : omplaint to which Occidental pleaJed gi uiir%- also specified -Inadequate 
,: ommunication of information 
from the preceding day-shift to the night-shift". 
A number of witnesses from the production and maintenance sides on Piper 
., aid in evidence to the Inquiry that no changes were made to handover practice 
after the fatality or Occidental*,, plea of guilty. There was no awareness of any 
weakness in or criticism 01 communication at handover. %vir Bodie. who was a 
member of Occidental's Board of Inquiry into the Sutherland fatality, was not 
made aware of the term,, of the complaint to which Occidental had pleaded 
guil-v or asked to reconsider the report of the Board in the light of those terms. 
The rcport was a production before the Inquiry and contains no examination 
of the adequacy or quality of the handover between the maintenance lead 
hands. Nonetheless. Mr Bodie said that he concluded that there was no 
contribution from the handover. 
The fatalltv to Mr Sutherland had a number of sequels, one of which was the 
issuing of a memorandum by Mr JL MacAllan. Occidental's Production and 
pipeline Manager. t(, all ()IMs dated 24 September 1987. In this memorandum 
he emphasised. inter alia. that persons tilling out permits should be encouraged 
to be more specific and detailed in the jot, description. As an example he said 
that it would not be sufficient to state "change gas head". The permit should 
read --erect scaffold. change gas head. dismantle scaffold". This advice 
reinforces the terms of the Occidental writEen procedure for permits to work. 
However. it was apparent that this advice was not followed. One example of 
this wa, provided by the permit which related to the refurbishment and 
ecertification of PSV 504 and 505 in March I QRS. The instruction "isolate as 
required" %vas inadequate. 
v Another sequel W the fatality wa,, the výsuinv- of a memorandum dated 21 
0,: t(lbe-, 1087 to rigging and other supervisors,. Thv, referred to the assessment 
,f he jot- by the rigging t. oreman and the raising of permits for certain 
,: ategorie- of 
lift. However th., evidence given by riggers at the Inquiry was 
that the%- would give assistance without their foreman being involved. Air Khards 
said that he had checked with the rigging foreman that -everything 
ne-t-ded rirvinv would 
were made for the removal of PS%* 504 on 6 July 1988. Once again it appears 
thaz althouch action was taken in a -certain respect after the Sutherland fatalit%- 
iL did nor ha%-,., a lasting cffeczz on. rrac-. icý:. 
I U, 
14.51 In contrast with onshore plants where a local fire service and expert fire crews 
can be called up within minutes an offshore platform such as Piper requires to be self- 
sufficient in fighting a fire. On Piper the main systems of active fire-fighEing were the 
deluge system and the fire monitors. It was essential that these systems along with the 
facility to blow down the hydrocarbon inventory were maintained in first class working 
condition. It was reasonable for Occidental to attempt to cure the difficulties which 
had come to light by fitting larger nozzles and carrying out regular cleaning, before 
embarking on a complete replacement of the distribution system in non-corrosive 
material. As I said in para 12.22 it was not unreasonable for them to proceed by taking 
the replacement of pipework in one module at a time and to do the work in such a 
way as to avoid putting the whole of the system in one module out of operation at any 
given time. However, having regard to the very great, if not critical, importance 
ýf 
the deluge system it was in my view unacceptable that the process of rectification 
should be still onlv one third complete 4 years after the problem had been cleariv 
identified. Even if it was reasonable for the initial replacement in B Module to taký 
as long as 2 years Occidental should have been able to draw on their experience by 
following on rapidly with replacement in 
, 
the other modules. They could and shoula 
have eliminated delay caused by the lack of enough contract draftsmen. The prolonged 
process appears to me to have stemmed from the failure of senior management to 
manage the rectification with the urgency that such a vital safety system warranted. 
No senior manager appeared to me to "own" the problem and pur'sue it to an early 
and satisfactory conclusion. None of the management who gave evidence took the step 
of witnessing deluge tests for himself They too readily accepted the advice of more 
junior staff that the system would still be effective in handling an emergency; whereas 
in reality by at least 
ýebruary 1988 it was clear that it would not. 
General observations 
14.52 The evidence which I have considered in this chapter should be considered 
along with my observations in Chapters 11-13. It appears to me that there were 
significant flaws in the quality of Occidental's management of safety which affected 
the circumstances of the events of the disaster. Senior management were too easily 
iatisfied that the PTNY, ' system was being operated correctly, relying on the absence 
of any feedback of problems as indicating that all was well. 
ihey iailed to provide the 
training required to ensure that an effecrive PTW system was operated in practice. In 
the face of a known problem with the deluge system they did not become personall% 
involved in probing the extent of the problem and what should be done to resolve i: t 
as soon as possible. They adopted a superficial response when issues of saferv were 
raised by others, as for example at the time of Nlr Saldana*s report and the Su&rland 
prosecution. They failed to ensure that emergencv training was being provided as they 
intended. Platform personnel and management were not prepared for a major 
emergency as they should have been. 
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21.72 In the light of representations made at the Inquiry by the contractors' intur.. 
I would also advise that in connection with the preparation of guidance notes 
regulatory body should review the procedures for consultation so as to ensitre th.! - 
view-, of representatives of efllpllye-15 -; tnd ernpl-yees involved in work offsholý: 
adequately taken into account. 
Involvement of the workforce 
21.73 In para 18.48 1 referred to the involvement of the workforce as an importo 
means of developing and maintaining an attitude to safety which is conducive to r 
prevention of accidents which may have harmful consequences. In para 21.56 
indicated that the operators' SMS, which is directed to demonstrating how safetý 
to be achieved, should include the way in which the total workforce is involved to th 
end. 
21.74 Under the present regime, both onshore and offshore, specific requiremen- 
have been laid down for the appointment and functions of safety representatives '. 
the workforce. At the Inquiry there was a clear controversy, which I will deal wit 
below, as to the form which the requirements in the offshore safety regime shoul 
take. However, the need for such requirements, whatever form they take, would not 
in my view, be affected by the implementation of the recommendations which I hav, 
made so far in this report. The representation of the workforce in regard to safetl 
matters is important not merely for what it achieves on installations but also for tht 
effect which it has on the morale of the workforce - in showing that their views are 
taken into account and that they are making a worthwhile contribution to their own 
safety. For this purpose it is clearly advisable to have statutory provisions which are 
well known, universally applied in similar circumstances and cffective in operation. 
Safety representatives and sqfeýýv committees in the onshore safety regime 
21.75 Under Sec 2 of the HSWA regulations may provide for the appointment by 
"recognised trade unions" of safety representatives whom the employer is bound to 
consult in regard to arrangements for co-operation in the promotion and development 
of measures to ensure health and safety at work and in the checking of the effectiveness 
of such measures. The employer may be required to establish a safety committee 
which has the function of keeping under review the measures taken to ensure the 
health and safety at work of his employees and such other functions as may be 
prescribed. So far as the onshore safety regime is concerned these provisions were 
implemented by the making of the Safety Representatives and Safety Committees 
Regulations 1977, which confer various functions on safety representatives including 
the making of investigations, inspections and representations. A "recognised trade 
union' ', which had the sole power to appoint safety representatives, meant an 
independent trade union which the employer concerned recognised for the purposes 
of negotiations relating to or connected with one or more of a number of specified 
matters - such as the terms and conditions of employment, or the physical conditions 
in which aný workers are required to work; the allocation of work or the duties of 
employment as between workers or groups of workers; and facilities for officials of 
trade unions. Since 1977 there has been a growth in' the extent to which trade unions 
have been "recognised". Mr Rimington said that safety representatives could play a 
valuable part in the promotion of safety and in relation to inspections. For those who 
were appointed safety representatives it was a very great strength that they were 
appointed by the unions. "The unions train them in quite a sophisticated way. Theý 
have the means of putting a great deal of power at the elbow of safety representatives 
where they care to do so. " Where a union was weakly organised or not very stronglý 
represented the usefulness of the safety representatives might be somewhat impaired. 
Safety representatives and sqfeýv committees in the offshore safety regime 
21.76 Although Sec 2 of the HSWA applied to the UKCS from 1977 the 1977 
Regulations were not applied offshore. Diametrically opposed views were held by the 
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trade unions and UKOOA. The latter obliected to the offshore application of the 
Regulations on the around that there were very few installations where there was Li 
4 
inscallation rnerc ...... 
workforce, including contractors . personnel. but did not consider it essentiai tu emt)od%- 
this in regulations (6.50 and 5.97',. However, 2 members of the committee, Mr R 
Lyons, then National Officer of AST. MS and Mr j Miller, then National Officer of 
the T& GWU dissented strongly on the latter point, urging that the 077 Regulations 
be extended offshore forthwith. 
21.77 In the'event after years of discussion the DEn in 1987 were able to achieve a 
measure of general acceptance which led to the making of the Offshore Installations 
(Safety Representatives and Safety Committees. ) Regulations 1989. These were made 
under the provisions of the MWA and provide that the workforce is to be entitled to 
elect safety representatives and that where these have been elected a safety cornmittee 
is to be established. This was clearly a step forward and an attempt to cleýl with a real 
problem. It still left as the bone of contention whether safety representatives should 
be appointed by trade unions, as was the case onshore. 
The trade unions' evideitce 
11.78 The attitude of the trade unions on the matter of safety representariv s a. e 
one of the principal subjects of the evidence given by Mr Lvons, since 1987 the 
Assistant General Secretary of ASTMS and latterly of MSF; Mr F Higgs, National 
Secretary of the Chemical, Oil and Rubber Group, T& GWU; and Mr A W' T 
Cunningham, Occupational Health and Safety Officer, EETPU. Mr Lyons said that 
MSF had over 4000 paying members and represented in total about 6000 employees 
in North Sea activities. XISF members worked for both operators and contractors'and 
performed a varietv of jobs. According to the evidence of Mr Higgs T& GWU had 
about 3000 members offshore. 
11.79 It was clear that the background to the evidence of these witnesses was a long- 
standing frustration as to the limited extent to which trade unions had been 
"recognised" offshore; whereas the unions had been recognised -by many of the 
operating companies in relation to their operations onshore. As Mr Lyons put it: 
"There is a large trade union influence offshore. It has not got an adequate 
machinery through which it can be expressed. " He complained that a memorandum of 
understanding as to the procedure for achieving recognition had not been adhered to 
or enforced. There were members of MSF on every platform in the North Sea, he 
thought; and there was a majority membership of 
ýISF alone on quite a few of the 
platforms where no ballots as to recognition had been agreed. "In many of the 
platforms we have got ioo,,,. membership. " The Inter-Union Off-shore Oil Committee 
., IU00Q 
had been formed in order to eliminate inter-union disputes over representa- 
tion offshore. On behalf of the IUOOC he had entered into a recognition agreement 
in 1978 with the Phillips Petroleum Company in regard to platforms in the Hewett 
field, the effect of which was that the 1977 1ýegulations should be treated as if they 
applied offshore. He said that this had led to an improvement in practices and an 
increase in confidence. It was hoped to extend that agreement to the Maureen field. 
MSF had also made many agreements with Shell on behalf of Shell Exxon which were 
supported by ballots of the workforce. MSF was the only trade union which held such 
agreements. However in each instance the agreement excluded health and safety. He 
claimed that there was no other country in the world in which there was a practice 
whereby a trade union which had been reco-gnised by the employer was excluded from 
discussing health and safety. 
21-80 Mr Lvons castigated the 1980 Regulations as contrary to the spirit of the 
HSV*A. Without the offshore extension of the 1977 Regulations it was nonsense to 
say that the HS%X'A fully applied offshore. The 1977 Regulations had the advantaL": 
that safety representatives appointed by trade unions would have the back-up anj 
facilities which a trade union is able to provide, including training and advice on healltr 
C and safety issues. Unions held rcgular tra; rirg schuo! s at whiich a wide rang o 
andsafety -, ssues wen. discus,,, -d. These took place at regional, national and internationa; 
levels. If a safety representative had difficulty in performing his or her function there 
was somebody for him or her to go to in order to get assistance. "For a safetv 
representative to be effective he requires a supportive culture, structure, credibilin 
. 
advice, training and recognition of the contribution that he can make on safety issues. 
'- 
For a number of years Shell had had a safety cornmittee systern which was similar W 
that provided for under the 1989 Regulations. However, 
ilespite the efforts of MSF 
the workforce were reluctant to stand or be represented. Where the trade union 
appointed the safety representatives "training and advice can be given openly without 
any 'fear factor' which unfortunately permeates the UK sector of the North Sea among 
the workforce. Workers do not want to put their continued employment in jeopardy 
through raising a safety issue that might be seen as embarrassing to management. " As 
an example he said that contractors' employees suffer particularlv from the "not- 
required-back" phenomenon. When asked wfiether a safety committee elected by the 
whole workforce might be seen to be more representative than one which was restricted 
to members of trade unions he said: "The quality of that committee bears no 
relationship to a trade union-based safety committee, and that is best borne out by 
looking at Shell onshore, where the committees do not cover all employees but are 
extremely positive in health and safety. " The 1989 Regulations were perceived as 
favouring the operators. This was seen as part of the evidence of a conflict of interest 
which led to trade unions favouring the replacement of the DEn with the HSE as the 
regulatory body, as he and Mr Miller had also advocated in their dissent from the 
report of the Burgoyne Committee. 
The sithmissions of UKOOA 
21.81 UKOOA opposed the application offshore of the 1977 Regulations. It would 
have only a limited scope for operation in view of the limited extent to which there 
were "recognised trade unions". The 1989 Regulations were adequate. They did not 
prevent a trade union member becoming a safety representative and having trade 
union support. There was no suggestion that trade union members were more 
concerned than others with matters of safety. Where trade unions represented a 
minority of the workforce, if they were able to appoint the safety representatives they 
might effectively disenfranchise non-union members: or even union members whý 
might wish to have a different representative. 
Safety delegates in the , Yorwegian offshore safqv regime 
21.82 In this regime it appears that trade unions receive automatic recognition. The 
extent of union membership has grown over the years. The regime provides for the 
appointment of safety delegates upon whom a number of important powers are 
conferred, including 
ýhe right to halt dangerous work. Mr Ognedal considered that 
union back-up could be beneficial to the work of safety delegates. However, they are 
elected by the whole workforce, rather than being appointed by the unions. 
Observations 
21.83 \Iy remit does not extend to matters of industrial relations, whether or not 
the point at issue is a controversial one, as it is in the case of the offshore workforce. 
Accordingly I am not concerned with the merits of the recognition of trade unions 
offshore or with the means by which support for such recognition should be ascertained. 
I have to concern myself with the question of safety, and in doing so take account of 
the existing situation in the North Sea. 
21,84 In the light of the evidence which I have heard, which admittedly came almost 
entirely from trade union witnesses, I am prepared to accept that the appointment Of 
offshore safety representatives bv trade unions could be of some benefit in making the 
work of safety representatives and safety committees effective, mainly through the 
credibility aný resistance to pressureq which trade union backing woulý provide. 
21.85 However, the position offshore is complicated by a number of factors, traLie 
union membership is still relatively limited in relation to the total offshore workforce; 
trade unions have been "recognised" only to a limited extent; and the employment of 
offshore workers is fragmented between a number of different employers, wit-h a high 
proportion being emploved by contractors. As matters stand it does not seem to me 
to be appropriate to replace the 1989 Regulations with the offshore extension of the 
1977 Regulations. This would remove safety representatives from a very large part of 
the workforce and would undo the limited progress which was achieved in difficult 
circumstances by the making of the 1989 Regulations. Further those regulations have 
been in force for only a short period. Experience will show whether or not representa- 
tives elected under those regulations lack adequate credibility or resistance to pressures. 
In the meantime I consider that it would be inappropriate for me to recommend any 
change in the method by which safety representatives are chosen. I understand that 
the regulatory body intends to review the 1989 Reguiations after 2 vcars' experience 
of their working. When carrying out that review the regulatory body may consider 
that there is room for improving the effectiveness of safety representatives; and putting 
the trade unions' contentions to the test for that purpose. For example, it may consider 
that it is appropriate to modify the existing scheme so as to require that safety 
representatives are appointed by trade unions in certain cases, such as where a trade 
union had achieved recognition in relation to a substantial aspect of labour relations 
and had a substantial membership on the installation in question. 
21.86 For the present I am satisfied that it is appropriate that the type of protection 
provided in the case of trade union activities under Sec 58(l)(b) of the Employment 
Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 should also be afforded to the activities of an 
employee as a safety representative. The Trade Union Group also submitted that 
intimidation and the breaking of a contract should become a criminal offence where 
it was directed against the raising or pursuing of a complaint relating to health and 
safety. As regards any wider measures I consider that the correct course in the first 
instance is to look to the safety representative as the channel through whom complaints 
in regard to health and safety should be expressed. I am also aware of the efforts which 
the Secretary of State for Energy and UKOOA have made in order to demonstrate 
that victimisation is not to be tolerated and that the reporting of incidents affecting 
safety is to be encouraged. 
21.87 The Trade Union Group and other parties made a number of specific criticisms 
of the 1989 Regulations. Since these regulations have only recently been introduced 
I do not in general think that it is appropriate for me to recommend alterations. 
However, there is one exception to that. Reg 27 provides that it is to be the duty of 
the employer of a safety representative to ensure that he is provided with such training 
in aspects of the function of a safety representative as may be reasonable in all the 
circumstances and that the employer is to meet any reasonable costs associated with 
such training including travel and subsistence costs. In the light of the evidence I 
consider that the burden of providing the training and bearing its cost should fall not 
on the employer but on the operator of the installation where the safety representative 
serves. The operator has a knowledge and a responsibility for safety on an installation 
which is far wider than that of contractors working on it. In the case of smaller 
contractors who may have few personnel working on an installation they may, as Mr 
Lvons suggested, have great difficulty in providing training for any of their employees 
who may be elected as a safety representative. It is extremely important that the safety 
committee should include an adequate representation of contractors' employees. 
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Chapter 23 
Recommendations 
In this chapter I will set out my recommendations in the light of the matters discussed 
in Chapters 17-22. Each recommendation is followed by reference to the paragraph 
in the earlier chapter to which it is directly related. The recommendations are arranged 
according to the following subjects: - 
Subject Recommendations 
Safety Case 1-13 
Auditing of the operator's management of safety 14-15 
Independent assessment and surveys of installations 16 
Legislation - General 17-22 
The regulatory body 23-26 
Safety committees and safety representatives 27-31 
Permits to work 32-38 
Incident reporting 39 
Control of the process 40-42 
Hydrocarbon inventory, risers and pipelines 43-46 
Fire and gas detection and emergency shutdown 47-48 
Fire and explosion protection 49-54 
Accommodation, TSR, escape routes and embarkation points 55-61 
Emergency centres and systems 62-70 
Pipeline emergency procedures 71-72 
Evacuation, escape and rescue - General 73-76 
Helicopters 77 
TEMPSC 78-81 
Means of escape to the sea 82-84 
Personal survival and escape equipment 85-87 
Standby vessels 88-96 
Command in emergencies 97-99 
Drills, exercises and precautionary musters and evacuations 100-104 
Training for emergencies 105-106 
Safety Case 
1. The operator should be required by regulation to submit to the regulatory body 
a Safety Case in respect of each of its installations. The regulation should be analogous 
to Reg 7 of the CIMAH Regulations, subject to recommendations 2-13 (paras 17.33- 
43). 
2. The Safety Case should demonstrate that certain objectives have been met, 
including the following: - 
(i) that the safety management system of the company (SMS) and that of the 
installation are adequate to ensure that (a) the design and (b) the operation of 
the installation and its equipment are safe (paras 17.36 and 21.56-57); 
(ii) that the potential major hazards of the installation and the risks to personnel 
thereon have been identified and appropriate controls provided (para 17.37); 
and 
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that adequate provision is made for ensuring, in the event of a maj'or emergencý 
affecting the installation f a' a Temporary Safe Refuge "TSR' for personnel On 
the installarion- and b their af-, ar-d ;. r. -acuation. cscapc and' rescuc .. paras 
17.37-3Sý DAM 19.157 and 20.8, 
3. The SMS should be in respect of (a., the design 1kboth conceptual and detailed) of 
the operator's installations; and (b'., the procedures (both operational and emergency) 
of those installations. In the case of existing installations the SMS in respect of design 
should be directed to its review and upgrading so far as that is reasonably practicable 
(para 21.56). 
The SMS should set out the safety objectives, the system by which these objectives 
are to be achieved, the performance standards which are to be met and the means by 
which adherence to these standards is to be monitored (para 21.56). 
It should dra-vN, on quality assurance principles similar to those stated in BS 5750 and 
ISO 9000 (para 21.58). 
4. In furtherance of the objectives set out in para 2 above, the operator should be 
required to set out the following in the Safety Case: - 
A demonstration that so far as is reasonably practicable hazards arising from 
the inventory of hydrocarbons 
(a) on the installation, and 
(b). in risers and pipelines connected to the installation both in themselves 
and as components of the total system of which they form part 
have been minimised kparas 19.17 and 19.20). 
(ii) A demonstration that so far as is reasonably practicable the exposure of 
personnel on the platform to accidental events and their consequences has been 
minimised (para 17-37). 
"iii) A demonstration by quantified risk assessment of major hazards that the 
acceptance standarcfs have been met in respect of risk to the integr ' ity of the 
TSR, escape routes, embarkation points and lifeboats from design accidental 
events and that all reasonably practicable steps have been taken to ensure the 
safety of persons in the TSR and using escape routes and embarkation points 
(paras 17.38 and 19.157). 
(iV) A demonstration that within the TSR there are facilities as specified by the 
operator which are adequate for the purpose of control of an emergency (para 
19.182). 
A fire risk analysis, in accordance with recommendation 49 below (para 19.90). 
"vi) An evacuation, escape and rescue analysis, in accordance with recommendations 
73-75 below i, para 20.9. ). 
5. For the purposes of the demonstration referred to in para (iii) of recor=endation 
4, the accidental events are to be identified by the operator. A design accidental event 
is an event which will not cause the loss of any of the following: - 
- the integrity of the TSR, 
- the passability of at least one escape route from each location on the platform, 
- the integrity of a minimum complement of embarkation points and lifeboats 
specified for personnel in the TSR, and 
- the passability of at least one escape route to each of these embarkation points, 
within the endurance period specified. Events m6re severe than this are referred to as 
residual accidental events Ipara 19.16W. 
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be set before the The acceptance standards for risk and endurance time s ou 
submission of the Safety Case. Standards should bý set bý reference to the ALARP 
rinciple. For the tirne being it should be thc regulatory body which sets these p .1 
standards. The operator should define the conditions which constitute loss of integrity 
of, and the standards of protection for, the TSR and escape routes to the TSR aný 
from the TSR to the embarkation points; and should specify the minimum complement 
of embarkation points and lifeboats for the TSR (paras 19.158-159). 
6. The TSR should normally be the accommodation (paras 19.156 and 19.161). 
In the case of existing installations any requirement for the upgrading of the 
accommodation, escape routes and embarkation points should be determined on the 
basis of the Safety Case (para 19.165). 
In connection with the above the Safety Case should specify the following: - 
In respect of the TSR- 
- its function 
- the conditions which constitute its integrity 
- the conditions for integrity of its supporting structure 
- the events in which and the period for which it is to maintain its integrity (paras 
19.157-158). 
In respect of escape routes to the TSR and from the TSR to the embarkation points- 
- the conditions which constitute their passability 
- the conditions for integrity of their supporting structure 
- the events in which and the periods for which they are to maintain their 
passability (provided that for each location on the platform there should be a 
minimum of two escape routes to the TSR, at least one of which should remain 
passable for the period) (para 19.164). 
In respect of embarkation points and lifeboats- 
- the number and location 
- the conditions for their integrity and that of their supporting structure 
Is - the events in which and the periods for which they are to maintain their integrit. y 
- the minimum complement for the TSR (para 19.164). 
8. No fixed installation should be established or maintained in controlled waters; and 
no mobile installation should be brought into those waters with a view to its being 
stationed there or maintained in those waters unless a Safety Case in respect of that 
installation has been submitted to and accepted by the regulatory body (para 17.41). 
9. As regards existing installations the date for submission of the Safety Case should 
be laid down by regulation. There is an urgent need for the submission of Safetv 
Cases, but the date should be selected by the regulatory body. The regulatory bod'v 
should have the power, in the event of the failure of an operator to submit an acceptabl'e 
Safety Case, to require the operator to take whatever remedial action it considered 
necessary, including requiring the installation to be shut down (paras 17.44-45). 
10. A Safety Case should be updated: - 
After a period of vears from its last assessment (not less than 3, not more than 
5, years). 
(ii) At the discretion of the regulatory body on the ground of a material change of circumstances, such as a change of operator, the occurrence of a major emergency (including one in which there is a precautionary evacuation -, a 
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major technological innovation or the discovery or better understanding of a 
major hazard. 
However, provision should be made in order to avoid the need for more than one 
Safety Case to be updated by an operator at the same time; and to enable the regulatory 
body to postpone the automatic updating where it has recently required a discretionary 
updating (para 17.46). 
11. As regards modifications to installations or their equipment or procedures, the 
operator should, before putting the modification into effect, ascertain what effect, if 
any, it has on the relevant components of the Safety Case. An operator should be 
required to report to the regulatory body all intended modifications which meet criteria 
set by the regulatory body, with a view to discussing with the regulatory body whether 
and to what extent a review of the Safety Case is required (para 17.47). 
12. For the time being the acceptance by the regulatory body of Safety Cases should 
not be regarded as justifying the revocation of regulations or the withdrawal of 
guidance notes (para 17.67). 
Where an operator proposes to meet the objectives of a Safety Case by means which 
are not in accordance with regulations or guidance notes the justification for such a 
course should be set out in the Safety Case. For the assistance of operators the 
regulatory body should publish as soon as possible, and thereafter update in the light 
of experience, a list of the individual regulations relating to an installation and its 
equipment in respect of which it is prepared to grant exemption in the light of a 
satisfactory demonstration in a Safety Case; and to do likewise in regard to guidance 
notes (para 17.67). 
In due course the existing regulations of a detailed prescriptive nature should be 
reviewed with a view to their revocation or replacement by regulations which set 
objectives. However, it is anticipated that there will continue to be even in the long 
term a case for some detailed prescriptive regulations (paras 17.63,17.67 and 21.67). 
13. The regulatory body should discuss with the industry whether it is desirable and 
practicable that at the stage of the application for Annex B consent (or its equivalent) 
there should be a procedure for submission by operators of a preliminary assessment 
of matters relevant to a Safety Case and for 
& acceptance of this assessment being a 
prerequisite for the granting of Annex B consent (para 17.43). 
Auditing of the operator's management of safety 
14. The operator should be required to satisfy itself by means of regular audits 
its SMS is being adhered to (para 21.60). 
that 
15. The regulatory body should be required regularly to review the operator's audit 
on a selective basis; and itself to carry out such further audit as it thinks fit; and by 
regular inspection verify that the output of the SMS is satisfactory (para 21.60). 
Independent assessment and surveys of installations 
16. The regulatory body should consider (i) after the introduction of requirements 
for the demonstration of SMS and auditing of compliance with it; and (ii) after 
experience in the operation and effectiveness of such requirements whether and to 
what extent it will be appropriate to retain the present system of certification (para 
21.64). 
Legislation - General 
17. T) The principal regulations in regard to offshore safety should take the form of 
requiring that stated objectives are to be met referred to as "goal-setting 
regulations") rather than prescribing that detailed measures are to be taken 
(para 21.67). 
ii) In relation to goal-setting regulation%, guidance notes should give non- 
mandatory advice on one or mort: inethods of ar, hieving, such --)biectives 
without prescribing any particular method as a minimum or as the measure 
to be taken in default of an acceptable alternative (para 21.67). 
(iii)However, there will be a continuing need for some regulations which prescribe 
detailed measures (para 21.67). 
18. The provisions of the Mineral Workings (Offshore Installations) Act 1971 and 
the Petroleum and Submarine Pipe-lines Act 1975 which have the same general 
purposes as those of Part I of the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 (HSWA), 
and the regulations made under such provisions, should be made relevant statutory 
provisions for the purposes of the HSWA (para 21.68). 
19. The Construction and Survey Regulations, the Fire Fighting Equipment Regula- 
tions, the Life-Saving Appliances Regulations and the Emergency Procedures Regula- 
tions should be revoked and replaced by- 
Construction Regulations, covering inter alia the structure and layout of the 
installation and its accommodation. 
(ii) Plant and Equipment Regulations, covering inter alia plant and equipment on 
the installation and in particular those handling hydrocarbons. 
(iii) Fire and Explosion Protection Regulations, covering inter alia both active and 
passive fire protection and explosion protection, and 
(iv) Evacuation, Escape and Rescue Regulations, covering inter alia emergency 
procedures, life-saving appliances, evacuation, escape and rescue. 
Each of the above sets of regulation ,s should 
include goal-setting regulations as their 
main or primary provisions and should be supported by guidance notes giving advice 
which is non-mandatory in the sense set out in paragraph (ii) of recommendation 17 
(para 21.69). 
20. Operators should be encouraged to specify the standards which they will use to 
comply with goal-setting regulations. For a given installation compliance may be 
demonstrated by reference to such standards, the terms of guidance notes and what 
is shown by a safety assessment or a combination of one or more of such methods 
(paras 17.6ý and 21.70). 
21. As regards existing guidance notes the regulatory body should consider whether 
and to what extent thl-y should be treated without replacement or modification as 
giving non-mandatory advice in the sense set out in paragraph (ii) of recommendation 
17; and should inform the industry accordingly (para 21.71ý. 
22. In connection with the preparation of guidance notes the regulatory body Should 
review the procedures for consultation so as to ensure that the viewý of Eht. 
representatives of employers and employees involved in work offshore are adequately 
taken into account , para 
21.721. 
The regulatory body 
23. There should be a single regulatory body for offshore safety para 21.62'. 
24. The single regulatory body should discharge the safety functions in relation :o 
fire-fighting equipment and life--iaving appliances. As regards standby vessels it should 
discharge all functions. %vhether -directly or through the agency of the Department of 
Transport DoT', save those which relate to , he statutory res 
Linder the Nierchant Shipping Ac: s paras 21-65-t)6 . 
ponsibility of the DoT 
1) : 
25. The functions of the Petroleum Engineering Division of the Department of 
Energy (DEn) which are concerned with the regulation of offshore safety should in 
future be discharged by a discrete division of the Health and Safetv Executive 1ISE 
which is exclusivelv devoted tc, ai*ý-- p-,,: -a:. aiiJ 2 ), - 
26. This division should employ a specialist inspectorate and have a clear identitv 
and strong influence in the HSE. It should be headed by a chief executive who should 
be responsible directly to the Director General of the 
ftSE and should be a member 
of its senior management board. His func: ion would include the development of the 
offshore safety regime, and in particular the implementation of its provisions for Safety 
Cases and SMS (para 22.37). 
Safety committees and safety representatives 
27. The regulatory body, operators and contractors should support and encourage 
the involvement of the offshore workforce in safety. In particular, first line supervisors 
should involve their workforce teams in everyday safety para 18.48). 
28. The operator's procedures included in line management of operations which are 
aimed at involving the workforce in safety should form part of its SIMS (para 21.56,. 
29. The DEn's intention to review the Offshore Installations (Safety Representatives 
and Safety Committees) Regulations 1989 after 2 years' experience of their working 
is endorsed (para 21.85). 
30. Safety representatives should be protected against victimisation by a provision 
similar to Sec 58(i)(b', of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 (para 
21.86). 
'Safety Representatives and Safety Committees) 31. The Offshore Installations k 
Regulations 1989 should be modified to the effect that the training of safety 
representatives should be determined and paid for by the operator (para 21.87). 
Permits to work 
32. The operator's permit to work system should form part of its SMS (para 21.56). 
33. Operators and the regulatory body should pay particular attention to the training 
and competence of contractors' supervisors who are required to operate the permit to 
work system (paras 18.17 and 18.29). 
r 34. Standardisation of the permit to work s% stem thioughout the industry is neither 
necessary nor practicable. However, in view of the fact that there is much in common 
between the s. ystems of different operators, the industry should seek to increase 
harmonisation, for example in the colours used for different types of permits to work 
and in the rules as to the period for which a permit to work remains valid (para 18.28). 
35. While it is not inappropriate for contractors' supervisors to act as Performing 
Authorities, operators should be made responsible for ensuring that such supervisors 
0 are trained in the permit to work systern for the installation where they are to act as 
Performing Authorities and that they carry documentary proof of having completed 
such training (para 18.29). 
36. All permit to work systems should incorporate a mechanical isolation procedure 
which involves the physical locking off and tagging of isolation valves (para 18.29). 
37. A permit to work and its consequent isolations, both mechanical and electrical, 
should remain in force until the work is sufficiently complete for the permit to be 
signed off and the equipment returned to operation -'. para 18.8). 
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38. Copies of all issued permits to work should be displayed at a convenient location 
and in a systematic arrangement such that process operating staff can readily see and 
check which equipment i-, under maintenance and not available for operation (para 
18.8/,. 
Incident reporting 
39. The regulatory body should be responsible for maintaining a database with 
regard to hydrocarbon leaks, spills and ignitions in the industry and for the benefit of 
the industry. The regulatory body should: - 
(i) discuss and agree with the industry the method of collection and use of the 
data, 
(ii) regularly assess the data to determine the existence of any trends and report 
them to the industry, and 
(iii) provide operators with a means of obtaining access to the data, particularly for 
the purpose of carrying out quantified risk assessment (para 18.43',. 
Control of the process 
40. Key process variables, as determined by the Safety Case, should be monitored 
and controllable from the Control Room (para 18.36). 
41. The Control Room should at all times be in the charge of a person trained and 
qualified to undertake the work of Control Room operator. The Control Room should 
be manned at all times (para 18.35). 
42. The training of Control Room operators should include instruction in an onshore 
course in the handling of emergencies (para 18.35). 
Hydrocarbon inventory, risers and pipelines 
43. The Emergency Pipe-line Valve Regulations should continue in force until thev 
are subsumed in the Plant and Equipment Regulations. The provision in these 
regulations for there to be on each riser a valve with full emergency shutdown capabilitY 
and located as close to sea level as practicable is endorsed (paras 19.34-35). 
44. There should be no immediate requirement that a subsea isolation valve (SSIVI 
be fitted on a pipeline connected to an installation. The operator should demonstrate 
in the Safety Case that adequate provision has been made, including if necessary the 
use of SSIVs, against hazards from risers and pipelines (para 19.36). 
45. Studies should be carried out with the following objectives: - 
To explore the feasibility of dumping in an emergency large oil inventories, 
such as those in the separators, in a safe and environmentally acceptable 
manner, so as to minimise the inventory of fuel available to feed a fire (para 
19.19). 
(ii) To minimise the pipeline connections to platforms (para 19.21). 
46. Studies should be carried out with the following objectives: - 
(i) To achieve effective passive fire protection of risers without aggravating 
corrosion (para 19.22). 
, ii) To improve the reliability and reduce the cost of SSIVs so that it is more often 
reasonably practicable to install them (para. 19.37). 
Fire and gas detection and emergency shutdown 
47. The arrangements for the activation of the emergency shutdown valves (ESVs, 
and of SSIVs if fitted, on pipelines should be a feature of tlýe Safety Case (para 19.42 . 
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48. Studies should be done to determine the vulnerability of ESVs to severe accident 
conditions and to enhance their ability to survive such conditions (para 19.43). 
Fire and explosion protection 
49. Operators should be required by regulation to submit a fire risk analysis to the 
regulatory body for its acceptance (para 19.99). 
50. The regulations and related guidance notes- should promote an approach to fire 
and explosion protection: - 
(i) which is integrated as between - 
- active and passive fire protection 
- different forms of passive fire protection, such as fire insulation and 
platform layout, and 
- fire protection and explosion protection (paras 19.87-95); 
(ii) in which the need for, and the location and resistance of, fire and blast walls 
is determined by safety assessment rather than by regulations (para 19.96); 
(iii) in which the function, configuration, capacity, availability and protection of 
the fire water deluge system is determined by safety assessment rather than by 
regulations (paras 19.97 and 19.99); 
(iv) which facilitates the use of a scenario-based design method for fire protection 
as an alternative to the reference area method (paras 19.91 and 19.98); and 
(V) which provides to a high degree the ability of the fire water deluge system, 
including the fire pump system, to survive severe accident conditions (para 
19.100). 
1. The ability of the fire water deluge system, including the fire pump system, to 4 rvive severe accident conditions should be a feature of the Safety Case (para 19.100). 
4- 
ý --1. The regulatory body should work with the industry to obtain agreement on the ýtlterpretation for design purposes of its interim hydrocarbon fire rest and other similar '1ý'Nts If in the view of the regulatory body there exists a need for an improved test, 'kAqrzh*a: 
s a heat flux test, it should work witlý the industry in order to develop one (para 
101). 
i The DEn 
discussion document on Fire and Explosion Protection should be 
ýI 
thdrawn (para 19-102). 
. The regulatory body should ask operators which have not already done so to 
Týiertake forthwith a fire risk analysis, without waiting for legislation ', para 19.103). 
"ýý 
q ornmodationg TSR9 escape routes and embarkation points c 
I Provisions should continue to be made by regulations supported by guidance 
kes as to the construction of the accommoLtion; and as to escape 
'routes 
and 
. para 
19.166). lbarkation points 
The regulations and the related guidance notes should promote an approach to 'ýA'tection of the accommodation: - 
in which external fire protection is provided both to prevent breach of the 
accommodation and to maintain breathabie air within it para 19-170 - and 
in which a, n integrated set of active and pasNive measures is provided to prevent 
ingress A imoke and other : ()ntaminants into the accommodation and to 
maintain hreathabie air within it paras 10 170-171 . 
57. For the purpose of maintaining breathable air within the accommodation, it 
should be required by regulation that the ventilation air intakes should be provided 
with smoke and gas detectors and that on smoke or gas alarm the ventilation and 
dampers should shut down (para 
58. The regulations and related guidance notes on escape routes should recognise 
that it may not be practicabie to protect escape routes against all physical conditions; 
and accordingly should be based on the objective that they should remain passable 
(para 19.174). 
59. It should be required by regulation that escape routes are provided with adequate 
and reliable emergency lighting and with photoluminescent direction signs (para 
19.175). 
60. The regulatory body should ask operators which have not already done so to 
carry out forthwith an assessment of the risk of ingress of smoke or gas into the 
accommodation; and to fit smoke and gas detcctors and implement ventilation shutdown 
arrangements as in recommendation 57, without waiting for legislation (para 19.173). 
61. Studies should be carried out with the objective of assisting designers in predicting 
the breathability of air in a TSR where its external fire wall is subjected to a severe 
hydrocarbon fire (para 19.163). 
]Exnergency centres and systems 
62. It should be required by regulation that there should be available within the 
TSR certain minimum specified facilities for the monitoring and control of an 
emergency under hostile outside conditions (paras 19.178 and 19.182). 
These facilities should be in the Control Room, which should be located in the TSR 
(para 19.179). 
On existing installations where the Control Room is not in the TSR, these facilities 
should be in an Emergency Control Centre located in the TSR. In such a case the 
Control Room should be protected against fire and explosion as determined by safety 
assessment (paras 19.180-181). 
63. It should be required by regulation that a Radio Room with facilities for external 
conununications should be located in the TSR (para 19.179). 
On existing installations where the Radio Room is not in the TSR, these facilities 
should be in an Emergency Radio Room located in the TSR (para 19.180). 
64. The regulations and related guidance notes should promote an approach to 
emergency systems: - 
which provides to a high degree the ability of these svstems to survive severe 
accident conditions (paras 19.188-189); and 
(ii) which applies to communications systems the fail-safe principle (para 19.193). 
The emergency systems include the emergency power supplies and systems, the 
emergency shutdown system and the emergency communications systems. Severe 
accident conditions include fire, explosion and strong vibration (para 19.188). 
65. The ability of emergency systems to survive severe accident conditions should 
be a feature of the Safety Case (para 19.189). 
66. The regulatory body should work with the industry to promote the use of status 
light systems (para 19.192). 
67. The regulatory body should work with the industry to achieve standardisation 
of status lights and of alarm svstems for emergencies ý'para 19.194). 
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68. Studies should be done to determine the vulnerability of emergency systems to 
severe accident conditions and to enhance their ability to survive such conditions (para 
19.190). 
69. The regulatory body should ask operators which have not already done so to 
review forthwith the ability of emergency systems to withstand severe accident 
(para 19.191). conditions , 
70. Where a regulation imposes a requirement for a major emergency or protective 
system, such as a fire deluge system, it should be required that the operator should 
set acceptance standards for its availability (para 19.199). 
Pipeline emergency procedures 
71. Operators should be required by regulation regularly to review pipeline emergency 
procedures and manuals. The review should ensure that the information contained in 
manuals is correct, that the procedures contained are agreed with those who are 
responsible for executing them and are consistent with the procedures of installations 
connected by hydrocarbon pipelines (para 19.196). 
72. Operators should be required by regulation to institute and review regularly a 
procedure for shutting down production on an installation in the event of an emergency 
on another installation which is connected to the first by a hydrocarbon pipeline where 
Ehe emergency is liable to be exacerbated by continuation of such production (para 
19.197). 
Evacuation, escape and rescue - General 
73. Operators should be required by regulation to submit to the regulatory body for 
its acceptance an evacuation, escape and rescue analysis in respect of each of its 
installations (para 20.9). 
44. The analysis should specify the facilities and other arrangements which would 
be available for the evacuation, escape and rescue of personnel in the event of an 
Itmergency which makes it necessary or advisable in the interests of safety for personnel 
'to leave the installation (para 20.9). 
'ý'5. In particular the analysis should specify: - 
(i) The formal command structure for the control of an emergency affecting the 
installation; 
(ii) The likely availability and capacity of helicopters, whether in-field or otherwise, 
for the evacuation of personnel; 
(iii) The types, numbers, locations and accessibility of totally enclosed motor 
propelled survival craft (TEMPSC) available for the evacuation of personnel 
from (a) the TSR and (b) other parts of the installation from which access to 
the TSR is not readily available; 
(iv) The types, numbers and locations of life rafts and other facilities provided as 
meaný of escape to the sea; 
(V) The specification (including speed, sea capability and accommodation), location 
and functions of the standby vessel and other vessels available for the rescue 
of personnel; 
'vi) 
The types, numbers, locations and availability of fast rescue c, -aft, whether 
stationed on the installation or on the standby or other vessels; and 
The types, numbers and locations of personal survival and escape equipment. 
All in para 20.9). 
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76. The regulatory body should ask operators which have not already done so to 
undertake an evacuation, escape and rescue analysis forthwith, without waiting for 
legislation. The timetable for completion of this analysis should be agreed between 
the regulatory body and the industry but should not exceed a total of 12 months. and 
that only for operators of a large number of irnt, -: 11lations pýira -10.9 
Helicopters 
77. Operators should adopt a flight following system for determining at short notice 
the availability and capacity of helicopters in the event of an emergency. This system 
could be either a system operated by the individual operator or a North Sea-wide 
system (para 20.11). 
TEMPSC 
78. The requirement by regulation that each installation should be provided with 
TEMPSC having in the aggregate sufficient capacity to accommodate safely on board 
1500,, of the number of persons on the installation &uld be maintained (para. 20.16). 
Such provision should include TEPYIPSC which are readily accessible from the TSR 
and which have in the aggregate sufficient capacity to accommodate safely on board 
the number of persons on the installation (para 20.16). ' 
79. On new installations where the provision of davit-launched TEMPSC is accepta- 
ble to the regulatory body they should be oriented so as to point away from the 
installation (para 20.24). 
80. The regulatory body should work with the industry to develop equipment and 
methods to enable 
iEMPSC to be launched clear of the installation including where, 
as on existing installations, they are oriented so as to point along the side of the 
installation (para 20.18). 
81. Reg 5 of the Life-Saving Appliances Regulations should be amended or replaced 
so as to enable free-fall TEMPSC to be installed on new and existing installations. It 
should remain for the operator to justify its choice of TEIMPSC as being appropriate 
in the particular conditions of its installation (para 20.24). 
Means of escape to the sea 
82. It should be required by regulation that each installation should be provided 
with life rafts having in the aggregate sufficient capacity to accommodate safely on 
board at least the number of persons on board the installation; along with suitable 
ropes to enable those persons to obtain access to the life rafts after they have been 
launched and deployed ýIpara 20.26). 
83. A variety of means of descent EO the sea should be provided on all installations. 
In accordance with recommendation - 
75 the types, numbers and locations of facilities 
for this purpose should be specified in the evacuation, escape and 1. -scue analysis; but 
such facilities should include: - 
fixed ladders or stairways 
personal devices for controlled descent by rope 'paras 20.28-29). 
84 The regulatory body should work with the industry to determine the practicability 
and safety of escape chutes and collapsible stairways Ipara 20.30). 
personal survival and escape equipment 
85. Each individual on board an installation should be provided %vith: - 
i" a personal survival or immersion, suit, 
307, 
(ii) a life-jacket; 
a smoke hood of a simple filter type to exclude smoke and provide protection 
-o or frorn die -1 for at Icast 10 minutes during escapC ASR; 
(iv) a torch; and 
(V) fireproof gloves. 
These articles should be kept in the accommodation (para 20.36). 
Other survival suits, life-jackets and smoke hoods for at least one half of the number 
of persons on the installation should be stored in containers placed at suitable locations 
on the installation (para 20.36). 
86. The use of small transmitters or detectors on life-jackets in order to assist in the 
finding of personnel in the dark should be considered. Luminescent strips should be 
of a colour other than orange (paras 20.33-34). 
87. Work should be carried out with the objective of combining the functions of a 
survival suit and a life-jacket in one garment (para 20.32). 
Standby vessels 
88. Changes in the regulations and the code for the assessment of standby vessels 
should be aimed at an improvement in the quality of standby vessels, introducing 
basic standards for existing vessels and higher specifications for new vessels (para 
20.41). 
89. It should be required by regulations that each standby vessel should comply with 
the following standards: - 
(i) it should be highly manoeuvrable and able to maintain its position; 
(ii) It should provide full visibility of the water-line in all directions from the 
bridge; 
(iii) It should have at least two 360* searchlights capable of being remotely 
controlled; 
ov) It should have two fast rescue craft. One of the 2 fast rescue craft should be 
able to travel at 25 knots in normal sea states. The smaller fast rescue craft (9 
person capacity) should be crewed by 2 persons; the larger by 3 persons. Fast 
rescue craft should be equipped with adequate means of conununicating with 
the standby vessel by VHF radio; and carry an adequate portable searchlight; 
(V) It should have the means of rapid launching of its fast rescue craft; 
(vi) It should have adequate means of conununication by radio with its fast rescue 
craft, the installation, nearby vessels and the shore; and 
(Vii) It sbould have at least two methods of retrieving survivors from the sea. 
(All in para 20.42). 
90. Reg 10 of the Emergency Procedures Regulations should be revoked (para 20-39) 
91. Scc 3 of the code for the assessment of standby vessels (areas of operation) should 
be withdrawn (para 20.39). 
92. The owners of standby vessels should be required to notify the regulatory body 
weekly as to the locations and functions of their vessels in the ensuing week. A copy 
of such notification should also be given to the DoT 'para 20.54). 
93. As regards the appropriate numbers for the crew of standby vessels, the DoT 
should take into account the evidence given in the Inquiry when reviewing the code 
in this respect (para 20.50). 
94. The proposals in the amended code as to age limit, medical examination and 
certification of fitness of members of the crew of standby vessels; and as to their 
periods of duty are endorsed (paras 20.51-52). 
95. The regulatory body should work with the industry to obtain agreement as to 
adequate training packages for the crew of standby vessels. Such training should be 
administered, and records of training kept by the Offshore Petroleum Industry 
Training Board (OPITB) (para 20.55). 
96. The coxwain and crew of fast rescue craft should receive special training for 
their duties, along with regular refreshers (para 20.55). 
Command in emergencies 
97. The operator's formal command organisation which is to function in the event 
of an emergency should form part of its SMS (para 20.59). 
98. The operator's criteria for selection of OlMs, and in particular their cornmand 
ability, should form part of its SMS (para 20.59). 
99. There should be a system of emergency exercises which provides OlMs with 
practice in decision-making in emergency situations, including decisions on evacuation. 
All 0 IMs and their deputies should participate regularly in such exercises (para 20.6 1). 
Drills, exercises and precautionary musters and evacuations 
100. The operator's system for emergency drills and exercises should form part of 
its SMS (paras 20.61 and 20.64). 
101. Offshore emergency drills and exercises should be carried out in accordance 
with the UKOOA guidelines for offshore emergency drills and exercises on installations 
(paras 20.6 1 and 20-64). 
102. All offshore staff should attend one muster per tour of duty (para 20.62). 
103. The circumstances of all precautionary musters and evacuations should be 
reported by operators to the regulatory body (para 20.62). 
104. Operators should maintain lists of personnel on board by alphabetical order 
and also by reference to the names of contractors whose personnel are represented on 
board. These lists should be updated for every movement of personnel and copied 
immediately to the shore (para 20.62). 
Training for emergencies 
105. The UKOOA guidelines for offshore emergency safety training on installations 
should be a minimum requirement for survival, fire-fighting and other forms of 
training detailed therein for the relevant personnel emploved offshore. Personnel who 
have not met the requirements of these guidelines shoul'd not be permitted to work 
offshore (para 20.64). 
In order to ensure that these guidelines are complied with operators should be required 
to devise and maintain a system for the purpose, pending the date when the central 
training register instituted by OPITB for recording the personal details and safety 
training courses attended by all personnel seeking employment offshore is fully 
operational . 1'para 20.64). 
10(j. The operator's system for emergency training and its enforcement should form 
part of its SIMS para 
; 
20.64'. 
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Appendix E 
List of Witnesses in Part 2 
(and the subject inatter of their evidence, 
ADAMS, AJ Principal Pipeline Inspector, Safety Directorate of 
PED, Department of Energy 
Pipeline Isolation Systems including Subsea 
Valves 
2. ALLEN, CS Head of Alwyn Safety, Total Oil Marine PLC 
Application of Computers to Permit to Work 
Systems for Offshore Installations 
3. ASHWORTH, M Senior Control Engineef, BP International 
Process Control and Emergency Shutdown 
Systems 
4. BANKS, RP Supervisor of Engineering Design and 
Construction, Chevron (UK) Ltd 
The Qualifications and Qualities required in an 
Offshore Maintenance Supervisor 
5. BAXENDINE, MR Offshore Installation Manager, Shell (UK) 
Exploration & Production Ltd 
Command Structure in an Emergency 
6. BOOTH, MJ Head of Operations Safety, Shell (UK) 
Exploration & Production Ltd 
Escape Routes to the Survival Craft and the 
Helideck on Offshore Installations 
7. BRANDIE, EF Safety and Compliance Manager, Chevron (UK) 
Ltd, Chairman of UKOOA Fire Protection 
Working Group, representative of CBI on OIAC 
Factors for Enhancing the Integrity of Offshore 
Safe Haven Areas. An Alternative to Standard 
Firewater System Designs for UK Sector 
Offshore Installations 
8. BROADRIBB, MP Central Safety Engineering Superintendent, BP 
Exploration 
Subsea Isolation Valves - The BP Approach 
9. CHAMBERLAIN, GA Technical Leader of Explosion Protection Review 
DR Task Force, Shell (UK) Exploration & Production 
Ltd 
The Nature and Mitigation of Vapour Cloud 
Explosions 
10. COX, RA DR Consulting Engineer, formerly Chief Executive of 
Technica Ltd 
Overview of Quantified Risk Assessment 
CLTNNINGHAM, AWT Occupational Health and Safety Officer, EETPU 
Safety Representatives 
12. DALZELL, GA Fire and Safety Engineer, BP International, 
Member of UKOOA Fire Protection Working 
Group 
The Prevention of Smoke Ingress into Offshore 
Accommodation Modules 
I 
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13. DANIEL, jjS Director, Hollobone Hibbert & Associates Ltd, 
Chairman of the Standby Ship Operators 
Association Ltd 
I Standby 
14. DAVIES, GH Area Director, Health and Safety Executive, 
Merseyside & Cheshire Area 
Permits to Work 
15. DAY, j Head of Electrical Engineering, Shell Exploration 
& Production Ltd, Member of UKOOA Electrical 
Sub-committee 
Electrical Power for Emergency Systems 
16. DE LA PENA, M Divisional Director, Environmental & Safety 
Produ=, Division, Dowty PLC 
Smoke Hoods 
17. DENTON, AA DR Chairman, Noble Denton International Ltd, Vice 
President of the Institution of Mechanical 
Engineers 
Quality Management Systems 
18. DOBLE, PAC Deputy Project Manager, Kittiwake Project, Shell 
(UK) Exploration & Production Ltd 
The Means of Preventing and Mitigating the 
Effects of an Explosion - Kittiwake Project 
19. DREW, BC Chief Surveyor, Marine Directorate, Department 
of Transport 
Code for Assessment of the Suitability of 
Standby Vessels 
20. ELLICE, KAJ Training Manager, BP Exploration 
Training of Offshore Installation Managers 
21. ELLIS, AF DR Deputy Chief Inspector, Technology Division, 
Health & Safety Executive 
Quantified Risk Assessment - HS. E's View 
22. EVANS, JD Research & Development Manager, MSA (Britain) 
Ltd 
Smoke Hoods 
23. FERROW, M Manager, Safety & Quality Assurance, Conoco 
(UK) Ltd 
The Offshore Safety Regime and Formal Safety 
Assessments 
24. FLEISHMAN, AB Senior Safety Technologist, Group Safety Centre, 
BP International 
Gyda Safety Evaluation 
25. GILBERT, RB DR Chief Engineer, Nelson Project Team, Shell (UK) 
Exploration & Production Ltd 
Subsea Valves 
26. GINN, MC CAPT Principal Air Transport Officer, British Gas PLC, 
Chairman of UKOOA Aircraft Committee 
The use of Helicopters in Offshorc Evacuation 
27. GORSE, Ej Principal Inspector, Safety Directorate of PED, 
Department of Energy 
Formal Safety Assessments 
28. HEIBERG- Platform Manager, Gullfaks C, Statoil, Norway 
ANDERSON, G The Means of Ensuring Safe and Full 
Evacuation - The Statoil Approach, The 
Control of the Process 
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29. HIGGS, F National Secretary of the Chemical, Oil & Rubber 
Group, Transport & General Workers' Union 
The Offshore Safety Regime 
3 HODGKT&', '%'-',, D Director -of Safety and General Policy Division, 
Health and Satery Executive 
The Agency Agreement between the Health and 
Safety Commission and the Department of 
Ene rg, y 
31. HOGH, MS DR Manager Projects and External Affairs, Group 
Safety Centre, BP International 
Overview of Use and Value of Quantified Risk 
Assessment 
32. JONES, MJ Training Officer, Central Training Division, BP 
Exploration 
Development of Craft Training Scheme 
33. KEENAN, JM Assistant General Secretary, Banking Insurance & 
Finance Union, formerly District Officer, 
Transport & General Workers' Union, Aberdeen 
Standby Vessels 
34. KELLEHER, TW Fire and Safety Engineer, Shell Exploration & 
Production Ltd, Project Manager of Department 
of Energy/UKOOA Research Projects on 
Evacuation by TEMPSC 
Survival Craft and Free Fall Lifeboats 
35. KINLOCH, DS Offshore Installation Manager, Conoco (UK) Ltd 
Independent Actions during Emergencies, 
Permit to Work Procedure 
36. KYLE, SR Environment and Safety Co-ordinator, Brae 
Operations, Marathon Oil (UK) Ltd, Chairman of 
UKOOA Working Group on Permits to Work 
Permit to Work Procedure 
37. LIEN, E Technical Director, Selantic Industrier as, Norway 
Skyscape Offshore Emergency Evacuation 
System 
38. LITTLEJOHN, IJ Process and Maintenance Engineering Group 
Supervisor, Amoco (UK) Exploration Ltd 
The Qualifications and Qualities Required in an 
Offshore Supervisor 
39. LYONS, RA Assistant General Secretary, Manufacturing, 
Science & Finance Union 
The Offshore Safety Regime 
40. MCINTOSH, AR Principal Inspector, Safety Directorate of PED, 
Department of Energy 
Protection against Fire and Explosion 
41. MCKEE, RE Chairman and Managing Director, Conoco (UK) 
Ltd 
Managing Safety 
42. MACEY, M Director, Maritime Rescue Services Ltd 
Standby Vessels - Training of Personnel 
43. MATHESON, AB MR Consultant in Accident and Emergency Care, 
Aberdeen Royal Infirmary 
The Offshore Specialist Team 
44. MARSHALL, VC DR Chartered Engineer, Formerly Director of Safety 
Services, Bradford University 
Safety Cases and Safety Assessments 
421 
45. MIDDLETON, C J. Marine Superintendent, Marathon (UK) Ltd, 
Chairman of UKOOA Marine Committee 
Standby Vessels 
46. NORDGARD, T Vice President, Projects Division, Statoil, Norway 
The Location and Protection of Accommodation 
on Integrated Drilling and Production Platforms 
on the Norwegian Continental Shelf 
47. OGNEDAL, M Director, Safety and Working Environment 
Division, Norwegian Petroleum Directorate 
The Norwegian Offshore Safety Regime 
48. PAPE, RP DR Head of Major Hazards Assessment Unit, Health 
and Safety Executive 
Quantified Risk Assessment - HSE's Experience 
49. PERROTT, IR Assistant Chartering Manager, Maersk Co Ltd 
Skyscape 
50. PETRIE, JR Director of Safety, PED, Department of Eriergy 
Life-Saving Appliances, The Offshore Safety 
Regime 
51. PRIDDLE, RJ Deputy Secretary, Department of Energy 
The Offshore Safety Regime 
52. RIMINGTON, JD Director General, Health and Safety Executive 
The Onshore Safety Regime 
53. RUDD, DT Marine Superintendent, BP Exploration 
Evacuation Policy and Plan for Forties Field 
54. SCANLON, TJ Mechanical Piping Engineer (formerly Offshore 
Superintendent, Wood Group Engineering 
Offshore Ltd) 
Permit to Work Systems 
SEFTON, AD DR 55 Leader of the Hazardous Installations and . Transport of Dangerous Substances National Y Interest Group, Health and Safety Executive 
The Control of Industrial Major Accident 
Hazards Regulations 1984, Safety Reports 
56. SHEPPARD, RA Vice President (Production) and Director, Amoco 
(UK) Exploration Co Ltd 
Managing Safety, 
57. SIDE, j DR 
58. SPOUGE, jR 
59. TAYLOR, BGS DR 
60. TVEIT, 0 
61. VAN BEEK, AW 
Senior Policy Scientist, Institute of Offshore 
Engineering, Heriot-Watt University 
Offshore Emergency Rescue and Evacuation 
Consulting Senior Engineer, Technica Ltd 
Comparative Safety Evaluation, Arrangements 
for Accommodating Personnel Offshore 
Director of Technical Affairs, UKOOA 
The Development and Future of the Offshore 
Oil Industry 
Senior Engineer, Statoil, Norway 
Risk Assessment, Th-- Norwegian Offshore 
Safety Regime 
Head of Offshore Structures Engineering, Shell 
, ', UK) Exploration 
& Production Ltd 
Blast Walls 
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GOVERNMENT MINISTERS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE 
UNITED EINGDOM OFFSHORE INDUSTRY 
1963-1996 
Ministers of Powe 
F. Errol (to Octobcr 1964) 
F. Lee (October 1964 to April 1966) 
R. Marsh (April 1966 to April 1968) 
R. Gunter (April 1968 to July 1968) 
R. Mason (July 1968 to October 1969) 
A. Benn(July 1966 to July 1970) 
G. Rippon (June 1970 to July 1970) 
J. Davies (July 1970 to October 1970) 
In October 1970 the Ministry of Technology was reorganised under the Department of 
Trade and Industry. 
J. Davies (October 1970 to November 1972) 
P. Walker (November 1972 to March 1974) 
In January 1974 energy was hived off from the Department of Trade and Industry and 
made a department in its own right. 
Lord Carrington (January 1970 to March 1970) 
E. Varley (March 1974 to June 1975) 
A. Benn (June 1975 to May 1979) 
D. Howell (May 1979 to September 198 1) 
N. Lawson (September 1981 to June 1983) 
P. Walker (June 1983 to June 1987) 
C. Parkinson (June 1987 to July 1989) 
J. Wakeharn (July 1989 to April 1992) 
T Eggar (April 1992 to November 1996) 
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SUMMARY 
This report (OTH 97543) presents the results from Project P3366 which has 
investigated human and organisational factors in offshore safety. The project 
was jointly sponsored by British Gas, British Petroleum, Coflexip Stena 
Offshore, Conoco UK Ltd., Elf Enterprise Caledonia, Texaco, Total Oil Marine, 
the Offshore Contractors Association and the HSE Offshore Safety Division. 
The study comprised three phases of work with the following objectives: 
1. To measure human and organisational factors identified as most important 
for offshore safety in the 1994 Risk Perception study 
2. To examine the role of the supervisor in determining safe working 
practices in their team or crews 4 
3. To investigate human factors coding systems and training practices in high 
hazard, high reliability industries and to see whether these codes 
correspond with the human factors causes of accidents as measured by 
the questionnaire. 
A representative sample of 722 employees working on 11 offshore 
installations (33% response rate) and 103 employees from 2 onshore 
installations (40% response rate) were surveyed using a modified version of 
the 1994 'Offshore Risk Perception Questionnaire'. The new 'Offshore Safety 
Questionnaire' (OSQ) and 'Gas Terminal Safety Questionnaire' (GTSQ) 
included scales measuring 'Work clarity', 'Work pressure', 'Job 
Communication', 'Safety behaviour', 'Risk perception - hazards and work 
tasks', 'Satisfaction with safety measures' and 'Safety attitudes'. The 
questionnaire also included a section on self-reported accidents and near- 
misses and the causes which victims ascribed to their accident. 
The results of the questionnaire survey showed that a majority of both the 
onshore and offshore samples felt 'safe' with regard to a range of potential 
hazards on oil and gas installations and felt 'satisfied' with safety measures 
designed for the detection, prevention and control of incidents. The majority 
of respondents also experienced good 'Work clarity' and 'Job communication' 
and reported that they 'never' committed violations or unsafe acts, although 
about a third of each sample admitted to carrying out some violations 
'seldor-n/sometirnes'. The 'Safety attitudes' scale revealed a diversity of 
opinions about safety and accident prevention at work. Personnel seemed 
generally positive about 'Supervisor commitment to safety' and 'OIM 
commitment to safety'. In addition, the majority did not feel that it was 
necessary to violate procedures and take risks in order to get the job done. 
They were more ambivalent about 'Speaking up about safety' and in their 
'Attitude to rules and regulations'. Finally, contractor staff generally expressed 
a diversity of attitudes about 'Management commitment to safety'; 
'Contractor company commitment to safety' and 'Confidence in the operating 
company', depending on which company they were working for. 
Multivariate analysis of the questionnaire data revealed a variety of 'safety 
sub-cultures' operating 
in the offshore environment, characterised by 
differences in the opinions and attitudes of employees from different 
companies; supervisory status and occupation. A number of different safety 
climates' were also apparent as evidenced by differences in perceptions of the 
state of safety on the various installations surveyed in the study. Accident 
victims had more negative opinions about factors affecting safety than those 
who had not had an accident. Irrespective of whether these opinions are a 
cause or an effect of the accident, accident victims hold these opinions now 
iv A 
and steps should be taken to improve their perspective on safety. These steps 
should include further emphasis by both peers and management that violations 
will not be tolerated and also improving accident prevention measures onboard 
the installations. 
In more general terms, improvements in safety could be brought about by 
reviewing the causes of violations, i. e. inadequate rules and procedures (as 
experienced by about a third of respondents) and work pressure. Personnel, in 
general, should also be encouraged to 'Speak up about safety' more, without 
fear of reprimand or sanctions being taken out against them. 
The results of the supervisors' study indicate that 'more effective' supervisors 
in terms of safety performance, value their subordinates and the work that 
they perform to a greater extent than 'less effective' supervisors. They appear 
to have a supportive style of management and be concerned for their 
subordinates welfare. They visit the work-site frequently to see how their 
subordinates are getting on, out of interest and not to -rv and catch people 
out. When visiting the work-site they monitor the safety of the operation and 
raise any safety concerns they may have with their subordinates. 'More 
effective' supervisors tended not to talk about productivity and costs to the 
same extent as the 'less effective' supervisors. When they did speak about 
production they felt that it was their role to try and remove subordinates' 
perception that there was a need to compromise their own safety to get a job 
done. 
The third phase of the project has provided a description of the human factors 
accident causation codes which are currently used by the UK offshore oil 
industry. These are compared against codes used in accident reporting forms 
by other high reliability industries. There appears to be a large degree of 
variance between companies in the UK offshore oil industry with regard to 
content, clarity and structure in their accident reporting forms, investigation 
procedures, guidance manuals and accident investigation training courses. It 
has proved difficult to obtain complete and accurate accident statistics with 
regard to their human factors causes, and companies tend not to use this data 
in their accident prevention strategies because of lack of expertise in this area. 
In addition, trained accident investigators do not code the same accident 
scenario consistently with regard to the human factors causes of the accident. 
Recommendations arising from these three phases of work include the 
following; 
Personnel working on oil and gas installations appear unsure about 
speaking up about safety issues and are not entirely convinced of the 
utility and efficacy of rules and regulations. A fair proportion also feel it is 
necessary to violate rules and regulations in order to achieve production 
targets, and furthermore admit to 'occasionally' carrying out violations to 
get the job done. It is necessary for management to cultivate an 
atmosphere in which personnel are willing to share information about 
safety issues and feel uninhibited about expressing their views on such 
matters. In addition, it is necessary to reinforce the belief that violations 
will not be tolerated, unless the rules and regulations which are in place to 
control risk and safety are proved to be totally inadequate or would benefit 
from modification. 
How supervisors manage the production versus safety issue and their 
acceptance of violations on the job determines their 'effectiveness' in 
terms of safety performance. Furthermore, 'less effective' supervisors 
appear to abdicate responsibility for safety and actually perceive that they 
V 
are under more pressure from management to get the job done. 
Supervisors thus need to be trained in key man-management skills related 
to leadership, communication, understanding and respect for others' 
opinions. This can be done through 'Crew Resource Management' (CRM) 
which was developed in the aviation industry to improve team skills on 
flight decks. Modified versions of CRM have already been developed for 
aircraft maintenance crews and control room operators in the nuclear 
industry and this approach has been proposed in a new project on the 
management of safety in the oil ýndustry (see Flin and Mearns, 1997). 
Analysis of oil industry accident reporting forms suggests that some 
companies would benefit from including more detailed human factors 
codes, such as those used in the marine and aviation industries. In 
addition, companies should agree on a common set of codes which would 
facilitate accident analysis on a larger scale in oil industry accident 
databases. This would help identify some of the more common trends in 
human factors causes of accidents. It is also suggested that accident 
investigation procedures are standardised throughout the industry so that 
the accident investigation process is consistent both between and within 
companies. The lack of consistency, even among relatively experienced 
personnel, in their coding of human factors causes of accidents, indicates 
a need for more training and a better understanding of those factors which 
influence human behaviour at the workplace. 
%li 
7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Respondents generally reported a good safety climate on their installations characterised by good 
work clarity and job communication, satisfaction with safety measures and general feelings of 
safety about hazards in the working environment. The only negative aspect was that a 
proportion of the sample appeared to be under considerable work pressure. It is suggested that 
management addresses this issue of perceived work pressure and that supervisors are trained to 
manage the team workload more effectively. 
2. Although the majority of respondents in this survey 'never' committed violations or unsafe acts 
at the workplace, a certain proportion (30-50%) admitted committing certain violations 'seldom 
or sometimes'. This raise the question of the extent to which rule violation is implicitly tolerated 
by peers, supervisors and managers. Attitude to violations' was also the best predictor of 
previous accident and near-miss involvement. In order to improve the 'safety climate', 
management must discourage the belief that rule violations are a necessary part of getting the 
job done. This may involve a reconsideration of the rules and regulations governing safety since 
respondents' attitudes to rules and reguiations were far from consistently positive. It may also 
involve training supervisors to be more aware of unsafe behaviour at the workplace and not to 
condone it when it happens (by not turning a blind eye, for example). Supervisors should also be 
encouraged to reward 'safe' behaviour when there is an apparent conflict between production 
and safety. There is also the possibility that rules and procedures may be outdated or inefficient 
and this should also be borne in mind. 
3. The data also indicate a reticence on the behalf of about a third of our sample to 'Speak up 
about safety'. This is shown by an unwillingness to report accidents and near-misses and a belief 
that if you say too much about safety you might be fired. In order to cultivate a positive safety 
culture, members of an organisation must be encouraged to share information about safety. 
related matters. Management must therefore have an open forum on safety if they are to achieve 
the 'learning culture' required to prevent accidents and near-misses in the future. 
4. From the supervisors' management of safety section of the project it was found that more 
'effective' supervisors (in terms of safety performance); value their subordinates more, visit the 
work site frequently and encourage participation in decision making. It is therefore obvious that 
supervisors would benefit from training to improve their man-management skills. Crew Resource 
Management (CRM) provides a framework for such training because it essentially teaches human 
factors skills such as leadership, team-working, decision making, assertiveness and 
communication with the aim of reducing human error (Wiener, Kanki & Helmreich, 1993). It is 
suggested that such a programme should be developed for training supervisors in the oil and gas 
industry and this is one of the proposals in our current project on 'Factoring the human into 
safety' (Flin & Mearns, 1997). 
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QUESTIONS TO PUT TO OEL MANAGERS 
A]IDE-MEEMOIRE FOR MUSTRIAL RELATIONS ISSUES 
I Employer Associations 
(a) Membership of UKOOA 
(b) Value of membership 
(c) Usefulness as regards industrial relations matters 
(d) Membership of any other employer association and its usefulness 
(e) General comments on the inter-relationship of employer associations and 
industrial relations 
2 
_Industrial 
Relations Policy and Procedure 
(a) What has been company policy on industrial relations over the past 25 years? 
(b) Degree of centralised. and devolved decision making on industrial relations 
matters 
(c) Dispute resolution methods: standard procedures or ad hoc approach ? 
(d) Comment on any major dispute in which your company was involved : its origin 
progress and resolution 
(e) Disciplinary procedure: formal ( conforming to ACAS code ), ad hoc or any 
other format ? 
(g) Grievance procedure: formal, ad hoc or any other format 
(h) Degree and/or nature of trade union involvement in any of these procedures 
such as representational rights in grievance or disciplinary issues. 
Accident Prevendon 
(a) Has the establishment of statutory safety committees following the Offshore 
installations ( Safety Representatives and Safety Committee ) Regulations 1989 
altered significantly the approach of your firm to accident prevention? 
(b) To what extent do you consider that employees offshore are satisfied with the 
current form of representation on safety committees ? 
(c) Trade unions assert that they alone can represent employees adequately in 
safety matters. How would you rebut this assertion ( assuming that you do not 
agree with it) ? 
(d) Do you think that trade unions approach accident prevention as a means 
whereby they can extract recognition rights from employers? 
4 ftrators and Contractors 
(a) In what ways have industrial relations been affected by the increasing use made 
of contractors ? 
(b) Any comments on the industrial relations practices of contractor firms or the 
approach of contractors' employees towards industrial relations issues 
The Oil-IndustEy Liaison Committ 
Any comments which you would care to make about its purpose, efficacy and 
prospects of survival. 
/4/444 I! ' 
Employment and Trade Union Statistics (in thousands) 1975 - 
1995 
Year No of 
Trade 
Unionists 
Workforce Workforce in 
Employment 
Employees in 
Employment 
Unemployed 
1975 12,026 25,894 25,050 22,723 977.6 
1979 13,289, 26,741 25,507 23,173 1,390.5 
1980 12,947 26,972 25,459 22,991 1,794.7 
1982 11,744 26,828 24,059 21,414 3,119.0 
1984 11,063 27,456 24,426 21,238 3,159.8 
1985 10,818 27,891 24,712 21,423 13,271.2 
1986 10,598 27,969 24,739 21,387 13,292.9 
1987 10,480, 28,171 25,266 21,584 1 2,953.4 
1988 10,387 28,492 26,151 22,258 2,370.4 
1989 10.043 28,700 26,957 22,661 1,798.1 
1990 9,810 28,755 27,200 22,920 1,664.5 
1991 9,585 28,584 26,343 22,270 2,291.9 
1992 9,048 28,454 25,776 21,931 2,778.6 
1993 8,665 28,249 25,384 21,613 51919.2 
1994 8,230 28,096 2 5,5 11 21,660 2,636.5 
1995 1 8,031 1 28,002 1 25,747 1 21,933 2,325.6 
Sources: (a) Annual Reports of the Certification Officer for Trade 
Unions and Employers' Associations 
(b) Economic Trends Supplement 1996/1997 
SECTION D 
ABBREVIATIONS 
Trade Unions (including federations) 
A-BPD Association of British Professional Divers (now part of AEEU) 
AEU Amalgamated Engineering Union (now part of AEEU) 
ASTMS Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staffs (now 
part of MSF) 
AUEW Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers (a former 
name of AEU) 
AEEU Amalgamated Engineering and Electrical Union 
BALPA British Airline Pilots' Association 
BSJC British Seafarers Joint Council 
CEU Constructional Engineers Union (now part of AEEU) 
EETPU Electrical, Electronic, Telecommunication and Plumbing Union 
(now part of AEEU) 
FPIC Fuel and Power Industries Committee (of the TUC) 
GMB General, Municipal and Boilermakers' Union 
IADC International Association of Drilling Contractors 
IU00C Inter Union Offshore Oil Committee 
LO Landsorganisasjon 
MSF Manufacturing, Science and Finance Union 
NOC National Offshore Committee 
NOPEF Norske O1je og Petrokjemiforbund 
NUM National Union of Mineworkers 
NUMAST National Union of Marine, Aviation and Shipping Transport 
Officers 
NUS National Union of Seamen (now part of RMT) 
OFS Oljearbeidemesfellessammenslutning 
OILC Offshore Industry Liaison Committee 
STUC Scottish Trades Union Congress 
TGWU Transport and General Workers Union 
TUC Trades Union Congress 
Employers' Associations 
COTA Catering Offshore Traders Association 
ECA(S) Electrical Contractors Association (Scotland) 
NAF Norsk Arbeidsgiverforening (now replaced by NHO) 
NHO Nwringslivets Hovedsorganisasjon 
1ADC International Association of Drilling Contractors 
OCA Offshore Contractors' Association (now OCC) 
OCC Offshore Contractors' Council 
OCPCA Oil Chemical Plant Constructors Association 
OLF Oljeindustriens Landsforening 
SJIB Scottish Joint Industry Board 
UKOOA United Kingdom Offshore Operators Association 
Government Organisations 
ACAS Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service 
HSE Health and Safety Executive 
NPD Norwegian Petroleum Directorate 
OSD Offshore Safety Division (of HSE) 
OPITO Offshore Petroleum Industry Training Board 
PED Petroleum Engineering Division (of Department of Energy) 
Miscellaneous Abbreviations 
CSA Continental Shelf Agreement 
HASAWA Health and Safety at Work Act 
NRB Not Required Back 
OCA Offshore Construction Agreement 
0IM Offshore Installation Manager 
SWA Southern Waters Agreement 
SECTION E 
SOURCES USED IN THE RESEARCH 
PRIMARY SOURCES 
I Interviews 
A United Kingdom 
As stated in the methodology, the author had no difficulty in obtaining interviews 
with managers although they made it a condition that any information had to be on a 
non-attributable basis. The one exception was Mr Cheetham, who had recently left his 
employment as personnel manager of Phillips Petroleum Company UK and his 
detailed account of the company's protracted discussions with ASTMS on recognition 
is given in Appendix S. Oral information was received from twelve managers in seven 
major oil operating companies and two servicing companies, one large and one small. 
Three of these managers were directors, two of them in major oil operating 
companies, three were concerned principally with accident prevention and six were 
heads of personnel departments. 
The author's academic colleagues, Dr Green and Mr Hutton, formerly managers with 
BP and Britoil respectively, were able to speak without any of the constraints, which 
might previously have applied. 
Trade unionists were prepared to discuss industrial relations without demanding 
anonymity. Mr Ronnie McDonald of OILC and Mr Campbell Reid of ASTMS (later 
MSF) were unstinting in their help across a wide range of accident prevention and 
industrial relations issues. Mr and Mrs Robertson of OILC were also most supportive 
with information, especially as regards the dispute (see Chapter Six) where they were 
personally involved. Mr Bobby Buirds of AEEU gave the author vital information 
about the events on Tern in late 1988, while Mr Rab Wilson, also of AEEU, 
explained the reasons for the re-negotiation of the Offihore Construction Agreement 
in 1991. 
B Norway 
Professor Jan-Erik Karlsen of Rogaland Research, Stavanger gave the author 
information on industrial relations in the Norwegian offshore oil industry, without 
which Chapter Three ("Norway and her Industrial Relations") would have lacked a 
proper perspective. A member of his staff, Dr Ole Andreas Engen, also gave 
assistance both at Stavanger and on a visit to Aberdeen. 
Mr Borge Bekkheien, Assistant Director of the Norwegian Oil Industry Association 
and Mr Gunnar Lied, Head of Technical Training, Elf Petroleum Norge, provided 
information on the approach to industrial relations by the managements of oil 
operating companies working in Norwegian waters. 
Interviews were also obtained from three senior officials of Norwegian trade unions 
representing oil workers. These were Mr Ketil Karlsen, Deputy Leader of NOPEF (the 
Norwegian Oil and Chemical Workers' Federation), Mr Tor Fjelldal, Research Officer 
of NOPEF and Mr Oýan Bergflodt, Deputy Leader of OSF (the Norwegian Oil 
Workers' Federation). 
2 Unpublished Sources 
A Trade Union Materials 
The minutes of the Inter-Union Offshore Oil Committee from its first meeting down 
to 1988 are held in the archives of the Offshore Industry Liaison Committee, which is 
currently located at 6 Trinity Street, Aberdeen. These minutes were found by Mr 
Ronnie McDonald when Tommy Lafferty resigned as secretary of IUOOC and 
anyone who seeks to carry out research on industrial relations offshore during these 
years owes a debt of gratitude to Mr McDonald. The minute books also contain the 
correspondence between fellow trade union officers in North East Scotland, between 
local and national trade union officers and between both local and national trade union 
officers and members of the government and senior civil servants. In addition, there 
are also original documents and of prime importance have been those relating to the 
discussions between government ministers and trade union representatives prior to the 
agreement on the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding on Trade Union 
Access to oil Installations. Without the opportunity to study these original sources it 
would not have been possible to write this thesis. 
As stated at page 17 in the chapter on Methodology these IUOOC documents have 
been catalogued under the title of OILCarc (OILC archives) and appear immediately 
below. 
OILC ARCHIVES (OILCarc) 
Number Date Contents, Description etc 
1 8 Nov. 1974 G. Gilliat to W. Price, MP. 
2 11 Nov. 1974 A. Booth, MP Under-Secretary of State for 
Employment to W. Price, MP. 
- 3 Undated but probably Charter of Unionisation of employees engaged in the 
April/ May 1974 Offshore Oil Industry within UK jurisdiction. 
-- 4r- 25 Mar. 1980 L. F. Myhre, President of NOPEF, to A. C. Reid. - 
5 3 July 1980 R. Lyons to A. C. Reid. Norwegian trade unions and 
safety issues offshore. 
6 Undated but probably W. P. Reid to oil industry employers 
April 1974 
7 Undated but received Draft Press Notice of meeting of Secretary of State for 
by IUO0C 17 May Energy (T. Benn), Minister of State (D. Mabon), 
1976 Minister of State, Dept of Employment (H. Walker), 
trade union and employer representatives. 
8 5 April 1976 Minute. of meeting held on 30 March, 1976 between 
Ministers, TUC and IUOOC- 
Undated but almost Final agreed wording of the Memorandum of 
certainly May 1976 Understanding on Trade Union access to Offshore 
I Installations 
1 Numbers 4 and 5 break the chronological order of these archives. 
This is deliberate since they refer to the chapter on Norwegian 
industrial relations which appears early in the thesis. 
10 Undated but almost 
certainly April 1976 
Earlier draft of above Memorandum. 
11 14 May 1976 A. C. Reid to J. Langan. 
12 3 Mar 1977 A. C. Reid to S. Davison. 
13 21 Mar 1977 D. E. Lea to all trade unions with offshore interests. 
14 27 April 1977 Report of meeting at Congress House on 23 March 
1977 to settle demarcation issues in offshore 
employment 
15 5 August 1977 R. Lyons to S. F)avison. 
16 26 July 1977 Notes from Department of Energy on meeting of 21 
July, 1977 between Secretary of State for Energy (T. 
Berm), ASTMS and UKOOA representatives. 
(Referred to in letter of 5 August, 1977) 
17 21 Nov 1978 D. M. Fraser (Shell UK) to H. Bygate (Secretary of 
IUOOC). 
18 28 Sept 1979 A. C. Reid to R. Lyons. 
19 8 May 1980 A. C. Reid to W. P. Reid. 
20 18 June 1980 A. C. Reid to F. James (S. E. Drilling Services Ltd). 
21 12 Nov 1980 A. C. Reid to S. Davison. 
22 18 June 1981 UKOOA to J. Baldwin and IUOOC trade unions. 
23 16 June 1981 Report of meeting held on 4 June, 1981 between TUC 
and 1UOOC. 
24 18 June 1982 J. Bromley to A. C. Reid. 
25 21 June 1982 H. Gray, Minister of State, Dept of Energy, to A. C. 
Reid. 
26 26 July 1982 T. P. Boston (Mobil North Sea)to A. C. Reid. 
27 6 Sept 1982 T. Kempner(Principal, Management College, Henley) 
to C. Jenkins. 
28 17 Sept 1982 C. Jenkins to T. Kempner. 
29 0 Sept 1982 T. Kempner to C. Jenkins. 
30 1 Nov 1982 L. Murray, TUC Secretary General, to N. Lawson, 
Secretary of State for Energy. 
31 June 1983 List of UKOOA Member Companies. 
32 23 Nov 1984' J. M. Keenan to A. C. Reid. 
T3_ 6 Dec 1984 W. Duncan to J. Kinahan. 
34 12 Aug 1985 R. Lyons to B. Callaghan. 
35 10 Oct 1985 "Scotsman" report of claim by ASTMS of acceptance 
by Sbell/Esso of representational rights on five 
installations. 
36 4 Dec 1985 A. C. Reid to B. Callaghan. 
37 23 Feb 1987 R. W. Eadie to A. C. Reid. 
' 38 10 Oct 1987 Un-named newspaper. Report of representational rights 
won by ASTMS on five installations. 
39 3 June 1988 Amended Constitution of Inter-Union Offshore Oil 
Committee. 
40 Various undated documents to which only approximate 
dates can be suggested follow: 
40 (a) Probably August 1979 Excerpt from evidence of TUC to Burgoyne 
Committee. 
Probably 1981 Draft of NoTh Sea Oil Charter 
40(c) Probably 1977 or 1978 Memorandum on Disputes Procedure 
40 (d) Probably 1986 or early. Excerpt from a report to the TUC by delegates who had 
1987 attended a meeting of the International Labour 
Organization. 
IUOOC minute books and correspondence from 1989 have been in the hands of Mr 
Campbell Reid, at 2 Layton Drive, Old Whittington, Chesterfield. He was invited to 
resume secretaryship of ITJOOC in 1991 although he had retired as an MSF officer 
and he was kind enough to bring them to Aberdeen so that the author could make full 
use of them. 
B OILC Records I 
OILC documents and minute books date from mid 1989 are held in the union's 
archives at 6 Trinity Street, Aberdeen where the author was granted full access to 
them. The most interesting document is a copy of Ronnie McDonald's address to 
national officers of the major British trade unions on 5th September, 1989 during the 
TUC meeting at Blackpool. This paper outlines the background to the OILC, 
comments on the industrial action offshore that summer and asks for unifying action 
by the trade unions to support offshore oil and gas workers. Curiously enough the 
author found a copy of this paper not among OILC material ýut among documents 
which he received from Marathon. 
C Company Records 
There was no likelihood of being given access to company records by direct request, 
because, as this thesis has demonstrated, oil companies prefer to carry out industrial 
relations policies without reference to any other organizations, whether it be another 
oil operator or a trade union. Nevertheless, the personnel manager of one company 
handed over some documentation providing information on the company's policies 
and reactions towards the offshore industrial action of 1989 and 1990. This allowed, 
for the first time, a comparison to be made between the trade union and the employer 
interpretations of that dispute through the use of original documents. 
D Correspondence and Communication with Individuals 
Since the main players, both company and trade union, were based in Aberdeen, 
correspondence was limited to requests for interviews, which were usually agreed. 
There was one exception in the person of Mr KAre Willoch, former Prime Minister of 
Norway. He kindly gave details of the offshore policy which his government had - 
sought to implement during his premiership (1981-1986) and explained that one of his 
ministers, Mr Ame Rettedal, should have received the credit for its success rather than 
himself 
Dr J. H. B. Vant, the author's adviser, has had a lot of experience of the oil and gas 
industry. Communication with him was almost always by telephone and fax and 
original information was incorporated into the thesis at relevant points. 
3 Official Publications 
A United Kingdom Government 
1967 Cmnd 3409. Report of Public Inquiry into the Loss of the "Sea Gem". 
1968 Cmnd 3623. Report of the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employer 
Associations. 
1969 Cmnd 3888. In Place of Strife. 
1969 Cmnd 4114. Report of Committee of Inquiry into Trawler Safety. 
1970 Cmnd 4117. First General Report of the Commission on Industrial Relations. 
1972 Cmnd 5034. Safety and Health at Work. 
1980 Crand 7866. Offshore Safety: Report of the Committee 1974. 
1990 Cmnd 13 10. The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster 
1990 HSE Contract Research Report 20/1990. Statutory Involvement in Health and 
Safety at the Workplace: a Report of the Implementation and 
Effectiveness of the Safety Representatives and Safety Committees 
Regulations 1977. 
1993 HSE Report OTO 93 012. The Effectiveness of Offshore Safety Representatives 
and Safety Committees- a Report to the Health and Safety Executive. 
1997 HSE Offshore Technology Report OTO 96 049. A Comparative Study of Risk 
Perception and Safety in UK and Norwegian Offshore Personnel. 
1998 HSE Report OTH 97 573. Human and Organizational Factors in Offshore 
Safety. 
1974 Hansard (House of Commons). Columns 690-691 of 16th January, 1974. 
1991 Seventh Report of the House of Commons Energy Committee (Session 
1990/1991). Offshore Safety Management. 
1990 Department of Energy. Petroleum Engineering Division Safety Notice S 1190. 
1994 Department of Trade and Industry Report. The Energy Report. 
1975 The North East of Scotland Joint Planning Advisory Committee. The Regional 
Report. 
B Norwegian Government 
1975 NOU 1975: 38. Report of Public Inquiry into Offshore Employment, 
1983 UDA 167/83 Industrial Democracy in Norway. 
1994 Annual Statistical Report of Statistisk Sentralbyrd, Oslo. 
C international Labour Organization 
1993 TMOPI/1993. Safety and Related Issues pertaining to Work on Offshore 
Petroleum Installations. 
4 Newspapers reporting Contemporary Events 
Dundee Courier and Advertiser 
7th December, 1996 - statement by UKOOA of expenditure on accident prevention. 
Financial Times 
31 st August, 1990 - comment of J. Airlie on recent industrial action offshore. 
Scotland on Sunday 
22nd October, 1995 - article by S. Fraser: "Safety Hopes buried at Sed". 
Scotsman 
10th October, 1987 - comment of Shell on result of an ACAS conducted ballot on 
trade union recognition. 
I lth August, 1993 - report on prosecution of Odeco Drilling following the blowout, 
which led to the destruction of the rig "Ocean Odyssey". 
3rd March, 1990 - comment of R. McDonald on non-negotiated pay award. 
19th April, 1990 - comment on formation of the National Offshore Committee. 
5th November, 1993 - interview with Mrs Lafferty. 
7th July, 1995 - article by J. Ledgard: "Booming Norway basks in its go-it-alone age". 
21 st May, 1996 - obituary of Isobel Rhind. 
18th July, 1996 - comment on HSE report on safety standards on "Elf Claymore". 
29th August, 1997 - comment on death of Enrico Mattei in 1962. 
Scottish Daily Express 
29th August, 1991 - comment of R. McDonald on Offshore Construction Agreement. 
The Times 
2nd December, 1963 - comment on selection of employee representatives. 
24th November, 1974 - report on visit to a BP drilling platform by union officials. 
I lth March, 1997 - obituary of J. Airlie. 
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